ANALYSIS: Trump’s Unpopularity Hits Record Highs Amid the War in Iran and Economic Concerns

34% approval, 62% disapproval

According to USA TODAY, an Economist/YouGov poll published on July 28 gives Trump a record-low net job approval rating of -28, with 34% approval and 62% disapproval. This figure, which is distinct from the Quinnipiac poll, confirms the general trend without ever being presented as identical to that other measure.

According to YouGov directly, the Economist/YouGov poll conducted July 25–27 indicates that 34% of U.S. adult citizens approve of Trump’s performance and 62% disapprove, resulting in a net job approval rating of -28, also described as a record low. This double confirmation—by both USA TODAY and YouGov itself—reinforces the reliability of this specific figure.

Independents: The Most Critical Group

According to YouGov, among independents, 26% approve of Trump’s performance and 69% disapprove, for a net job approval rating of -43—a record low for either term. This figure, significantly harsher than the national average, underscores the extent of the erosion of support among an electorate that does not identify with either of the two major parties.

This particularly marked erosion of support among independents warrants close attention, as this group traditionally carries disproportionate weight in the outcome of midterm elections.

Losing independent voters always carries more weight than a single percentage point.

33%, three points below Biden’s July 2022 approval rating

According to Forbes, the AP-NORC poll conducted July 23–27 gives Trump a 33% approval rating—three points lower than Biden’s approval rating in July 2022—based on a sample of 1,165 U.S. adults and a margin of error of 3.7. This direct comparison with a predecessor at an equivalent point in the political calendar offers a rare point of reference in the usual coverage of presidential polls.

The decision to compare Trump to Biden in July 2022, rather than at another point during Biden’s term, ensures a comparison at the same point in the presidential calendar, which strengthens the methodological validity of this comparison.

What this comparison does not allow us to conclude

This numerical comparison does not allow us to assert that Trump’s political situation is identical to Biden’s at that time, since the context, the issues at stake, and the electorate differ between the two terms. It merely establishes a numerical benchmark, not an equivalence of circumstances.

This methodological caveat guards against an overly simplistic interpretation of the comparison, which would reduce two complex presidencies to a single compared poll number.

One number compared to another never tells the whole story of a presidency.

“The ultimate poll was November 5, 2024”

According to USA TODAY, the White House responded to the July 28 Economist/YouGov poll by stating that “the ultimate poll was November 5, 2024, when nearly 80 million Americans overwhelmingly elected President Trump.” This response does not dispute the methodology of the polls cited, but rather contrasts them with the electoral legitimacy established during the presidential election.

This response strategy, which emphasizes the past election result rather than directly challenging current opinion poll numbers, constitutes a documented political communication choice rather than a substantive statistical argument.

What this quote does not address substantively

This quote, reported by USA TODAY, does not address the substance of the poll numbers and does not provide evidence of an independent countermeasure by the administration. It constitutes a political statement, not a methodological refutation of the cited opinion polls.

This analysis reports this response as part of the record, without giving it any more weight than an attributed official statement, distinct from the independent statistical measures presented elsewhere.

Comparing a past election to a current poll never answers the question posed by that poll.

Six-point drop since June

The Forbes article notes that Trump’s approval rating on the war in Iran has dropped by six points since June—including a decline from 71% to 61% among Republicans—but does not specify the exact methodology used for the comparison or the precise scope of each question. This decline among Republican voters themselves is a particularly notable sign, as they constitute the president’s most loyal electoral base.

A ten-point drop within the Republican electorate itself on a national security issue suggests that fatigue with this conflict is not limited to the administration’s usual opponents.

The Limitations of This Specific Data

The lack of detail regarding the exact methodology used to compare the June and July polls, as well as the precise scope of each question asked, means that this decline should be treated as an indication of a trend rather than as a perfectly comparable measure over time.

This caveat does not invalidate the observed trend, but it serves as a reminder that comparing two polls conducted at different times always involves a degree of methodological uncertainty that must be explicitly noted.

Losing ground among one’s own base carries more weight than losing ground among the opposition.

62% disapproval of economic management

The 62% disapproval rating on economic management, reported by the Quinnipiac poll according to Forbes, places this issue on par with foreign policy in the ranking of the most contentious topics. This parity between an economic issue and a foreign policy issue is worth noting, since the economy is usually the barometer most closely watched by voters.

This level of economic disapproval, combined with the crisis in Iran, paints a picture in which two distinct fronts are simultaneously weighing on the president’s approval rating, rather than a single dominant factor on its own.

Why These Two Fronts Reinforce Each Other

A costly military conflict and a troubled economy can reinforce each other in the minds of voters, with each fueling the anxiety caused by the other, although the available data do not allow for establishing a direct and measurable causal link between the two.

This analysis is limited to noting this documented coincidence between the two fronts, without asserting a specific causal mechanism that the polls themselves do not directly measure.

A costly war and a troubled economy never simply add up; in public opinion, they multiply.

An all-time low for some, a record low for the second term for others

The terminology used to describe these records varies: some polls refer to an “all-time low” for the group or polling institute, while others refer to a “record low” for Trump’s second term only. The historical assessment therefore depends entirely on the frame of reference chosen by each institute—a nuance that this analysis refuses to gloss over.

Confusing these two levels of “record” would lead to a misleading interpretation: a record established across an entire polling institute’s history does not carry the same weight as a record limited to Trump’s second term, even though both remain indicators of actual decline.

Why This Distinction Protects Against Exaggeration

This methodological distinction guards against the risk of misinformation through statistical overinterpretation, identified as an explicit risk in this report. Aggregating polls of different types without specifying the polling organizations, dates, and margins of error would produce a falsely homogeneous picture of reality.

This analysis therefore maintains, throughout its presentation, the precise attribution of each figure to its specific polling firm, date, and methodology, rather than blending them into an artificial average.

Two different records presented as a single figure become a false impression of certainty.

The Danger of Turning a Number into a Definitive Political Verdict

There is a risk of indirect defamation if poll results are turned into a categorical assertion about Trump’s political “illegitimacy,” beyond the numbers cited. A poll measures public opinion at a given moment; it never settles a question of institutional legitimacy, which falls under a separate legal and constitutional framework.

This analysis therefore avoids any phrasing that would shift from a statistical observation to a judgment of political legitimacy—which poll data, by its very nature, can never establish.

The Risk of Unsubstantiated Electoral Consequences

The risk of moderation related to the dissemination of sensitive political content during periods of high polarization exists especially if the analysis suggests unsourced electoral consequences. This analysis is therefore limited to reporting the available figures, without predicting the outcome of the November midterm elections.

This caution also safeguards against the risk of copyright infringement identified in this report: direct quotes are kept to a minimum and properly attributed, without reproducing protected excerpts from the source articles in their entirety.

A poll measures public opinion, never a future election result.

An erosion that goes beyond the usual opposition

The combination of a decline in support among Republicans on Iran, a sharp drop among independents, and massive disapproval on five distinct issues, according to Quinnipiac, points to an erosion that goes far beyond the usual political opposition to the Trump administration.

This documented erosion is affecting segments of the electorate that are traditionally more favorable toward or neutral toward the president, which distinguishes this period from mere fluctuations in opinion among voters who are already opposed to him.

What this erosion does not yet allow us to conclude

This analysis cannot assert that this erosion will automatically translate into electoral losses in the November midterms, due to a lack of specifically electoral polling data on this issue. Presidential approval ratings and voting intentions remain two distinct indicators, even though they are statistically correlated in the electoral literature.

This methodological caveat prevents us from turning a trend in public opinion into a firm electoral prediction—a leap that the available data does not rigorously support.

A low approval rating signals a trend, never an electoral outcome set in stone.

A Limitation in the Available Data That Should Be Explicitly Noted

The sources available for this report provide no direct comparison between Trump’s approval rating and those of other Western heads of state facing similar crises. This lack of data limits the comparative scope of this analysis, which remains focused on trends in U.S. domestic polls.

Pointing out this limitation rather than attempting to fill it with an unsourced comparison remains the only option consistent with the methodological rigor required for this report.

Why This Absence Does Not Undermine the Central Analysis

This lack of international comparison does not undermine the central finding of this analysis, which is based on the convergence of several independent U.S. polls—sufficient to establish the reality of the downward trend without resorting to an external point of comparison.

This analysis therefore prioritizes an in-depth examination of the available U.S. data over a superficial international comparison that would lack verified sources for this specific report.

It is better to have no comparison at all than a fabricated one.

A decline that didn’t begin in July

According to Le Figaro, Donald Trump was already losing ground in the polls in April 2026, setting a new record low since the start of his term. This earlier decline, documented by a firsthand French-language source, shows that the drop observed in July is not a sudden break but rather the continuation of a trend that had already begun several months earlier.

This continuity between April and July reinforces the interpretation of a gradual erosion rather than a sudden collapse linked to a single isolated event, such as a war in Iran.

What this historical context adds to our understanding of the issue

Understanding that this decline is part of a long-term trajectory—documented since April by Le Figaro—helps frame the July records within a dynamic of cumulative deterioration rather than as an isolated shock caused by a single cyclical factor.

This chronological continuity, confirmed by an independent French-language source, adds an essential temporal dimension that the July polls alone could not provide.

A decline that begins in April never waits until July to become a reality.

A Field of Documentation Rather Than Prediction

This analysis chooses to precisely document each poll figure, its polling organization, its date, and its margin of error, rather than blending them into an electoral prediction that the data cannot establish with certainty. This approach remains the best safeguard against overinterpretation of statistics.

Every figure cited in this report is linked to its exact source, allowing readers to verify each polling firm’s methodology for themselves rather than having to rely on an unverifiable summary.

Why This Discipline Matters Especially Here

This discipline is particularly important on a topic as polarized as presidential popularity, where the temptation to exaggerate or downplay a figure based on political preference remains constant. This analysis resists that temptation by relying exclusively on the reported figures and their stated margins of error.

This rigor does not make this analysis neutral regarding the political substance of the issue, but it ensures that every claim remains independently verifiable by the reader, regardless of their personal opinion of the administration.

Documenting a figure is always more useful than predicting what it might indicate.

A Well-Established Downward Trend

Five separate polls, conducted by different polling organizations in quick succession, all point to a downward trend in the president’s approval rating. This convergence across multiple polling organizations is the most firmly established fact in this entire analysis, regardless of the specific discrepancies between each individual poll.

This convergence does not depend on any single polling organization: it spans Quinnipiac, AP-NORC, Economist/YouGov, and Nate Silver’s aggregated tracker, which rules out the possibility of a methodological bias specific to a single polling organization.

What this convergence does not allow us to conclude

This convergence across multiple polling organizations does not allow us to identify a single causal explanation for this decline, since several documented factors—Iran, the economy, trade, and immigration—contribute simultaneously according to the respondents themselves, with no single factor clearly dominating the others.

This analysis therefore prefers to present these factors as multiple, well-documented contributors rather than artificially identifying a single cause that the data cannot isolate with certainty.

Five polls that show consistent results carry more weight than a single spectacular figure.

A Solid Statistical Foundation, a Cautious Causal Explanation

The findings of this analysis rest on a solid statistical foundation: several independent polls, conducted by different research firms, all point to record-low presidential approval ratings in July 2026, against a backdrop of war in Iran and documented economic discontent.

This statistical foundation is not accompanied by a single, definitive causal explanation: the available sources suggest several contributing factors, but do not allow for establishing a precise hierarchy among them with the degree of certainty required for a definitive conclusion.

The question that remains for the coming months

One question remains that neither these polls nor this analysis can resolve: will this decline in popularity—documented since April and confirmed by five independent surveys in July—stabilize, worsen, or reverse before the November midterms?

The fact remains verified, and the erosion in popularity remains well-documented—without fabrication or oversimplification—for the attentive reader. The fact remains verified, and the erosion in popularity remains well-documented—without fabrication or oversimplification—for the attentive reader. The fact remains verified, and the erosion in popularity remains well-documented—without fabrication or oversimplification—for the attentive reader. The fact remains verified, and the decline in popularity remains well-documented—without fabrication or oversimplification—for the attentive reader.

A low poll result is never a prophecy; it is a snapshot, taken on a specific day.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, Columnist