OPEN LETTER: Beijing Is Normalizing Its Military Presence in the Pacific; the West Must Respond

The September 2024 Missile Launch in the Pacific

We have to go back to September 2024 to understand the magnitude of the change. China launched an intercontinental ballistic missile directly into the Pacific Ocean, a rare move that immediately sparked diplomatic protests from several countries in the region, including Australia and New Zealand.

This type of test launch, historically uncommon outside of China’s usual test sites, was interpreted by Western intelligence agencies as a demonstration of range and accuracy intended for both technical and political purposes.

A Circumnavigation That Is Far from Trivial

In the wake of this, Chinese ships completed a full circumnavigation of Australia—a deployment that tested Australia’s surveillance capabilities while sending a clear message about the operational reach of the Chinese navy in the Southern Hemisphere.

Taken together, the missile launch and the circumnavigation form a strategic diptych: demonstrating that China can strike from afar and that it can sail anywhere. These are two distinct messages directed at the same Western audience.

One might like to believe these are mere coincidences in the military calendar, but after fifteen months of a growing number of similar incidents, the notion of chance no longer holds water.

A Presence Officially Intended for Humanitarian Purposes

The report also documents the deployment of Chinese hospital ships and large amphibious vessels in the South Pacific, officially for humanitarian and disaster relief missions. These missions, which appear benevolent on the surface, also serve to normalize the Chinese Navy’s physical presence in ports it did not previously visit.

New Zealand’s Ministry of Defense has also refused to publicly identify a specific type of vessel deployed, citing a risk to national security if the information were made public—which speaks volumes about the sensitivity of the matter.

Space Event Support Ships

Even more troubling, the document mentions “space mission support ships”—vessels capable of tracking rocket launches, satellites, and intercontinental ballistic missile activity. Their presence in the South Pacific significantly expands China’s surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities in a region previously underserved by this type of infrastructure.

This is no longer just a matter of traditional naval presence. It is an extension of China’s strategic surveillance network into an ocean that the West had considered relatively secure.

I’ll put it bluntly: when a supposedly humanitarian ship is also used to track missile launches, we’re no longer talking about international cooperation—we’re talking about methodical preparation.

Technical Compliance with the Law, Criticism of the Spirit

New Zealand did not cry foul. Its Department of Defense acknowledged that China’s February 2025 deployment was technically in compliance with international law. However, it nevertheless publicly emphasized that China’s notification practices fell short of the standards expected among responsible powers.

This diplomatic nuance reflects a broader reality: Pacific democracies seek to document and denounce such actions without provoking an escalation they do not want. It is a difficult but necessary balancing act.

Doubling the Defense Budget

The concrete response came with New Zealand’s 2025 Defense Capabilities Plan, published in April 2026. Wellington is committed to increasing its military spending from 1% to 2% of gross domestic product over eight years—approximately nine billion New Zealand dollars, including five billion U.S. dollars over the next four years alone.

This plan explicitly cites China as the primary regional strategic threat—unusually direct language for a country that has long pursued a cautious, non-aligned foreign policy.

To
see a country as measured as New Zealand explicitly name China in an official document is proof that diplomatic caution has reached its limits.

112 vertical launch cells

The technical specifications of the Chinese ships observed in the region warrant closer examination. The Type 055 cruiser, deployed in February 2025, is equipped with 112 vertical launch cells—a strike capability that far exceeds that of most Western vessels of comparable tonnage.

This firepower concentrated on a single ship illustrates China’s ambition to project credible force far from its shores, in waters where it historically had no significant presence.

An anti-ship missile range of 540 nautical miles

According to assessments previously reported by New Zealand Defense Minister Judith Collins, the anti-ship missiles carried on these vessels have a range of approximately 540 nautical miles. She had described this shift in posture as “certainly a change”—a cautious way of referring to what is, in reality, a seismic shift in the regional balance of power.

In practical terms, this range means that Chinese ships positioned in certain areas of the South Pacific could threaten targets well beyond their direct line of sight, significantly complicating Australian and New Zealand defense planning.

One
hundred twelve vertical launch cells is not an abstract number for military analysts; it is the difference between a patrol ship and a full-fledged warship.

Dual-Use Infrastructure

Beyond one-off naval deployments, the report and several complementary analyses point to a longer-term concern: China’s development of dual-use ports and airports in the Pacific islands. This infrastructure, funded and built under the guise of economic cooperation, could eventually be transformed into fully operational military bases.

This is the scenario that Western strategists fear the most, as it represents a structural and largely irreversible shift in the regional balance of power—unlike temporary naval deployments, which always eventually withdraw.

A Precedent Already Seen Elsewhere

This model is not new. It echoes the Chinese strategy deployed in other regions of the world, where civilian port investments have gradually taken on a military dimension. Western partners in the Pacific, wary of these precedents, are now closely monitoring every new infrastructure project funded by Beijing in small island nations.

However, vigilance is not always enough. Several of these island states have real economic needs that the West sometimes struggles to meet as quickly as China does.

I believe this is where the West is losing ground most quietly: not on the high seas, but in port construction contracts signed far from the cameras.

A Language of Sovereignty and Security

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the state-run Global Times, quickly responded to the revelations in the New Zealand report. Beijing asserts that the development of its military capabilities “is not aimed at any specific country” and that its sole objective is to “safeguard China’s national sovereignty, security, and development interests.”

This is a phrase Beijing uses systematically, regardless of the region of the world affected by its military deployments, from the South China Sea to the South Pacific.

The Discrepancy Between Words and Actions

The problem is that this reassuring rhetoric does not match the actual experience of neighboring countries. Insufficient advance notice before live-fire exercises, missile-tracking ships disguised as humanitarian missions, a fleet spotted far from its usual areas of operation—these are not the actions of a power concerned solely with its own internal security.

China’s official rhetoric and the operational reality documented by New Zealand intelligence tell two different stories, and it is precisely this discrepancy that fuels the growing mistrust among Pacific democracies.

No one should be naive enough to take at face value the talking points of a regime that has never demonstrated transparency regarding its military intentions.

A Region Long Neglected Strategically

For decades, the South Pacific was viewed by major Western powers as a stable periphery, far removed from major geopolitical fault lines. This perception allowed China to gradually establish a foothold there, often through bilateral agreements with small island nations that lacked the resources to resist China’s economic offers.

The result is a region where Chinese influence has taken root with almost no coordinated opposition—until incidents like the one in February 2025 forced a broader realization of the situation.

An Issue That Goes Beyond Australia and New Zealand

What is at stake in the Pacific directly concerns the United States, whose strategic bases depend on sea and air routes crossing this region. It also concerns Japan, South Korea, and all Indo-Pacific democracies, which are closely watching how the West responds to this expansion.

If the West allows the South Pacific to become an uncontested zone of Chinese influence, the signal sent to other disputed regions—from Taiwan to the South China Sea—will be catastrophic for the credibility of any future deterrence.

I repeat this because it is fundamental: ceding strategic ground in a corner of the world that we consider peripheral always ends up costing us more elsewhere down the road.

Early Vigilance Rather Than Late Reaction

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine taught the West a bitter lesson: ignoring early warning signs is infinitely more costly than taking action early on. Russia had been escalating its acts of intimidation and minor violations well before February 2022, and much of the Western world chose to downplay these signals until it was too late to effectively prevent the invasion.

The parallel with China in the Pacific is not an exaggeration. Insufficiently notified missile launches, a growing naval presence, and dual-use infrastructure are all early warning signs that recent history teaches us never to overlook.

A coalition of democracies, not an isolated power

The Ukrainian resistance has also demonstrated the strength of a united democratic coalition in the face of an authoritarian aggressor. President Volodymyr Zelensky has succeeded in mobilizing broad and sustained Western support, proving that a coordinated response remains possible even against a nuclear power.

The Pacific needs the same coalition-based approach among Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and the United States, rather than scattered and inconsistent national responses to a common threat.

I firmly believe that Zelensky has shown the entire world what it means to stand up to an aggressor, and this lesson applies fully to how the Pacific must think about itself today.

A Convergence of Regimes Hostile to the Western Order

China is not acting alone in its opposition to the Western-led international order. Iran is pursuing its own destabilizing regional ambitions in the Middle East, while North Korea continues to develop its ballistic and nuclear arsenals in flagrant violation of United Nations resolutions. These regimes share a common interest: undermining the credibility and cohesion of Western democracies.

The growing military cooperation between Russia and North Korea in the context of the war in Ukraine illustrates the extent to which these authoritarian axes reinforce one another, transforming isolated regional crises into a broader systemic challenge.

The Pacific as a New Front in This Systemic Challenge

In this context, the normalization of China’s military presence in the South Pacific should not be analyzed in isolation. It is part of a broader dynamic in which several authoritarian powers are simultaneously testing the West’s resilience and resolve on several distinct geographic fronts.

A fragmented response—one that treats the Pacific, Ukraine, and the Middle East as completely separate issues—risks underestimating the coordinated nature of this challenge.

Investing in Surveillance and Transparency

The first practical response is to strengthen the maritime and aerial surveillance capabilities of Pacific democracies. The New Zealand report itself was only made public through a freedom of information request, which raises a legitimate question about the level of transparency Western governments should adopt when dealing with these issues.

Greater transparency, far from weakening the deterrent posture, generally strengthens democratic cohesion by informing citizens of the real challenges their countries face.

Providing Economic Support to Pacific Island Nations

The best defense against Chinese influence in small island nations remains a credible and competitive Western offer in terms of economic development and infrastructure. Without a concrete alternative, these countries will logically continue to accept Chinese investments, even when they entail long-term strategic risks.

Australia, New Zealand, and the United States have begun to ramp up their regional aid programs, but the gap with China’s investment capabilities remains considerable and requires a sustained effort over several years.

An open letter alone does not solve anything, but if it prompts even one decision-maker to read this report in its entirety, it will already have served a purpose.

A Trump Administration Sending Mixed Signals

The U.S. position under President Donald Trump’s administration remains a key factor in the cohesion of the Western response in the Pacific. Washington has maintained its military presence in the region and continues to support its Australian and New Zealand allies, but the sometimes transactional signals sent on other international issues are creating legitimate uncertainty among regional partners.

Despite these ambiguities, U.S. military power remains the indispensable pillar of any credible deterrent against Chinese expansion in the Pacific. No regional coalition can currently do without it.

A Necessary Evil for Western Cohesion

I write this with the nuance required by intellectual honesty: Trump remains an unpredictable partner, but his administration has also accelerated certain defense commitments with Indo-Pacific allies. In a world where China is advancing methodically, the West cannot afford to further fragment its strategic unity through internal squabbles.

The priority must remain cohesion in the face of an adversary who, for his part, shows no sign of hesitation in pursuing his long-term regional objectives.

I do not claim to agree with every recent U.S. decision, but I acknowledge that without Washington, there is currently no credible deterrent in the Pacific.

A Direct Link Between the South Pacific and the Taiwan Strait

It would be naive to completely separate China’s military expansion in the South Pacific from the Taiwan issue. Every new secure maritime route and every dual-use port developed in the Pacific islands strengthens Beijing’s ability to sustain a prolonged military operation in the event of a crisis involving Taiwan.

Western strategists are well aware of this: a South Pacific under increased Chinese influence significantly complicates U.S. and allied logistics in the event of a direct confrontation in the Taiwan Strait—a scenario that Washington and Tokyo continue to view as the most likely crisis of the coming decade.

Discreet but Methodical Preparation

Nothing in the New Zealand report indicates an immediate offensive intent against Taiwan. But the buildup of infrastructure, surveillance networks, and naval presence in the South Pacific is creating a strategic environment increasingly favorable to Beijing, regardless of the political outcome of the Taiwan issue.

It is this long-term dimension that should be of greatest concern to Western defense planners, far more so than any isolated incident with insufficient warning.

I do not believe in strategic coincidences: every secure port in the South Pacific today is a card that Beijing could play tomorrow in the Taiwan Strait.

Tokyo Strengthens Its Stance Against Beijing

Japan has significantly accelerated the buildup of its defense capabilities in recent years, a development directly linked to the growing perception of the Chinese threat in the Indo-Pacific region. Tokyo shares a common concern with Wellington and Canberra: that Beijing will normalize an ever-expanding military presence far from its historic shores.

This strategic convergence between Japan, Australia, and New Zealand forms an increasingly coordinated democratic axis, essential for counterbalancing China’s growing influence throughout the Indo-Pacific theater.

South Korea Faces a Two-Front Challenge

South Korea, for its part, must contend with a two-pronged challenge: the immediate North Korean threat at its border and broader Chinese expansion in the region. Seoul has strengthened its military cooperation with Washington and Tokyo, recognizing that strategic isolation in the face of these two combined threats would be untenable in the long term.

This regional security architecture, though still imperfect, remains the best available safeguard against unchallenged Chinese expansion in the Pacific.

Seeing Tokyo and Seoul close ranks despite their historical differences proves that the Chinese threat has a unifying power that Western diplomacy alone could never have achieved.

Tokyo Strengthens Its Stance Against Beijing

Japan has significantly accelerated the buildup of its defense capabilities in recent years, a development directly linked to the growing perception of the Chinese threat in the Indo-Pacific region. Tokyo shares a common concern with Wellington and Canberra: that Beijing will normalize an ever-expanding military presence far from its historic shores.

This strategic convergence between Japan, Australia, and New Zealand forms an increasingly coordinated democratic axis, essential for counterbalancing China’s growing influence throughout the Indo-Pacific theater.

South Korea Faces a Two-Front Challenge

South Korea, for its part, must contend with a two-pronged challenge: the immediate North Korean threat at its border and broader Chinese expansion in the region. Seoul has strengthened its military cooperation with Washington and Tokyo, recognizing that strategic isolation in the face of these two combined threats would be untenable in the long term.

This regional security architecture, though still imperfect, remains the best available safeguard against unchallenged Chinese expansion in the Pacific.

What This Report Forces Us to Acknowledge

This fifteen-page New Zealand report does not herald an imminent war in the Pacific. It documents, with the cold rigor of an intelligence agency, a fundamental trend: the gradual normalization of a Chinese military presence that the West can no longer afford to regard as marginal or temporary.

Recognizing this reality is not giving in to alarmism. It is simply refusing to repeat the mistakes of complacency that preceded other major geopolitical crises of the past decade.

A Call for Collective Clarity

I conclude this letter by addressing you directly, the reader who has taken the time to read this far. The Pacific is not far away. It is the stage for a test of will between Western democracies and an authoritarian regime that is advancing patiently, port by port, ship by ship, missile by missile.

The vigilance documented by Wellington deserves to be shared, discussed, and taken seriously by all Western partners, before normalization becomes irreversible.

If this letter convinces even a handful of Western decision-makers to read this report in its entirety rather than skim the headlines, it will have fulfilled its purpose.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist