OP-ED: Kaine and Cornyn Want to Cut Through Red Tape to Deliver Artillery Shells to Ukraine

What the NATO Summit Expects from Congress

The timing of this bill’s introduction on June 29 is no coincidence. The NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, is set to confirm an additional €70 billion in military aid to NATO allies to support Ukraine. This promise is worthless if the delivery mechanisms remain bogged down in archaic procedures. The Kaine-Cornyn bill is, among other things, a signal to European allies: the United States is working to make its systems more efficient.

At the Ankara summit, allied leaders should also declare their intention to maintain a similar level of aid in 2027. Support for Ukraine will feature in the final declaration as one of the central points. But a declaration of principle without a functional supply chain remains merely words on paper. This is precisely the problem that this bill seeks to resolve.

The USAI and the $500 million Approved by the Senate

As part of the same legislative process, the Senate Armed Services Committee approved in June—by a vote of 26 to 1—the draft National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which allocates $500 million to the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) for fiscal year 2026. This represents an increase from the $300 million allocated for 2025. The bill also includes an extension of the USAI through 2028.

The House of Representatives is currently maintaining the level at $300 million. The final figure will be determined by negotiations between the two chambers. But the Senate’s stance is clear: increase aid, extend the commitment, and structure long-term support. Even in a Trump-era America, a legislative majority understands that Ukraine cannot be left without ammunition.

A 26-to-1 vote in favor of aid to Ukraine: no matter how skeptical one may be about the workings of the U.S. Congress, these numbers speak to something fundamental. Pure isolationism does not prevail in the committees that review intelligence reports. Those who know what is really happening in Ukraine—and what defeat would mean—continue to vote in favor of aid.

Tim Kaine, John Cornyn, and the Art of Functional Compromise

Tim Kaine serves on the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees. John Cornyn is one of the Republican stalwarts of the Texas Senate, rooted in a conservative interventionist tradition. Their collaboration is not an ideological reconciliation—it is a pragmatic agreement on a shared priority. The two senators have different reasons for wanting to speed up arms deliveries to Ukraine—the defense industry for Cornyn, Atlanticist values for Kaine—but the result is the same: a law that could change the daily lives of Ukrainian soldiers.

This kind of targeted bipartisanship may be the last form of cross-party cooperation still possible in the U.S. Senate of 2026. It doesn’t work on major social or tax issues, but it still works on national security when the stakes are clear enough. Ukraine is clear enough.

What the Bill Does Not Do

This bill does not create new military aid. It does not change the fundamental U.S. arms export policy. It does not alter the conditions for aid to Ukraine. What it does is remove obstacles from the pipeline. It streamlines what already exists. It is a piece of administrative “plumbing” legislation—but in a high-intensity war, administrative “plumbing” can make the difference between a successful counteroffensive and one that fails due to a lack of ammunition.

The requirements for monitoring the end use of weapons remain intact. Ukraine remains subject to the usual conditions governing the use of U.S. weapons. The bill reduces the approval timeframe, not the responsibilities. This is important to note for those who might fear a deregulation of arms transfers: that is not what the Kaine-Cornyn bill proposes.

I understand the arguments of those who say that 500 million or 300 million makes no difference on the scale of the war. They are both right and wrong at the same time. Right because Ukraine needs tens of billions over several years. Wrong because every shipment of Excalibur or GMLRS ammunition delivered on time can decide the outcome of a battle. In modern warfare, quantity and precision are two legs of the same body—one cannot function without the other.

A Win-Win Situation: Ukraine and U.S. Industry

The Kaine-Cornyn bill also seeks to “expand the capabilities of the U.S. defense industry”—a telling phrase. By streamlining ammunition transfers to Ukraine via NATO allies, the bill creates predictable, high-volume orders for U.S. arms manufacturers. Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and BAE Systems America—the producers of Excalibur, GMLRS rockets, and HIMARS munitions—benefit from sustained and predictable demand.

This is the logic that allows support for Ukraine to survive in the current U.S. political climate: it is presented not only as aid to an ally at war, but as an investment in the U.S. defense industrial base. Trump may despise the ideological framework behind aid to Ukraine, but it is difficult for his administration to oppose measures that create jobs in the defense industries of Texas and Virginia.

The House and Upcoming Negotiations

The major hurdle remains the House of Representatives, where the House version of the NDAA keeps aid to Ukraine at $300 million rather than the Senate’s $500 million. Bilateral negotiations will determine the final figure. If a compromise is reached between the two versions, Ukraine could receive between 350 and 450 million through the USAI for 2026. The Accelerated Deliveries Act, meanwhile, is following its own legislative process.

The timeline is tight: the Ankara summit on July 7–8 will put additional pressure on U.S. decision-makers. European allies, who must confirm their own commitments of 70 billion euros, need to know that the United States is not backing out. The introduction of the Kaine-Cornyn bill—even without an immediate vote—sends that signal.

It is painful to realize that, in 2026, Ukraine still depends on the U.S. legislative process to obtain ammunition it has needed since 2022. But that is the reality. And within that reality, a bipartisan bill that streamlines the supply chain is not merely symbolic—it is an operational necessity.

A Trump Administration That Blocks with One Hand and Unleashes with the Other

The Trump administration has sent mixed signals about aid to Ukraine since returning to power. On the one hand, there is pressure to force ceasefire negotiations that benefit Moscow. On the other, according to Reuters, Trump could approve—for the first time since returning to power—a transfer of weapons to Ukraine from existing stockpiles—a package worth approximately $300 million that may include Patriot interceptors and medium-range offensive weapons. No final decision had been announced at the time of this writing.

This paradox is characteristic of the Trump era: rhetoric that sows doubt, but a state apparatus that continues, in part, to operate according to the Atlanticist logic of the national security establishment. Senators like Kaine and Cornyn are navigating this space—by going through Congress, which is beyond the White House’s direct control, to enshrine support for Ukraine in lasting legislative mechanisms.

A necessary evil that sometimes produces good

Trump is a necessary evil for the West. His pressure on defense spending has forced allies like the United Kingdom, Germany, and France to take ownership of their own security. But his volatility on Ukraine has created instability that comes at a high cost—in delayed deliveries, strategic uncertainty for Kyiv, and opportunities for Moscow to bide its time. The Kaine-Cornyn Act is a legislative response to this volatility: if the executive branch hesitates, Congress steps in to ensure that the mechanisms remain in place.

This is the separation of powers at work in its most useful form: a legislature that anchors foreign policy in enduring laws, even when the executive branch is unpredictable. It doesn’t solve everything. But it builds safeguards.

I am not enthusiastic about the idea that Ukraine’s security depends on the vote of a U.S. congressional committee. But I am grateful that this committee exists and that it voted 26 to 1 to provide assistance. In the world we live in, this second reality is more important than the discomfort of the first.

Why This Law Matters Beyond the Numbers

The “Fast Tracking European Investment in Ukraine’s Defense Act” is not a spectacular piece of legislation. It does not create new aid, transform U.S. policy, or alter major strategic directions. What it does is remove yet another friction point in a supply chain that already has too many. Every obstacle removed means Excalibur shells that potentially arrive on time at the Ukrainian front lines, GMLRS rockets available for a decisive counter-battery strike, and HIMARS ammunition that makes it possible to hold an exposed position.

In a war where logistics delays can mean the difference between victory and defeat in a matter of weeks, this technical legislation deserves to be taken seriously. And the bipartisan support from Kaine and Cornyn deserves to be commended—not as a revival of American political cooperation, but as proof that, when it comes to the essentials, some U.S. elected officials still understand what is at stake.

What This Says About the West’s Commitment to Ukraine

This legislation also speaks to something deeper: the West’s commitment to Ukraine is not manifested solely in grand gestures—aid packages, NATO summits, declarations of solidarity. It is manifested in the willingness to reform its own systems so that these gestures have a real impact. Reforming the AECA to deliver shells more quickly is perhaps the most humble and concrete form of support for Ukraine. No speeches. No photo ops. Ammunition that arrives on time.

Ukraine has been holding out since 2022, partly thanks to its own resilience, and partly thanks to the West, which—despite its slowness and ambiguities—continues to seek ways to do better. The Kaine-Cornyn bill is a small demonstration of that ongoing commitment. In a long war, small demonstrations add up. And in the end, it all counts.

If this bill passes—which is by no means guaranteed in such a fragmented Congress—it won’t make the headlines. That is precisely its merit. True administrative reforms are invisible until the moment they make a difference. I hope this one will.

The Significance of a Blog Post on a Technical Law

I wanted to write this post because technical laws on export controls don’t make the headlines—but they can make a difference on the ground. Behind every 155 mm shell that arrives in Kharkiv or Zaporizhzhia, there’s an administrative chain that has to function. Kaine and Cornyn have understood that fixing this chain is also a way to fight for Ukraine. Not with speeches. With amendments to a 1976 law.

Ukraine deserves allies who think not only about grand gestures, but also about the details that make those gestures a reality. This bill is one of those details. An important detail.

What Remains to Be Done

It remains to be seen whether the bill will pass the Senate floor vote, then negotiations with the House, and finally receive the president’s signature amid an uncertain political climate. It remains to be seen whether NATO, in Ankara, will turn its €70 billion in commitments into actual deliveries rather than empty promises. It remains to be seen whether the prior approval mechanisms will work as well in practice as they do on paper. But the fact that efforts are being made to resolve these issues—rather than ignoring them—is, in itself, good news for Ukraine and for the West.

A long war requires long-term solutions. This bill is a small piece of that puzzle. It matters.

I cannot say whether this bill will pass. I am not a U.S. senator, and American politics has become so unpredictable that it defies analysis. What I can say is that the intent is good, the mechanism makes sense, and there is genuine bipartisan support. In the America of 2026, that is already a lot.

The Political Landscape in Ukraine Ahead of Ankara

The week of June 29, 2026, was significant for Ukraine in terms of U.S. legislation: the introduction of the Kaine-Cornyn bill to expedite transfers, Senate approval of $500 million in defense aid, and rumors of a $300 million Patriot package in the works at the White House. Taken together, these developments paint a picture of a U.S. political system that—despite its turbulence, despite Trump, and despite its divisions—remains capable of supporting Ukraine when competent and committed elected officials do their jobs.

Zelensky and his team have been watching Washington with understandable anxiety since Trump’s return. This week offers them some reasons to believe that U.S. institutional safeguards remain partially operational. It’s not enough. But it’s real.

The Irreplaceable Role of Congress

The U.S. Congress—imperfect, slow, fragmented—remains one of the last bastions of strategic continuity in an executive branch that has become unpredictable. The laws it passes cannot be undone by a tweet. The mechanisms it creates are designed for the long term. Kaine and Cornyn have understood that, under these circumstances, passing legislation on the Ukrainian supply chain is one of the most useful actions a senator can take in 2026. I agree with them.

Ukraine needs allies capable of thinking both about grand gestures and about the bolt that needs to be tightened. This law is the bolt. And bolts hold structures together.

Ten years from now, if Ukraine has won, no one will remember the “Fast Tracking European Investment in Ukraine’s Defense Act.” That is the fate of technical legislation: to disappear into the very effectiveness it has created. But the people who will have survived thanks to ammunition delivered on time—they will remember. Even without knowing the name of the law.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist