COLUMN: How Ukraine Is Strangling Russia’s War Machine — Drones vs. Explosives

How Fertilizer Becomes a 500-kg Gliding Bomb

To understand what’s at stake, let’s trace the chain of causality. The chemical plants that have been hit produce precursors used in the manufacture of military explosives. These explosives power the FAB-500 and FAB-1500 glide bombs that Russia drops daily on Ukrainian cities—Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, and Mykolaiv. A reduction in precursor production automatically translates to a potential reduction in the production rate of these devastating weapons.

Russian attacks on June 30, 2026, alone killed 13 people and wounded 109 others across several oblasts: Dnipropetrovsk (6 dead, 38 wounded), Kharkiv (4 dead, 24 wounded), and Zaporizhzhia (3 dead, 18 wounded). These figures serve as a stark reminder of why every explosives factory struck by a Ukrainian drone has direct and immediate human significance.

The Strategy Against Refineries—A Parallel Economic Front

This campaign against explosives factories is part of a broader strategy to economically strangle Russia. Since 2024, Ukraine has waged an intensive campaign against Russian oil refineries, disrupting fuel production and forcing Moscow to make painful trade-offs. The gasoline shortages documented in several Russian regions are a direct consequence of this. Russia is fighting on several fronts at once—the battlefield, the logistics front, and now the industrial front.

Ukraine has also demonstrated its ability to strike targets more than 1,300 km from its territory. On July 1, 2026, SBU drones struck the Kupol plant in Izhevsk, Udmurtia, which manufactures Tor and Osa air defense systems. Russia’s geography, long considered a natural shield, has become a vulnerability in the face of Ukrainian long-range drones.

If you can’t stop all the Russian bombs in your airspace, go destroy the factories that make them. This is a doctrine of asymmetric warfare applied with formidable precision. And it works—figures from Russian industrial sources themselves confirm this. It’s hard to deny when your own accounting betrays the truth.

Long-Range Drones as a Force for Transformation

Ukraine’s deep-strike capability is based on a drone development program that accelerated significantly in 2025–2026. On June 30, 2026, the European Union announced the disbursement of 3.9 billion euros specifically for the production of Ukrainian drones, as part of a total loan of 90 billion euros approved in April. These resources will enable Ukraine to significantly increase the pace and range of its industrial strikes against Russia.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated that these funds will be directly invested in expanding Ukraine’s defense production. Ukraine spends between $45 billion and $50 billion annually on domestically manufactured weapons—a figure cited by Zelenskyy himself during a conference with the NATO Secretary General. The Ukrainian defense industry has grown tenfold since 2022. Drones targeting Russian chemical plants are the most spectacular manifestation of this growth.

From Reconnaissance Drones to Industrial Strike Vehicles

The growing sophistication of the Ukrainian drones used in these industrial strikes is worth highlighting. These drones are not merely moderately adapted reconnaissance tools. They are long-range delivery systems specifically designed to strike targets hundreds, or even more than 1,000 km away, with sufficient precision to damage specific industrial facilities while minimizing civilian casualties. This represents a considerable technological achievement for a country that has been at war since 2014.

The July 1, 2026, strike on the Kupol factory in Izhevsk—more than 1,300 km from Ukrainian territory—is the most recent example of this. Two drones struck production and storage facilities, triggering a fire. The Izhevsk airport was temporarily closed. The local governor confirmed there were casualties but did not specify the number. No warning sirens sounded before the strike. This is the level of precision and stealth that Ukraine has achieved.

When Ukraine strikes a missile factory in Izhevsk without sirens sounding 1,300 km from its territory, something has fundamentally changed in this war. Russia had relied on its geographical depth as a shield. That conviction now lies in ruins, just like the factories Putin thought were untouchable.

The Sustainability of Russia’s Rate of Fire Is in Question

The question this campaign raises with increasing urgency is whether Russia’s rate of fire is sustainable. Russia is firing tens of thousands of shells a day at the Ukrainian front. It is producing glide bombs at an industrial pace. But every Ukrainian strike on a chemical precursor factory, every refinery hit, and every disrupted logistics hub contributes to weakening this war machine that seemed inexhaustible in 2022.

North Korea is supplying artillery ammunition, and Iran is providing drones, but none of these unreliable allies can replace a domestic chemical industry that has been methodically dismantled. Moscow can import precursors in the short term, but every adjustment takes time and costs resources that Putin is finding increasingly difficult to devote to the war as his economy erodes.

What the West Must Do to Amplify This Effect

For this strategy of industrial suffocation to bear fruit on a full scale, Ukraine needs its Western allies to support it unequivocally. At the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, the 32 allied nations will discuss supplying additional long-range weapons to Ukraine—not in spite of this strategy, but precisely to amplify it. The EU granted a 3.9 billion euro loan for the production of Ukrainian drones, announced on June 30, 2026. This is a strong signal, but it will be insufficient if concrete deliveries do not follow.

The meeting of the five European powers in Berlin on June 24, 2026—Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Poland—resulted in a commitment to coordinate the supply of long-range weapons. Friedrich Merz stated that Europe must send a strong signal: “Ukraine remains strong.” ” These words must translate into delivered weapons systems. Rhetoric does not win industrial wars.

Ukraine is waging an economic war of a sophistication that no one had anticipated in 2022. It is striking explosives factories, refineries, logistics hubs, and communications centers. Meanwhile, some Western allies are still debating the “red lines” that must not be crossed. There is something deeply inconsistent about this moral and strategic equation.

A systematic campaign with documented results

The campaign against chemical plants is part of a broader strategy. Since January 1, 2026, the Ukrainian drone force has destroyed nearly 200 Russian air defense systems, including 31 in June 2026 alone, according to Euromaidanpress. A Pantsir system and two radar stations in occupied Crimea were taken out during an operation in late June. This systematic pressure on Russian air defense capabilities creates operational windows for Ukrainian industrial drones to strike deep into enemy territory.

On June 30, 2026, Zelensky confirmed a second strike on the Dubna Space Communications Center in the Moscow region, approximately 500 km from the Ukrainian border. This center supports Russian military communications, intelligence, and satellite operations. This repeated strike demonstrates that Ukraine can not only strike from a distance but also return to strike the same strategic targets until they are permanently neutralized.

The Impact on Russian Communications and Logistics

These combined strikes—on chemical plants, refineries, communications centers, and air defense systems—create a strategic synergy. Every air defense system destroyed opens a new route for Ukrainian drones. Every communications center hit impairs the coordination of Russian forces on the front lines. Every factory struck reduces ammunition production capacity. Together, these effects accumulate and reinforce one another in what strategists call an industrial attrition campaign.

The fact that Japanese components are found in 90% of Russian missile and drone types—as revealed in analyses dated June 30, 2026—adds an additional dimension: Ukraine is actively working with its allies to identify and sever the international supply chains on which the Russian military-industrial complex depends. This is a war on all fronts—including sanctions and export controls.

Two hundred air defense systems have been destroyed since January 2026. Every Pantsir, every radar, every S-300 silenced is a step toward a safer Ukrainian sky. While diplomats negotiate peace agreements whose terms no one knows, Ukrainian engineers and soldiers are methodically rewriting the balance of power on the ground. I prefer to watch what’s actually happening.

Syrskyi Warns of a Potential New Front

While Ukraine strikes Russian chemical plants, Russia may be preparing a new ground offensive. On June 30, 2026, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that the most realistic option for Moscow is an offensive from the Russian region of Bryansk toward the Chernihiv Oblast. Putin reportedly ordered the Russian General Staff to prepare plans for several offensive scenarios, including one involving a route through Belarus. Ukrainian authorities have ordered the mandatory evacuation of 12 border towns effective July 1, 2026.

This threat from the north illustrates Ukraine’s dual challenge: maintaining offensive pressure on Russian industry via drones, while preparing to defend against new ground attack axes. The industrial campaign cannot replace territorial defense—it complements it and makes it more sustainable by depleting the enemy’s resources. This is the theory of asymmetric total war that Ukraine is putting into practice on the ground.

Evacuations as a Sign of Military Intelligence

The fact that Ukraine has ordered the evacuation of a total of 19 localities in the Chernihiv region—12 new ones and 7 extensions of previous orders—demonstrates that the threat is being taken extremely seriously. Ukraine has already reinforced its defenses in the region: fortifications, minefields, and new drone units. The geography favors the Ukrainian defense—the Ukrainian bank of the Dnieper is elevated, and all bridges capable of supporting heavy equipment have been destroyed in the direction of Chernobyl.

This northern threat adds a new dimension to Ukraine’s industrial campaign. If Russia were to open a new front, its ammunition needs would skyrocket—at precisely the moment when its production of explosive precursors is declining. Ukraine is playing chess while Putin is playing checkers. This strategic difference could prove decisive.

The E5 Summit in Berlin and Its Concrete Commitments

Ukraine’s industrial campaign is unfolding against a rapidly evolving diplomatic backdrop. On June 24, 2026, the meeting of the five major European powers in Berlin—Friedrich Merz (Germany), Emmanuel Macron (France), Keir Starmer (United Kingdom), Giorgia Meloni (Italy), and Donald Tusk (Poland)—resulted in a commitment to coordinate efforts on long-range weapons, air defense, and artificial intelligence. These commitments are directly linked to Ukraine’s ability to continue its deep industrial strikes.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte participated via videoconference from Washington, where he was in talks with U.S. President Donald Trump. Merz’s message was clear: Europe must send a strong signal to Moscow ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026. This signal must be based on concrete deliverables, not on declarations of intent that reassure allies without changing anything on the ground.

Trump, NATO, and the Paradox of a Necessary Evil

For Europe, Donald Trump is an unpredictable partner, but one whose support remains essential. His repeated criticism of European allies for not devoting enough of their GDP to defense has ultimately produced an unexpected result: Europe is spending more, coordinating better, and taking war more seriously than it did in 2022. The goal of spending 5% of GDP on defense by 2035, set at the Hague summit, is a direct result of this American pressure.

But Ukraine’s industrial campaign does not depend on Trump. It depends on Ukraine itself—on its ability to produce drones, identify targets, and carry out precision strikes. What the West can do is provide the targeting technologies, electronic components, and navigation systems that make these drones more effective. That is what Zelensky will ask of Ankara. And that is what the allies will have to deliver.

Trump says he loves money and results. The results of Ukraine’s industrial campaign are measurable and well-documented. A 9 percent drop in Russian precursor explosives. Factories ablaze from Tver to Stavropol. Russia suspending its ammonium exports. If Trump wants proof that Ukraine is putting Western aid to good use, here it is. Deliver the drones. Ukraine will do the rest.

Nine percent today—and tomorrow?

A 9% drop in Russian explosive precursor production over five months is a start. It’s not yet a decisive victory. But it demonstrates that a coherent strategy, carried out with limited resources, can have a measurable impact on a major power’s war economy. Every additional strike amplifies this effect. The question is not whether this strategy works—the numbers confirm it. The question is whether Ukraine will have the resources needed to see it through to its logical conclusion.

The war in Ukraine is being fought on several fronts simultaneously: the ground front, the air front, the diplomatic front, and, increasingly decisively, the industrial front. Zelenskyy has long understood this: to defeat a major power, one must attack its capacity to produce, not just its capacity to deploy. Nine percent. The clock is ticking. And the trend is clearly unfavorable to Vladimir Putin.

Ukraine is striking. Russia is taking the hits. And Russia’s industrial production figures don’t lie. This war will not be won solely in the trenches of the Donbas—it will also be won amid the smoldering ruins of the factories in Tver, Perm, Samara, and Izhevsk. A 9 percent drop in precursor explosives is the true invisible front of this war. And Ukraine is gaining ground there.

What this column cannot yet say

Let’s be honest about the limitations. The figures on the decline in production come from Russian industrial sources cited by independent media—credible but not verifiable by outside inspectors. The exact impact of these strikes on the actual rate of fire of Russian forces on the front lines remains difficult to quantify, as Russia still has significant stockpiles. What is certain is the direction: unfavorable to Putin, favorable to Ukraine. That is already a significant achievement in a war of attrition.

This Ukrainian campaign against explosives factories represents one of the most ingenious strategies of this conflict. It deserves to be better known by the Western public, which hears about front lines shifting a few kilometers per week but does not always grasp the industrial dynamics that will ultimately determine the outcome of this war. Ukraine strikes. Russia absorbs. For how long?

If Ukraine can reduce Russian explosives production by 9% with the drones it currently possesses, imagine what it could accomplish with more long-range drones and targeting systems. What the West is delaying today are capabilities that could bring this war to a quicker end. This is a moral choice, not just a strategic one.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist