ANALYSIS: EU Unveils Five Joint Defense Projects; Ukraine Invited

Thirteen Countries Along the Russian and Belarusian Border

The second initiative, called “Eastern Flank Watch,” brings together thirteen EU member states, Norway, and Ukraine. It aims to strengthen surveillance of Europe’s eastern flank—the long border stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, which is directly exposed to Russia and its ally Belarus.

This project echoes recent announcements by the Baltic states, some of which have increased their national defense budgets to as much as seven percent of GDP, citing the existential urgency of their geographic position. European coordination here complements—rather than replaces—this national mobilization that is already underway.

A border that is more than just a line on a map

Europe’s eastern flank is not a strategic abstraction. It is an area where millions of European citizens have lived under the direct threat of incursions, sabotage, and hybrid warfare since the start of the conflict in Ukraine. This coordinated surveillance project finally acknowledges this reality on a continental scale rather than leaving it solely to the responsibility of the border countries.

The question that remains is that of the actual funding for this surveillance initiative: electronic and satellite surveillance is expensive, and 325 million euros spread across five projects will not, on their own, be enough to cover this ambition.

I believe that this Eastern Watch project is perhaps the most urgent of the five, precisely because it concerns populations who already live, on a daily basis, with the fear of an escalation. Europe can no longer afford to treat this border as a mere administrative line on a map in Brussels.

Cut cables, sabotaged gas pipelines: a very real threat

The third project focuses on integrated maritime defense and the protection of the seabed. This aspect is often underestimated in public debates on European defense, even though several incidents involving severed undersea cables and sabotaged energy infrastructure have already been reported in the Baltic Sea in recent years.

Unlike the first two projects, the Commission’s initial announcement did not provide specific details on the participating countries or the funding for this third project. This lack of detail warrants close monitoring in the coming weeks.

A Vulnerability That Directly Affects the Continent’s Energy Supply

Europe’s seabed is home to a growing amount of critical infrastructure: data cables, gas pipelines, and future offshore wind farms. A coordinated attack on this infrastructure could paralyze entire sectors of the continent’s economy without a single missile being fired in the conventional sense of the term.

It is precisely this type of hybrid threat—one that is difficult to attribute and to counter militarily—that this third project is intended to counter, even though its funding remains unclear for the time being.

I regret that this maritime project remains the least clearly defined of the five in the official communication, even though it addresses a vulnerability that Russia has already demonstrated a willingness to exploit in the Baltic Sea. Europe should not wait for another major act of sabotage to clarify the budgetary details of this underwater protection.

Europe’s Air Defense Remains Fragmented

The fourth initiative concerns air and missile defense as well as early warning. This component addresses a well-documented historical shortcoming: Europe has national air defense systems that are often incompatible with one another, which significantly complicates the creation of a coherent continental shield against Russian ballistic and cruise missiles.

Once again, specific details about the participating countries were not made public at the time of the announcement, which limits the depth of analysis possible at this stage. But the very existence of this project confirms that Brussels has identified this fragmentation as a priority issue.

Early warning, an often-overlooked aspect of the public debate

Early warning—the ability to detect a missile launch before it reaches its target—relies heavily on satellites and radars, for which Europe remains, for the most part, dependent on the United States. Developing an autonomous European capability in this area would represent a significant step toward strategic sovereignty, which several European leaders have been calling for for years without ever providing sufficient funding.

If successful, this project could become one of the most transformative aspects of the entire initiative, far beyond its modest initial funding.

I view this missile defense shield project as a decisive test of Europe’s sincerity regarding strategic sovereignty. Talking about autonomy from Washington is easy at a press conference; actually funding European early-warning satellites is much harder, and that is where we will see whether words turn into action.

Space: The New Arena for Strategic Competition

The fifth and final project focuses on space defense. This choice reflects a belated but genuine realization: space has become a major arena of strategic competition, where communications, navigation, and intelligence satellites are now potential targets for adversaries seeking to blind or disorient Western forces.

Both China and Russia have invested heavily in anti-satellite capabilities in recent years, a fact that makes this fifth project less trivial than it might initially appear on the list of five initiatives.

An Area Where Europe Lags Far Behind

Unlike the United States and China, Europe lacks a unified space defense doctrine or a dedicated agency comparable to what Washington has established with its Space Force. This fifth project could lay the foundation for such a continental doctrine, provided that long-term funding is secured.

For now, the Commission has not provided any specific details on the participating countries or the amounts allocated specifically to this space component.

I find it significant that Europe is finally making space defense one of its shared priorities, even if the funding remains unclear. Ignoring space as a strategic theater today would be just as imprudent as ignoring military aviation was a century ago.

From National Sovereignty to Open Collaboration

For decades, defense remained the quintessential domain of the member states, each fiercely protective of its industrial and budgetary prerogatives. The fact that twenty-six countries have agreed to coordinate their efforts on a project as sensitive as counter-drone operations marks a significant doctrinal shift, accelerated by the urgency of the war in Ukraine.

This pooling of resources does not spell the end of national defense industries, but it paves the way for coordination that, if carried through to completion, could reduce the costly duplication that has long weakened European competitiveness against American defense giants.

The Role of the Council of the EU: The Next Decisive Step

At this stage, these five projects remain proposals from the European Commission, which must still receive approval from the Council of the European Union to become fully operational. This political step is never a mere formality within the Union, where the 27 member states do not always share the same strategic priorities or the same perception of the Russian threat.

The outcome of this approval process will determine whether this announcement marks a genuine turning point or whether it joins the long list of ambitious European initiatives slowed down by institutional red tape.

I remain cautious about the next steps in this process, having seen too many ambitious European initiatives get bogged down in the Council’s bureaucratic maze. But I choose to welcome this first step, because a Europe that is finally beginning to think collectively is better than a Europe that continues to fragment in the face of an adversary that is, for its part, perfectly unified in its strategy.

Two announcements, one week, the same sense of urgency

This European announcement comes at the same time as NATO’s commitment to invest more than $40 billion over five years in anti-drone capabilities, unveiled at the Ankara summit. The two initiatives largely converge on the same assessment: Europe remains vulnerable to drones and must accelerate its collective response.

But the two announcements do not quite speak the same budgetary language: 40 billion dollars on the NATO side versus 325 million euros for all five European projects combined. This difference in scale raises questions about the true complementarity between the two architectures—NATO’s and Europe’s.

Coordination or duplication: the question that remains without a clear answer

The proliferation of initiatives—NATO-led on one side, European on the other—raises a legitimate question of coordination. A country like Poland or Germany, which is a member of both NATO and the EU, will have to navigate between these two frameworks without the precise relationship between them having been clearly explained at this stage by the two organizations.

This institutional gray area could eventually become a bureaucratic obstacle if it is not quickly clarified by the relevant leaders on both sides.

I am somewhat concerned to see two defense architectures being built in parallel—one NATO-based and the other European—without a clear link between them. History has shown that institutional duplication is costly and slows down implementation, which is exactly what the current crisis cannot afford.

Participation in two out of five projects: a strong signal

Ukraine is explicitly listed among the participants in two of the five announced projects: the drone wall and the eastern flank watch. This direct—rather than merely symbolic—inclusion confirms a fundamental trend observed for several months in European forums: Kyiv is no longer treated solely as a country to be defended, but increasingly as a full-fledged industrial and technical partner.

This development is worth highlighting, as it contrasts with the initial hesitation of certain member states, at the start of the conflict, to fully integrate Ukraine into European defense cooperation structures.

What Kyiv Can Contribute, and What Kyiv Expects in Return

Ukraine brings to these projects unparalleled combat experience against Russian drones and missiles, acquired at great cost since 2022. In return, Kyiv likely hopes for easier access to European technologies and funding, as well as further political recognition of its path toward integration into the European Union.

This relationship, still in its early stages as an institutionalized arrangement, could serve as a model for integrating other partners close to the EU without immediately granting them full membership status.

I believe that Ukraine’s inclusion in two out of five projects is the most promising aspect of this entire announcement. It proves that Europe is finally beginning to treat Ukraine as a strategic partner rather than merely a humanitarian issue to be managed from Brussels.

Three hundred twenty-five million—a drop in the bucket compared to actual needs

It would be disingenuous to present this announcement as a budgetary revolution. Three hundred twenty-five million euros, spread across five projects covering the entire European continent, remains a modest sum given the needs identified by defense experts since the start of the war in Ukraine. This initial funding resembles more a statement of intent than a budgetary response commensurate with the threat.

What happens next will depend largely on the EU’s ability to secure additional funding—an issue that remains unresolved until the Council of the EU has ruled on these proposals.

European unanimity: a recurring obstacle that still looms large

On many sensitive issues, the European Union still operates according to rules that require a broad consensus among its 27 member states. This requirement, which safeguards national sovereignty, can also become a major obstacle to the rapid implementation of projects as transformative as those announced this week.

It is this tension between strategic urgency and institutional slowness that will ultimately determine the success or failure of this unprecedented European initiative.

I conclude this analysis convinced that the political will demonstrated this week by the Commission will not be enough on its own. The history of the European Union is rife with ambitious announcements slowed down by institutional red tape, and only the swift approval and effective funding of these five projects will allow us to judge whether this time will truly be different.

Dozens of Overlapping National Programs

Prior to this announcement, Europe had dozens of partially redundant national defense programs, with each country developing its own drone, radar, or interceptor systems without any real coordination with its neighbors. Experts have long identified this fragmentation as one of the main structural weaknesses of the European defense industry when compared to its American giants.

The cost of this fragmentation amounts to billions of euros wasted on duplication—a finding that several European parliamentary reports had already highlighted even before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

Pooling Resources: A Solution Finally Taken Seriously

By choosing to fund joint projects rather than strictly national initiatives, the European Commission is directly addressing this long-standing fragmentation. If implementation matches the intention, this approach could generate significant economies of scale in the medium term, beyond mere immediate military benefits.

Still, changing decades of national industrial practices cannot be achieved with a single press release, however well-written it may be.

I believe that this fight against industrial fragmentation is perhaps the most underestimated aspect of this entire announcement. European citizens do not always see the waste represented by dozens of redundant national programs, but this waste comes at a real cost in terms of defense capabilities that are sorely lacking today in the face of Russia.

National Giants Called Upon to Collaborate More Closely

This announcement also marks a paradigm shift for major European defense companies, which are accustomed to responding primarily to national tenders. Companies such as France’s Thales, Germany’s Rheinmetall, and Italy’s Leonardo will now have to adapt to specifications designed on a continental scale rather than strictly domestic ones.

This transition will not necessarily be smooth, given how powerful national industrial interests remain within each member state, with each seeking to protect its jobs and market share against its direct European competitors.

A Growth Opportunity for Defense SMEs

Paradoxically, this pooling of resources could also open up opportunities for smaller companies specializing in technological niches such as anti-drone systems or seabed surveillance, which previously struggled to gain access to national markets dominated by a few large, long-established conglomerates.

This diversification of the European defense industrial ecosystem would, in itself, be a lasting benefit of this initiative, regardless of its short-term military outcome.

I see this industrial restructuring as a unique opportunity to break up the national monopolies that have long stifled innovation in European defense. Small technology companies often possess an agility that the large, long-established conglomerates have lost, and this new landscape could finally give them their chance.

The Galileo Program: A Slow but Real Success

This is not the European Union’s first attempt at strategic industrial coordination. The Galileo satellite program, launched more than two decades ago, took many years to become fully operational, but today it stands as a globally recognized, autonomous European infrastructure. This precedent fosters cautious optimism regarding the Union’s ability to successfully carry out long-term projects, despite often difficult beginnings.

If the five announced defense projects follow a similar trajectory, their first concrete results may not materialize for several years—a timeframe that is difficult to reconcile with the urgency of the current threat.

The Risk of Repeating Past Mistakes

Conversely, other European defense cooperation initiatives, such as certain joint fighter jet programs, have experienced considerable delays due to industrial disagreements among national partners jealous of their respective technological prerogatives. This risk of history repeating itself looms over the five projects announced this week.

The difference this time could lie in the security crisis being far more immediate than in the past, leaving less room for prolonged industrial procrastination.

I choose to believe that the urgency of 2026 is sufficiently different from previous contexts to avoid the industrial deadlocks that have paralyzed other joint European programs in the past. But I remain realistic: the recent history of European defense cooperation does not inspire blind optimism regarding actual implementation timelines.

A political signal the Kremlin will not be able to ignore

This European announcement, combined with NATO’s announcement regarding the $40 billion anti-drone program, sends a clear political signal to Moscow: the West is seeking to quickly address the vulnerabilities exploited by the Russian drone campaign documented by the IISS. The Kremlin, accustomed to exploiting divisions within the West, will now have to contend with greater coordination than before.

It would be naive, however, to believe that this announcement alone will be enough to immediately deter new attempts at incursions or hybrid sabotage, as long as the actual capabilities are not fully operational on the ground.

A technological race that has only just begun

Russia will most likely continue to adapt its low-cost drone tactics in response to this new European architecture, in a technological and doctrinal race that promises to be a long one. Just because Europe is finally coordinating its efforts does not mean the threat will disappear overnight.

It is precisely this dynamic of perpetual competition that justifies maintaining budgetary and political pressure on these five projects over the long term, well beyond this week’s initial announcement.

I believe we must never underestimate Russia’s ability to adapt its tactics in the face of new Western defenses. This European announcement is not a final victory; it is a move in a chess game that will likely continue for several more years before either side gains a decisive and lasting advantage.

Key Takeaways from This Announcement

These five joint defense projects mark an important symbolic step in the European Union’s path toward greater strategic coordination. The explicit inclusion of Ukraine in two of the five initiatives confirms a growing recognition of its role as a technical partner, rather than merely a recipient of aid.

However, the initial funding of 325 million euros remains, as it stands, far below the scale of the threats documented in recent months, whether these involve incursions by Russian drones or the maritime and space vulnerabilities identified by experts.

The test that will determine the credibility of this initiative

The real litmus test will come with the approval of the Council of the European Union and, above all, with the speed at which these projects translate into concrete capabilities deployed on the ground. Europe has demonstrated this week that it knows how to make proposals. It must now demonstrate that it knows how to execute them, at a pace finally commensurate with the urgency of the moment.

Otherwise, these five projects will join the long list of Brussels’ good intentions, while the threat will continue to loom over the continent without waiting for unanimous agreement from the twenty-seven member states.

I conclude this analysis with cautious optimism rather than naive enthusiasm. Europe has shown this week that it can still surprise us with its ability to coordinate when the urgency becomes sufficiently clear; it is now up to Europe to prove that this coordination will stand the test of time and the upcoming budget negotiations.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist