EDITORIAL: Anti-Russian oil sanctions are back—without fanfare, without excuses, without Trump

The 14-Point Memorandum and Its Implications for Russia

The 14-point framework agreement signed on June 17, 2026, between the United States and Iran—the Islamabad Memorandum, according to some sources—ushered in a 60-day negotiation period to resolve complex outstanding issues. This agreement, the result of intensified Pakistani mediation, provided, among other things, for the gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and discussions on Iran’s nuclear program. With regard to Russian oil sanctions, it served as an implicit condition: the end of the Strait of Hormuz crisis meant the end of the justification for the exemption.

What this agreement made possible—or at least allowed—was the realignment of U.S. policy with the G7 commitments made in Évian. Even though Washington never officially linked the reinstatement of sanctions to its multilateral obligations, the diplomatic reality is this: European allies had maintained their pressure, and the window for maintaining the exemption closed with the relative normalization of tensions in the Persian Gulf. For Ukraine, this is good news—albeit belated and insufficiently publicized.

The Iran-Russia-China Axis and the June 13 Consultations

On June 13, 2026, a few days before the memorandum was signed, the Russian and Chinese ambassadors in Tehran held consultations with Iranian authorities on the text of the preliminary U.S.-Iran agreement. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi confirmed this on X: “The strategic partnership between Iran, China, and Russia, as well as coordination among the three countries, will continue with full force.” This message is not insignificant. It means that the Moscow-Beijing-Tehran triangle is closely monitoring any agreement that could reduce Russia’s financing capabilities—and that it will seek to minimize the effects of such an agreement.

This geopolitical reality lends even greater weight to the reinstatement of sanctions. Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran have worked together to contain Western pressure on Russia. The fact that U.S. sanctions are being reinstated despite their consultations is a sign that the mechanics of Western alliances remain—imperfectly, but genuinely—stronger than the resistance of the revisionist axis.

The Moscow-Beijing-Tehran triangle met in June to discuss the Iran-U.S. agreement. This image—three authoritarian regimes gathered around a table to protect their common interests—summarizes the stakes of our era better than any analysis. We are not facing separate crises. We are facing a bloc.

The Man Who Says One Thing and Does Another

Donald Trump has always had a peculiar relationship with sanctions against Russia. During his first term, he showed marked reluctance to impose or maintain economic restrictions against Moscow, even while being legally compelled to enforce them by congressional votes. In his second term, this ambivalent relationship has persisted, but with a nuance: Trump’s transactional approach means he can activate or deactivate sanctions depending on what he believes he can get in return. The March 2026 waiver is a perfect example: it was not ideological; it was pragmatic—stabilizing prices to prevent inflation in the United States.

This is precisely why the reinstatement on June 17 is significant: it demonstrates that even under Trump, when objective conditions change—such as the end of the Strait crisis—the sanctions mechanisms resume their course. This is not a victory for sanctions policy as a moral principle. It is a victory for institutional inertia—and American institutional inertia, in this specific case, is working in the right direction.

European Pressure and the G7: Commitments That Endure

European allies have maintained constant pressure on Washington to reinstate sanctions as soon as the situation in the Gulf normalized. The 21st package of European sanctions against Russia was under discussion, with innovative proposals including the first European embargo on Russian fish imports—a symbolic but politically significant measure—and restrictions on tankers carrying Russian LNG. The price of Urals crude was trading around $58 per barrel, below the $60 cap set by the G7, meaning that the price cap mechanism remained formally in effect.

This consistent European pressure is one of the quiet successes of Western policy on Ukraine. Brussels has stayed the course on sanctions, package after package, despite internal resistance—from Hungary and Slovakia—and pressure from certain industrial sectors. This behind-the-scenes work, led by the European Commission and proactive member states, has helped keep the economic cost of the war to Moscow at a tangible level, even if it remains insufficient.

Trump says one thing, does another, and the institutional machinery corrects the discrepancies. It’s a style of governance that gives his allies ulcers—but that sometimes produces the right results for the wrong reasons. I don’t know if that’s reassuring or worrisome. Probably both.

China, India, and the Ghosts of the Shipping Registry

The reinstatement of sanctions does not eliminate the problem of circumvention. Beijing and New Delhi continued, throughout the exemption period and well before, to purchase Russian oil at discounted prices, allowing Moscow to maintain its revenue despite Western restrictions. China is now the top destination for Russian oil in terms of volume, ahead of India. Both countries have used their diplomatic and economic influence to resist U.S. pressure to enforce the price cap or reduce their purchases.

On July 1, 2026, the United States lifted sanctions on four Indian companies that had been sanctioned for providing financial assistance to the Russian government, following sustained dialogue between Washington and New Delhi. This move, revealed by Euromaidan Press and confirmed by Ukrainian sanctions monitoring agencies, illustrates the complexity of sanctions policy in a multipolar world: the United States is maintaining pressure on Russia on the one hand, while easing sanctions on its key trading partners on the other, in order to maintain diplomatic relations with countries like India, which are considered essential in the competition with China.

The Ghost Fleet: Flagless Oil Tankers and Bogus Insurance

One of the most tangible challenges in enforcing Russian oil sanctions is the “ghost fleet”—hundreds of oil tankers that have changed flags, changed nominal owners, and changed insurers to transport Russian oil while circumventing sanctions. This fleet, estimated to consist of several hundred vessels, represents a significant export channel that formal sanctions struggle to reach. Ships re-registered under the flags of third countries, with nominal owners in offshore tax havens, evade the restrictions imposed by G7 nations.

That is why, during the review of U.S. sanctions, two Russian oil tankers—the Vyacheslav Arshinov and the Gennady Egorov, linked to the Russian State Transport Company and sanctioned under Executive Order 14024—were removed from the SDN list on June 24, 2026, by OFAC, without any public explanation. This move, revealed by Euromaidan Press, raises questions about the consistency of U.S. sanctions policy—reinstating sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil on the one hand, and removing Russian vessels from the blacklist on the other.

The ghost fleet, the Indian exemptions, the silent removals of Russian ships from the SDN list: the sanctions policy is a colosseum with leaks in every wall. That is no reason to abandon it—but it is a reason to strengthen it rather than offer half-hearted praise.

Seven Russians, two ships, two Turks — quietly removed

On June 24, 2026, the U.S. Treasury’s OFAC removed seven Russian nationals from its SDN list—including Ivan Potanin, son of Vladimir Potanin, the oligarch who controls the metals giant Norilsk Nickel, and several executives from the sanctioned banks Novikombank, Sovcombank, and Bank Otkritie—as well as two Russian oil tankers and two Turkish companies, including IDA Asansor, an elevator manufacturer previously flagged for helping Russia circumvent sanctions. The agency provided no public explanation for these removals.

This pattern is not new. For several months now, unexplained removals of Russian entities from the SDN list have been fueling concern among Ukraine’s allies. Last December, companies accused of supplying the Russian military were removed without explanation. The Treasury told RFE/RL in April that these removals did not reflect a change in overall policy. But the removals continue, and their cumulative impact is real: each entity removed regains access to financial markets, can once again work with U.S. counterparties, and can help—even indirectly—to finance the Russian war economy.

The contradiction: sanctioning Rosneft, lifting sanctions on brokers

This contradiction—between the reinstatement of sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil on the one hand, and the quiet removals from the SDN list on the other—is one of the most troubling features of U.S. sanctions policy under the Trump administration. Sanctions are maintained where they are most visible—the major Russian oil companies, whose names make headlines—but relaxed where they fly under the radar—the individuals, ships, and second-tier companies that form the bypass routes.

For Kyiv, this dynamic is particularly painful. The Ukrainian government—and specifically Commissioner Vlasyuk—closely monitors every change to the SDN list. It views the reinstatement of oil sanctions as a victory—but it also sees the removals as a steady erosion of the tool’s effectiveness. And it is right on both counts. U.S. policy is sending mixed signals, and Moscow is reading both carefully.

Sanctioning the visible giants while letting the discreet middlemen off the hook is like locking the front door while leaving the kitchen window open. Moscow knows exactly where that window is. And it’s taking advantage of it.

Zelensky and the Office of the Sanctions Commissioner

Ukraine’s reaction to the reinstatement of sanctions was measured. Vladyslav Vlasyuk confirmed the return of sanctions without triumphalism, but with a level of documentary precision that speaks volumes: the Ukrainian government tracks data in near real time and knows what is happening in OFAC’s records before Western journalists do. This monitoring capability is an achievement in itself: Ukraine has developed expertise in sanctions that few other countries possess at this level.

But Kyiv’s gratitude is tempered by reality: for 97 days, Russia raked in more than $2 billion in additional revenue thanks to the U.S. exemption. During those 97 days, Russian missiles struck Ukrainian cities, Shahed drones hit civilian infrastructure, and Russian soldiers advanced—slowly and at great cost—along various sections of the front. The causal link between Russian oil revenues and Moscow’s war-fighting capacity is well-documented, real, and quantifiable. And the U.S. waiver fueled this cycle.

What Ukraine Is Asking For—and Has Not Yet Received

Ukraine’s official position on sanctions has always been clear: maintaining the status quo is not enough. Sanctions must be strengthened, the oil price cap must be lowered further, entities that enable circumvention must be targeted, and secondary measures must be imposed on third countries that purchase Russian oil above the cap. The 21st European sanctions package currently under discussion moved in this direction on certain points—notably the embargo on Russian fish and restrictions on LNG tankers—but remained stalled on the issues most economically sensitive to importing member states.

Ukraine, in particular, is demanding secondary U.S. measures against countries that purchase Russian oil above the cap or that facilitate its circumvention. These measures exist in the U.S. arsenal—they have been used, for example, against Iran and Venezuela—but have not been applied on a large scale to Russia, because doing so would mean sanctioning potential allies such as India or major trading partners. This is the Gordian knot of sanctions policy in 2026—and it is far from being untied.

Ukraine is calling for secondary sanctions. Washington is responding with quiet removals from the SDN list. There is something almost cruel about this asymmetry—between what Kyiv is enduring and what Washington is willing to do. I have no gentler word to describe it.

The Evian Summit and Promises of Consistency

The G7 summit had produced explicit collective commitments to maintain and strengthen sanctions against Russia. These commitments included enhanced coordination on the oil price cap, mechanisms for sharing information on circumventions, and a review clause should circumstances require it. The U.S. exemption in March 2026 occurred outside this multilateral framework—which created tensions with European partners, who would have preferred a collective decision.

The reinstatement on June 17 therefore also serves as a recalibration with respect to these multilateral commitments. It formally realigns the United States with the position of the rest of the G7—even if this realignment occurred by default (the disappearance of the justification for the exemption) rather than through a proactive political decision. It is not the same thing—but the practical result is identical: sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil are back in place.

Europe as Guardian of the Sanctions Regime

In the absence of clear U.S. leadership on sanctions, it is Europe that has served as the guardian of the regime. Twenty sanctions packages have been adopted since 2022—despite Hungarian vetoes, despite Slovak resistance, and despite industrial lobbies—and these 21 packages represent a considerable achievement. The fact that the price of Russian Urals crude is consistently below the $60 cap shows that the sanctions are having a real effect, even if it is insufficient.

But this guardian is also growing weary. The process of adopting European sanctions packages is becoming increasingly laborious as member states grow weary of sanctions—fearing the effects on their own industries, on their trade relations with third countries, and on their energy supplies. This fatigue is the real risk for 2027—not a sudden abandonment of sanctions, but their gradual erosion, the loss of their bite through a series of compromises and exceptions.

Europe has stayed the course on sanctions—package after package, despite Budapest and Bratislava. That’s no small feat. But the fatigue is evident in the discussions about exemptions and in the debates over the oil price cap. Sanctions fatigue is Putin’s secret weapon—he’s waiting for us to grow weary. And some in Europe are beginning to show signs of it.

From the Refinery to the Front Lines: The War’s Funding Chain

The link between Russia’s oil revenues and its military capacity is well documented. According to analyses by the Kyiv Institute for Economics and other independent research centers, revenues from hydrocarbon exports account for approximately 40 to 50 percent of Russia’s federal revenue—a proportion that fluctuates with global prices but remains structurally high. These revenues directly fund the Russian defense budget, which has reached historically high levels since 2022: in 2026, Russia is allocating approximately 40% of its federal budget to military and security spending.

Every barrel of Russian oil sold without restriction is therefore, in the literal sense, a contribution to Putin’s war machine. This is why the additional 2 billion earned during the U.S. waiver is not an abstract economic statistic: it represents actual funding for the war—in the form of recruited soldiers, produced equipment, and manufactured missiles. And the reinstatement of sanctions—even if belated, even without an official announcement—constitutes a reduction in this flow of funding.

Ukraine Fights While Sanctions Fluctuate

During the 97-day waiver period, Ukrainian soldiers continued to fight. Along the 1,000-kilometer front line, positions shifted at the cost of hundreds of lives each week. Russian strikes on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure continued—power plants, fuel depots, train stations, hospitals. And behind the scenes, the U.S. exemption fueled the machinery that was causing this destruction. This reality deserved to be spoken aloud—but it was not. Neither in Washington nor in the European capitals that accepted the exemption without sufficient public protest.

The reinstatement of sanctions is good news. But it does not make up for the 97 days of the exemption. It does not reimburse the 2 billion collected by Moscow. And it does not guarantee that the next crisis—the next oil shock, the next tension in a strategic strait—will not lead to another exemption. That is why the fight for robust, permanent, and multilaterally binding sanctions remains the number one priority of Ukrainian diplomacy. And that is why this victory must be celebrated with restraint, without losing sight of the battles ahead.

97 days of exemption. $2 billion for Moscow. Hundreds of Ukrainian lives. I don’t want to say that the reinstatement of sanctions makes up for all of that. It doesn’t. It corrects a mistake—and the correction of a mistake deserves to be noted, not glorified.

Sanctions Fatigue as Seen from Main Street

Sanctions against Russia enjoy majority support in U.S. polls—but that support is fragile, conditional, and heavily influenced by energy prices. When gas prices rise, support for sanctions falls. This is the dynamic of American public opinion that Trump’s advisors understand very well—and it is precisely why the exemption was introduced in March 2026 without prior public debate. Political logic prevailed over geopolitical logic.

This vulnerability of sanctions as a tool to fluctuations in public opinion is structural. Sanctions are effective in the long term—their cumulative effect on the Russian economy is real and well-documented—but their immediate impact on energy prices, on the costs borne by trading partners, and on certain industrial sectors creates constant political backlash. Managing this tension between the long-term effectiveness of sanctions and their short-term political cost is one of the most difficult challenges of Western policy toward Russia.

What Trump Might Do—and Might Not Do

Donald Trump remains unpredictable. He has shown that he can impose sanctions, suspend them, and reimpose them—following a logic that owes more to short-term political calculation than to a coherent doctrine. The upcoming U.S. midterm elections, future oil shocks, and crises in other regions are all variables that could influence his stance on sanctions against Russia. What Ukraine and its European allies can do is work to embed sanctions within multilateral, legally binding frameworks that can withstand shifts in the will of any single administration.

The International Court of Justice, the G7 framework, UN mechanisms, and bilateral agreements between the EU and Ukraine: all these frameworks are imperfect and often ineffective in practice. But they impose political and diplomatic costs on any administration that might wish to unilaterally abandon them. This is the most realistic safety net in a world where the continuity of sanctions depends as much on the will of a U.S. president as on institutional mechanisms.

Relying on Trump’s consistency to maintain sanctions against Russia is like building a house on sand. What protects sanctions in the long term is their institutionalization—and Europe is carrying out this work of institutionalization, imperfectly, but genuinely.

Export Diversification and a Substitute Economy

Russia has had more than four years to adapt its economy to the sanctions. It has done so—imperfectly, at great cost, and with considerable distortions—but it has done so. The Russian economy of 2026 is less technologically sophisticated, more dependent on China for high-tech imports, and less efficient in its non-oil industries. But it has avoided the collapse that some analysts had predicted in 2022. The shift toward Beijing and New Delhi for oil exports has partially offset the losses resulting from Western sanctions.

Tensions at the gas pump in Russia during the summer of 2026—long lines and rationing in some regions despite official claims of 1.7 million metric tons of gasoline reserves—show that the Russian economy has its own internal contradictions. The war is absorbing considerable resources, creating shortages in the civilian economy, and generating inflationary pressures. These tensions will not bring down Putin in the short term—but they are real, and the sanctions are contributing to them.

North Korea and Iran: Alternative Arms Suppliers

One of the unintended consequences of the sanctions regime has been to accelerate Russia’s shift toward non-Western suppliers. North Korea is supplying 152-mm artillery shells and ballistic missiles to Russia—a collaboration documented by U.S. intelligence agencies and Ukrainian intelligence services. Iran supplies Shahed drones, which have struck Ukrainian cities by the hundreds since 2022. These collaborations represent a circumvention of sanctions through military channels—the equivalent of a ghost fleet in the realm of armaments.

This complex picture does not argue against sanctions—it argues for sanctions that are better targeted, better enforced, and supported by complementary policies: pressure on North Korea, sanctions on Iranian suppliers, and restrictions on dual-use technologies exported via China. The challenge is not to choose between sanctions and an alternative—it is to build a sanctions regime robust enough to close the loopholes one by one.

Russia has adapted to the sanctions by turning to Pyongyang and Tehran. This is not a success for Putin—it is a geopolitical humiliation to be reduced to depending on North Korea for ammunition. But a humiliation that kills Ukrainians remains a dangerous humiliation.

Lessons from 2026 for the Coming Decade

The events of 2026—the March waiver, the June reinstatement, and the quiet removals from the SDN list—offer several lessons for the future of the sanctions regime against Russia. First lesson: Sanctions must be embedded in multilateral frameworks that withstand changes in national administrations. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the other G7 members have a crucial role to play in anchoring sanctions in binding legal obligations.

Second lesson: exemptions are inevitable in a world of multiple crises—but they must be time-limited, transparent in their justification, and contingent on a return to normalcy. The March 2026 exemption fell short on the last two criteria: it was not fully transparent, and its expiration was not clearly stipulated.

The Imperative of Transparency in Sanctions Policy

Third lesson, perhaps the most important: sanctions policy must be transparent. Silent removals from the SDN list, unannounced waivers, and reactivations without press releases—this lack of transparency undermines the credibility of the tool itself. If Ukraine’s allies do not know what Washington is doing in real time, if the American and European public is not informed of the decisions made, if removals from the list multiply without explanation—then sanctions lose their value as a political signal, even when they retain a certain degree of economic effectiveness.

Transparency is not a luxury: it is a prerequisite for the democratic legitimacy of the tool. And democratic legitimacy is what allows sanctions to endure—beyond a presidential term, beyond a one-off crisis, beyond pressure from oil lobbies. This is the central challenge for 2027: to build a sanctions regime that is transparent, robust, multilateral, and flexible enough to adapt to crises without being dismantled by them.

The transparency of sanctions is a democratic issue, not just a geopolitical one. When Washington makes major decisions about funding the war in Ukraine without announcing them, it deprives its own citizens of the ability to hold their elected officials accountable. That is not healthy for a democracy—even when the end result is the right one.

Kyiv as an International Watchtower

One of the most remarkable developments during these four years of war has been Ukraine’s growing expertise in sanctions matters. Commissioner Vlasyuk’s office, in particular, has become a global leader in real-time monitoring of SDN list movements, Russian oil flows, and suspicious financial transactions. This expertise did not emerge by chance: it is the product of a vital necessity. Ukraine cannot afford to overlook even the slightest loophole in the sanctions regime—every loophole funds the war that is destroying it.

Ukraine’s role as an international watchdog is one of the most important and least recognized contributions of its resistance. By closely monitoring U.S. and European decisions, documenting them, and making them public, Kyiv exerts pressure on its allies to be transparent. This is a service rendered not only to itself, but to the entire international sanctions architecture—whose effectiveness depends on the vigilance of those who need it most.

A More Equitable Partnership: What More Can Kyiv Ask For?

The reinstatement of sanctions on June 17, 2026, is a victory for Ukraine’s monitoring policy—but only a partial one. What Ukraine can legitimately ask of its allies for the future is more demanding: prior consultation before any exemption, real-time sharing of decisions to amend the SDN list, a formal commitment not to lift sanctions on entities that have not demonstrated a verifiable change in behavior, and rigorous enforcement of secondary sanctions against third countries that facilitate circumvention.

These demands are not unrealistic. They are the bare minimum one can expect from allies who claim to support Ukraine in an existential war. And if they are heeded—by Washington, by Brussels, by the G7 capitals—they will transform the sanctions regime from an imperfect and reactive tool into a robust and proactive framework. It is this goal that deserves to be pursued.

Kyiv monitors the SDN list more closely than most Western governments. This is no coincidence—it is a matter of survival. And if its allies were as vigilant as Ukraine is regarding their own decisions, sanctions would be twice as effective.

Why Secondary Sanctions Are the Missing Tool

The current sanctions regime has a structural flaw: it targets Russian companies but does not directly punish third countries that help them circumvent the restrictions. India, China, Turkey, and other countries continue to purchase Russian oil at or near the ceiling set by the G7 without facing direct consequences. Secondary sanctions would change this dynamic: they would impose restrictions on companies in these third countries that participate in circumvention, by excluding them from the dollar-based financial system or preventing them from accessing U.S. markets.

The United States has successfully used this tool against Iran—significantly reducing Iranian oil exports by forcing Asian buyers to choose between the U.S. market and Iranian oil. The same secondary sanctions applied to buyers of Russian oil above the cap would have a similar effect—and they would be far more impactful than any SDN list. The reason they have not been imposed is simple: the political cost of forcing India to choose between Washington and Moscow is deemed too high in the context of competition with China. This calculation may change—and the events of 2026 show that geopolitical conditions are evolving rapidly.

The 2027 Horizon: Strengthen or See It Eroded

In 2027, the sanctions regime against Russia will reach a crossroads. Either Western democracies choose to strengthen it—by imposing secondary sanctions, further lowering the oil cap, and closing the loopholes in the “ghost fleet”—or it will continue to erode gradually under multiple pressures. This erosion will not have a clearly identifiable starting point. It will be the result of an accumulation of technical decisions, sector-specific exemptions, and quiet removals from the SDN list. And one day, we will look back and realize that the sanctions are still officially in place but no longer have any real bite.

Avoiding this scenario is one of the most urgent challenges facing Western policy on Ukraine. It requires constant vigilance, sustained multilateral coordination, and the willingness to make politically costly decisions—such as imposing secondary sanctions on major trading partners. That willingness is not guaranteed. But it is necessary. And the reinstatement of sanctions on June 17, 2026, shows that such a willingness can exist, even under difficult political conditions.

Secondary sanctions are the tool everyone is afraid to use. Fear of upsetting India. Fear of provoking China. Fear of complicating G20 diplomacy. These fears are understandable. But they allow Putin to sell his oil and finance his war. The time to overcome these fears will eventually come—let’s hope it’s not too late.

What the Reinstatement Changes—and Doesn’t Change

The reinstatement of sanctions on Russian oil on June 17, 2026, is good news. It reduces Moscow’s revenue, restores the coherence of the Western sanctions regime, and signals—even imperfectly, even without an official announcement—that the March exemption was temporary and that the course has not changed. For Ukraine, this is a relative relief amid a landscape where bad news remains abundant: removals from the SDN list continue, secondary sanctions on third countries have not been imposed, and the “ghost fleet” continues to export Russian oil.

The fight for effective sanctions against Russia is not yet won. It will never be won once and for all: it is an ongoing battle—against erosion, against short-term economic interests, against the weariness of democracies, and against Moscow’s adaptation strategies. This fight deserves columnists to document it, commissioners like Vlasyuk to monitor it, governments to lead it, and citizens to demand transparency. Above all, it deserves a clear conviction: that allowing Putin to finance his war with oil revenues amounts to complicity—and that this complicity, even if partial or unintentional, comes at a human cost that we all pay.

The Next Battle: Secondary Sanctions

The next major front in the sanctions war is that of secondary measures. If the United States were to decide to impose secondary sanctions on countries that purchase Russian oil above the G7 cap—starting with warnings and escalating to trade restrictions—the impact on Russian revenues would be significantly greater than anything done so far. This decision has not yet been made. It is being held up by diplomatic considerations regarding India and other partners. But it remains on the table—and the events of 2026 show that conditions can change rapidly.

Pending this decision, the reinstatement of sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil remains what it is: a necessary correction of a costly mistake, brought about by institutional mechanics rather than political conviction. It is not a victory. It is a reset. And the next starting point for building something more solid. The fight for Ukraine’s freedom and for economic justice toward Moscow is not yet won. It resumes with every decision, every sanctions package, every barrel of oil that should not cross the strait.

The reinstatement of sanctions without an official announcement. That is the paradox of our time: good decisions are sometimes made quietly, while bad ones are made with great fanfare. Ukraine deserves better than that—it deserves allies who stand up for their choices openly.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist