ANALYSIS: Interception of the "Banderol" — Saviez-vous Que? — Tous les jours, découvrez de nouvelles infos pour briller en société !

The Kremlin Fires Them Straight Out of the Factory

In August, Moscow launched approximately 2,500 jet-powered drones, according to Serhii Beskrestnov.

According to the Ukrinform news agency, this volume of jet-powered drones in August subjected Ukraine’s defenses to massive attacks against the country under attack.

In July, according to Serhii Beskrestnov, approximately 1,500 drones had targeted Ukraine. The pace is picking up.

On August 30, the presidential advisor on defense technology estimated the increase between July and August at 1,000 drones. Moscow is stepping up its efforts.

Ukraine is bearing the brunt of this escalation.

According to Beskrestnov, Russian drones are deployed almost immediately after production. The factory is directly supplying the strikes.

Russian jet-powered drones fly faster, reducing the time available to detect and intercept them.

Defenders must fire within a shorter timeframe.

Russian drones are no longer the exception.

I find this escalation of the Kremlin’s campaign against Ukraine—which is under attack—unacceptable. Production now dictates the strikes.

Missiles capable of reaching these targets still leave defenders facing decisions compressed by massive attacks. Time is running out.

The Kremlin is pressing the issue.

The speed of an interceptor matters, but it must reach its target in time. Cost matters, too.

For us, supporting Ukraine also means keeping an eye on this race against time. The defense has less time to wait.

The Ukrainian defense is now facing strikes that are arriving even faster as they roll off the production line.

With no stockpiles, the factory sets the pace

No gap between the assembly line and launch

Launch follows production almost immediately.

On August 30, Serhii Beskrestnov stated that Moscow was launching these drones almost as soon as they were produced. The waiting time is shrinking.

As an advisor to the Ukrainian president on defense technology, he describes a seamless chain between production and attack. The factory is fueling the war.

The increase in production is quickly reflected in the air campaign, as Moscow deploys the drones almost immediately. Strikes follow.

The production schedule becomes the attack schedule.

In my view, every acceleration in deliveries brings the threat closer to Ukrainian civilians. Their daily lives are paying the price.

The pace is increasing.

The close link between production and deployment rapidly translates more drones into more attacks. The targets remain Ukrainian.

Ukrainians are bearing the brunt of this pace.

For Ukrainian civilians, this acceleration means more time spent under the threat of strikes. Their daily lives are paying the price.

This time is a reality for residents; it cannot be reduced to mere industrial output.

The nearly immediate deployment described by the advisor directly links the production of a weapon to its use against Ukraine. This choice is unacceptable.

The acceleration threatens residents, and the drones produced almost immediately become weapons in use.

The protection of residents is therefore also measured by the speed at which their defenses are produced, in the face of this aerial campaign.

The exotic weapon becomes a weapon of mass destruction

The jet-powered drone joins the combined strike

Previously, a conventional Shahed gave defense units more time. The drone is accelerating.

The defense is scrambling.

On August 28, the Ukrainian Air Force described an attack combining drones and missiles on Ukrainian territory.

The combined strike involved 96 attack drones, including more than 70 jet-powered drones during the attack, according to the Ukrainian Air Force. Moscow strikes.

The combined strike that day involved targets with different speeds, characteristics, and capabilities. The defense adapts.

Today, intercepting these weapons requires tracking different targets within a single attack, with less time to react to fast drones arriving all at once.

Moscow is now intensifying its counterattack.

On September 19, Zelensky announced that the SBU had successfully used a new, locally developed Ukrainian interceptor against a Geran-5. Kyiv strikes back.

The agency deployed it twice in a single day against this jet-powered drone. The interception worked.

This success demonstrates a real response, but a massive airstrike requires more than just a successful interception of a fast-moving target. The scale is changing.

For Ukrainian civilians, these strikes mean their protection hangs in the balance until the next interception. The wait continues.

The Kremlin fires as soon as the missiles leave the factory.

In my view, turning this into a never-ending race puts the Ukrainian population at risk. The Kremlin is forcing this race upon Ukraine.

The delay puts Ukraine at risk.

A small missile that Kyiv must catch up with

Defence-ua attributes the development of the Banderol to Kronstadt and reports that it is typically launched from an Orion reconnaissance drone.

A photo shared by Ukrinform shows this armed carrier.

Ukrainian intelligence classifies the S8000 as a cruise missile; other sources describe it as an inexpensive jet-powered drone missile. The classification matters.

In June 2026, Moscow used this cruise missile against Kyiv for the first time, according to Defence-ua. The capital has become a target.

Its cruising speed reaches 520–560 km/h, according to Ukrainian intelligence. It moves fast.

Its top speed reaches 620–650 km/h.

The reported range extends up to 500 km. Distance matters when it comes to interception.

The payload weighs up to 150 kg.

This payload lends weight to the term “missile” and underscores what Kyiv is facing. Caliber matters.

As it approaches its target during the final phase of the attack, the missile descends to low altitude, according to Defence-ua. This complicates interception.

Its speed leaves little time for a response.

I find its small size misleading given the reported range and payload of this missile. Interception requires more.

On September 2, a Ukrainian unit destroyed it over the Odesa region, reports Defence-ua.

The weapon is thus encountering Ukrainian defenses.

Faced with a massive attack, the Ukrainian armed forces are confronting a fast-moving target.

The missile matters.

Kyiv is indeed facing a missile.

The cities under attack are paying the price for the delay

Saturation reduces decision-making time

For Ukrainian families, safety depends on the time between the alert and the interception. Time is their enemy.

Speed compresses this window.

The Ukrainian defense is facing drones whose flight speed has been increased by the Russian military. Moscow is accelerating.

The Ukrainian defense would run out of time during massive attacks, even with enough missiles to catch up to the targets. Decisions are urgent.

The Ukrainian defense is seeking a less costly interception. The cost of interception matters.

The Ukrainian defense must also hit the target in flight in time to destroy it, the analysis says. The trajectory dictates the urgency.

Interceptors provide a partial solution.

Military terminology refers to targets and decision-making timeframes. Residents bear the brunt of the gap.

The Associated Press reports that Russian attacks have damaged a bridge in Kyiv, thereby striking civilian infrastructure in the capital.

The city’s residents are bearing the consequences.

I reject this time constraint imposed on cities.

Targets are moving faster, decisions are urgent, and residents depend on a timely interception.

Residents are waiting.

For residents, protection in cities requires interception before the weapon arrives. You understand the gap.

The Kremlin is accelerating its strikes; residents are enduring the delay wrested from their defense.

Old-school defense is running out of steam

On August 24, Ihnat admits to the shortage

Ihnat acknowledges the shortage.

At the Air Force General Staff, Yurii Ihnat heads communications and announces a shortage of missiles. The institution acknowledges its limitations.

There is a shortage of ammunition.

The shortage affects the Patriot systems, used against jet aircraft alongside fighter jets. The shortage is taking its toll.

The shortage also affects other ground-based and airborne systems.

This admission regarding ammunition affects several interception systems. The shortage is widespread.

Let’s be frank: aircraft also require missiles.

Owning a fighter jet and having its weapons at your disposal are two different things. The aircraft depends on reserves.

Even with more missiles, a massive assault would still leave too little time to make decisions and intercept. The urgency remains as acute as ever.

Increasing the number of mobile teams does not magically replenish the batteries’ stockpiles. Weapons are still in short supply.

A destroyed target ceases to threaten residents; yet interception requires an available weapon and a sufficiently rapid decision. Civilians are waiting.

In my view, this admission compels us to examine the ammunition supply for each piece of equipment. The residents come first.

We depend on the difference between possessing a weapon and being able to use it. The shortage leaves us vulnerable.

Kyiv acknowledges a shortage affecting several types of interception systems.

I see this as weakened protection for civilians.

The shortage is affecting the defense shield.

A scarce missile must not be wasted

From Shaheds to jets, the same math applies

With the Shaheds, cost-effectiveness already dictated the strategy.

Faced with inexpensive Iranian drones, Kyiv developed mobile units. Interceptors followed.

Defence-ua emphasizes that a less expensive interceptor would allow costly missiles to be reserved for priority threats. Every interception depletes a reserve.

This history sheds light on the current challenge: conserving scarce missiles—whether against the Shahed or a jet-powered drone—also requires arriving in time.

Ukrainian sources report that the Banderol has a cruising speed of 520 to 560 km/h.

To counter it, the interceptor must combine a lower price, sufficient speed, and the ability to arrive before impact.

Time dictates the launch.

A cost-effective interceptor that arrives too late misses its target. Its cost becomes secondary. The stopwatch is the deciding factor.

Imagine an operator having to enter coordinates before interception: the time spent on that task would reduce their margin for protecting a civilian. Every second would count.

We also depend on that margin.

Even thousands of interceptors would not automatically make every engagement effective. Quantity matters. So does arriving on time.

I refuse to allow allied suppliers to use local innovation as a pretext for withdrawal: letting Kyiv bear this burden alone would be unacceptable. Their responsibility remains.

Kyiv is building a complementary response to the missiles. Suppliers retain their role in this system.

An interceptor destroys the target before impact.

Saving a missile means keeping a shot available to protect another person under threat.

A response can already fit on a pickup truck

Alexa Spatium was adopted on August 21

Kyiv has adopted its first jet-powered interceptor officially accepted into service. Alexa Spatium enters the scene.

The ministry cites its high speed as one of the advertised strengths of the model designed to catch up with jet-powered targets. Pursuit becomes possible.

The ministry cites the automation of operations as one of the advantages of this interceptor. The system operates automatically.

The ministry also cites its mobility and notes that the system can be transported in a pickup truck. The model is mobile.

Kyiv can retaliate.

Geran-3 and Geran-4 are among its jet targets; this interceptor is designed to intercept them. Its mission is becoming clearer.

What level of protection do we want to provide to the people of Ukraine?

Other small targets are also among those the system is designed to counter. Its role is thus expanding.

These announced capabilities are promising.

In my view, destroying the missile before it reaches its target is tantamount to protecting Ukrainian cities.

This also applies to structures such as the Kyiv bridge, which has already been damaged in Russian attacks.

Their protection is paramount.

Recognizing this achievement shapes our Western perspective on aid to the country under attack and on the protection of its people. We have a choice.

To ignore this achievement reduces Ukraine to a series of strikes rather than a country organizing its resistance. Kyiv is taking action.

An interceptor aircraft serves the residents first and foremost, even before reconstruction following a strike.

Technology finds its purpose in serving civilians.

Kyiv is deploying an interceptor to counter the air campaign.

Four prototypes do not make a shield

Khmara aims for thousands of units

Khmara is aiming for volume.

At the end of August, the minister announced an industrial target yet to be achieved. The goal remains pending.

The announcement does not deliver any interceptors.

Civilians depend on devices capable of intercepting targets before impact. And their protection requires available units.

The wait leaves them vulnerable.

The solution includes tested candidates, still to be refined. Khmara sets the course.

The solution includes a target of thousands of units, announced in late August by the minister in charge of armaments. The scale is changing.

The solution includes the interceptor that has already been adopted.

The solution also includes other developments for which the ministry has not released technical details. The details remain confidential.

These tests demonstrate real progress, but Khmara still describes production as a work in progress. The gap persists.

You, like this civilian, depend on protection that arrives in time—not on the power of a ministerial announcement. Words remain powerless.

I refuse to confuse this announced goal with available equipment. That distinction is what protects us.

The minister champions this industrial goal; presenting his announcement as a shield already deployed would be a denial of the work that remains to be done. Civilians are waiting.

The minister announces the scale; residents will only be protected once the candidates have been upgraded to the available devices.

Several products exist, but only one serves

Brave1 remains silent on the developer and the cost

Brave1 announces that a system designed by a member of its network has demonstrated its ability to destroy the Banderol cruise missile, reports Defence-ua.

The Defence-ua headline announces an interception that is less expensive than the target. The announcement is eye-catching.

Several Ukrainian products can already counter this missile, claims Brave1. Their developers must now improve them and increase production. Deployment is pending.

Brave1 does not name the developer.

Its specifications remain unknown. Brave1 also does not disclose the exact cost of an interception using this system.

This lack of information limits the ability to compare the claimed cost savings with the resources actually available to protect civilians. The matter remains a secret.

I refuse to confuse this demonstration against the Banderol with actual protection deployed for civilians.

Given the acknowledged shortage, Alexa Spatium remains the only officially adopted interceptor against the Geran-3 and Geran-4.

No interceptor specifically designed for the Banderol has been officially adopted, even though the 208th Brigade has already shot one down. The discrepancy is significant.

On the ground, this distinction concerns the protection of residents, not the publicity.

The proof is there.

On the industrial front, increasing production can translate announcements into concrete results. Scale is key.

Moving to mass production remains crucial.

During alerts, destroying the missile protects civilians; increasing the number of interceptors extends that protection to cities.

Success now rests on the shoulders of its proponents.

The gap is industrial, not technical

4 models tested, about 10 more manufacturers

The front lines put the machines to the test.

On September 17, Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn described the tests currently underway within the armed forces. He is leading their innovation efforts.

On the front lines, four models are facing off against Russian jet-powered drones during the tests. The military is testing them.

About 10 manufacturers are also testing their designs.

“These models include jet-powered versions,” Voloshyn specifies regarding the tests. Research is progressing.

These models also include electric variants.

The SBU’s success opens up prospects for engaging fast-moving targets in future operations. Manufacturing plays a decisive role.

The test does not specify any delivery dates.

Voloshyn describes the development but does not announce an industrial production rate. The contrast remains.

A portfolio of promising models can inform military decisions while leaving civilians to wait for factories to produce enough aircraft to protect them.

The delay leaves civilians vulnerable. The Kremlin is forcing them into this race between attack and retaliation.

The ministry remains silent on other developments. Press releases don’t build any aircraft; families depend on available units to stop an attack.

Analytical reports distinguish between engines. They don’t put any aircraft into service.

To mistake testing for guaranteed protection would be to ignore the delay between the factory and the families.

This confusion is blinding.

The factory decides on the shield.

The next wave has already been ordered

A massive strike is possible in 5 to 6 months

On September 14, Serhii Beskrestnov described plans for low-cost cruise missiles. According to him, Ukrainian intelligence is aware of the orders.

Kyiv is looking ahead.

These weapons could fly at low altitude, the advisor estimates. Detection would be key.

These weapons could reach speeds of 500–750 km/h.

According to estimates from September 14, a massive strike could occur in 5 to 6 months.

Bandrol, Dan-T, Dan-M, and Gerbera-5 are among the systems cited by the advisor in connection with these Russian preparations. He names them.

He specifies that their scale would be comparable to that of the orders for jet-powered Shahed drones.

These orders pertain to production. But their scale does not turn this estimate into a strike timeline. The timeframe remains an estimate.

These preparations are now expanding the efforts to protect the country under attack. Kyiv is planning ahead.

Speed, altitude, range, and trajectory would distinguish these targets; each might require a specific countermeasure, rather than a one-size-fits-all solution. This variety would be a factor.

A one-size-fits-all model would have its limitations.

Kyiv is already developing low-cost countermeasures against jet-powered Shaheds. The work continues.

In our view, ground-based platforms would add potential launch sites to monitor, but the timeline mentioned still reflects a planned massive deployment. Caution remains warranted.

This anticipation also involves the allies.

What Two Interceptions Don’t Reveal

In the Odesa region, the 208th Brigade has shown footage of interceptions of the Banderol, reports Defence-ua.

Its fighters had shot down this model on September 2 using a portable air defense system in the same region. The target was destroyed.

During the subsequent engagement, the unit’s video shows the drone in flight at night, followed by the flash of its destruction.

The target falls.

The brigade does not specify the system used for this second interception. The firing platform remains unknown.

This omission limits the comparison.

The word “intercepted” describes a destroyed target, not a production line capable of keeping up.

A local success leaves the question of industrial-scale production open.

I reject the denial that would turn these victories into a license to let Kyiv shoulder the effort alone. The allies remain responsible.

Their aid is crucial to our security.

These images respond to those who believe the system is invulnerable. Fighters have stopped it.

However, successfully firing a missile and increasing the available capabilities are different tasks for those protecting cities. The industrial supply chain is just as critical.

Leaving this burden to the country under attack benefits the Kremlin’s air campaign; the West must therefore help Kyiv produce more. Time is on the aggressor’s side.

In the face of relentless attacks, Western aid makes sense only when it increases the means of retaliation. Intercepting the “Banderol” is the West’s responsibility.

Interception of the “Banderol.”

I want the West to help Kyiv produce more rather than leave it to fend for itself.

After that, are you for or against this, and why?

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist

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