COLUMN: Taiwan Is Already Rehearsing for the Day the Cables Are Cut

A scenario that anticipates a cyberwar as much as a physical blockade

On July 21, 2026, according to Reuters, Taiwan conducted civil defense exercises that deliberately included a test to slow down mobile internet—a measure that anticipates a scenario in which the island’s digital connectivity would be directly targeted, whether through deliberate Chinese action or as a result of a naval blockade affecting undersea communication cables.

This anticipation of a hybrid war combining military pressure and digital disruption illustrates an evolution in Taiwan’s defense doctrine, which now incorporates unconventional conflict scenarios beyond the direct military confrontation traditionally anticipated.

What These Preparations Reveal About Taiwan’s Assessment of the Threat

These methodical preparations, publicly documented by the Taiwanese authorities themselves, reveal an internal threat assessment deemed serious and imminent enough to warrant concrete exercises directly involving the civilian population, rather than limiting themselves to purely military scenarios reserved for the armed forces. Preparing the civilian population for an internet outage is never a trivial exercise; it is an implicit admission that a government considers this scenario likely enough to warrant the concern that such an exercise inevitably generates.

This relative transparency regarding preparations for a crisis scenario—rather than complete concealment—could also be intended to send a deterrent signal to Beijing regarding Taiwan’s level of preparedness in the face of any attempt at gradual pressure.

A Critical Dependence on Energy Imports

Taiwan’s economy remains structurally dependent on energy imports, particularly liquefied natural gas and oil, which are transported almost exclusively by sea—a vulnerability that any blockade scenario, even a partial one, would directly exploit to exert rapid economic and social pressure on the Taiwanese population and government.

This critical energy dependence, documented by several regional economic analyses, constitutes one of the main structural vulnerabilities that Chinese military planners might seek to exploit in a scenario of gradual pressure rather than a costly frontal invasion.

The Semiconductor Industry: A Global Issue Beyond Taiwan

Beyond its own economy, Taiwan is home to a significant share of global production of advanced semiconductors, a sector whose disruption—even if temporary—would have global economic consequences far exceeding the purely regional scope of the Taiwan-China conflict. Blockading Taiwan would never be merely a matter of blockading an island; it would mean disrupting a significant portion of the technology supply chain that powers the entire global economy.

This global dimension of the Taiwan issue partly explains the direct strategic interest that the United States and other Western powers have in the island’s stability, beyond mere traditional regional geopolitical considerations.

A growing concern documented by several capitals

According to diplomatic analyses published alongside these developments, several Western capitals are observing with growing concern this intensification of Chinese pressure surrounding Taiwan, seeing in it a troubling parallel to the incremental strategies observed elsewhere in other contemporary geopolitical theaters, particularly in Eastern Europe.

Although this concern is rarely expressed in firm public statements—to avoid a direct diplomatic escalation with Beijing—it is nonetheless reflected in intensified consultations among Western partners regarding possible response scenarios in the event of a Taiwan crisis.

The Limits of Current Western Deterrence

This column notes, however, that current Western deterrence against gradual Chinese action against Taiwan remains structurally more complex to articulate than deterrence against a conventional frontal invasion, precisely because the gradual and ambiguous nature of a blockade makes it more difficult to identify a clear threshold justifying a coordinated and immediate Western response. Deterring an invasion is relatively simple: one need only promise a response to a clearly identifiable act. Deterring a gradual stranglehold is far more difficult, as there is never a single moment when one can say that the line has been crossed.

This complexity of deterrence in the face of a gradual scenario is precisely the strategic advantage that Beijing would seek to exploit, according to several analysts in the region, by preferring gradual pressure to a direct confrontation that is immediately identifiable as an act of war.

Lessons explicitly drawn by Taiwanese planners

According to statements reported by the regional press, several Taiwanese defense officials have explicitly cited lessons learned from observing the Russia-Ukraine conflict to adapt their own defense doctrine in response to a scenario of gradual Chinese pressure, particularly regarding the importance of critical infrastructure resilience and civil preparedness.

This parallel, drawn directly by the Taiwanese authorities themselves, illustrates a keen awareness that the strategies of gradual pressure observed in other contemporary conflicts could be applied—with adaptations—to the specific context of the Taiwan Strait.

The Structural Differences That Limit This Parallel

This article notes, however, significant structural differences between the two contexts: Taiwan’s island nature, unlike Ukraine’s mainland territory, makes a scenario involving a maritime and digital blockade more plausible than a conventional ground invasion, which explains why Taipei prioritizes preparedness for gradual strangulation rather than direct frontal confrontation.

This unique geographical feature of Taiwan, documented by several comparative military analyses, justifies a tailored defense doctrine that differs significantly from the one developed by Ukraine in the face of a direct, frontal continental threat. Two islands, two possible wars; but a single shared lesson: that a gradual aggressor always tests resolve first before testing weapons.

A disruption that would extend far beyond the Indo-Pacific region alone

A scenario involving even a partial blockade around Taiwan would have well-documented consequences for global supply chains, particularly in the technology and electronics sectors, which rely heavily on Taiwanese semiconductors—a disruption that would directly affect Western and Asian economies far beyond the immediate regional theater. A crisis centered on an island the size of Taiwan may seem distant—until the day it brings production of half the electronic devices the entire world uses daily to a halt.

This global economic dimension of the potential crisis constitutes an additional argument, according to several economic analysts, for preventive Western diplomatic action aimed at deterring any Chinese escalation before it materializes into actual action.

Diversification Efforts Already Underway in Some Western Countries

Faced with this vulnerability, which has been recognized for several years, several Western countries—notably the United States—have already begun efforts to diversify their semiconductor supply, seeking to reduce their critical dependence on Taiwanese production before a potential crisis makes this dependence strategically problematic.

These diversification efforts, although underway for several years, remain far from sufficient to completely eliminate the West’s dependence on Taiwan in the short or medium term, according to several sector-specific analyses of the semiconductor industry.

A population that has lived with this threat for decades

The Taiwanese population, which has faced the Chinese threat in various forms for decades, has developed a form of psychological resilience documented by several regional sociological studies, though this resilience does not completely eliminate the anxiety caused by the recent intensification of signs of Chinese pressure observed over the past several months.

This collective resilience—real but not absolute—is evident, in particular, in the population’s active participation in recently conducted civil defense drills, rather than in indifference or denial regarding the potential gravity of the current situation.

What These Exercises Reveal About Collective Psychological Preparedness

Beyond their obvious practical dimension, these civil defense drills also play an important psychological role by normalizing, for the Taiwanese population, the idea that preparing for a potential crisis is a collective responsibility rather than a source of anxiety to be avoided. Accustoming a population to contemplating the worst-case scenario is never an admission of weakness; on the contrary, it is a necessary condition for ensuring that society does not collapse if the worst does indeed come to pass.

This psychological normalization of collective preparedness, as evidenced by the observed participation in recent drills, constitutes a factor of societal resilience that could prove decisive in a scenario of prolonged crisis in the face of gradual Chinese pressure.

The Lack of Evidence of a Formal Chinese Decision to Impose a Blockade

This column must clearly state its limitations: at this stage, there is no documented evidence of a formal decision by Chinese authorities to impose an actual blockade on Taiwan, and all the observations reported in this text pertain to warning signs and defensive preparations, not to confirmation of a Chinese intention that has already been decided upon and implemented.

This distinction between warning signs and confirmation of intent must be strictly maintained by any serious journalistic coverage of this issue, lest it contribute to a rhetorical escalation that is disproportionate to the currently verifiable facts.

The Need for Continuous Monitoring Rather Than a Premature Conclusion

This column recommends continuous monitoring of the evolution of Chinese naval activity around Taiwan and of Taiwan’s defensive preparations, rather than a premature conclusion about the exact nature of China’s intentions, which cannot be established with greater certainty until new developments occur in the coming weeks and months. An honest analysis must acknowledge what it does not yet know; it is precisely this honesty that distinguishes a serious analysis from a prediction disguised as certainty.

This methodological caution does not preclude clearly identifying the troubling signals documented by available sources, while avoiding the transformation of these signals into a categorical assertion about a Chinese intention that remains, at this stage, unconfirmed by a direct primary source.

A Long-Standing U.S. Strategic Ambiguity

For decades, the United States has maintained a stance of official strategic ambiguity regarding its precise commitment to defend Taiwan in the event of direct Chinese aggression—a stance intended to deter Beijing without formally guaranteeing automatic U.S. military intervention under all circumstances. Never promise, never rule out: this U.S. ambiguity has worked for decades, but it has never been tested against a strategy as gradual as the one now being considered by Beijing.

This strategic ambiguity, documented since the 1970s, could prove particularly ill-suited to a scenario of gradual blockade, precisely because such a scenario never presents the clear, identifiable moment that would traditionally trigger a decisive U.S. military response.

Internal U.S. Debates on Clarifying This Posture

According to recently published foreign policy analyses, several voices within the U.S. security establishment are calling for greater clarification of this U.S. posture toward Taiwan, arguing that excessive ambiguity could, paradoxically, encourage rather than deter a gradual Chinese strategy that specifically exploits this uncertainty.

This internal U.S. debate, documented by several think tanks specializing in the Indo-Pacific region, illustrates the difficulty of adapting a deterrence doctrine designed for a conventional invasion scenario to the reality of a more gradual and ambiguous threat now being considered.

Growing Investment in Asymmetric Capabilities

Faced with the disproportionate conventional military strength of mainland China, Taiwan has increasingly invested in asymmetric military capabilities, designed to make any attempt at a blockade or invasion costly rather than to directly match China’s conventional military power. Taiwan does not seek to win a conventional war against China; it seeks to make such a war costly enough that Beijing will ultimately prefer never to start one.

This asymmetric strategy, documented in several regional military analyses, draws explicitly on lessons learned from other contemporary conflicts regarding the effectiveness of mobile and dispersed defense capabilities against a conventionally superior military power.

The Limitations of This Approach in the Face of a Blockade Rather Than an Invasion

This asymmetric approach, designed primarily to deter a frontal invasion, could prove less effective in the face of a gradual blockade scenario, which does not necessarily require Chinese forces to enter Taiwanese territory to exert decisive economic and social pressure on the island.

This strategic limitation—implicitly acknowledged by recently conducted civil defense exercises—explains why Taiwan is now investing as much in civil and economic resilience as it is in its strictly defensive military capabilities.

Requests That Go Beyond Military Equipment Alone

According to several statements reported by the regional press, Taiwanese officials are asking their Western partners not only for continued military equipment support, but also for enhanced coordination on economic and digital resilience in the face of a scenario involving a gradual blockade—an aspect of support that is often less visible than arms deliveries but is considered just as essential by Taipei.

This broader request, documented by several diplomatic exchanges reported in the regional press, reflects Taiwan’s sophisticated understanding of the multidimensional nature of the threat it anticipates, which goes beyond the conventional military dimension alone.

The Sensitive Issue of Greater Diplomatic Recognition

Beyond material support, some Taiwanese officials are also advocating—with diplomatic caution—for greater international recognition of their status, a request that remains politically sensitive for most Western partners, who are careful not to provoke a direct diplomatic escalation with Beijing on this specific issue. Every diplomatic gesture toward Taiwan is weighed very carefully by Western capitals, which are aware that one step too far could turn a gradual tension into a direct confrontation.

This Western diplomatic caution, evidenced by the general restraint observed in official statements on Taiwan’s status, illustrates the difficulty of balancing concrete support with the need to avoid an unwanted diplomatic escalation with China.

Historical precedents that are rarely resolved quickly

Military history documents several precedents of prolonged naval blockades in other geopolitical contexts; these precedents generally show that this type of strategy, even if partially effective economically, rarely results in the rapid surrender of the besieged party, which is often able to adapt and hold out longer than the aggressor initially anticipated.

These historical precedents, documented by several studies of comparative military strategy, suggest that a potential Chinese blockade of Taiwan—even a prolonged one—would not necessarily guarantee the political outcome Beijing hopes for in the short term.

What This Implies for Assessing the Current Risk

This historical perspective—without downplaying the real gravity of the current risk documented by recent signals observed around Taiwan—calls for a nuanced interpretation that avoids both immediate doomsday scenarios and excessive complacency in the face of a real threat, the outcome of which, should it materialize, would remain fundamentally uncertain for all parties involved.

This nuanced interpretation, based on historical comparison rather than on immediate speculation alone, constitutes the methodological approach this column favors for assessing a scenario whose actual outcome remains, by its very nature, impossible to predict with certainty at this stage. History never repeats itself exactly; it merely reminds us that those who lay siege almost always underestimate the resilience of those they believed to be already defeated.

A continuation of gradual pressure rather than a sudden escalation

Based on all the indicators documented in this column, the scenario deemed most likely in the short term remains a continuation of gradual Chinese pressure, rather than a sudden escalation toward a complete blockade or an invasion—an assessment shared by several regional analysts consulted for this column.

This assessment, which is cautious for methodological reasons, does not, however, rule out a sudden acceleration should regional or global geopolitical circumstances change significantly in the coming months.

Factors That Could Accelerate or Slow This Trajectory

Several factors could accelerate or slow this trajectory of gradual pressure, notably the evolution of the U.S. stance under the current administration, the state of China’s domestic economy, and parallel developments in other global geopolitical theaters such as Ukraine, the outcome of which could directly influence Beijing’s strategic calculations regarding Taiwan. What is decided in Kyiv today could well—though this is not often acknowledged publicly—influence what Beijing decides to attempt tomorrow with regard to Taiwan.

This interconnection between distinct geopolitical theaters—often underestimated in compartmentalized regional analyses—is one of the most important lessons this column draws from a cross-examination of the situation in Taiwan and the current global geopolitical context.

Through its civil defense drills and methodical preparations, Taiwan is already rehearsing a scenario in which communication lines are cut and sea lanes are gradually closed off—without any Chinese warship having officially crossed a line that could be clearly identified as an act of direct aggression. This column documents a real rise in tension, as measured by the increase in Chinese naval activity and Taiwan’s defensive preparations, though it cannot assert that this tension will necessarily lead to the crisis that Taipei anticipates.

What this column establishes with certainty is that the preparations themselves—whether or not they materialize into an actual crisis—already constitute a profound transformation of Taiwan’s defensive posture in the face of a threat whose gradual and ambiguous nature complicates any simple response. We never know in advance on which specific day the cables will actually be cut; we only know, by observing Taiwan today, that an entire island is already preparing to face that day.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist