A Stealth Missile Designed for the F-35A
The JSM is a fifth-generation stealth cruise missile designed to be carried inside the F-35A’s internal weapons bay, thereby preserving the aircraft’s low radar signature, according to technical details reported by InsideDefense.com. This feature represents a fundamental game-changer in the face of increasingly sophisticated air defenses.
Designed primarily to strike maritime and land targets from a safe distance, the JSM allows Western pilots to engage heavily defended targets without unnecessarily exposing their aircraft—a crucial strategic capability in the context of growing Russian and Chinese threats.
Adoption Extends Beyond the United States
According to Kongsberg itself, the missile has already been selected by Japan, Norway, Australia, Germany, and the United States, making it a truly multinational weapon at the heart of the modern Western arsenal.
This widespread adoption among allied democracies strengthens interoperability among Western forces—a factor that is often underestimated but absolutely critical during joint operations in times of actual crisis.
Seeing so many allied democracies choose the same weapon reassures me of the West’s strategic coherence, even when internal political tensions sometimes give the opposite impression.
The financial details of a contract that spans two fiscal years
Funding spread over two fiscal years
The contract draws on $137,970,866 in funds from the 2024 fiscal year earmarked for the purchase of missiles, as well as $102,933,232 from the 2025 fiscal year, according to the official statement from the Department of War dated June 5, 2026.
This budget allocation across two separate fiscal years illustrates the typical complexity of major Western weapons programs, where multi-year planning remains essential to ensure the continuity of defense industrial production.
A Single-Source Award, Justified by Expertise
The contract was awarded on a sole-source basis, without a competitive bidding process, as Kongsberg is the sole designer, developer, and manufacturer of the JSM, according to FAR Part 6 rules cited by GovConFeed. This type of award remains perfectly legal when no other company can meet the stated requirement.
Far from being an anomaly, this practice simply reflects the industrial reality of the Western defense sector, where certain cutting-edge technologies are mastered by only a very limited number of highly specialized companies.
I have no problem with a sole-source award when it is based on genuine and verifiable technological expertise, rather than on disguised political favoritism.
A delivery schedule extending through 2028
Production Focused in Norway
The work will be carried out in Kongsberg, Norway, and is expected to be completed by November 30, 2028, according to the Pentagon’s press release. This location confirms the central role of the Norwegian defense industry within the NATO military ecosystem.
The decision to keep production in Norway, rather than moving it entirely to the United States, also demonstrates a mutual industrial trust between allies—a trust that is essential to maintaining a diversified and resilient Western defense industrial base.
A Contract That Builds on Lot 1
This new agreement comes more than two years after Kongsberg was awarded the first production contract for Lot 1 in May 2024, worth approximately $141 million, according to InsideDefense.com, confirming the continuity and long-term credibility of this transatlantic industrial partnership.
This contractual continuity—rare in major defense programs, which are often plagued by delays or cancellations—deserves to be commended as an example of relatively effective military project management.
In the defense sector, a defense program that stays on schedule for several consecutive years is almost a feat in itself, and this deserves public recognition.
The total value of the order planned by the Air Force
A Final Target of 263 Missiles
According to InsideDefense.com, the U.S. Air Force’s fiscal year 2027 budget request indicates that the total JSM inventory is expected to ultimately reach 263 missiles, a figure that provides a clear picture of the scale of the precision rearmament effort undertaken by the U.S. Air Force.
The service plans to purchase 100 JSMs next year for approximately $384.6 million, followed by 41 additional missiles in 2028 for $179.56 million, before halting purchases beyond that point according to current budget plans.
One milestone among many in the F-35’s modernization
This ramp-up of the JSM is part of a broader effort to modernize the F-35’s arsenal, where each new weapons capability enhances the overall strategic value of this aircraft platform at the heart of the Western deterrence posture.
Integration of the missile onto the F-35B and F-35C variants is still planned but not yet complete, which means that this contract remains, for the time being, specifically tied to the F-35A program, according to details from GovConFeed.
Seeing such a detailed acquisition plan, with precise figures spread out over several years, convinces me that Western military modernization goes far beyond one-off announcements.
A figure in Norwegian kroner that says it all about the scale
A contract valued at 2.7 billion kroner
Kongsberg itself confirmed the signing of this contract for the delivery of additional missiles, estimating its value at approximately 2.7 billion Norwegian kroner, with deliveries scheduled through the end of 2029, according to the company’s official press release issued on June 8, 2026.
This separate announcement, coming directly from the manufacturer, confirms and supplements the information provided by the Pentagon, reinforcing the credibility of all the data published on this bilateral arms program.
A Tangible Economic Impact for Norwegian Industry
This contract represents a major economic boost for the Norwegian defense industry, consolidating Kongsberg’s position as a key strategic supplier within the Western military supply chain, well beyond Scandinavia’s borders.
This economic dimension also illustrates how Western rearmament directly benefits allied economies, creating skilled jobs and strengthening long-term industrial ties among NATO partners.
I find it reassuring to see that Western rearmament is also translating into tangible economic benefits for allied nations, rather than a one-sided dependence on a single dominant supplier.
The broader strategic context of this rearmament
A Direct Response to Russia’s Ambitions in the Arctic
Norway, Russia’s immediate neighbor in the Far North, occupies a key geostrategic position in the face of the Kremlin’s military ambitions in the Arctic—a region whose strategic importance continues to grow as the ice melts and new sea routes open up.
The strengthening of Norway’s defense industry, through contracts such as the JSM project, is directly aligned with this strategy of deterrence against a Russia whose aggression in Ukraine since 2022 has reminded all of Northern Europe of the urgent need to prepare seriously.
A Credible Deterrent Against China in the Pacific
The adoption of the JSM by allies such as Japan and Australia also illustrates how this weapon fits into a broader Western strategy of deterrence against China’s expansionist ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, where tensions surrounding Taiwan remain a constant source of concern.
This convergence between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters confirms that the West is now approaching its rearmament in a comprehensive manner, linking Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean threats within a coherent—rather than fragmented—defense architecture.
This strategic convergence between the Arctic and the Pacific strikes me as exactly the kind of holistic thinking the West needs to confront adversaries who, for their part, are already coordinating their interests to a large extent.
Trump's Role in Accelerating Western Rearmament
An Administration That Is Boosting Defense Production
It must be acknowledged, without undue flattery, that the Trump administration has maintained and at times accelerated certain military modernization programs inherited from previous administrations, of which this type of contract with NATO allies such as Norway serves as a concrete example.
This continuity in defense priorities—despite the numerous domestic political controversies surrounding this administration—deserves to be credited for what it is: a choice to maintain a credible deterrent posture against the West’s strategic rivals.
Constant Pressure on Allies to Share the Burden
The U.S. administration also continues to push its NATO allies to increase their own defense spending—a pressure that, as diplomatically frustrating as it may be for some European governments, has helped accelerate long-delayed rearmament decisions across the continent.
This type of contract with Norway illustrates precisely how such pressure can translate into concrete industrial partnerships rather than mere declarations of intent at NATO summits.
I give this administration credit for its firm stance on issues of military deterrence, while refusing to turn a blind eye to domestic political excesses, which deserve equally firm criticism.
What This Contract Reveals About the Western Defense Industrial Base
A Supply Chain Put to the Test by Rising Demand
The proliferation of such contracts, against a backdrop of growing global demand for precision-guided munitions, is putting pressure on Western defense supply chains—an industrial challenge that allied governments must address collectively to avoid critical bottlenecks.
Kongsberg’s ability to meet precise delivery deadlines, despite this growing demand, nevertheless demonstrates an industrial resilience that stands in stark contrast to the difficulties encountered by certain other, more high-profile Western weapons programs.
A Model to Be Replicated for Other Critical Capabilities
This partnership between the United States and Norway could serve as a model for other critical military capabilities where the West relies on a limited number of specialized suppliers, thereby reinforcing the need for coordinated industrial investment among allies rather than costly and inefficient duplication.
This approach of embracing industrial specialization, rather than fruitless competition among allies, could well represent the future of Western rearmament—one that is both faster and more financially sustainable in the long term.
I believe that this deliberate industrial specialization among allies, rather than fruitless competition, is precisely the kind of strategic maturity the West needs to stay ahead of its rivals over the long term.
The limitations and gray areas that must also be acknowledged
A Dependence That Carries Its Own Risks
This dependence on a single supplier—however reliable it may have been thus far—carries structural risks: any major disruption to Norwegian production—whether industrial, political, or geopolitical—could directly affect the availability of this capability for all allied air forces that rely on it.
This vulnerability deserves to be taken seriously by Western defense planners, who should consider diversification or licensed production mechanisms to reduce this risk of excessive dependence in the long term.
Budgetary Transparency Still Needs Improvement
Despite the publication of this detailed contractual information, the exact number of missiles delivered under this specific contract remains unclear—a relative lack of transparency that, while not scandalous, warrants further clarification by U.S. authorities to enable more rigorous public oversight of these substantial military expenditures.
This call for transparency does not stem from excessive suspicion toward Western defense institutions, but simply from the basic democratic principle that taxpayers deserve to know exactly what their money is funding.
I refuse to turn this letter into an unqualified endorsement: even a good defense contract deserves a minimum of public scrutiny regarding the details of its implementation.
Why This Contract Deserves Your Attention, Even Away from the Spotlight
A concrete example rather than an abstract promise
In a media landscape saturated with sensational claims about Western rearmament, this $240.9 million contract offers the rare advantage of being verifiable, dated, quantified, and documented by multiple official sources, rather than relying on mere political promises.
This verifiability should, in my view, serve as the standard for evaluating all other discourse on Western rearmament: less rhetoric, more contracts signed, delivered, and publicly documented like this one.
A reminder that deterrence is built over time
Western military deterrence is not built in a day or through a single spectacular contract, but rather through the patient accumulation of solid industrial partnerships like this one, repeated year after year among trusted allies who share the same fundamental democratic values.
It is this quiet but steady accumulation that will ultimately determine whether the West retains or loses its strategic advantage against rivals who, for their part, do not hesitate to invest heavily in their own military capabilities.
I far prefer this quiet accumulation of verifiable contracts to grandiloquent speeches that, all too often, never translate into a single concrete delivery on the ground.
What I Now Expect from Western Decision-Makers
Greater Transparency on Future Deliveries
In this open letter, I call on the U.S. and Norwegian authorities to publish regular, detailed updates on the progress of Lot 2 production, thereby enabling public oversight commensurate with the considerable sums committed to this strategic arms program.
This enhanced transparency would in no way compromise the program’s operational security, while reassuring Western citizens that public funds allocated to their own collective defense are being used appropriately.
Replicating this model with other strategic allies
I also hope that this type of industrial partnership will serve as a model for other similar collaborations with allies such as Poland, Finland, or the Baltic states, whose geographic proximity to Russia makes their industrial integration into Western defense equally strategically essential.
It is these concrete industrial decisions—far more than diplomatic summits or solemn communiqués—that will truly determine the credibility of Western deterrence in the years to come in the face of determined adversaries.
I conclude this letter with the hope that this contract—which today seems almost trivial in the news—will one day be cited as one of the many quiet milestones that enabled the West to preserve its strategic freedom of action.
The Precedent Set by Lot 1 and Lessons for the Future
An initial contract that had already proven its worth
The initial contract for Lot 1, signed in May 2024 for approximately $141 million, had already demonstrated Kongsberg’s ability to deliver on time—a successful track record that directly facilitated the negotiation of this second, larger-scale contract.
This logical progression from one lot to the next—rather than a break or a reevaluation of the partnership—demonstrates the strength of an industrial relationship built on mutual trust and concrete results delivered on time.
Lessons Applicable to Other Defense Programs
Pentagon officials in charge of other defense programs could draw direct inspiration from this incremental approach, in which each additional production batch builds on the measurable results of the previous one rather than on unverified promises.
This methodical approach, while far from spectacular, is nevertheless one of the best guarantees of the long-term credibility of Western rearmament in the face of rivals who, too, are pursuing long-term industrial trajectories.
I see this methodical progression from one batch to the next as proof that industrial discipline—even if less spectacular than grand announcements—remains the true driving force behind sustainable Western rearmament.
What European allies can learn from this
An Example of Successful Industrial Specialization
European governments that are still struggling to coordinate their own defense investments might take note of this U.S.-Norwegian partnership, in which a smaller ally’s deliberate industrial specialization has led to the production of a weapon adopted far beyond its own borders.
This Norwegian success story illustrates that a medium-sized country, properly integrated into the Western defense industrial chain, can play a strategic role disproportionate to its overall population or economic size.
A Call to Invest More in the Defense Industry
This success should encourage other European capitals to invest more decisively in their own defense industrial capabilities, rather than relying exclusively on foreign procurement, which, in the long run, undermines the continent’s strategic autonomy in the face of future crises.
It is precisely this type of coordinated national industrial investment, modeled after the Norwegian approach, that will enable Europe to exert greater influence over its own defense decisions within the Atlantic Alliance.
I hope that the Norwegian example will inspire more European capitals to invest in their own defense industries, rather than simply purchasing solutions already developed elsewhere.
Conclusion: Rearmament is judged by contracts, not by rhetoric
Just one sign among many, but a real one
This $240.9 million contract between the U.S. Air Force and Kongsberg will not, on its own, guarantee the West’s security in the face of its strategic rivals. But it is precisely the kind of concrete, verifiable, and documented evidence our side needs to demonstrate that rearmament is not just an election campaign slogan.
It is through the accumulation of dozens of similar contracts between trusted allies who share the same fundamental values that deterrence is patiently built—a deterrence that, we hope, will continue to protect our democracies against the ambitions of Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang.
A Call for Vigilance and Steadfastness
I conclude this open letter by calling on Western decision-makers to maintain this steadfastness in the years to come, without succumbing either to complacency in the face of the progress made or to fatalism in the face of the scale of the work that still remains to be done to ensure a credible and sustainable deterrent.
History will judge harshly those Western democracies that had the means to seriously rearm but chose—out of complacency or internal division—not to do so in time, despite clearly identified threats.
I sign this letter with the conviction that agreements like this one, repeated and multiplied, will remain the best concrete response the West can offer to those who still doubt its resolve.
Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist
Sources
Primary Sources
Contracts for June 5, 2026 — U.S. War Department, June 5, 2026
KONGSBERG to Deliver More JSM Missiles to the U.S. Air Force — Kongsberg, June 8, 2026
Secondary sources
Air Force Awards $240M for Joint Strike Missile — InsideDefense.com, June 5, 2026
USAF Contracts Kongsberg for $240.9M in Joint Strike Missile Production — SamSearch, June 8, 2026
USAF Selects Kongsberg Joint Strike Missiles for F-35A — Aerospace Global News
This content was created with the help of AI.