EDITORIAL: They call it an election fueled by hate, and they’re not afraid to say so

“A community of dreadful fear and hate”

In response to this quote from 2026, Thom Hartmann cites President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s farewell address, delivered in 1961, in which the general-turned-Republican president warned: “America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.” ” According to this 2026 quote, the very same party that issued this warning in 1961 would go on to explicitly promote what Eisenhower feared. This contrast falls within the realm of editorial argumentation; on its own, it does not prove a continuity of doctrine between two eras of the same party.

Eisenhower also offered a prayer, likewise cited by Hartmann, in which he expressed the hope that “all who are insensitive to the needs of others will learn charity” and that “the scourges of poverty, disease, and ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth,” in a vision of peace guaranteed by “the binding force of mutual respect and love.” This rhetoric from 1961 belonged to a Cold War context very different from that of 2026, a fact that an honest editorial must acknowledge before making any direct comparison.

What a historical contrast proves—and what it does not prove

Using Eisenhower as a mirror does not establish that the Republican Party of 2026 has betrayed a doctrine that has remained fixed since 1961: parties evolve, reorganize, and shift their electoral coalitions over the course of several decades. What this contrast more modestly establishes is that a historic Republican presidential speech—delivered publicly and documented—contradicts, in its exact wording, the 2026 quote reported by Axios and relayed by Hartmann. Both texts exist; their contrast is a matter of reading, not an editorial invention.

The columnist draws an explicitly partisan conclusion from this: that the party has changed in nature. This editorial presents this conclusion as Hartmann’s thesis, not as an independently established truth. The difference between the two matters, and it will be maintained throughout this text.

Ten percent of Americans, compared with one percent elsewhere

Hartmann cites data from Lloyd’s Register’s Global Risk Poll, covering 140 countries, which reportedly found that 10% of Americans identify politics as the greatest risk in their lives, compared to about 1% on average in the other 139 countries surveyed and 5% among Russians. This editorial team has not consulted Lloyd’s Register’s full report: this figure is reported here exactly as it appears in Hartmann’s column in Alternet, without independent verification of its methodology, fieldwork date, or margin of error.

Ten times more political fear than elsewhere in the world—if the figure stands up to scrutiny—does not describe a calm, debating nation. It describes a country that fears its own system. But a figure reported without available methodology remains just a reported figure, not data validated by this analysis.

Why the Comparison with Russia Deserves a Closer Look

The 5% figure attributed to Russian respondents—in a country where freedom of political expression is structurally more restricted than in the United States—calls for extra caution: an opinion poll conducted in an authoritarian context does not measure political fear in the same way as a poll conducted in a democracy where criticizing those in power does not carry the same personal risks. This methodological difference does not invalidate the U.S. figure, but it complicates any simplistic interpretation that would directly compare the two percentages as if they measured the same thing under the same conditions.

This report does not allow for a further resolution of this methodological issue. What it does confirm is that Hartmann’s column presents this figure as an alarming sign regarding the state of the U.S. political climate—an interpretation that stems from the author’s own perspective, not from a conclusion independently validated by this editorial team.

The Lewis Powell Memo and Think Tank Funding

In his column, Hartmann traces the history back to the plan attributed to Lewis Powell in 1971, then lists the funding sources for several conservative organizations: the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, ALEC, the Libertarian Party, and the Federalist Society. He also mentions David Koch’s 1980 vice-presidential run, which reportedly garnered about one million votes. This historical lineage is the author’s thesis, built upon fifty-five years of American political history; it is not a fact independently established by this editorial staff in the context of this editorial.

Establishing a direct causal link between a 1971 memo and an anonymous quote from 2026 is a matter of far-reaching historical interpretation. This editorial does not validate this causality as a fact; it reports that Hartmann constructs it, using the names, dates, and organizations he explicitly cites in his column.

What a fifty-five-year genealogy can and cannot demonstrate

A political genealogy of this scope offers real explanatory value for understanding how currents of thought are funded and spread over several decades. It also has a structural limitation: by its very nature, it selects the milestones that confirm the author’s thesis, without necessarily accounting for the internal complexity of the American conservative movement over the same period, nor for the dissenting voices within it.

This editorial treats this genealogy for what it is: a columnist’s argument—coherent in its structure—but one that is not of the same nature as a historical study peer-reviewed by several independent researchers. Once again, this distinction must remain clear to the reader rather than getting lost in the citation.

From Reagan’s Debt to Tax Rates in the 1930s–1980s

Hartmann cites several macroeconomic figures in his column: a national debt of $800 billion when Reagan took office; a top marginal tax rate that reached 90% and a corporate tax rate of 50% during the period of prosperity he identifies as spanning the 1930s to the 1980s; a middle class that then accounted for two-thirds of the population, compared to about 45% today. Let’s be clear: these macroeconomic figures are the author’s assertions as presented in this column, not data that has been independently verified for this report.

An economic figure cited by an activist columnist may be accurate. It may also be approximate. Without independent verification in this report, neither is established here. This editorial team did not consult the official statistical series from the U.S. Treasury or the Bureau of Economic Analysis to corroborate these specific figures prior to publication.

Ten out of eleven recessions, thirty-four thousand billion in debt: the same caution

Hartmann adds that ten of the last eleven U.S. recessions occurred under Republican presidencies, and that the tax cuts under Reagan, Bush, and Trump added more than 34,000 billion dollars to the national debt. These two claims fall into the same category as the previous ones: figures put forward by the author to support his partisan argument, reported here with the attribution they require, without independent statistical validation conducted by this editorial team as part of this editorial.

A reader wishing to verify these figures should consult the official federal debt series and the National Bureau of Economic Research’s data on the dating of recessions directly. This text is not a substitute for such verification; it merely reports faithfully what Hartmann’s column asserts, without attributing to it a level of accuracy that this editorial team has not independently established.

Three figures identified by the author as embodiments of the current political line

Hartmann names Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Vice President JD Vance, and Stephen Miller as figures representing what he presents as the current political line of the movement he is criticizing. This article reports this mention by name, without adding any further judgment regarding the personal intentions of these three officials, who are not accused of any specific act in this passage of the column, but are cited as representatives of a political orientation that the author himself deems dangerous.

No criminal charges or specific factual allegations are leveled against these three individuals in this section of Hartmann’s column: it is a political characterization, made by a self-declared opinion columnist, which this editorial faithfully reports without transforming it into an independently established fact.

The difference between identifying a political stance and accusing a person

There is a clear journalistic distinction between reporting that a columnist associates political figures with a stance he deems problematic, and asserting that those figures have committed a specific act. This editorial respects that distinction: it reports Hartmann’s political judgment regarding Rubio, Vance, and Miller as a columnist’s opinion, without elevating it to the status of a fact verified by this newsroom.

This distinction does not diminish the force of Hartmann’s argument; it correctly places it in its proper context—that of reasoned political commentary, published by a media outlet that espouses a progressive editorial line, rather than that of neutral factual reporting. A columnist has the right to judge a political stance. He does not have the right to pass off that judgment as a judicial verdict, and this editorial refuses to make that confusion on his behalf.

A war that has lasted five months after a promise of six weeks

The climate of “electoral hatred” described by Hartmann did not arise out of thin air. Other documents in this same fact file, reported by the activist newsletter Really American, indicate that a war against Iran—initially presented as a six-week operation—has now been ongoing for five months, with the Pentagon facing a budget shortfall documented by these same sources. This context does not prove Hartmann’s thesis, but it sheds light on why a climate of widespread political frustration might exist independently of the Republican electoral strategy he describes.

A war that drags on, a budget that’s cracking, and now a strategy that openly relies on hatred: three separate documents that, when placed side by side, paint a picture—though none of the three, on its own, provides complete proof.

The polls cited in the same report, with the same degree of caution

This same collection documents polls cited by columnist John Stoehr—who also writes for Alternet—showing Democrats leading in the generic national poll. No fieldwork dates or margins of error are available for these polls either—a limitation already documented elsewhere in this series of articles and which applies with the same rigor here: a climate of discontent measured by polls never automatically equates to a guaranteed election result.

The convergence of a quote about “electoral hatred,” a fifty-five-year history, and polls without a documented margin of error forms, in this report, a set of assertions by politically engaged authors. This editorial treats them as such, without attributing to them the weight of an independent factual investigation that this report does not allow for.

What It Means to Announce Your Strategy Out Loud

There is a difference between a campaign that, in practice, becomes hostile and bitter over the course of months, and a campaign in which a strategist—according to the quote attributed by Axios and relayed by Hartmann—would announce in advance that the goal is to maximize hatred toward the opponent. This second scenario, if the quote is accurate, describes a stated intention rather than a deviation observed in hindsight. This nuance is important for assessing the moral gravity of the reported statement.

This report does not allow us to establish the identity of the person quoted, nor to verify the exact accuracy of the quote beyond what is reported in the Alternet column. What this text can affirm is that the quote, as relayed, constitutes an explicit rhetorical declaration of intent, distinct from a mere observation of a negative campaign atmosphere.

Why this issue falls within the realm of domestic democratic debate, not foreign validation

A country that publicly debates its own electoral hatred is not a country in decline. It is a country that, at the very least, still refuses to turn a blind eye to what it is becoming. This debate over the nature of an American election campaign is strictly a matter of the United States’ domestic democratic life. It must never be interpreted as an endorsement of the arguments put forward by authoritarian governments, which themselves do not tolerate any contradictory electoral debate on their own soil. This editorial board’s stance remains pro-Western and committed to democratic accountability: criticizing an American electoral strategy—as reported here by progressive opinion media—does not call into question the value of the system that allows for this debate in the first place.

It is precisely because this debate can take place publicly, under the watchful eye of the press and citizens, that it differs fundamentally from regimes where such an op-ed simply could not be published without consequences for its author. The right to publish this op-ed, to challenge it, and to respond to it is exactly what the strategy of hatred, taken to the extreme, has historically endangered elsewhere in the world.

Confirmed: The Existence of the Quote and the Historical Context

This editorial can affirm that the quote “it’s going to be a hate election,” attributed by Axios and reported in Thom Hartmann’s column in Alternet on July 25, 2026, exists in the terms reported here. It can also affirm that Eisenhower’s 1961 farewell address does indeed contain the sentences cited by Hartmann—a historic presidential text that is well-documented and accessible in the U.S. public archives.

A contrast between two Republican voices, separated by sixty-five years, does not settle any debate. It opens one up, and it is precisely the role of an editorial to open it up without claiming to close it by decree.

Left open: the actual impact of this strategy on the election outcome

This editorial cannot assert that this quote represents the entirety of the Republican strategy for 2026, nor that the “genealogy” traced by Hartmann since 1971 constitutes evidence of rigorous historical causality rather than a coherent authorial narrative. These two questions remain open, and nothing in this report allows us to settle them with the certainty that such a claim would require.

What this report does allow us to assert with greater certainty is that a political climate of deep frustration—measured, with the methodological caveats already outlined, by several polls included in this same corpus—coexists with a quote that explicitly champions hatred as a tool for mobilization. The coincidence of these two elements does not prove a causal link between them, but it deserves to be noted without reservation.

The Vocabulary of War Applied to an Election

The quote reported by Axios and echoed by Hartmann draws on the vocabulary of conflict—material, an implied enemy, comparative aversion—rather than the vocabulary of democratic competition. An election is normally decided on the basis of proposals, track records, and verifiable promises. A strategy aimed at maximizing hatred toward the opponent shifts the playing field: it no longer seeks to be preferred; it seeks to make the other side unacceptable. The difference between the two approaches is not merely cosmetic; it changes the very nature of what a vote is supposed to measure.

Nothing in this report suggests that this approach entirely replaces the debate on public policy in the 2026 Republican campaign. According to the quoted statement, it coexists with the usual campaign arguments, serving as an additional tool rather than a complete replacement.

Why This Rhetoric Is Troubling Beyond Partisan Lines

A strategy based on comparative hatred does not target only the electorate of the camp that formulates it: it also shapes the other camp’s perception of its own opponents, in a spiral that can feed on itself election after election. A campaign that relies on hatred of the other side almost always reaps hatred in return. No one wins in this spiral; it simply continues.

This observation is not aimed at any particular side: it applies to any electoral strategy—whether Republican or Democratic—that makes aversion to the opponent its primary driving force for mobilization rather than a secondary element of a campaign built on policy proposals.

From Axios to Alternet: A Chain of Sources Worth Keeping in Mind

The quote examined in this editorial passed through at least two sources before reaching this text: Axios reportedly collected and published it first, and then Thom Hartmann’s column in Alternet picked it up to build his argument. This editorial team did not consult the original Axios article directly: the quote is reported here as Hartmann reports it, with the attribution that this two-step relay explicitly requires.

Axios is generally regarded as an established political news outlet in the United States, distinct in its editorial line from openly activist publications such as Alternet or Really American. This distinction in status between the primary source and the outlet that comments on it is worth emphasizing: the quote itself comes from a general-interest news outlet, while its political interpretation comes from a declared opinion column.

What This Distinction Means for the Reader

An attentive reader must distinguish between two layers in this text: the quote itself, whose primary source is an established news outlet, and the interpretation—the historical context dating back to 1971, the contrast with Eisenhower, the macroeconomic figures—which comes entirely from Hartmann’s opinion column. The two layers do not have the same factual rigor, and this editorial has sought to highlight this distinction at every step rather than blending them into a single homogeneous block.

A quote reported by a news outlet and an argument constructed by an opinion columnist do not carry the same weight. Mixing the two would be the real dishonesty, not citing them together.

Public Figures, Public Stances

Unlike the anonymous quote reported by Axios, the public positions of figures such as Marco Rubio, J.D. Vance, and Stephen Miller are, in fact, documented by numerous public statements, speeches, and votes recorded over the years. This report does not provide these statements in detail; it merely notes that Hartmann cites them as examples of the stance he criticizes, without the editorial having the additional factual evidence needed to independently assess this characterization beyond what the column asserts.

The methodological caution applied to the anonymous Axios quote must also apply, to a lesser extent, to the characterization of named public figures: being cited as a representative of a political line by an opposition columnist does not equate to a personal endorsement of that line by the individual in question.

The Risk of Caricature in a Partisan Editorial

An editorial that draws on a partisan opinion piece inherits a structural risk: that of transforming complex political figures into simplified symbols of a broader argument. This editorial seeks to limit that risk by systematically noting that the characterization of Rubio, Vance, and Miller stems from Hartmann’s interpretation, not from a neutral assessment established independently by this editorial staff.

Identifying a political stance is not the same as identifying a fault. Confusing the two is precisely what a rigorous editorial must avoid, even when it shares the political conclusion of its source author.

November 2026: A Date Already Part of the Lexicon

If the quote reported by Axios is accurate, it reveals that as early as July 2026, part of the Republican strategy for the November midterm elections was already in place. This means that four months before the election, at least one voice close to Trump’s political organization was already framing the electoral mobilization in terms of comparative aversion rather than in terms of a record to defend. This timeline coincides with the polls unfavorable to the Republican Party documented elsewhere in this report, though one does not necessarily prove the other.

A plausible hypothesis—though not verified in this report—would be that a strategy based on comparative aversion becomes more tempting precisely when the record to be defended appears difficult to sell in a positive light. This hypothesis remains an inference drawn from this editorial, not a fact established by a primary source consulted directly.

How voters will respond to this strategy remains, by definition, unknown

No poll, no column, and no political analysis can predict with certainty how the American electorate will react, in November 2026, to a campaign that has made comparative hatred an explicit tool for mobilization. Voters might reward this strategy, punish it, or pay it only marginal attention compared to the economic and international issues documented elsewhere in this same fact sheet.

No one votes on a day in November based on a statement made in July. But no one completely forgets the tone of a campaign either when it comes time to cast a ballot.

A statement attributed to an anonymous Republican strategist—reported first by Axios and then by a progressive columnist—advocates hatred as an electoral strategy. A 1961 Republican presidential speech warned, in almost identical terms, against exactly that. Both texts exist. Their contrast is evident upon reading, not a fabrication. What this editorial cannot determine is whether this 2026 quote represents a widespread strategy or the isolated expression of a single voice within a political movement that is broader and more diverse than a single sentence can summarize.

The economic figures cited by Hartmann, the historical lineage he traces back to Lewis Powell, and the polls he references: all of these remain, in this report, assertions made by the author and relayed here, not data independently verified by this editorial staff. What is verifiable, however, is that an election that presents itself as an “election of hate” no longer seeks to convince. It seeks to divide more effectively than its opponent does. A democracy that accepts this premise without naming it has already lost something, even if it wins the ensuing election.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist