COLUMN: Slow Internet and the "Gray War" Over Taiwan

A Concerning Trend in the Numbers

According to The Straits Times on July 16, 2026, the number of Taiwanese detained or missing in mainland China is rising, a trend that is causing growing concern among the families affected and Taiwanese authorities. While it is difficult to establish these figures with absolute precision—given the opacity of the Chinese judicial system to outside observers—this trend is nonetheless supported by a body of converging evidence reported by several families and organizations.

This documented increase adds to the other signs of pressure already mentioned in this column: in a way, it humanizes a tension that might seem abstract when reduced solely to figures on naval movements or official diplomatic statements. Behind every detention statistic is a family waiting, without certainty, for a call that does not always come.

What This Trend Reveals About the Extent of the Pressure

This human dimension—distinct from the military and diplomatic issues already documented—illustrates an often-underestimated aspect of China’s pressure on Taiwan: it is not limited to large-scale naval maneuvers or presidential statements, but also affects ordinary citizens, for some of whom travel and activities in mainland China are becoming a source of increased personal risk.

This column chooses to highlight this human dimension without exaggerating or dramatizing it beyond what the sources allow us to establish: The Straits Times documents an upward trend, not a definitive and exhaustive figure—a crucial methodological nuance to keep in mind.

What Senator Tammy Duckworth Said

On July 19, 2026, according to Focus Taiwan, U.S. Senator Tammy Duckworth warned that China might opt for an economic blockade of Taiwan rather than a full-scale military invasion—a strategic scenario that directly aligns with the central thesis of this column regarding gradual coercion rather than open confrontation.

This statement, made by a U.S. elected official with access to national security briefings, is not a definitive prediction but a serious strategic warning that deserves to be taken into account in any forward-looking assessment of the trajectory of the Taiwan issue in 2026. A blockade does not make the headlines on a single day of war; it makes the headlines every day as an economy slowly suffocates.

Why This Scenario Deserves to Be Taken Seriously

This hypothesis of an economic blockade rather than a full-scale invasion fits logically within the trajectory of gradual coercion documented in this column: it would allow Beijing to exert considerable pressure on Taiwan without automatically triggering the Western military response mechanisms typically associated with a conventional invasion.

This column notes that this scenario, if it were to materialize, would be a direct continuation of the trend already observed in the increase in Chinese maritime activity and in the Taiwanese civil defense exercises documented in July 2026.

Exercises Concluded Amid Tensions

According to the EFE news agency, on July 17, 2026, Taiwan concluded defense maneuvers conducted amid heightened tensions with China—a large-scale military exercise that illustrates Taiwan’s determination to demonstrate its resilience in the face of pressure perceived as growing and multifaceted.

These maneuvers, which concluded on the same day as the vice president’s statement on Chinese repression “everywhere,” are part of a series of preparations that go beyond a one-off military exercise to form a coherent set of resilience measures announced and carried out over a tight timeframe of just a few days. Concluding a military exercise on the very same day as a statement on repression is never a mere coincidence of timing.

What These Maneuvers Signal to Beijing and Its Allies

These defense maneuvers, documented by an independent international agency, send a dual signal: to Beijing, they demonstrate a capacity for resistance that is not intimidated by mounting pressure alone; to its Western and regional allies, they serve as a reminder that Taiwan continues to make concrete investments in its own defense, going beyond mere political statements.

This column considers these exercises to be one of the most concrete elements of the sequence documented in July 2026, contrasting with the more abstract nature of the budgetary or diplomatic announcements discussed elsewhere.

The expanded patrols documented in early July

This column notes that the mid-July 2026 period of tension did not arise in isolation: on July 5, 2026, The New York Times had already reported an expansion of Chinese Coast Guard patrols along Taiwan’s east coast—a geographical area broader than the traditional flashpoints limited to the strait itself.

This expansion, confirmed by Reuters on July 6, 2026, through its tracking of an upward trend in Chinese naval movements observed by the Taiwanese authorities themselves, points to a continuous trajectory rather than a series of unrelated incidents.

The thread connecting all these developments

The common thread linking, according to this column, all the developments documented between July 5 and 21, 2026—expanded patrols, increased naval activity, rising detentions, a warning of a blockade, Taiwanese maneuvers, and deliberate internet slowdowns—constitutes a coherent trajectory of gradual deterioration, rather than a mere accumulation of unrelated isolated incidents. None of these events, taken alone, would tell much of a story; it is their sequence over time that forms a narrative.

This interpretation as a continuum, rather than as isolated incidents, is precisely the added value of a chronicle compared to a simple, one-off account of the day’s events.

The South China Sea as a Previous Test Case

This strategy of gradual pressure, as documented in relation to Taiwan in 2026, is not without precedent: several analysts in the Asia-Pacific region have noted comparable dynamics in the South China Sea over the past decade, where the methodical buildup of presence and infrastructure preceded, over several years, any more explicit assertion of sovereignty.

This column argues that, by 2026, Taiwan could serve as a theater where this method—already proven elsewhere—reaches a higher level of sophistication and diversification, simultaneously combining the maritime, human, diplomatic, and informational dimensions documented above. A method that has worked elsewhere never stops on its own; it refines itself and shifts focus.

Why This Historical Continuity Matters

This historical continuity is important for interpreting the situation in 2026: it suggests that the current trajectory is not the result of a one-off tactical improvisation, but rather a proven method that has been consistently applied across several regional theaters for over a decade—a fact that should directly inform Western and Taiwanese expectations for the coming months.

This column does not claim that the outcome will necessarily be identical to that observed in the South China Sea; it merely asserts that the method itself exhibits striking similarities—sufficient in number to warrant vigilance informed by this precedent.

Wear Down Rather Than Defeat

This column focuses on an often-overlooked aspect of this strategy: its psychological dimension. Pressure that never crosses the threshold into open conflict is aimed less at military victory than at gradually wearing down the political and popular resolve of its target, until resistance itself becomes, for the affected population, more costly than resignation.

The deliberate slowdown of mobile internet documented on July 21, 2026, can be interpreted precisely as a psychological countermeasure: by acclimating the population to the idea of a possible disruption, the Taiwanese authorities are attempting to preserve collective resolve rather than allowing uncertainty alone to erode public morale. We cannot prevent a people from becoming worn down; we can, at least, train them not to collapse when it happens.

What this dimension implies for the duration of the conflict

This psychological dimension, if it indeed constitutes the core of the Chinese strategy documented in this column, implies a long-term timeframe: a war of attrition is neither won nor lost in a matter of weeks, but over a period of months or even years, which poses a particular challenge both to Taiwanese resilience and to Western attention, which has historically been less adept at strategic patience than at ad hoc reactions.

This column considers this temporal asymmetry to be one of the most underestimated issues in the entire matter—even more so than the content of each individual incident taken in isolation.

The Taiwanese President and Collective Defense

On July 17, 2026, the Taiwanese president called on the island to assume its share of responsibility in “collective defense”—a phrase that, when viewed in the context of all the developments documented in this column, takes on its full meaning: this is not an isolated slogan, but a direct response to pressure perceived as multifaceted and ongoing.

This presidential statement, delivered on the same day as the vice president’s remarks on repression “everywhere,” confirms a convergence of views at the highest levels of the Taiwanese government regarding the scale and persistence of Chinese pressure in mid-2026. When two leaders issue the same urgent message on the same day, it is never a mere coincidence in communications.

What this convergence calls for from Western partners

This convergence of views at the highest levels of the Taiwanese government should, according to this column, prompt an equally unified response from Taiwan’s Western and regional partners, rather than a series of scattered reactions to each incident taken in isolation with no apparent connection to the others.

This column alone cannot dictate that Western response; it merely documents the consistency of the Taiwanese perspective itself, which is an indicator that is hard to ignore for anyone following this issue seriously.

The Limits of a Continuous Reading

By choosing to link several distinct developments into a coherent trajectory, this column takes on a methodological risk that should be explicitly acknowledged: that of overinterpreting a temporal coincidence as a deliberate and coordinated strategy, when some of the documented events could, strictly speaking, be part of dynamics that are partially independent of one another.

This column accepts this risk by explicitly acknowledging it, rather than concealing it behind a façade of certainty: the documented convergence of the cited sources makes this continuous narrative plausible and defensible, without turning it into an absolute certainty. Connecting the dots means risking seeing a pattern that doesn’t exist; it is also, at times, the only way to see the pattern that truly exists.

Only the future can confirm or refute this

Only continued observation over the coming months will confirm whether this trajectory of gradual coercion—documented in this column based on sources dated July 2026—continues, intensifies, or, conversely, stabilizes without further significant deterioration.

In the interest of methodological rigor, this column is limited to documenting what current sources allow us to establish, without claiming to definitively settle a question that only time—and future events—can truly shed light on.

A Neighbor Directly Affected by the Same Developments

Japan, an immediate neighbor to the waters where Chinese patrols—documented since July 5, 2026—now operate, is watching this trajectory with particular attention: any expansion of China’s naval presence toward Taiwan’s east coast automatically brings this pressure closer to Japan’s own territorial waters and its vital trade routes.

This column notes that coordination between Tokyo and Taipei—though rarely publicly acknowledged in official statements—is an essential contextual factor for understanding the regional scope of the “gray war” documented here, beyond the mere bilateral China-Taiwan framework. Pressure that spreads eastward never stops exactly at the border it initially targeted.

A Still-Cautious Japanese Response

Japan’s official response to this documented expansion remains, at this stage, marked by traditional diplomatic caution; none of the sources consulted for this column provide evidence of a significant shift in Tokyo’s stance during the month of July 2026.

This column merely notes this caution without passing judgment, while emphasizing that, depending on how events unfold in the coming months, it could become increasingly difficult to maintain in the face of pressure that is geographically drawing nearer.

Semiconductors: At the Heart of Global Economic Interests

Taiwan accounts for a significant share of global production of advanced semiconductors—a well-documented fact that turns any sustained disruption in the strait or surrounding shipping lanes into a direct risk to global technology supply chains, far beyond the scope of regional geopolitics alone.

This column observes that this global dependence makes the trajectory of gradual coercion documented here particularly relevant for economic actors who, historically, have rarely spoken out publicly on this sensitive issue. The entire world depends on an island about which it, all too often, avoids taking a clear stance.

An Economic Silence That Raises Questions

This relative silence on the part of major global technology companies regarding the trajectory of tension documented in this column contrasts with their direct operational dependence on Taiwan’s stability—a contradiction that few observers have, until now, articulated so explicitly.

This column chooses to highlight this contradiction without claiming to resolve it, leaving it to the economic actors concerned to clarify—or not—their own position in the face of this pressure, which has been documented month after month since the beginning of 2026.

A Gradual Adaptation to the Pressure

This column notes that the Taiwanese population itself, having faced this ongoing pressure for several years now, has developed a form of psychological adaptation that should not be confused with indifference: rather, it reflects a necessary acclimatization to daily life in a context of constant tension, though this does not erase the underlying anxiety documented by the rise in detentions reported on July 16, 2026.

While this adaptation allows Taiwanese society to continue functioning normally on a day-to-day basis, it should not be interpreted, according to this column, as a sign that the documented pressure is less serious than it actually is. Getting used to living under tension is never proof that the tension has diminished; it is often proof of the opposite.

What Civil Defense Drills Reveal About This State of Mind

The civil defense drills documented on July 21, 2026—including the deliberate slowdown of mobile internet—illustrate precisely this coexistence of apparent normality and real vigilance: the Taiwanese population participates in these drills while, the rest of the time, going about a daily life that appears largely unchanged.

This column views this coexistence as one of the most striking characteristics of contemporary Taiwanese society, shaped by years of managed tension that has never tipped into panic or complete denial.

A vigilance that can no longer be limited to isolated incidents

This column concludes this series of articles with a call for structured vigilance on the part of the West: faced with a trajectory that spans months rather than days, a fragmented, incident-by-incident response is no longer sufficient to grasp the true extent of the documented pressure on Taiwan.

This column calls on Taiwan’s Western partners to view this trajectory as part of a broader picture rather than as a series of scattered reactions—which, according to this text, is the only way to adequately counter a strategy that specifically relies on diverting the opponent’s attention. Responding piecemeal to a strategy designed as a whole is already half the battle lost.

Time as a Decisive Factor

In this context, time does not necessarily work in Taiwan’s and its allies’ favor: every additional month of documented pressure without a structured response reinforces the tactic rather than deterring it—an observation that this column deems necessary to state plainly.

This column concludes on this note of cautious lucidity: documenting the trajectory is not enough to reverse it, but it is a necessary condition for the response—if it comes—to live up to what the facts, month after month, continue to demonstrate.

This column sought to trace, within a coherent historical narrative, the developments documented between July 5 and 21, 2026, concerning Taiwan: the expansion of Chinese patrols, increased maritime activity, a rise in the number of Taiwanese detained in China, a U.S. warning about a possible economic blockade, Taiwanese defense maneuvers, and the deliberate slowing of mobile internet speeds during civil exercises.

The thread linking these events is not a journalistic invention: it is a “gray war,” documented fact by fact, that requires no invasion to produce, month after month, a measurable erosion of Taiwan’s room to maneuver—and which, precisely because it never makes a sudden noise, deserves Western vigilance that does not wane before it does. A war that is never declared is no less a war; it is, perhaps, the most difficult to fight because it never explicitly demands a response.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist