ANALYSIS: Ankara’s Gamble: From Promises to Actual Tanks and Missiles

The American Review: A Calculated Sword of Damocles

Pete Hegseth has officially launched a six-month strategic review of the U.S. military presence in Europe. The timing is no coincidence: the results of this review will be released around the time of the Ankara summit, or shortly thereafter. This is a calculated attempt to pressure European allies into accelerating their own investments before the findings are released.

The threat to reduce U.S. contributions to NATO is not new—Trump raised it during his first term. But the context in 2026 is different: the war in Ukraine is real, the risks on the eastern flank are concrete, and European allies have already begun to increase their spending. The question is no longer “will you spend?” but “will you spend quickly enough?”

What Europeans Really Fear

The fear expressed by NATO leaders to The Guardian on June 27, 2026, goes beyond budgets. It touches on the fundamental question of Article 5: if Russia attacks a Baltic state or Poland, will Trump’s United States actually invoke the collective defense clause? The question is no longer theoretical. Contingency plans are being discussed privately in several European capitals for scenarios in which Washington would not respond—or would respond too slowly.

This uncertainty has a direct consequence: it is pushing Europeans to rearm more quickly, not to do without the United States, but to avoid being at the mercy of an unpredictable U.S. presidential decision. Rutte knows this and uses it as an argument to convince the hesitant to reach the 5% of GDP target. The fear of being abandoned by the U.S. is a more powerful political driver than any discourse on shared values.

Europeans are afraid. And for once, this fear is productive. It forces them to take a hard look at themselves and admit that they have underinvested for three decades. Trump is a necessary evil if his brutality finally forces Europe to grow militarily.

What “tens of billions” actually means

Rutte’s announcement of “tens of billions” in new defense contracts with Ankara encompasses a variety of realities. These include orders for ammunition—notably the much-discussed fourfold increase in the production of 155-mm shells mentioned by Deputy General Stringer in a speech prior to the summit. It also includes orders for missile defense systems, armored vehicles, and command and communication systems.

The context is that of a Europe which, since 2022, has realized that its ammunition stocks were dangerously low, that its production lines had been scaled back since the end of the Cold War, and that in the event of a direct conflict with Russia, it would be unable to sustain a war effort for more than a few weeks. The contracts announced in Ankara are the industrial response to this realization.

The 155 mm: The Caliber of Modern Warfare

The goal of quadrupling the production of 155 mm shells is one of the most concrete commitments to emerge from the Ankara summit, according to Deputy General Stringer, as quoted by the AP on June 26, 2026. The 155 mm caliber has become the symbol of modern artillery warfare—Ukraine uses tens of thousands of them each month, and Western allies have struggled to keep up since 2022.

Quadrupling production requires massive investments in manufacturing lines, training for specialized workers, and supplies of propellant and explosives. These investments cannot be made in a matter of months; they are part of a three– to five-year plan. The decision made in Ankara in 2026 will therefore have tangible effects in 2028–2030—a timeframe that may seem distant but which will determine the West’s ability to support Ukraine and deter Russia over the long term.

Four times as many 155-mm shells. That is a concrete commitment in a world of vague diplomatic promises. If this figure is met, it will change the reality of the Ukrainian battlefield in two years. That is Ankara’s real decision.

From Theory to Reality

The Gdańsk Declaration of June 25, 2026, reaffirms that strengthening the eastern flank is the Alliance’s top priority. This is nothing new in official rhetoric—since 2022, every NATO summit has included commitments to this effect. But the reality on the ground has changed: multinational battle groups have been deployed in the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.

These deployments are not yet at the level required for a robust defense against a large-scale Russian attack. Military experts estimate that entire army corps would be needed to effectively defend the eastern flank, not battle groups of a few thousand troops. But the direction is the right one, and the Ankara summit could announce substantial reinforcements—full brigades rather than mere battle groups.

Finland and Sweden Are Changing the Baltic Equation

The accession of Finland in 2023 and Sweden in 2024 to NATO has radically transformed the Alliance’s geography in Northern Europe. The Baltic Sea is now surrounded by NATO member nations, with the exception of Russia and the Kaliningrad enclave. Finland brings to the Alliance its 1,340-km border with Russia and a trained and motivated reserve force.

This geographical transformation makes the northern flank much more defensible than it was before 2023. But it also requires a rethinking of collective defense plans. The Ankara summit will need to incorporate these new realities into the Alliance’s operational plans—a fundamental task that is being carried out discreetly, but whose broad outlines emerge at each summit.

Finland’s accession to NATO is the clearest strategic victory of this war—one that Putin did not foresee. He wanted to weaken the Alliance. Instead, he gave it an additional 1,340 km of border with Russia. Such is the irony of history.

Membership: Always Promised, Always Postponed

The issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership will be on the agenda in Ankara, just as it has been at every summit since 2023. And as always, the response will likely be an ambiguous statement reaffirming Ukraine’s “aspiration” to join the Alliance without setting a timeline. The United States—whether under Trump or his successor—is not prepared to invoke Article 5 for Ukraine as long as the war is ongoing.

This ambiguity is frustrating for Kyiv. It is understandable from the perspective of NATO legal experts—accepting a country at war would amount to automatically going to war with Russia. But the ambiguity itself comes at a cost: it does not provide Ukraine with the security it needs to accept a potential negotiated ceasefire, and it leaves Zelensky in a position of constant vulnerability.

Security Guarantees: The Middle Ground

The solution taking shape—imperfect but pragmatic—is that of bilateral security guarantees. Several NATO countries, including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, have signed security agreements with Ukraine committing to provide military support in the event of a new attack, without invoking Article 5. These agreements do not replace membership, but they create an interim safety net.

Ankara could further formalize this framework of bilateral guarantees by enshrining it in an agreement involving the entire Alliance. This is the most realistic path for now—providing Ukraine with a sufficient level of security to consider a negotiated peace without finding itself completely exposed after a ceasefire.

Ukraine deserves NATO. But NATO cannot accept it while it is at war without triggering a world war. This paradox is one of the most painful of our time. And I have no magic solution. Just the conviction that support must continue, with or without formal membership.

From Order to Production Lines

The political commitments made since 2022 are gradually translating into real industrial capabilities. The European defense industry is operating at a pace it hasn’t seen since the Cold War. Ammunition factories in Germany, the Czech Republic, Finland, and Poland have dramatically increased their production rates. 155-mm shells, military drones, and portable missile defense systems—all of these are being manufactured in greater quantities than they were two years ago.

This industrial ramp-up is evident in the order books of defense contractors, in the new production lines that have been opened, and in the thousands of jobs created in the defense sector. Ankara’s mission will be to accelerate this momentum—by coordinating joint procurement that enables economies of scale, harmonizing technical standards to facilitate interoperability, and creating shared financing mechanisms.

Persistent Bottlenecks

Despite this growth, bottlenecks persist. Propellant for artillery ammunition is a critical point of tension: few factories in Europe produce it, and capacity expansion takes a long time. Critical materials—certain rare metals needed for the electronic components of weapons systems—still come mainly from China. This dependence creates a strategic vulnerability that the summit must acknowledge.

And a skilled workforce for high-tech defense industries takes years, not weeks, to train. The Ankara summit will need to address these constraints frankly. Commitments on propellants and on diversifying supply chains for critical materials—these are concrete decisions that would make Ankara a summit of substance rather than mere public relations.

Europe is manufacturing more. But manufacturing more is not enough if bottlenecks in the supply chain prevent ammunition from reaching where it is needed quickly enough. Logistics is the tedious part of victory. That is often where everything is decided.

Russian Missiles in Belarus — The Geography of the Threat

The deployment of Russian tactical nuclear missiles in Belarus has changed the geography of the nuclear threat in Europe. These missiles can strike any European capital within minutes from Belarusian territory. This is a reality that NATO planners are factoring into their calculations, and one they cannot ignore when discussing the defense posture of the Eastern Flank.

The Alliance’s response to this nuclear threat is a delicate one: if too explicit, it risks triggering a rhetorical escalation with Moscow; if too discreet, it leaves a void that could be misinterpreted. Rutte will have to navigate this terrain carefully during the talks in Ankara. Strengthening NATO’s nuclear posture in Europe is one of the summit’s most pressing issues.

Extended deterrence and its future

The U.S. tactical nuclear bombs stationed in Europe—notably the B61s currently being modernized to the B61-12 version—constitute America’s extended deterrence on the continent. If the United States were to reduce its presence in Europe under pressure from Trump, the question of an autonomous European nuclear deterrent would become urgent. France, the EU’s sole nuclear power, would then be at the center of this debate.

Ankara will not resolve this issue in two days. It is too complex, too sensitive. But the summit can lay the groundwork for a structured discussion to take place in the coming months—and that may be the most important role it can play in this strategic area, which is essential to Europe’s security.

Nuclear power has been the unspoken topic at every NATO summit since 2022. People talk about shells, tanks, and budgets—and in the background, Russian nuclear missiles in Belarus are changing the calculus of any European deterrent. This issue will have to be addressed. Honestly. Courageously.

What the Summit Must Deliver

The Ankara summit will be judged by its concrete outcomes, not by its rhetorical statements. Tens of billions in defense contracts, a fourfold increase in 155-mm shell production, and firm commitments to spend 5% of GDP by as many members as possible—these are the real indicators. If diplomats return with eloquent statements but vague commitments, the summit will be a political failure, even if it is presented as a communications success.

NATO’s transformation since 2022 has been real and significant. The additional $1.2 trillion spent by Europeans and Canada over the past decade represents a silent revolution. Ankara must serve as its public confirmation and institutional catalyst. Not a celebration. A step forward in the work.

The ultimate test: deterring Putin

The true measure of the Ankara summit’s success is not what the allies say to one another. It is what Putin will conclude from it. If the Kremlin sees an Alliance that is divided, hesitant, and haggling over its commitments—then deterrence fails. If the Kremlin sees an Alliance that has quadrupled its shell production, strengthened its eastern flank, and maintained its support for Ukraine—then deterrence is working.

Ankara’s gamble is to turn the promises repeated since 2022 into tanks, missiles, artillery shells, and a tangible military presence. NATO has the money. It has the industries. It has the political will—fragile, but present. The question is whether it has the institutional courage to move from words to action.

From promises to concrete realities—that is exactly what NATO must deliver to Ankara. No more rhetorical outbursts. Signed contracts, factories in operation, troops deployed. Rhetoric does not protect Kyiv. 155-mm shells, yes.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist