ANALYSIS: Kim Jong Un and Russia — A Military Alliance That Threatens the West from Within

“Surpassing the World”: A Goal Taken Seriously

The 2nd Plenary Session of the 9th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, held from June 20 to 22, 2026, provided Kim Jong Un with an opportunity to publicly articulate a goal of military modernization unprecedented in his previous statements: “to surpass the world.” In light of the U.S. intelligence report and documented Russian technology transfers, this statement takes on particular significance.

Kim’s rhetoric is nothing new when it comes to bravado. But when this rhetoric is backed by actual technology transfers, when missiles are genuinely improved, and when submarines are truly less detectable—the gap between words and reality narrows. According to Kim, North Korea’s exercise of its nuclear rights is “the only way to deal with an unpredictable and complicated global security situation.” It is also a way of saying: we will not disarm.

Denuclearization: A De Facto Abandoned Goal

The U.S. intelligence community’s annual report and analyses by experts such as the FDD (Foundation for Defense of Democracies) are clear: “international efforts to end North Korea’s nuclear program have failed.” North Korea will not disarm voluntarily—neither under the pressure of sanctions, nor under diplomatic pressure, nor through anyone’s mediation. It has chosen the nuclear path as a guarantee of the regime’s survival, and no economic or diplomatic incentive has succeeded in changing its course in 30 years.

We must be honest about this failure. The policy of denuclearization has been a stated goal of every U.S. administration since the 1990s. It has failed. This is not an opinion—it is a factual assessment officially made by U.S. intelligence agencies. Using this assessment as a starting point for reasoning about regional security requires a paradigm shift that the international community is still reluctant to embrace.

Soldiers Trained for Real Combat

Military cooperation is not limited to technology. North Korea has sent ground troops to support the Russian army in Ukraine. These soldiers, trained in the conditions of modern conflict—drones, electronic warfare, urban combat, and long-range artillery—will return to Pyongyang with combat experience that no training program can replace. For an army that has not seen combat since the Korean War (1950–1953), this is a considerable operational advantage.

This feedback from the battlefield will be incorporated into North Korean military doctrine, training programs, and the tactics of special forces units. North Korea is observing how Russian forces use drones, how the Ukrainians counter tanks, and how attrition warfare plays out in modern conditions. This knowledge has immense strategic value for a country that is planning, at the very least, to defend its regime against a potential intervention.

North Korean soldiers are learning how to wage war in Ukraine. When they return home, they will teach their comrades. And when this knowledge is integrated into a nuclear-armed military that has declared its intent to “surpass the world,” I don’t know how to describe it as anything other than a top-tier threat to the stability of Northeast Asia.

North Korean ammunition in the shells falling on Kyiv

The flow goes both ways. Millions of pieces of North Korean artillery and rocket ammunition are feeding Russian guns on the Ukrainian front. North Korean artillery pieces have been photographed in combat zones. KN-23 ballistic missiles have struck Ukrainian cities. This massive material support has helped maintain Russia’s rate of fire at a level that its domestic industry alone could not have sustained for so long. North Korea has become Moscow’s reserve arsenal—and this has direct consequences, in terms of Ukrainian lives lost, every week.

The Third Partner in the Revisionist Triangle

Iran completes the picture. Since 2022, it has supplied Russia with hundreds of Shahed drones that have struck Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. These drones, which are relatively inexpensive to produce, have enabled Russia to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses and deplete stocks of interceptor munitions. Russia, in return, has shared aeronautical technologies with Iran and strengthened its military cooperation with Tehran.

This triangle—Russia, North Korea, and Iran—is an alliance of convenience rather than an ideological one. Their regimes do not share the same doctrine, the same ambitions, or the same immediate enemies. But they share a common structural goal: to weaken the West and its institutions—NATO, the UN, international financial institutions, and the norms of international law. This tactical convergence is enough to make them dangerously effective when acting together.

Iran, North Korea, and Russia—three regimes that hate the Western order for different reasons, but that cooperate because they share a common enemy. This is not a centralized conspiracy—it is a convergence of interests. And in a world where coordination does not need to be formal to be effective, it is dangerous enough to be treated as a systemic threat.

What China Doesn’t Do, but Allows

China does not supply weapons directly to Russia—at least not officially. But it maintains trade ties that allow Moscow to circumvent Western sanctions. It supplies dual-use components. It absorbs Russian oil at discounted prices, injecting foreign currency into the beleaguered Russian economy. Without this quiet economic support, Russia’s ability to continue the war—and to fund its technology transfers to Pyongyang and Tehran—would be significantly reduced. China is not a co-belligerent, but it is an indispensable facilitator.

A Triangle of Instability: Moscow-Pyongyang-Tehran

Cooperation between Russia and North Korea does not stop at their shared border. It is part of a broader triangle of instability that includes Iran. The three countries share a common goal: to erode the West’s ability to maintain the international order. Russia is doing this in Ukraine. Iran is doing this by supporting proxies in the Middle East. North Korea is doing this by supplying ammunition to Russia, testing missiles that no one can any longer describe as purely defensive, and developing submarine capabilities that threaten U.S. naval dominance in the Western Pacific.

This triangle of instability also benefits indirectly from the diplomatic and economic support of China, which has refused to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and continues to trade with Pyongyang and Tehran despite international sanctions. China is not a partner in this alliance—but it is its silent economic backbone.

What the West Must Do—and Is Not Doing Enough

In the face of this growing power, Western responses remain inadequate. Sanctions against North Korea have been in place for decades—and have had no effect on its nuclear program. CVID (complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization) remains a stated goal but one that is practically impossible to achieve. The most effective thing the West can do today is not to try the same diplomatic approaches that have all failed—it is to strengthen the defenses of its allies in the region: Japan, South Korea, and Australia—and to treat the war in Ukraine as the front line in this broader conflict with revisionist powers.

I cannot tell you how to stop North Korea’s nuclear program. Honestly, no one knows. But I can tell you that the best response to this Russia-North Korea alliance lies in Ukraine. Weakening Russia in Ukraine means weakening Kim Jong Un’s technological sponsor. These are the same battlefronts.

Thirty Years of Sanctions—What Has Been Achieved?

International sanctions against North Korea represent one of the most systematic pressure campaigns in the history of modern diplomacy. The UN Security Council has adopted numerous resolutions covering arms trade, financial transactions, oil exports, and travel by leaders. The result: a nuclear program that remains active, an increasingly sophisticated missile program, and a military that is now classified by its own intelligence as being “in its strongest strategic position in decades.” This track record does little to inspire confidence in sanctions as a standalone tool.

One of the fundamental reasons for this failure is precisely China and now Russia: two permanent members of the Security Council that block any tightening of sanctions and maintain economic loopholes essential to the survival of Kim’s regime. As long as these two countries maintain this stance, sanctions will remain an imperfect tool—necessary, but insufficient.

Sanctions serve as a signal—they signify that the world does not recognize North Korea’s actions as legitimate. But they have not prevented the bomb. They have not prevented the missiles. We must be honest about their limitations in order to develop policies that actually have a chance of working.

What the region’s allies are doing in practice

Japan, South Korea, and Australia have accelerated their investments in missile defense systems, long-range strike capabilities, and trilateral military cooperation with the United States. These investments aim to maintain a credible deterrent against a North Korea whose capabilities are improving thanks to Russian transfers. This is the only realistic short-term response available: not to eliminate the threat, but to make it too costly to carry out. Deterrence is not a victory—it is the management of a threat that we have failed to eliminate.

What Kim Means to His Own People

Behind the missiles and military technology lies the North Korean people, who live under one of the world’s most closed-off and brutal dictatorships. The resources invested in Kim Jong Un’s military modernization are resources taken from an economy that cannot reliably feed its own population. North Korea is an arsenal state that deprives its citizens of freedom, information, and basic dignity in order to sustain a regime that survives only through the threat of force.

No security policy on the Korean Peninsula can ignore this reality. Denuclearization, if it ever occurs, must be accompanied by a transformation of the human rights situation in North Korea—otherwise, any solution will be precarious and reversible, as all historical precedents demonstrate.

I do not want to overlook the North Korean people in this analysis. Talking about missiles and technology is necessary. But behind every million rounds of ammunition sent to Ukraine, there are resources that will not be used to feed, educate, or provide medical care for North Korean citizens. Kim Jong Un is sacrificing his people on the altar of military ambition. This fact should never be lost sight of in our strategic analyses.

Human Rights as a Diplomatic Lever

One of the weaknesses of Western policy toward North Korea has been treating the nuclear issue and the human rights issue as separate matters. They are not. A regime that imprisons hundreds of thousands of its citizens in camps, that executes people for watching foreign news broadcasts, that maintains totalitarian surveillance over every aspect of daily life—such a regime will not disarm simply because it is offered economic incentives. Its survival depends on its ability to threaten its neighbors. The bomb is the regime’s guarantee of survival. It will not trade that guarantee for anything.

The strongest position in decades—and it’s going to continue

North Korea is more dangerous today than it has ever been since the end of the Cold War. This is not an opinion—it is the official assessment of U.S. intelligence. Its missiles are more accurate. Its submarines will soon be quieter. Its air defense systems have been strengthened. And its leader has publicly declared his intention to “surpass the world” militarily. This reality demands a coherent, concerted, and urgent response from the West—a response that recognizes that the Ukrainian front and the Korean Peninsula are two theaters of the same strategic challenge.

The bad news is that North Korea is not going to disarm. The good news—if you can call it that—is that we finally know this officially. Stopping the pretense that diplomacy aimed at denuclearization is possible could free up resources and strategic attention for responses that actually have a chance of working.

When Ukraine and the Korean Peninsula Are One and the Same Issue

By helping Ukraine resist and prevail, the West reduces Russia’s ability to provide technological support to North Korea. By weakening the Russian economy, it reduces Moscow’s ability to finance these transfers. By standing firm in Kyiv, it sends a signal to Beijing about the cost of a military adventure against a sovereign neighbor. These connections are not theoretical—they represent the most solid strategic logic available to the West in 2026.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist