ANALYSIS: Oman Proposes Managing the Strait of Hormuz the Same Way the Strait of Malacca Is Managed

A long-standing responsibility that the IMO intends to uphold

The International Maritime Organization has stated that it is not involved in the current discussions between Oman and Iran. An IMO spokesperson said that “any proposal for new shipping routes or traffic management measures should be submitted to the IMO for review by member states.” This clarification is not merely for show: the IMO established the recognized shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz in 1968, and it intends to remain the authoritative body on such arrangements. No one can act on its behalf.

In a statement to the IMO Council dated July 9, Oman had already clarified its position: it does not support the imposition of transit fees on ships passing through the strait, while seeing value in exploring voluntary arrangements related to navigation support services. This earlier statement, made nearly three weeks before the Reuters report, shows that Oman has been laying this diplomatic groundwork for some time, away from the cameras. Serious diplomacy is conducted quietly. Oman did so for three weeks before its first public statement appeared in the press.

Diplomacy Moving Forward Without Multilateral Endorsement

The fact that this mechanism is proceeding without first going through the IMO raises a question of procedural legitimacy that no one, at this stage, has publicly addressed. A bilateral or trilateral agreement between Oman, Iran, and a few Gulf states could function on the ground without ever receiving formal endorsement from the organization that, in principle, has regulated this type of maritime corridor for nearly sixty years. Corridor diplomacy often outpaces conference-room diplomacy.

This lack of a clear multilateral framework also means that no guarantee of implementation exists yet. A voluntary fund without an enforcement mechanism remains, by definition, dependent on the goodwill of each actor—and goodwill, in this region, has a lifespan measured in weeks rather than years.

A Minister Expanding His Network

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi discussed the Strait of Hormuz with his Omani and Saudi counterparts on Monday, July 27—just one day after the proposal reported by Reuters was presented. This series of meetings, taking place within the span of a few days, illustrates Iran’s active diplomatic engagement on the issue of the strait, even as it refuses to publicly acknowledge the exact scope of its efforts. Three capitals, two days, a single issue.

The Reuters article, by Timour Azhari and Jonathan Saul, specifies that these talks with Oman took place on Friday and Saturday, July 24 and 25. Araqchi is thus negotiating on two fronts simultaneously: that of a regional technical mechanism with Oman, and that of a firm public stance intended for domestic Iranian consumption and for Tehran’s regional allies. It is possible to negotiate discreetly and publicly deny it on the same day. It’s a skill; Araqchi has mastered it.

Trump Speaks of “Good Talks,” but Offers No Evidence of an Agreement

U.S. President Donald Trump spoke on that same Monday of “good talks” with Iran and the possibility of an agreement, while warning that strikes would resume if negotiations failed. This statement, reported in the same news report, adds further pressure to the timeline: Washington does not separate the issue of the Strait from the broader issue of its direct conflict with Tehran.

No source consulted provides grounds to assert that a formal agreement is imminent. What Trump calls “good talks” remains, at this stage, a unilateral U.S. assessment, unconfirmed by a corresponding Iranian statement on the substance of the discussions. A few optimistic words do not make a treaty.

Baghaei Sets the Record Straight: No Negotiations Through the United States

Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei publicly denied, during a press briefing on July 27, that these talks with Oman constitute negotiations with or via the United States. This statement directly contradicts the more optimistic framing that Reuters—and Trump himself—have given to these discussions. Two capitals can discuss the same issue and describe two incompatible realities. The Strait of Hormuz is today’s proof of this.

This disagreement over interpretation is not a semantic detail. If Tehran categorically refuses to allow these discussions to be perceived as a gateway to Washington, any U.S. announcement of progress risks being immediately neutralized by an Iranian denial—which is precisely what happened within twenty-four hours of the Reuters report. The public contradiction has itself become a diplomatic tool.

The contradiction between a “closed strait” and measured traffic

Baghaei also asserted that the situation in the Strait of Hormuz has not changed, that it remains closed, and that these negotiations have nothing to do with the United States. This statement contrasts with maritime traffic data compiled by Lloyd’s List Intelligence, which shows reduced but not entirely zero traffic. The distinction between the claimed total closure and the measured partial disruption must be rigorously maintained; otherwise, the analysis devolves into an uncritical repetition of a stakeholder’s narrative.

This distinction matters because it determines how we should interpret each subsequent diplomatic announcement: if the strait is not completely closed, the Omani proposal does not seek to reopen a blocked route, but rather to structure a route that is already partially functional before it deteriorates further. The word “closed” serves a narrative, not a measure.

A Regional Coalition Setting Its Terms

The Gulf states, with the exception of Oman, are following this issue with particular attention because the closure or restriction of the Strait of Hormuz directly impacts their own oil exports. Their insistence on the absence of a mandatory toll for Iran reflects a desire not to legitimize, even indirectly, Iran’s right to financial control over a maritime route that these same states consider a regional common good.

This collective stance lends the Omani proposal a weight that a strictly bilateral initiative would not have had. Oman is not speaking alone: to a certain extent, it is voicing a concern shared by all Gulf oil producers, which explains the speed with which Reuters was able to report on this proposal based on multiple sources in the region. An isolated voice is easily dismissed. A coalition of oil producers, far less so.

Riyadh, a silent but concerned player

Saudi Arabia does not appear to be the direct proponent of this proposal, but Araqchi discussed the matter with his Saudi counterpart on the same Monday as his meeting with the Omani minister. Riyadh remains, in this matter, an observer and influencer without necessarily exposing itself publicly—a stance consistent with its cautious handling of tensions with Tehran over the past several years. Saudi silence does not equate to indifference; it is a strategy.

This Saudi caution contrasts with the media exposure chosen by Oman, which has agreed to publicly shoulder the burden of a risky proposal. Two strategies coexist within the same regional camp, without either formally contradicting the other.

A three-night lull in airstrikes

The Omani proposal comes at a time when the U.S. military and Iran are observing a third consecutive night without strikes, following thirteen nights of U.S. strikes, according to Euronews. This timing is likely no coincidence: diplomatic channels are taking advantage of rare windows of relative calm to advance technical issues that would remain stalled during periods of active strikes.

But this window remains fragile. The Iranian military spokesperson announced on Sunday the suspension of “retaliatory operations,” a phrasing that leaves open the possibility of a resumption at any time. Neither side has published a formal, signed ceasefire as of this writing, meaning that the proposal regarding the Strait of Hormuz is moving forward on diplomatic ground with no guarantee of stability.

A reminder of U.S. military ambitions in the background

U.S. Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz reiterated on CBS that “additional military assets are arriving in the region” and that “the regime should believe the president when he says they are at the ready, ready to fire.” This statement, made at the same time as Oman’s proposal, shows that regional diplomacy regarding the Strait of Hormuz is not taking place in a security vacuum, but under explicitly sustained U.S. military pressure. A strait is never negotiated in absolute calm. It is negotiated under threat, and this proposal is no exception.

This military backdrop gives the Omani proposal a significance beyond that of a mere technical maritime management project: for Oman, it also constitutes an attempt to defuse an escalation whose economic consequences extend far beyond Iran’s borders. The timing, in this case, speaks almost as loudly as the content.

Maritime traffic already heavily impacted

The fact sheet documents a sharp decline in maritime traffic through the strait: non-Iranian transits fell to 25 for the week of July 13–19, down from 108 the previous week, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence. Inbound traffic dropped to 8 vessels from 43 previously, and total traffic plummeted by approximately 90% year-over-year. These figures predate Oman’s proposal; they explain the urgency behind it.

This dramatic decline directly affects oil revenues across the entire region, including those of Iran itself, which relies in part on this same strait to export its own oil. A prolonged blockade penalizes Tehran almost as much as its regional adversaries, which paradoxically serves as an argument in favor of a compromise, even a partial one. A blockade that punishes everyone equally is no longer a weapon. It is a trap with no way out for either side.

The Cost of Uncertainty for Shipping Companies

Shipping companies that continue to operate in the area face significantly higher insurance and rerouting costs, a situation documented separately in the fact sheet on maritime premiums. A proposal that would offer a more predictable framework—even in the form of a voluntary fund—would provide real relief for these operators, provided it survives the diplomatic standoff between Tehran and the Gulf capitals.

No shipowner plans a shipping route based on an unconfirmed proposal. As long as Iran publicly denies the scope of these talks, shipping companies will continue to factor in the worst-case scenario in their risk assessments, regardless of the optimism expressed in Washington.

Colonel Zolfaqari and Military Red Lines

Colonel Ebrahim Zolfaqari, Iran’s military spokesman, warned that Iran would bar any company or country that accepts compensation funded by frozen Iranian assets from passing through the Strait of Hormuz — a direct reference to the U.S. proposal to use at least $100 billion in frozen Iranian assets to reimburse shipping companies affected by the blockade. This military red line significantly complicates any solution that would combine financial compensation with management of the strait.

The mechanism proposed by Oman explicitly avoids this issue of frozen assets by relying on voluntary contributions from the companies themselves, rather than on a fund financed by unfrozen Iranian assets. This distinct financial structure could be the key to the proposal’s political viability from the Iranian side, since it does not cross the red line set by Zolfaqari.

A financial trap that diplomacy must circumvent

Any solution that would even remotely link the issue of the Strait to that of frozen assets would automatically trigger the threat of closure brandished by the Iranian military. This is a trap that diplomacy must navigate without ever explicitly naming it, lest months of technical discussions be derailed by a single ill-chosen phrase in a press release. Lexical caution, in this case, is not merely a matter of formality.

This financial trap partly explains why Oman has chosen a model based on voluntary contributions rather than on compensation directly linked to U.S. or Iranian assets. The choice of mechanism is never neutral; it implicitly carries the memory of all previous deadlocks.

Producers with No Room to Wait

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates export most of their oil through the Strait of Hormuz, which puts them—more than any other regional player—in a position to seek a swift resolution to this crisis. Every week of reduced traffic translates directly into revenue losses for these economies, which are structurally dependent on energy exports. The Saudi and Emirati timeline is anything but theoretical.

This dependence explains the speed with which Riyadh and Abu Dhabi allowed Oman to publicly put forward a proposal that, should it fail, would not directly compromise their diplomatic credibility. In this scenario, Oman serves as an intermediary entrusted with bearing the political risk, without the major Gulf producers having to jeopardize their own relations with Tehran.

The Low-Key Role of the United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates, whose port of Fujairah is located outside the Strait itself but is heavily dependent on regional stability, is following this issue with the same attention as Riyadh, though there is no documented public intervention in the case file reviewed. This absence of an official Emirati statement does not signify a lack of interest; rather, it reflects a preference for discreet diplomacy over taking a public stance on an issue that is still evolving. The silence of a major oil port is never a coincidence. It is a calculated move, like everything else in this crisis.

This convergence of interests among Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—even if not publicly coordinated—gives the Omani project a broader regional foundation than its sole official sponsor would have us believe. Three oil-based economies, a single shared urgency.

A proposal, not an operational agreement

Nothing in the document reviewed provides grounds to assert that this mechanism will be formally adopted. At this stage, it is a proposal that has been put forward, discussed behind the scenes, and publicly dismissed—in terms of its political scope—by the party most directly involved. The gap between a diplomatic proposal and an operational agreement can span weeks, sometimes years, and there is no guarantee that this proposal will bridge that gap before a new military conflict renders it obsolete.

A mechanism modeled after the Malacca agreement may work on paper. It will never work if one of the parties publicly denies its existence.

Key indicators to watch

Three indicators will help gauge whether this proposal is actually moving forward: a new official meeting between Oman and Iran without a public denial in the hours that follow, a formal response from the IMO to the proposal, and a measurable change in maritime traffic reported by Lloyd’s List. As long as these three indicators are absent, the proposal remains a diplomatic hypothesis rather than an established fact.

The IMO’s silence, in particular, warrants close attention: an organization that has regulated this strait since 1968 will not remain indefinitely on the sidelines of a mechanism that potentially redefines the navigation rules it itself established.

A failure that would go beyond the Strait of Hormuz issue alone

If the Omani proposal fails due to a lack of agreement between Tehran and the Gulf states on the issue of tolls and frozen assets, the precedent would carry significant weight for any future attempt at regional mediation. A model modeled after Malacca—rejected before it was even tested—would reinforce the view, already widely held in Washington, that only direct military pressure can move Tehran on this specific issue. A failure here would fuel all arguments in favor of a tougher stance.

Conversely, even a partial adoption of this mechanism would set a useful precedent for other maritime flashpoints in the region, notably the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which has been rocked by Houthi attacks on Saudi oil tankers. The Strait of Hormuz would then become an exportable model, rather than just another isolated failure in a long list of aborted attempts.

The lesson Washington would draw from each scenario

Washington is watching this situation with an interest that goes beyond the mere issue of oil traffic: a regional proposal that succeeds in stabilizing the Strait of Hormuz without direct U.S. military intervention would, in part, validate the strategy of maximum pressure combined with selective diplomatic overtures that the Trump administration appears to have been favoring for several weeks. For Washington, a low-key diplomatic success is worth more than a high-profile military victory.

A failure, on the other hand, would strengthen the position of those in Washington who are advocating for a swift resumption of strikes rather than an indefinite extension of the current diplomatic window. The fate of the Omani proposal could thus indirectly influence the U.S. military timeline in the weeks following its presentation.

Bab al-Mandeb, the Other Strait in Turmoil

While diplomatic efforts are focused on the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait—just a few hundred kilometers away—is experiencing its own crisis, fueled by repeated Houthi attacks on Saudi oil tankers. This parallel situation serves as a reminder that an agreement on the Strait of Hormuz, even if successful, would resolve only part of the regional maritime problem. Two straits, two crises, a single region under strain.

The Houthis, who have been enforcing a blockade against Saudi Arabia since July 20, operate according to a different logic than Tehran’s in the Strait of Hormuz, but the two issues reinforce each other in the regional perception of maritime risk. A shipowner assessing the risk in the Strait of Hormuz is simultaneously assessing that in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which complicates any isolated interpretation of the Omani proposal.

A contagion of risk that goes beyond Iranian diplomacy alone

This spread of maritime risk means that an Omani success in the Strait of Hormuz alone would not be enough to fully restore shipowners’ confidence in the region. You cannot reassure a shipowner on a strait-by-strait basis when the entire region is intermittently in turmoil. Insurance premiums, reported separately for the two areas, already reflect this overall—rather than localized—caution.

The Omani proposal, if successful, will therefore resolve only part of the maritime security puzzle that has been weighing on regional oil trade for several months. Investors and insurers will continue to view the two issues together, not separately.

Why Tehran Negotiates While Denying It

Iran’s double talk is not an accidental contradiction: it is a deliberate political calculation. By negotiating discreetly with Oman while publicly denying any U.S. involvement in these talks, Tehran maintains its stance of firmness before its domestic audience and regional allies, while keeping the door open to a technical de-escalation on the ground. The two narratives coexist because they serve two different audiences.

This modus operandi is not new in Iranian diplomacy: it has already been observed during previous negotiations on the nuclear issue, where technical discussions continued behind the scenes while public statements maintained a line of apparent confrontation. A regime that negotiates while denying it is negotiating is not being inconsistent. It is simply doing two things at once, for two distinct audiences.

The Cost of This Approach to the Credibility of All Parties

This approach comes at a cost: it casts suspicion on every diplomatic announcement, suggesting it serves a communications objective rather than a genuine goal of resolution. Reuters, Oman, and Washington all risk seeing their respective credibility eroded if this cycle of proposals and denials repeats itself without ever leading to a verifiable agreement on the ground.

It is precisely for this reason that methodological caution is essential in the journalistic coverage of this issue: reporting a proposal is not the same as confirming an agreement, and reporting a denial is not the same as confirming a definitive failure. The two announcements coexist, contradictory, as long as no verifiable facts on the ground resolve the discrepancy between them. A maritime issue is not judged by a press release. It is judged by a ship that crosses—or does not cross.

As of July 28, 2026, the facts can be summed up in one sentence: Oman presented a concrete proposal, documented by Reuters, and Iran immediately publicly reframed it to deny any U.S. involvement. Between these two facts lies everything that remains uncertain—the survival of the mechanism, the Gulf states’ final position on tolls, and the IMO’s reaction to an initiative that, for now, circumvents it.

What remains to be proven goes far beyond maritime diplomacy alone: it is the ability of the two sides to effectively separate a technical agreement on a strait from a broader political agreement on strikes, sanctions, and frozen assets. As long as this separation does not hold, no regional mechanism—regardless of the model on which it is based—will survive the next night of strikes. It took decades for the Strait of Malacca to stabilize. The Strait of Hormuz does not have that luxury of time.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist