What Happened—and Why It Failed
Turkey regularly points out that it hosted the Istanbul talks in 2022. Those talks produced a draft memorandum, the details of which remain disputed. Russia now claims that an agreement had been reached—a claim that Ukraine and Western observers formally dispute. What is undeniable is that Putin continued the offensive—particularly after the discovery of the atrocities in Bucha in April 2022.
Citing Istanbul as a positive precedent without analyzing why that process failed risks repeating the mistake. Worse still: it gives Russia the argument it is seeking—that Ukraine had accepted a territorial framework and then backed out of it under Western pressure. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio was explicit in his remarks to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov: “There was no agreement in Anchorage.” The same clarity is needed regarding Istanbul.
What Zelensky Is Doing in the Meantime
On June 26, 2026, President Zelensky stated that he had presented proposals to Putin’s key partners and allies for a possible end to the war. At the same time, he approved a 40-day SBU operation aimed at influencing Russia to cease hostilities. These two approaches—diplomatic and coercive—are not contradictory. They are consistent with the position of a country that wants peace but refuses to surrender. This fundamental distinction must guide any serious mediation effort.
Zelensky is not shying away from peace. He rejects surrender disguised as compromise. This is a distinction that mediators who fail to balance responsibilities properly end up blurring. Turkey cannot afford to make this mistake, especially just days before a NATO summit in its own capital.
The NATO Summit in Ankara: An Opportunity and a Pitfall
July 7 and 8: The Moment of Truth
The 32 heads of state of NATO member countries will meet in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026. Trump, Zelensky, and European leaders will be in your capital. Secretary General Mark Rutte has described this summit as a transition toward “NATO 3.0,” with Europe assuming greater responsibility for conventional defense. A commitment of 70 billion euros in military aid to Ukraine is expected to be included in the joint statement, along with a pledge for an equal amount in 2027.
Hosting the NATO summit while proposing to bring Kyiv and Moscow to the same table is a difficult position to maintain. Will NATO allies, who are preparing to announce massive support for Ukraine, view your mediation as a complement to their efforts or as an attempt to temper their solidarity? The answer depends on the guarantees you offer to Ukraine—and not just to Russia.
Turkey Deploys 70,000 Police Officers to Secure Ankara
Turkey has deployed 70,000 police officers and placed Ankara under a security lockdown, banning all demonstrations for 13 days surrounding the summit. This is a sign that you are taking this event seriously—as you should. But the physical security of the summit is not enough. What the allies expect from Turkey is political clarity: Is Ankara with them in their support for Ukraine, or is Ankara simultaneously negotiating terms that Moscow would approve?
70,000 police officers for a NATO summit is a tremendous demonstration of organizational capability. But the true security of this summit will not be measured by police numbers—it will be measured by the clarity of the message sent to Putin. And that message depends as much on you as it does on Trump or Macron.
What Ukraine Needs to Hear from Turkey
Concrete guarantees, not general statements
Zelensky will not refuse to engage in dialogue if the conditions respect Ukrainian sovereignty. What he refuses is a negotiation whose starting point would legitimize Russia’s illegal territorial gains. Any Turkish mediation that treats these gains as a fait accompli would be contrary to the international law you invoke. To be meaningful, your mediation must offer Ukraine guarantees: regarding the withdrawal of troops, verification mechanisms, and future security.
This is not an extravagant demand. It is the bare minimum that a serious mediator must put on the table so that the aggrieved party—Ukraine—can sit down without fearing that this table is a trap. Fidan said that Ankara wanted peace to be achieved “on the basis of international law.” Very well. International law prohibits the acquisition of territory by force. Let’s start there.
The Positive Precedent: The Grain Deal
With the Black Sea grain agreement, Turkey demonstrated that it was capable of playing a constructive and effective role. That agreement enabled the export of millions of metric tons of Ukrainian grain despite the war—a concrete, measurable, and humanitarian achievement. But when Russia unilaterally withdrew from it and Turkey was unable or unwilling to impose consequences, the lesson was a painful one. What you are proposing today must draw lessons from that failure: without enforcement mechanisms, mediation is worth only as much as the goodwill of the parties—and Moscow’s goodwill is, forgive my frankness, a particularly fragile assumption.
The grain agreement was a shining moment for Turkish diplomacy. Russia’s unilateral breach of it, without any consequences, was a lesson in the limits of mediation without deterrence. What you are proposing for a comprehensive peace must be accompanied by guarantees that no one—especially not Moscow—can violate without incurring a real cost.
Third truth: Choose a side without saying it out loud
Turkey’s strategic position is both an asset and a risk
Your geostrategic position is exceptional: you control the Bosphorus, you are a member of NATO, you maintain relations with Moscow despite the war, and you sell Bayraktar drones to Ukraine while continuing to engage in dialogue with Russia. This position gives you real influence. It also imposes a commensurate responsibility on you.
China, Iran, and North Korea—these revisionist powers that directly or indirectly support the Russian war machine—are closely watching your every move. If your mediation leads to a framework that validates, even partially, Moscow’s territorial gains, you are sending a signal to all these powers: aggression pays off, provided you hold out long enough. That is the opposite of the message the world needs to hear.
NATO needs a Turkey that makes a choice
NATO allies are not asking you to abandon your relations with Russia overnight. They are asking you not to use those relations to undermine their support for Ukraine. Minister Fidan himself has acknowledged this: it is time to demonstrate “practical implementation” of defense commitments. This implementation also requires a clear alignment with fundamental principles: one country cannot seize another’s territory by force, and a peace that sanctions this violation is not peace—it is a delayed capitulation.
I know that diplomacy is the art of the possible, and that the art of the possible sometimes requires not saying aloud what one thinks. But there are moments in history when ambiguity comes at a higher cost than clarity. This summit in Ankara is one of those moments. The world is watching. Ukraine is watching. And Ukraine deserves better than balanced rhetoric.
What Turkey Needs to Do in Practical Terms
Three Conditions for Credible Mediation
In practical terms, your mediation must be based on three non-negotiable conditions. First: publicly demand that Russia commit to withdrawing its troops as a precondition for any substantive negotiations—not the current front lines as a starting point, but Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders as the ultimate goal. Second: propose a framework with international verification mechanisms, not just a negotiating table. Third: publicly align Turkey’s position with the United Nations Charter and not with the vague “spirit of Istanbul” that Moscow exploits.
If Turkey does this, it deserves to be heard and respected as a mediator. It would then clearly position itself on the side of international law—which does not prevent it from speaking to Russia, but defines the terms under which that conversation takes place. Mediation without principles is not mediation. It is a facilitation of impunity.
Ankara can become a name associated with just peace
You have a historic opportunity. The NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, can be the moment when Turkey clearly affirms that it stands on the side of the law, sovereignty, and the right of peoples to determine their own future without foreign military intervention. Ankara can become a name associated not with a compromise agreement that leaves a wound open, but with a just peace that endures because it is founded on unassailable principles. That would be your most enduring diplomatic legacy.
Peace is not the absence of conflict. Peace is an agreement that all parties can defend before their peoples, before history, and before the law. A peace that enshrines the aggressor’s victory is not peace—it is an invitation to the next war. Ankara has the capacity to achieve better than that. It must have the courage to do so.
Putin's Russia: An Unreliable Negotiating Partner
What Lavrov Says and What Lavrov Does
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently stated that Moscow was ready to resume talks with Kyiv “where they left off.” This phrasing seems conciliatory. In reality, it is a disguised demand: resuming talks “where they left off” means returning to the territorial concessions outlined in the 2022 Istanbul draft—a draft that Ukraine never officially endorsed and that Putin himself derailed by continuing the offensive after Bucha.
Putin also stated that he had no “preconditions” for negotiations. But the substance of his actual demands—recognition of the annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts, Ukraine’s permanent neutrality, and an end to any NATO membership—constitutes precisely the most onerous set of preconditions imaginable. The language of Russian negotiations is a coded language: every word must be read in reverse of its apparent meaning.
When Putin says “no preconditions,” it should be read as: “All my conditions are already incorporated into the definition of peace that I am proposing.” It is a semantic game that experienced mediators quickly decipher. Fidan seems to have understood this. Now he must state it publicly.
What Turkey Knows About Moscow
Turkey knows Russia better than most Western capitals. It has negotiated with Russia in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. It knows how Moscow uses peace processes to freeze situations that are favorable to it rather than to resolve conflicts. This knowledge is invaluable. It must be put to use for Ukraine’s benefit, not used as an argument to convince Kyiv to accept a deal that Moscow might tolerate.
What the West Had Already Been Expecting from Ankara
NATO Needs a Turkey That Is on Board
NATO allies are not asking you to abandon your relations with Russia overnight. They are asking you not to use those relations to undermine their support for Ukraine. Minister Fidan himself has acknowledged this: it is time to demonstrate “practical implementation” of defense commitments. This implementation also requires clear alignment with a fundamental principle: one country cannot seize another’s territory by force, and a peace that sanctions this violation is not peace.
The allies announced 70 billion euros in support for Ukraine at the Ankara summit. If, at the same time, Turkey facilitates negotiations that would lead Ukraine to cede territory, the message sent to the world is contradictory. A choice must be made. Not between NATO and Russia—you have already chosen NATO. But between mediation that upholds the law and mediation that serves the immediate interest of ending the fighting at any cost.
This is not about lecturing Ankara. It is about reminding everyone that in a world where China is watching Taiwan, where Iran is watching the Gulf, and where North Korea is building up its nuclear capabilities with Russia’s help, every poorly negotiated peace is an invitation to the next act of aggression. Turkey has the power to negotiate a good peace. This is a historic responsibility commensurate with its position.
Defense Spending as Proof of Commitment
Turkey has significantly increased its defense spending in recent years. Its defense industry—Bayraktar drones, naval systems, Roketsan missiles—has become a global player. These capabilities give Turkey a level of military credibility that few mediators possess. They must underpin a mediation effort that carries real weight—not just well-equipped meeting rooms.
Conclusion: It's up to you
Turkey at a Crossroads
You hosted the Istanbul talks in 2022. Today, you are proposing a new mediation effort. Between those two events, Turkey sold drones to Ukraine, maintained trade relations with Russia, and played an ambiguous role in controlling the Bosphorus. This ambiguity has had tactical advantages for Ankara. But throughout history, powers that have chosen ambiguity over clarity at decisive moments have not always stood the test of time.
One final question
I have a simple question for you, Mr. Erdogan. If the Turkish mediation succeeds—if Ukraine and Russia sit down in Ankara and sign a document—what will it entail? Will it enshrine Ukraine’s sovereignty over all of its internationally recognized territory? Or will it provide for zones of influence, frozen front lines, and arrangements that leave Moscow with what it has taken by force? The answer to this question is the difference between a mediator and an accomplice. I give you the benefit of the doubt that you want to be the former. Prove it.
This war will end one day. It will end because the men and women fighting it have their limits, because the economies funding it have their limits, and because the patience of the people has its limits. When it ends, the mediators who spoke the truth will be on the right side of history. The others will be forgotten—or worse, remembered as the people who made possible an injustice disguised as peace.
Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist
Sources
Primary sources
RBC Ukraine — Turkey Offers to Host New Ukraine-Russia Talks — June 27, 2026
RBC Ukraine — Erdoğan Calls on NATO Allies Regarding the War in Ukraine — June 29, 2026
The Straits Times — Erdoğan: NATO Summit Must Emphasize Unity and Resilience — June 2026
Secondary sources
Reuters — Turkey Says NATO Is Adapting, U.S. Is Not Withdrawing — June 30, 2026
Yeni Şafak — The NATO Summit in Ankara: A Stronger Platform for Sharing Experiences — June 2026
Haberler — Secretary of State Rubio Meets with His German Counterpart — June 2026
This content was created with the help of AI.