EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT: Forty days of Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russian territory

Five refineries named

The report cites the Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez refinery in Perm, Lukoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka in Volgograd, and three sites in Ufa: Bashneft-UNPZ, Novoil, and Ufaneftekhim. These refineries make up the list. The analysis ends where the published information ceases to document the event.

The list indicates a campaign targeting Russian oil refining. It does not contain independent figures on the production actually disrupted by each of these attacks. The details identified alter the interpretation, without drawing a general conclusion.

A Fuel Objective

The report describes refining as strategic for financing the Russian war effort and for supplying fuel to the armed forces. This is the mechanism put forward to explain the selection of targets. This distinction separates a strategic hypothesis from an established outcome on the ground.

The exact operational impact would depend on the damage, stockpiles, and repairs—factors that the report does not quantify. A strategic target is not automatically neutralized. The stakes are not abstract: this delay affects the available response capacity.

Two hangars and a workshop

At the aviation plant in Yevpatoria, in occupied Crimea, the SBU claims to have struck two hangars and a workshop. Three structures, a single source. Precise terminology prevents the narrative from taking the place of the facts.

These technical details come exclusively from the Ukrainian agency’s press release. No third-party satellite imagery is provided to confirm the extent of the damage. This data reflects a limitation, not a definitive assessment of the campaign.

Crimea in the Campaign

The inclusion of Yevpatoria extends the assessment to the occupied territory. It shows that the claimed sequence of events is not limited to refineries located within Russia. Causality must remain tied to the elements that the sources actually link.

The report does not describe the exact function of each targeted building. The article therefore does not invent any such functions. The document allows for this specific observation; it does not support any further conclusions.

Targeted Aircraft

Near Maykop, the Khanska military airfield appears on the SBU’s list, with two Su-35s, two L-39s, and fuel tanks reported as targets. “Targeted” does not mean “destroyed.” This caveat preserves the report’s credibility rather than overstretching it.

The term “targeted” must be distinguished from “destroyed.” The report provides no independent confirmation of the actual fate of these aircraft. The public can follow the process without being given false certainty.

Airfield fuel

The fuel tanks are associated with the same claim regarding Khanska. Their mention links an aerial target to the logic of logistical support that runs throughout the assessment. The information gains significance when it maintains this visible distinction.

No fuel volume, duration of unavailability, or impact on Russian sorties is established in the assigned sources. This absence also matters, as it precludes any fabricated figures or assessments.

Podlyot-K1 and Kasta-2E2

The SBU claims to have struck three Podlyot-K1 radars and one Kasta-2E2 radar in the Krasnodar region. The press release mentions four radars. The claimed outcome remains tentative as long as verification data is lacking.

These four systems represent a different category from refineries and aircraft. They underscore a campaign that also claims to target detection capabilities. This difference in status determines what a reader can take for granted.

The Unquantified Impact

The report provides no data on a possible loss of radar coverage, on repairs, or on the tactical consequences in Krasnodar. The choice of words must align with the quality of the available confirmation.

Describing a radar that has been struck therefore does not justify claiming an open corridor or that Russian defenses are blind. The final effect is missing. This piece adds context, not an independent validation of the whole.

Port Infrastructure

The SBU’s assessment includes port infrastructure in Taman. This mention adds maritime logistics to the aerial, oil, and radar targets. Taman is included in the assessment. The reasoning remains sound only if it does not skip any factual steps.

It specifies neither the facilities involved, nor the damage, nor the disrupted traffic. The name of the port is the only level of detail available. The determining factor is what is verified, not what might seem plausible.

A Network Rather Than a Single Point

The diversity of the locations claimed—from Perm to Crimea, via Ufa and Taman—suggests a campaign described as distributed. This is an interpretation of the list, not proof of coordination among all the strikes. This assessment provides direction to the debate without closing out the open questions.

The SBU provides a cumulative timeline; it does not publish a complete, strike-by-strike schedule for the area in question. What happens next will depend on factors that the file does not yet allow us to observe.

July 27–August 2

The RBC-Ukraine report places the campaign between July 27 and August 2, 2026, while referring to 40 days of operations based on the SBU’s cumulative tally. The cumulative total exceeds one week. This clarification helps avoid confusing announced capacity with actual capacity deployed.

This wording requires that the sequence not be limited to the seven days visible in the dated window. The total refers to a longer operation. The reported fact therefore requires a response proportionate to its level of evidence.

A report released on August 3

August 3 is the date of the report’s publication, not necessarily the date of all the strikes mentioned. Confusing the announcement with the actual events would make the timeline appear artificially condensed. This interpretation preserves the real tension without adding context or witnesses.

The reader must distinguish between the date of the press release and the dates of the actions it summarizes. The factual details specify the target but are not sufficient to gauge the lasting impact.

An Analytical Update

The ISW’s August 6 assessment indicates that the SBU claims at least 100 successful strikes. It provides additional analytical insight into the situation. The ISW cites sources but does not certify them. The publication of a source conveys its perspective before reaching a conclusion.

It does not replace satellite imagery of hangars, aircraft, radars, or refineries. No such imagery was consulted in this report. This specific information carries more weight than an unsupported generalization.

An Explicit Limitation

The report states that none of the detailed strikes have been confirmed by third-party satellite imagery in the sources consulted. This limitation applies to the exact extent of the damage to each of the targets. The analysis cannot fill this gap with a convenient assumption.

The article does not gloss over this omission to bolster the narrative. A claimed strike retains the status assigned to it by the source. The significance of this passage lies in its limitation, not in decorative emphasis.

A Strategy of Depth

The sites mentioned are located far from the ground front: Perm, Volgograd, Ufa, Krasnodar, and Taman are all listed in the SBU’s report. Depth becomes the battlefield. This dynamic shifts the responsibility to the actor who holds the next decision.

This geography makes the campaign a call for deep strikes. It does not provide information on the actual frequency of successes at each of these distances. The report requires a precise statement here rather than a promise of results.

The Financial Stake

The report explicitly links the refineries to the financing of the Russian war effort. This economic logic distinguishes these targets from a mere media stunt. This constraint explains why an isolated data point cannot become a confirmed trend.

However, the article cannot calculate lost revenue or refined volumes without the missing data. Strategic intent is no substitute for an economic assessment. The available data establishes a threshold, and that threshold must be respected.

"Successful" According to the SBU

The term “successful strikes” comes from the claimed assessment. It does not define in the report the threshold used: impact, damage, fire, temporary shutdown, or permanent destruction. Successful according to the striker. The sequence reveals real pressure without documenting all its hidden variables.

Retaining the quotation marks around the attribution preserves the meaning. Without a definition, the adjective cannot become an independent assessment. This nuance does not weaken the analysis; it prevents it from devolving into unfounded assertion.

The Precision of Types

The press release distinguishes between the Su-35, the L-39, the Podlyot-K1, and the Kasta-2E2. This level of detail does not negate its source, but it explains why the assessment deserves to be examined rather than dismissed without reading it. The source allows us to identify the question, but not to announce the final answer.

Rigor does not mean either credulity or contempt. It consists of maintaining both detail and perspective simultaneously. Political or military calculations remain distinct from the fact that has just been established.

Potential for Disruption

If the claimed strikes caused the reported damage, they could affect Russian refining capacity, radar detection, fuel reserves, and port facilities. This potential remains to be proven. This distinction also protects the credibility of the pro-Ukrainian argument.

The conditional tense is necessary: sources do not assess the long-term repercussions. The consequence is plausible given the nature of the targets, but it has not been confirmed here. Documented information must retain its own weight, without speculative additions.

No documented human toll

Block U1-13 provides no casualty figures for the listed sites. This article does not attribute any to it nor draw inferences from the sources’ silence. This reality requires attention to timelines, volumes, and verifiable effects.

The absence of data justifies neither minimizing nor exaggerating the situation. It establishes a boundary that this account must not cross. The reader may take note of this consequence without attributing to it any unpublished significance.

The number 100 as a threshold

The figure of at least 100 is a threshold put forward by the SBU and echoed by the ISW. It does not provide details about these 100 operations, their targets, or the extent of the damage they caused. One hundred does not erase the details. The available evidence draws a clear line that the text does not cross.

The total makes sense as an indication of the claimed frequency, not as cumulative individual evidence. A simple sum does not replace one hundred verifications. This logic links the number to its significance, without detaching it from its source.

Forty Days: A Political Timeframe

Highlighting 40 days allows the SBU to present continuity rather than an isolated burst of activity. This timeframe structures the public narrative of the operation. The absence of detail is not a void to be filled, but a fact worth noting.

It does not establish that each day produced the same volume of results. The campaign’s performance curve is not published. This constraint makes precision an editorial choice rather than a meaningless precaution.

What the Document Reveals

A signed text can attest to what the SBU chooses to make public: the names of sites, categories of targets, and an ambition to strike deep into Russian territory. The document speaks for itself, not the author. This fact remains significant even when it does not allow for a definitive conclusion.

It cannot claim to provide evidence of explosions, damage, or personnel without on-the-ground presence, independent imagery, or an established direct source. The document is the available evidence. This line of reasoning remains open until additional evidence becomes available.

The Reading Contract

The reader is presented with a detailed Ukrainian assessment, relayed by RBC-Ukraine and cited by the ISW, but without third-party satellite confirmation in the report. This is enough to describe a claimed campaign; not enough to certify its complete success. The report provides this part of the picture; it does not provide the entire picture.

Accuracy does not diminish the scope of the Ukrainian effort. It prevents its credibility from resting on a fabricated certainty. Caution pertains to the evidence, never to Ukraine’s right to defend itself.

The 40-day campaign highlights Ukraine’s determination to strike at Russia’s rear, particularly its refining facilities and detection capabilities. But the 100 successful strikes remain the SBU’s tally, not a publicly available audit. In a war of depth, the truth must travel as far as the drones.

The editorial response, therefore, is neither to deny Ukraine’s efforts nor to certify the destruction from afar. It is to identify the sites, the figures, the attribution, and what is still missing: detailed independent confirmation.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist