PROFILE: General Saltzman and the 30,000 satellites that are set to save the West

Growth on an Industrial Scale

According to projections detailed in Objective Force, the U.S. government’s satellite fleet is set to grow from 7,291 units in 2025 to 30,246 in 2040—a fourfold increase over fifteen years, according to Breaking Defense. The plan structures this growth into three distinct periods: the next five years, the following five years, and the final five years leading up to 2040.

This phased approach allows the Pentagon to align investments with budget cycles, particularly the funding request for fiscal year 2027, which is intended to lay the foundation for the plan’s first five years.

A Direct Comparison with China and Russia

The document makes no secret of the competitive logic underlying it: China, which had 1,871 satellites in 2025, is projected to have 20,913 by 2040, while Russia is expected to increase from 407 to just 1,488 over the same period. These trajectories show that the gap between Washington and Beijing could persist, provided the United States meets its growth commitments.

This statistical overview illustrates a simple strategic reality: tomorrow’s orbital superiority will not be won by a single spectacular launch, but by the industrial capacity to sustain a steady production pace over fifteen years. These raw figures, when viewed side by side, convey one thing that I find reassuring: the West maintains a lead that it must not squander through overconfidence.

Current Personnel Levels Deemed Insufficient

The Space Force currently has approximately 15,094 members, including 10,198 service members—a force that General Saltzman considers significantly insufficient to handle the new missions outlined in the Objective Force. The plan calls for doubling this total force over the next decade.

Saltzman was explicit about this requirement: “The Objective Force we are planning calls for more Guardians—officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians—who are needed to carry out the new missions and meet the operational pace required of the Space Force,” he said, according to Breaking Defense.

Growth That Goes Beyond Simple Recruitment

The general emphasized that increasing personnel numbers alone will not be enough: “To meet mission requirements in the future threat environment, the Space Force must grow significantly over the next five to ten years: thousands of additional Guardians in our final strength, and, equally important, the infrastructure, bases, and training structure to support this growth,” he explained.

This dual requirement—for both personnel and infrastructure—illustrates the complexity of a build-up that cannot be limited to simply hiring more personnel without simultaneously building the physical foundations capable of accommodating them. Recruiting thousands of Guardians without building the accompanying infrastructure would, in my view, be a superficial victory that would mask a real operational void.

A deterrence doctrine without unnecessary escalation

The Objective Force specifies that by 2040, the Space Force must move beyond current attrition-based methods to adopt a “mature combat approach centered on campaign, maneuver, and replenishment that preserves strategic advantage without causing unnecessary escalation,” according to the document cited by Breaking Defense. This wording seeks a delicate balance between firmness and strategic restraint.

The plan explicitly acknowledges that when defensive measures protecting the satellite constellation become insufficient, the service must integrate offensive and defensive anti-satellite capabilities in direct support of joint forces.

Classified details hint at the scope

Precise projections of requirements for orbital warfare and electronic warfare appear only in the classified version of the document, but Saltzman confirmed that the service wants new equipment for both missions. He added: “We will need new capabilities working very closely with U.S. Space Command, as they are broadly responsible for the overall warfare mission.”

This interagency coordination illustrates the maturation of a U.S. space doctrine that now refuses to treat orbit as merely a logistical platform, but rather as a theater of operations in its own right. The fact that the U.S. military is already planning for orbital maneuvering rather than relying solely on passive defense strikes me as a welcome sign of strategic maturity in the face of rivals who lack such restraint.

A Successful Launch That Closes a Chapter

On April 21, 2026, the Space Force successfully launched the GPS III-8 satellite into orbit from Cape Canaveral, thereby completing the active constellation of 32 GPS satellites, according to an official statement from the Department of War. This launch marks the completion of the deployment of the GPS III generation, which is said to be three times more accurate and eight times more resistant to jamming than the previous constellation.

Colonel Ryan Hiserote highlighted the speed of execution: “Collective efforts across the Space Force, and our close collaboration with SpaceX, allowed us to adjust the launch schedule in less than seven weeks—a remarkable achievement compared to traditional timelines.”

Future Technologies Already On Board

The GPS III-8 satellite also served as a test platform for several innovations, including a demonstration of inter-satellite laser communication, a new space-qualified atomic clock, and the first use of a 3D-printed omnidirectional antenna, reducing production costs by nearly 60%. Colonel Stephen A. Hobbs noted that these laser tests “enable us to evaluate next-generation capabilities that can enhance the resilience and responsiveness of our space systems.”

These technical advances—discreet but tangible—show that the modernization of the U.S. military GPS system is progressing in parallel with the broader 2040 plan, delivering results without waiting for the doctrine to be fully finalized. Seeing a 3D-printed antenna flying on a military satellite today convinces me that modernization is not just a conference slogan, but a project already well underway.

The NM-4 Constellation in the Works

Beyond GPS III-8, the Objective Force calls for the construction of a new constellation dubbed NM-4, a low-cost, simplified-design satellite intended to complement the long-lifespan GPS-IIIF satellites. The document specifies that the agency will then develop the architecture for a resilient fourth-generation system for delivery by 2040.

The schedule calls for the construction and launch of the first NM-4 satellites as early as 2035—a deadline that leaves little room for error for such an ambitious program.

A Demanding Operational Availability Goal

The plan sets a clear objective: to ensure that at least 88% of the positioning, navigation, and timing constellation is operationally available more than 98% of the time, despite jamming and spoofing by adversaries. This requirement reflects a keen awareness of the vulnerability of military GPS to modern electronic warfare.

Such a level of resilience, if achieved, would offer Western and allied forces a decisive advantage in an environment where navigational accuracy can mean the difference between victory and operational failure. Setting such a precise numerical target, rather than a vague promise of resilience, strikes me as exactly the kind of rigor required by today’s space competition.

The Space Data Network as the Backbone

Among the most ambitious projects is the Space Data Network, described in the plan as a true space internet connecting military and commercial communications satellites in all orbits. This network is intended to serve as the “backbone” for data transmission in low Earth orbit, an infrastructure deemed essential for future force coordination.

The system is designed to include a family of solutions capable of supporting both legacy narrowband users and new broadband requirements—a technical flexibility that reflects the growing diversity of military space applications.

A Missile Defense Capability on the Rise

The plan also addresses the modernization of missile defense, with an approach that layers early warning and tracking systems. The document acknowledges, however, a degree of uncertainty: “The specific requirements necessary to achieve fire control remain uncertain. If the Space Force builds space-based interceptors or supports their deployment, it should undertake a targeted study on the specifications required to do so.”

This honesty about the program’s gray areas—rather than a promise of total technological certainty—paradoxically strengthens the credibility of the document as a whole. I appreciate that this plan openly acknowledges its own uncertainties rather than touting a technological certainty that does not yet exist.

A Track Record of Accelerated Launches

The System Delta 80’s ability to execute launches on a rapid schedule builds on previous missions dating back to December 2024, with the launch of the GPS III-10 mission, followed by two additional accelerated launches of GPS III satellites. This operational continuity demonstrates that the Space Force has progressively built expertise in responsiveness.

Colonel Hiserote emphasized that “the government’s acquisition strategy and industrial collaboration that led to a common integration standard for GPS III satellites have repeatedly proven to be a strategic foresight that enhances our launch flexibility.”

SpaceX’s Central Role in This Acceleration

Close collaboration with SpaceX has made it possible to adjust launch manifests in record time—an industrial agility that contrasts with the traditional delays often associated with military space programs. This growing reliance on the U.S. private sector illustrates a profound transformation of the Pentagon’s acquisition model.

This alliance between the military public sector and private-sector innovation is, in the view of many observers, one of America’s key assets in the space race against more rigid state-run systems. This synergy between the Pentagon and private industry remains, I believe, the structural advantage most difficult for rivals—who rely on slower bureaucracies—to replicate.

Areas Deliberately Left Vague

Despite its scope, the Objective Force does not specify an exact target number of Guardians for 2040, settling instead for a goal of doubling the force over ten years. This lack of precision, far from being insignificant, raises concerns that actual requirements may still exceed what has been made public.

Similarly, the Future Operating Environment accompanying the plan explicitly states that it is not an intelligence assessment and that it describes neither specific threat scenarios nor defined military solutions, which limits the document’s immediate practical relevance for the general public.

A Conceptual Document Rather Than an Operational One

The plan describes itself as “a conceptual vision of a future in which our efforts toward space superiority must contend with new technologies, new threats, new missions, and new ways of waging war,” according to Breaking Defense. This semantic caution reflects a desire not to prematurely lock in technological choices that are still uncertain.

Paradoxically, this transparency regarding the document’s limitations reinforces the credibility of the entire initiative undertaken by General Saltzman and his team. A plan that acknowledges it does not yet know everything strikes me as more honest—and therefore more reliable—than a doctrine that would claim to have all the answers fifteen years in advance.

Funding Related to Fiscal Year 2027

The plan’s first five-year phase aligns with the funding request for fiscal year 2027, a timing that gives Congress immediate budgetary visibility into the Pentagon’s space-related plans. This phased approach avoids a single, risky financial commitment spanning fifteen years.

However, the plan’s next two phases, extending through 2040, will depend on future budget decisions by administrations and a Congress that do not yet exist—a political uncertainty that the document cannot overcome through its technical ambition alone.

A Bet on U.S. Political Continuity

The success of the Objective Force presupposes continuity in strategic priorities across several U.S. election cycles—a gamble that is never a sure thing in a democracy where administrations change and sometimes radically redefine their defense priorities.

This political fragility, inherent in any 15-year plan, is undoubtedly the main structural risk threatening the actual deployment of the promised 30,000 satellites by 2040. The greatest risk to this plan may not be technological but political: that a future administration might decide that space can wait.

A Direct Response to the Rise of Rival Powers

Faced with a China that is increasing its launches and a Russia that continues to develop anti-satellite capabilities, the Objective Force represents the most structured response to date by the leading Western military power to preserve its orbital advantage. It is no coincidence that the document places such emphasis on comparing figures with these two strategic rivals.

In a world where space superiority increasingly determines military superiority on land, in the air, and at sea, investing heavily in space is tantamount to investing in the entire Western defense apparatus. I see this space race as the logical and necessary continuation of Western deterrence, extended into a domain that our rivals are already taking very seriously.

The Price of Staying Ahead

Doubling the Space Force’s personnel and quadrupling its satellite fleet over the next fifteen years represents a considerable budgetary and human effort, but the alternative—a gradual decline in the face of rivals who are less scrupulous about international rules—appears far more costly in the long term for Western collective security.

General Saltzman’s bet is simple: it is better to pay the price of preparedness today than the price of vulnerability tomorrow. I believe that this choice—costly but deliberate—is precisely the kind of strategic decision that the West has sometimes been too slow to make in the past.

A network of suppliers that extends beyond national borders

Beyond SpaceX, the Objective Force relies on a broad industrial ecosystem, combining long-established major contractors with startups specializing in small satellites, sensors, and reusable launch systems. This industrial diversity is an asset that neither China nor Russia can replicate as easily, given the lack of such a dynamic private sector.

The Pentagon is explicitly banking on this diversity of suppliers to avoid dependence on a single player—a lesson learned from past difficulties related to production delays concentrated at a single manufacturer.

Western Allies Partnering in the Effort

The plan also mentions the integration of allied and commercial satellites into the future positioning and navigation architecture, a way to broaden the program’s industrial and political base beyond U.S. borders alone. This cooperative approach strengthens NATO’s cohesion in the space domain, a sector that has long remained on the sidelines of major alliance discussions.

Involving European and Indo-Pacific partners in this expansion of orbital capabilities could transform what was initially a national project into a true collective Western shield—provided that technical and political coordination follows through. I believe the true strength of this plan lies in its ability to become an allied project rather than a mere isolated U.S. initiative.

Ukraine as a Testing Ground for Modern Space Warfare

Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated, in the eyes of many Western strategists, the crucial importance of commercial and military satellite communications for conducting modern operations. The disruptions and jamming attempts suffered by navigation systems in this conflict zone have directly influenced the resilience requirements outlined in the Objective Force.

These lessons partly explain why the plan places such a strong emphasis on resistance to jamming and decoys, rather than simply increasing the number of satellites—a costly lesson learned on an actual battlefield rather than in a simulation exercise.

Vigilance Must Not Waver

Western defense experts regularly point out that today’s technological superiority in no way guarantees that of tomorrow, given how rapidly advances in electronic warfare and anti-satellite systems are progressing among the West’s strategic adversaries. This race has no definitive finish line.

It is precisely this lack of respite that, in the eyes of its advocates, justifies the scale and cost of the plan championed by General Saltzman, in an environment where every year of delay could potentially come at a heavy price on a future battlefield. The conflict in Ukraine has convinced me that neglecting space resilience is tantamount to neglecting the backbone of any modern army, whether ally or adversary.

A generational initiative rather than a mere program

The Objective Force unveiled by General Chance Saltzman goes far beyond the scope of a traditional arms program: it is an attempt to rethink, over the course of an entire generation, how the West occupies and defends space. The success or failure of this ambition will be measured well beyond the term of its current champion.

Between the 30,000 promised satellites, the thousands of Guardians to be recruited and trained, and a doctrine of orbital warfare still under development, the road to 2040 promises to be long and fraught with budgetary and political obstacles.

One Man, One Plan, One Collective Gamble

General Saltzman’s profile ultimately reveals an officer who has chosen transparency over rhetorical excess, preferring to acknowledge the uncertainties of his own plan rather than promise absolute and immediate space dominance.

It remains to be seen whether Congress, industry, and future administrations will share this same discipline over the long term, for no plan—no matter how sound on paper—can survive without consistent funding and political will, which cannot be decreed in advance.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist