The August 2025 Summit and Its Aftermath
In August 2025, Trump and Putin met in Alaska. The Kremlin emerged from the meeting satisfied. The Russian media portrayed the event as an implicit acknowledgment of Russia’s position: Russia must control the Donbas as a precondition for any peace agreement. On the American side, the messaging was more ambiguous—but the signals sent to Moscow suggested tacit acceptance of this demand.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio attempted to set the record straight months later, stating that during the meeting in Alaska, “a proposal had been made, but no agreement had been reached.” But Ukraine, Europe, and NATO allies had already read between the lines. The “Anchorage agreements,” as European foreign ministries called them, represented the red line that the West should never cross: recognizing Russia’s right to dictate the terms of peace on Ukrainian soil.
Why Trump Is Considering Abandoning Them
According to Axios and sources cited by Fakti, the intensification of Ukrainian military operations—notably the 40-day campaign announced by Zelensky on June 25, 2026—has forced Trump to reassess his convictions. “Trump is no longer at all sure that Russia is capable of defeating Ukraine,” these sources reported. And a Putin who cannot win is not a negotiating partner with whom one can negotiate a victory disguised as peace.
Trump’s logic is essentially business-oriented: you make concessions to someone who has bargaining power. If that power erodes, concessions become pointless—even counterproductive. As he watches Ukraine hold its ground, strike back, and make diplomatic headway, Trump may be recalculating which—Kyiv or Moscow—is the better political investment.
The Anchorage agreements should never have existed, even as a concept. Recognizing Russia’s right to occupy the Donbas as a condition for peace amounts to legitimizing conquest by force. This is precisely the precedent that China is watching for Taiwan, that Iran is watching for its regional ambitions, and that all revisionist powers are watching to plan their next moves. That they have been abandoned is not belated good news. It is an emergency correction.
The G7 Summit in Évian: A Quiet but Real Turning Point
Trump and Zelensky on the Sidelines of the Summit
On June 15 and 17, 2026, in Évian-les-Bains, France, Trump and Zelensky held several conversations on the sidelines of the G7 summit. According to United24 Media, during these discussions, Zelensky proposed granting Ukraine licenses to produce missiles for the Patriot air defense systems—a request that was received “positively for the first time” by the U.S. side. This is significant: giving Ukraine the ability to produce its own Patriot missiles grants it a strategic autonomy that Russia cannot ignore.
The G7’s final statement reaffirmed the collective commitment to “step up pressure on Russia.” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, host of a parallel meeting in Berlin with the leaders of France, Britain, Italy, and Poland, stated: “The message to Russia is: Ukraine remains strong.” He added that Europe would propose to its NATO allies a solid financial commitment to Kyiv.
The G7 as a Turning Point
What the Evian G7 marks is the end of U.S. ambiguity regarding Ukraine. Or at least, a significant reduction in that ambiguity. The signals sent from Anchorage gave Moscow the impression that the United States was prepared to accept its terms. The signals sent from Évian tell a different story: the United States observes that Ukraine is holding its ground, that Russia is no longer advancing, and that Putin has not kept his implicit promises of a quick victory.
For European allies who had watched with concern as Washington’s policy had evolved since January 2025, this shift is a breath of fresh air. Friedrich Merz mentioned the preparatory meeting for the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, where the 32 member nations, including the United States, will discuss long-term support for Ukraine. The atmosphere, he said, was significantly more favorable to Kyiv than it had been in months.
The G7 summit in Évian may not go down in history as a decisive turning point. But for those who have been watching the Trump-Putin relationship with anxiety over the past year, the signals coming out of France this summer feel like a course correction. Not enough. Not definitive. But real. And in this conflict, every course correction counts.
Putin Facing the Shattered Mirror
A leader who failed to live up to his implicit commitments
Trump is a man who judges people by their results. This is repeated ad nauseam by those close to him and his critics alike. When Putin met with Trump in Alaska in August 2025, the implication of the meeting was this: Russia was going to show that it was on the verge of victory, that Ukraine was going to give in, and that the conditions for a deal favorable to Moscow were in place. A year later, none of that is true.
Russia’s territorial advance has slowed considerably, according to data from the Institute for the Study of War. Ukraine is striking deep into Russian territory—air bases, communications centers, and refineries. Zelenskyy has announced a 40-day campaign. Moscow is facing shortages of aviation fuel. For a man like Trump, who viewed Putin as a strong leader, this reality is news. And it changes the calculus.
Trump’s Skepticism Toward Putin: An Ideological Break
According to Axios, during the G7 summit, Trump was “skeptical of anything related to Putin.” This skepticism is significant because it contrasts sharply with Trump’s stance during his first term, when his personal relationship with the Kremlin leader was presented as a strategic asset for the U.S. If this skepticism is confirmed—if Trump concludes that Putin used him without ever intending to negotiate in good faith—the consequences for U.S. policy could be profound.
Other sources have reported that the White House has privately endorsed an intensified diplomatic and military campaign by Ukraine. They also report that Trump advised Zelensky to act “more boldly” to bring Moscow to the negotiating table. These are signals that European foreign ministries are reading carefully—and from which Kyiv is drawing operational conclusions.
There is a painful paradox in this picture: it may be Ukraine’s resistance—the very resistance that Trump underestimated—that is saving U.S. policy toward Ukraine. Zelensky did not persuade Trump with speeches. He persuaded him by holding his ground militarily. And that, Trump understands.
Europe Regains Its Place
Merz, Macron, and Renewed Coordination
The G7 summit in Évian also marked a return to closer transatlantic coordination. Friedrich Merz, the newly appointed German chancellor, hosted the leaders of France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Poland in Berlin and held a video conference with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. The message was unanimous: Europe remains behind Ukraine, support remains unwavering, and the Alliance is heading to the Ankara summit with a consolidated position.
This coordination is important in a context where intra-European divisions—over the amount of aid, the conditions for Ukraine’s NATO membership, and peace negotiations—had seemed to threaten allied cohesion. Merz’s message: “Europe’s support is not wavering.” ” And in the face of a Russia that has always bet on Western disunity, this display of unity holds real strategic value.
The Ankara NATO Summit as a Test
The NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, will be the true barometer of this turnaround. If Trump arrives there with a speech expressing firm support for Ukraine, if the United States joins Europe’s commitment to long-term funding, and if NATO sends a clear message to Moscow from Ankara—then the G7 summit in Évian will truly mark the beginning of a turning point. Otherwise, it will remain nothing more than the warm atmosphere of a European summit, quickly forgotten in the twists and turns of American politics.
What Ukraine needs above all is confirmation that the United States will not walk away at the wrong moment. Not a spectacular diplomatic victory—just continuity. The word that Zelensky has repeated more than any other since the start of this war.
NATO is meeting in Ankara on July 7–8. That’s just a few days away. And I wonder what Trump will say there. If he says that Ukraine must hold out and that he will support it, that will be a defining moment. If he hedges, if he sends mixed signals, if he suggests that the Anchorage agreements are still on the table—then Putin’s disappointment will have been a flash in the pan. This summit will reveal whether Trump’s disillusionment is a conviction or a passing mood.
Final Portrait: A Man Between Two Wars
Trump: Neither a Warmonger Nor a Capitulator
Trump is not a foreign policy hawk. He has never wanted to send American soldiers to fight in Ukraine. But he is not a capitulator either—at least not when capitulation doesn’t pay off. And that may be the most accurate portrayal of him in this matter: a pragmatist who believed a deal with Putin was possible, who realized that Putin never intended to make a deal, and who is recalibrating his position in light of that reality.
This recalibration is belated. It comes at a high cost—in American credibility, in concessions that should never have been made, and in lost time during which thousands of people have continued to die. But it is real. And in American foreign policy, gradual shifts in position are better than none at all.
Zelensky: The Hero Trump Is Beginning to See
A year ago, Zelensky “didn’t have the cards.” Today, he “holds his own” and “is doing rather well.” This is still not outright praise—Trump doesn’t give in easily on this front. But it is an acknowledgment of reality. And for a Ukrainian president who has been leading his country in a state of war for more than four years, being recognized as someone who “holds his own” by the most powerful man in the world is no small feat.
Zelensky has grasped something essential: to get Trump’s attention, you have to deliver. You have to show results—damage inflicted on the enemy, territories defended, bold decisions. The 40-day campaign, the strikes on Russian bases, holding the front lines—all of this is also political messaging directed at Washington. And judging by the words coming out of the Oval Office, it’s working.
I’m not sure Trump’s disillusionment with Putin will last. U.S. presidents change their positions as quickly as the weather, depending on their moods and domestic interests. But even if this shift is fragile, even if it lasts only six months, it may be long enough to make a significant difference on the battlefield. In this war, six months of clear U.S. support can mean the difference between holding out and giving in.
What Trump Told Zelensky in Private
The Call to Act “More Boldly”
Beyond public statements, sources familiar with the Ukrainian situation have reported that Trump advised Zelensky to act “more boldly” to force Moscow to the negotiating table. This advice, relayed by a senior Ukrainian official, signals a shift in the U.S. stance: Ukraine is no longer being told to tone down its approach and accept a difficult deal. Instead, Ukraine is being told to take action—to increase pressure, impose costs, and create the conditions for a peace negotiated from a position of strength, not weakness.
The White House has also reportedly given its private approval to an intensified diplomatic and military campaign aimed at compelling Russia to negotiate in earnest. These discreet signals, coupled with Trump’s public statements on Zelensky’s performance, paint a coherent picture: the United States is encouraging Kyiv to maintain maximum pressure while the diplomatic window remains ajar.
Patriot Licenses: A Strategic Concession
During discussions at the G7 summit in Évian, Zelensky made a specific request: that the United States grant Ukraine licenses to locally produce missiles for the Patriot air defense systems. According to Zelensky, this request was received “positively for the first time” by the U.S. side. Ukraine reportedly already has the technical capacity to begin this production—all that was missing was the U.S. president’s approval.
If this approval materializes, the implications are significant. Ukraine would no longer depend solely on deliveries of Patriot missiles from its allies—it could produce its own. This is a form of strategic autonomy that Russia cannot tolerate and that NATO allies had never granted with such apparent enthusiasm. It would represent a lasting transformation of Ukraine’s capabilities, extending well beyond the term of the current administration.
Licenses to produce Patriot missiles. It’s not a sensational headline. But if it comes to pass, it may be the most important decision to emerge from the G7 summit in Évian. Because relying on an ally’s goodwill for ammunition is a constant vulnerability. Producing one’s own ammunition is sovereignty. And for Ukraine, sovereignty is priceless.
Disillusionment as Foreign Policy: What It Says About America
What This About-Face Says About America
This portrait of Trump, disappointed by Putin, is not just the story of one man. It is the story of American foreign policy confronting its own naivety. The idea that one can negotiate with Putin the way one negotiates a real estate deal, that a summit in Alaska can resolve an existential war, that pragmatic deal-making is enough in the face of an imperial ideology—that idea has been put to the test. And it has failed.
The lesson, for those willing to hear it: dictators do not honor deals they are not forced to honor. The only thing they understand is the balance of power. And as of July 2026, thanks to Ukrainian resistance, that balance of power has shifted significantly. Trump sees this. Europe knows it. We can only hope that Putin, for his part, will draw the necessary conclusions.
An American president who realizes that Putin has duped him. A Zelenskyy who, against all odds, is holding his ground militarily. A Europe united behind Ukraine despite the turbulence. This isn’t the end. It may not even be the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning of the West’s capitulation. And that’s worth saying.
Conclusion: Trump, Russia, and the Price of Disappointment
Disappointment as a Starting Point
Trump’s disappointment with Putin is not a Ukrainian victory in and of itself. It is an opportunity—a window for diplomatic recalibration that Ukraine and its allies must exploit quickly and skillfully before the next domestic distraction in the U.S. closes it. The Ankara summit, the negotiations on Patriot licenses, and European financial commitments—all of this must be solidified while the window is open.
Zelensky knows this. He has never had the luxury of waiting for conditions to be perfect. He has always worked under pressure, with the resources at hand, turning every political opening into a concrete gain. That is exactly what he must do now. And with Trump beginning to see what Zelensky has always seen—that Putin is the obstacle, not the solution—the conditions may, for once, be slightly favorable.
History will judge
In a few years, historians will look back on the G7 summit in Évian and what it represents. Was it the moment when the United States truly began to treat the Ukrainian issue with the seriousness it deserves? Or was it a brief interlude, an improvement in communication before a return to concessions? The answer depends largely on what Trump decides in the coming weeks and months.
What is certain is that Ukraine has not waited. It is striking back. It is holding its ground. It is making progress both diplomatically and militarily. And if Trump has learned anything from this first year of his second term, it may be this: in this conflict, bets on Ukraine’s weakness have all lost. Bets on its resilience have all won. History rarely remembers men on the right side when they’ve chosen the wrong side at the wrong time.
Trump’s disillusionment with Putin is belated, imperfect, and perhaps temporary. But it’s there. And for Ukraine, which has been fighting for more than four years without ever having had the luxury of doubt, even belated support counts. Because in this war, every day the front holds is a victory that no one can erase.
By Maxime Marquette, columnist
Sources
Primary sources
Secondary sources
Fakti — Moscow speaks: We have not changed our terms for a peace agreement with Kyiv — June 2026
EU Alive — Is Trump Encouraging Zelenskyy to Strike Russia Even Harder to Achieve Peace? — June 2026
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