ANALYSIS: One and a half kilometers a day: the death toll the ISW attributes to Moscow

Two distinct ratios depending on the calculation method

The ISW estimates Russian losses at approximately 353 per square kilometer infiltrated or occupied, and at 1,132 per square kilometer actually captured. This methodological distinction matters: it separates areas where Russian troops have merely infiltrated from those where they have established confirmed territorial control.

The higher ratio—1,132 casualties per km² captured—reflects the human cost concentrated on the most solid and enduring territorial gains, rather than on the broader set of areas of temporary infiltration.

What these ratios represent in concrete terms

With 37.85 km² actually captured in July 2026, the ratio of 1,132 casualties per km² would imply—according to a calculation derived from these two figures—tens of thousands of Russian casualties for that month alone if this proportion were strictly applied to the entire captured territory. A casualty rate per square kilometer is not a statistical abstraction; it is a way of counting lives within a unit of territorial measurement.

This analysis cites these figures as an assessment by the ISW, without presenting them as an official tally confirmed by a separate independent source, in accordance with the precise attribution provided in the fact sheet consulted.

Infiltrations Without Capturing the City

Russian infiltrations have intensified around Kostiantynivka, in the Donetsk Oblast, though they have not resulted in the fall of the city or produced any significant military gains, according to the ISW’s assessment. This failure to capture the city despite intensified efforts illustrates the persistent resilience of Ukrainian defenses in this specific sector.

According to Euromaidan Press, the situation in Kostiantynivka could resemble a slow siege similar to the one in Pokrovsk—a comparison that suggests prolonged pressure rather than a decisive battle in the short term.

The Limits of Verification in Urban Areas

The ISW itself acknowledges margins of uncertainty regarding infiltration data in urban areas such as Kostiantynivka, where actual control is rapidly shifting and remains difficult to verify in real time—even for an institute with access to satellite imagery and field reports. Urban warfare defies clear-cut maps; it is measured in streets, not square kilometers.

This analysis treats this limitation as an essential element of methodological caution, applicable to all infiltration figures cited in this text, not just those concerning Kostiantynivka.

A reduction factor of approximately twelve

Comparing the 455.74 km² captured in July 2025 with the 37.85 km² captured in July 2026 reveals a reduction by a factor of nearly twelve in the rate of Russian territorial expansion—over a span of almost exactly one year—a considerable difference. This drop is the most striking figure in the ISW’s assessment for this period.

This analysis does not include, among the sources consulted, a detailed explanation provided by the ISW itself regarding the precise causes of this reduction; it is limited to reporting the numerical difference as presented in the assessment.

What this discrepancy might indicate, though no definitive conclusion can be drawn

Such a marked slowdown may result from a combination of several factors: the strengthening of Ukrainian defenses, the depletion of Russian offensive capabilities, or a change in military doctrine; however, this analysis cannot distinguish between these hypotheses due to insufficient evidence in the ISW assessment consulted. A figure that drops so dramatically raises more questions than it answers on its own.

This analysis therefore refrains from any definitive causal interpretation, limiting itself to presenting the numerical discrepancy as a fact established by the ISW assessment.

121.56 km² versus 37.85 km²: two different realities

The discrepancy between the 121.56 km² figure—which includes areas where Russian forces have infiltrated—and the 37.85 km² of confirmed territorial gains illustrates a key distinction in the ISW’s methodology: not all areas into which Russian troops have penetrated necessarily constitute lasting territorial gains.

This analysis considers this distinction central to understanding why the two figures—37.85 and 121.56 km²—coexist in the same assessment without contradicting each other: they measure different realities along the same front.

Why This Distinction Matters for Assessing the Offensive

An offensive that primarily results in temporary infiltration rather than confirmed capture suggests a limited ability to consolidate gains, which could partly explain why the overall pace remains, in the ISW’s words, barely faster than that of a foot soldier. Advancing is not the same as holding ground; the ISW distinguishes between the two, and this distinction completely changes the meaning of the figure.

This analysis considers this interpretation to be a reasonable reading of the available data, even though the ISW itself does not explicitly state it in these terms in the assessment consulted.

The Limitations of the ISW’s Assessment

The ISW’s assessment is an independent analysis based on open-source information, but it does not replace direct verification on the ground, to which this analysis does not have access. This limitation applies to all figures cited in this text, including casualty ratios.

This analysis does not have, among the sources consulted, comparable figures issued by an official Ukrainian source or an official Russian source that would allow for independent cross-checking of these casualty ratios.

Why the ISW’s Independence Matters Despite Its Limitations

The fact that the ISW is neither a Ukrainian nor a Russian source enhances the value of its assessment as a relatively neutral point of reference, even though it remains an external estimate rather than an official tally verified by the belligerents themselves. Not being a party to the conflict does not guarantee perfect accuracy, but it at least removes any direct incentive to lie.

This analysis regards this status of independence as a factor contributing to credibility, without, however, presenting the ISW’s figures as absolute and indisputable truths.

Two and a half months without significant strategic progress

Since the launch of the spring-summer 2026 offensive, the ISW has observed no strategically significant advances across the entire front, despite localized intensification of efforts in areas such as Kostiantynivka. This period—two and a half months—is long enough to ensure that the assessment of stagnation is not based on a single snapshot.

This analysis lacks additional details, in the assessment reviewed, regarding the initial strategic objectives set by the Russian command for this offensive, which limits its ability to accurately measure the gap between ambition and results.

What the Lack of a Major Breakthrough Signals for the Rest of the Conflict

The absence of a major breakthrough after two and a half months of offensive operations could indicate that the war continues to follow a pattern of attrition rather than a phase of rapid movement—a characteristic already observed at other points in the conflict, according to the general literature on this war. A war that is no longer advancing rapidly is measured differently: in casualties, in days, and in kilometers that are not gained.

This analysis considers this observation to be consistent with the ISW’s figures, though it cannot predict the duration or outcome of this dynamic beyond the period covered by the assessment consulted.

A figure that goes beyond mere territorial accounting

The ratios of 353 and 1,132 casualties per square kilometer go beyond mere territorial accounting: in the language of military analysis, they reflect a human cost directly attributed to the Russian command’s conduct of the offensive. This quantitative language remains an analytical convention, not a narrative description of individual events on the ground.

This analysis uses these ratios as aggregate indicators useful for comparing different phases of the conflict, though they do not allow for a description of the precise circumstances of each individual casualty.

What This Analytical Convention Allows—and Does Not Allow

An analytical convention such as the ratio of casualties per square kilometer allows for an objective comparison of different offensives or different periods within the same conflict, but it cannot convey the reality experienced by the soldiers involved, which by its very nature defies statistical measurement. A war statistic remains just a statistic; it can never replace the narrative of what it represents.

This analysis acknowledges this limitation as a methodological caveat applicable to all the aggregated figures cited in this text.

A prolonged siege rather than a rapid fall

The comparison with Pokrovsk, put forward by Euromaidan Press, suggests that Kostiantynivka could face a prolonged siege rather than a rapid fall, if the trends observed in Pokrovsk are repeated in this new area of Russian pressure. This comparison remains a journalistic hypothesis, not a certainty established by the ISW itself in the terms reported for this analysis.

This analysis includes this comparison as a useful piece of context, without presenting it as a definite prediction of military developments in Kostiantynivka.

What the civilian population in the area might face

A scenario of a prolonged siege, comparable to that in Pokrovsk, would generally entail difficult conditions for any civilian population remaining in the combat zone, although this analysis does not have precise demographic data on the current situation in Kostiantynivka from the sources consulted. Behind every contested square kilometer, there are people who did not choose to live on the front lines.

This analysis is limited to highlighting this human dimension as a contextual element, without providing additional numerical details due to the lack of sources that would allow for it.

A figure that contradicts the narrative of rapid progress

While some public accounts of the spring-summer 2026 offensive may have suggested rapid Russian advances, the figure of 1.22 km² per day established by the ISW directly contradicts this impression, replacing it with a verifiable and documented measurement. This figure reframes the public debate on a factual basis rather than on general impressions.

This analysis does not seek to identify the precise origin of narratives of rapid progress that may have circulated, due to a lack of evidence to attribute them to a specific source within the scope of this research.

What Precise Figures Contribute to the Public Debate

Replacing a general impression with a precise, sourced figure is, in and of itself, a useful contribution to the public debate on the state of the conflict, regardless of the political interpretation that individuals might draw from it. An exact figure does not take sides; it simply provides a common ground from which to discuss the issue.

This analysis identifies this function of the figure as its primary contribution, beyond any additional strategic interpretation.

Open-source information, imagery, and field reports

The ISW’s methodology, based on the analysis of open sources, satellite imagery, and field reports, distinguishes this assessment from direct military statements issued by the belligerents themselves. This approach has its own limitations, particularly regarding real-time verification of contested urban areas.

This analysis considers this methodology sufficiently rigorous to justify using ISW figures as the primary factual basis, while noting the limitations explicitly acknowledged by the institute itself.

What This Methodological Transparency Offers the Reader

Explaining the methodology behind a figure, rather than presenting it as a raw and indisputable truth, allows the reader to gauge their level of confidence in each piece of data reported in this analysis. An explained figure is worth more than an imposed one; trust is built on method, not on authority alone.

This analysis strives to maintain this transparency throughout the text by systematically linking each figure to its source and its stated calculation method.

An institute that observes the battlefield, not the command headquarters

The ISW’s assessment focuses on observable results on the ground—captured territory, infiltrations, estimated casualties—rather than on a direct analysis of the internal state of the Russian armed forces, their morale, or their specific logistical capabilities. This methodological limitation means that the slowdown in the pace of advance could have several internal causes not detailed in the assessment consulted for this analysis.

This analysis lacks additional evidence to confirm whether this slowdown stems from depleted equipment stocks, a shortage of trained personnel, or a deliberate choice of tactical caution on the part of the Russian command.

Why This Uncertainty Does Not Diminish the Value of the Territorial Figure

Even without knowing the precise internal causes of the Russian slowdown, the figure of 1.22 km² per day remains an observable fact that can be independently verified through satellite imagery, which gives it its own factual robustness, independent of any causal explanation. One can measure a result without knowing all its causes; the result itself remains true.

This analysis therefore considers this figure to be reliable as an observation, while acknowledging the uncertainty that remains regarding its underlying causes.

What the assessment suggests without explicitly stating it

Although the ISW assessment consulted for this analysis does not explicitly detail the mechanisms of the Ukrainian defense in Kostiantynivka, the lack of significant military gains despite the intensification of Russian infiltrations suggests a level of resistance sufficiently organized to prevent a decisive breakthrough. This resistance is a plausible explanation for the observed slowdown, though it is not precisely quantified in the available data.

This analysis refrains from attributing this slowdown exclusively to the Ukrainian defense, due to a lack of comparative data that would allow this factor to be isolated from the other possible causes already mentioned.

What This Means for Assessing the Current Balance of Power

Such a slow pace of Russian advancement, sustained over several months, could indicate a more balanced balance of power than a superficial reading of the number of troops deployed would initially suggest. The number of soldiers deployed does not tell the whole story; the number of kilometers gained sometimes tells us more.

This analysis considers this interpretation to be reasonable, without presenting it as a definitive conclusion formulated by the ISW itself in the exact terms of its assessment.

In July 2026, Russia captured an average of 1.22 km² of Ukrainian territory per day—a pace that the ISW compares to “the pace of an infantryman”—at an estimated cost of between 353 and 1,132 casualties per square kilometer, depending on the calculation method used. This slowdown—nearly twelve times slower than the pace in July 2025—has not been accompanied by any significant strategic gains, according to the ISW’s independent assessment.

What these figures unequivocally demonstrate is the human cost of an offensive that, in two and a half months, has produced neither a decisive breakthrough nor the capture of Kostiantynivka. One and a half kilometers per day is not progress; it is a counter ticking away, counting lives with every tick.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist.