COLUMN: The Decline in U.S. Foreign Aid

A Targeted Withdrawal, Not a Complete Abandonment

This decline in direct aid does not signify a complete abandonment of Ukraine: it coexists with the Patriot manufacturing license granted on July 8, 2026, the extension of the USAI approved on July 9, and the PURL mechanism championed by European allies—three instruments that, together, form a support framework more complex than a simple figure for direct disbursements.

A reorientation rather than a halt

This represents more of a reorientation of funding channels—from direct budgetary grants toward commercial and indirect mechanisms—than an outright halt to U.S. support for Ukraine and its other allies around the world, a crucial distinction to avoid an overly alarmist interpretation of these raw figures.

A Global Policy, Not Just a Ukrainian One

This cut affects U.S. foreign aid as a whole, not just Ukraine, suggesting a broader policy of reducing federal spending on international aid under the second Trump administration, rather than a specific targeting of Kyiv. Treating this cut as a punishment directed at Ukraine would be inaccurate; it is a global policy that impacts this war without being exclusively aimed at it.

A Clear Domestic Budget Priority

This policy is accompanied by a stated priority for U.S. domestic spending, as exemplified by the Pentagon’s $1.5 trillion budget and the Golden Dome missile defense project—two priorities that are absorbing an increasing share of this administration’s budgetary attention at the expense of more traditional international aid programs.

The Ankara Summit and Its 140 Billion Euros

On July 8, 2026, NATO allies meeting in Ankara pledged to provide Ukraine with 70 billion euros per year in 2026 and 2027—for a total of 140 billion euros—a commitment presented as a direct response to the U.S. budget cutback documented by the Pew Research Center.

A Commitment Only Partially Fulfilled to Date

Approximately 40% of this amount does not represent new funding, and only about 10 billion euros had actually been disbursed as of April 30, 2026, illustrating a persistent gap between diplomatic announcements and the budgetary reality on the ground. A promise of 140 billion euros makes a strong impression in a summit press release; only the actual disbursement figures will, over time, reveal whether this promise lived up to its commitments.

A Doubling Approved Against the Grain

Against this general backdrop of retrenchment, the vote on July 9, 2026—which approved, by a vote of 26 to 1, the doubling of the USAI ceiling from $300 million to $500 million—constitutes a notable exception that deserves to be highlighted in this column.

Why This Exception Does Not Contradict the Overall Trend

This exception does not contradict the general downward trend; rather, it illustrates that a bipartisan consensus persists on targeted, precisely defined funding lines that directly benefit the U.S. defense industry itself. A 26-to-1 consensus in a Senate so divided on nearly everything else deserves to be noted as the exception that, by contrast, underscores the extent of disagreement elsewhere.

A European Response to Fill the U.S. Void

According to figures from the Kiel Institute reported by RBC-Ukraine, the cumulative increase in allied defense budgets totals approximately $258 billion for 2025 and 2026, with Germany contributing 11.5 billion euros, the United Kingdom and Norway at 7.6 billion euros—of which about 80% is directly allocated to weapons delivered to Ukraine—leading this budgetary effort.

An effort that does not fully fill the gap left

Despite its scale, this combined European effort does not fully fill the budgetary void left by the direct U.S. withdrawal, particularly regarding the persistent shortfall of 2,000 Patriot interceptors per year on Ukrainian soil—a gap that neither European funds nor the manufacturing license announced in Ankara will instantly fill. A shortfall of 2,000 interceptors per year cannot be resolved simply by signing a license; it takes months, sometimes years, to turn an industrial authorization into delivered munitions.

What This Decline Means on the Ground

Behind these percentages and billions lies a more concrete reality: every dollar of reduced direct aid potentially means fewer air defense systems available to protect Ukraine’s civilian population from ongoing Russian bombardments, though no available source allows us to attribute a specific casualty to this particular budget cut.

A Necessary Caution Regarding This Interpretation

While this human-centered interpretation is legitimate, it must be handled with caution: the drop in direct U.S. aid does not automatically or immediately translate into an equivalent reduction in Ukraine’s overall defense capabilities, given the other funding mechanisms still in place—notably the PURL and European bilateral commitments—which continue to operate in parallel with this direct U.S. withdrawal. Linking a budget figure to a direct human consequence is tempting, but rarely as simple as the temptation suggests; factual caution must take precedence over rhetorical effect.

The Thune-Graham Standoff Over Sanctions

On July 16, 2026, Senator John Thune proposed adding a provision to a bill that combines additional aid with strengthened sanctions against Russia—a measure also supported by Senator Lindsey Graham—which specifically targets buyers of Russian oil. Proponents view this measure as an economic lever that complements direct military aid.

Real Progress, but an Outcome Still Uncertain

According to Fakti, this bill made progress in the Senate on July 22, 2026, though this does not guarantee rapid passage or a significant reversal of the general trend toward direct budget cuts observed since the beginning of the year. Progress in the Senate does not equate to passage; between the two often lie weeks—sometimes months—of negotiations that may just as easily succeed as they may fail.

Aid That Has Already Experienced Ups and Downs

U.S. aid to Ukraine has already experienced significant fluctuations since 2022, particularly during previous congressional deadlocks that delayed the passage of aid packages—which all observers of the Ukraine situation have deemed urgent since the start of the war—by several months.

What Sets the Current Setback Apart from Previous Ones

The current impasse differs from these previous ones in its scale and in the fact that it is accompanied by an explicit shift in policy, rather than a mere temporary procedural delay linked to the vagaries of the parliamentary calendar. A parliamentary delay always eventually resolves itself; a shift in policy, however, does not resolve itself in the same way, because it reflects a deliberate political will rather than a mere scheduling glitch.

A diplomatic approach that adapts without complaining publicly

In his public statements, President Volodymyr Zelensky has avoided directly criticizing this decline in direct U.S. aid, preferring instead to emphasize the alternative mechanisms available—a diplomatic stance consistent with the need to preserve relations with Washington, a balance that Kyiv has managed with consistent pragmatism since 2022.

An active search for compensation through other channels

This diplomacy of active compensation illustrates how Kyiv is navigating this shift in U.S. policy by relying more on the PURL mechanism and European commitments rather than on a hypothetical return to the previous model of direct grants. Adapting without complaining publicly is a risky strategy: it preserves the relationship with Washington, but it also leaves little public leverage to reverse the trend if it continues.

The future trajectory remains uncertain

Nothing in the sources available to date allows us to state with certainty that this decline will continue at the same pace in the coming months, nor whether the ongoing Senate standoff will succeed in significantly mitigating its impact.

The true extent of the impact remains to be assessed with the benefit of hindsight

The true impact of this decline on Ukraine’s defense capabilities can only be assessed with the benefit of hindsight in the coming months, once all European and American compensation mechanisms have produced tangible results on the ground. Today’s figures are merely a snapshot; only the trajectory over the coming months will reveal whether this decline represents a bottom or merely a step toward an even deeper withdrawal.

A Shift That Benefits the Industry Rather Than the Taxpayer

This shift toward commercial mechanisms such as PURL and USAI directly benefits the U.S. defense industry, which continues to produce and sell military equipment while reducing the direct budgetary burden borne by U.S. taxpayers themselves. A dollar saved by U.S. taxpayers is not necessarily a dollar lost to U.S. industry; it simply changes its accounting trajectory, from a grant to a sale.

A domestic economic effect that explains the persistence of certain funding programs

This domestic economic effect partly explains why certain funding lines, such as the USAI, are bucking the general downward trend: they benefit American jobs and businesses, making them politically easier to maintain than a pure grant with no local economic return. A dollar that returns to an American factory is easier to justify to voters than a dollar that leaves with no visible return; this logic explains part of what survives budget cuts.

A Partnership Being Redefined Amid Budgetary Constraints

This decline in direct U.S. aid is forcing a redefinition of the transatlantic partnership, in which European allies and Canada are shouldering a growing share of the direct funding for this war—a shift in the balance that was not necessarily anticipated on this scale just two or three years ago.

A Redefinition Not Without Tension

This redefinition is not without tension: several European voices—though not always cited publicly—are expressing frustration at what they perceive as a U.S. disengagement that presents them with a budgetary fait accompli rather than a balanced negotiation. Frustration that is rarely voiced aloud remains a real frustration; European diplomatic silence should not be confused with an absence of tension over this budgetary issue.

This article traced a documented 98% drop in direct U.S. aid to Ukraine between 2023 and 2026—a decline that is part of a broader policy of reducing U.S. foreign aid worldwide, though it does not amount to a complete withdrawal of support for Kyiv.

Between the void left by this direct budgetary cut and the compensatory mechanisms put in place by European allies and through targeted programs such as the USAI, the equation for Western funding of this war remains, to date, incomplete and fragile. A 98% drop in funding can never be fully offset by other channels; it always leaves a gap, and it is this gap—which remains poorly quantified—that will determine the course of this war.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist