ANALYSIS: Sixty days to seal the deal: The fragile roadmap between Washington and Tehran

Maxime Marquette

2026-06-29 14:10:30

From the 1981 Agreement to the JCPOA: A Long History of Promises

To understand why the 2026 roadmap is both promising and fragile, it must be viewed within the context of the long history of U.S.-Iranian relations. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the two countries have experienced a succession of episodes alternating between open hostility and attempts at normalization. The 1981 Algiers Accords led to the release of American hostages. The revelation of Iran’s nuclear program in 2002 ushered in a new era of sanctions and negotiations. The 2015 JCPOA seemed to have found a formula—before Trump abandoned it in 2018.

Each of these cycles has left institutional scars and accumulated mistrust on both sides. U.S. negotiators recall how Tehran gradually redefined the JCPOA’s commitments, making verification increasingly difficult. Iranian negotiators remember how Trump unilaterally abandoned an agreement that Iran was complying with, according to the IAEA. These institutional memories form the psychological context within which the 2026 roadmap is attempting to build something lasting. Negotiating while carrying the memory of all past betrayals is a psychological exercise as complex as the technical problem itself.

Why 2026 Is Different—Or Perhaps Not

Several factors distinguish the 2026 situation from previous negotiations. Iran’s level of uranium enrichment is considerably higher than in 2015—close to the military threshold—which creates a greater sense of urgency for an agreement but also demands more extensive dismantlement. The Iranian economy is in a more critical state, which strengthens Tehran’s motivation for an economic agreement. And the Pakistan-Qatar mediation offers a less politically charged channel than the multi-power formats of the past.

On the other hand, hardline factions in Iran are more powerful than they were in 2015, having consolidated their position in the post-Rouhani era. The U.S. Congress is more wary of an agreement with Iran than it was in 2015. And the regional situation—the war in Ukraine, tensions in Taiwan, instability in Israel and Gaza—creates a more volatile global geopolitical environment that could interfere with bilateral negotiations at any moment. 2026 is different—but not necessarily in a way that is most favorable to a deal.

The variable I’m watching most closely in these negotiations isn’t the timeline or the official positions—it’s Supreme Leader Khamenei’s health and the dynamics of the succession taking place in Iran. An Iran in the midst of a leadership transition is an Iran where every major strategic decision is uncertain, where factions are vying to define the post-Khamenei stance. Signing a major nuclear agreement during an informal and unannounced transition of power means signing with an entity whose continued commitment is not guaranteed.

A Breakdown of the 14 Points of the Islamabad Memorandum

Points of apparent consensus

According to information available on the Islamabad Memorandum as reported by Ground News, there appears to be a tentative consensus between the parties on certain points. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to international commercial shipping without unilateral Iranian conditions is an issue on which both sides share common ground—even if the details of implementation and verification remain to be worked out. The gradual lifting of economic sanctions in exchange for verifiable nuclear commitments is also a shared general framework.

The inclusion of an escrow arrangement for Iran’s purchase of U.S. grain—mentioned by the Washington Times on June 23—represents a pragmatic mechanism that allows Iran to use unfrozen assets for food purchases without those funds flowing freely through Iranian financial channels, thereby reducing the risk that they will finance weapons programs. This is a minor mutual concession, but one that is symptomatic of a willingness to find workable mechanisms in areas of common interest. Small, pragmatic mechanisms are often the building blocks for broader agreements.

Points of Explosive Friction

But the points of friction are just as numerous—and more fundamental. Nuclear inspections, as documented by Al Jazeera on June 23 and 24, 2026, constitute the main sticking point. Iran wants inspections that respect its “national sovereignty”—a phrase that, in diplomatic language, means the right to deny access to certain sites. The United States wants the IAEA to have unlimited, unannounced access to all nuclear sites, including military sites where suspicious activities have been detected.

The issue of frozen assets—$12 billion claimed by Tehran, according to Al Jazeera—is another sticking point. Washington wants to make the release of funds contingent on verifiable progress on the nuclear issue. Tehran wants the funds released first as a sign of goodwill. This sequence—who pays first?—is the age-old manifestation of the trust problem in negotiations. Each side wants the other to show its hand first—and neither is willing to do so.

The dispute over the sequence—sanctions relief first or nuclear commitments first—is the classic manifestation of the trust problem in international relations. It cannot be resolved through goodwill alone. It requires a mechanism of “simultaneous action” in which every concession is conditional and verifiable in real time. The 2015 JCPOA had partially resolved this problem. The 2026 agreement will have to find an equivalent or better solution—otherwise, this fundamental impasse will derail the roadmap.

Switzerland's Role as a Forum for Negotiations

Swiss Neutrality as a Diplomatic Asset

The talks that produced the roadmap were held in Switzerland—a well-established diplomatic tradition. Switzerland has represented U.S. interests in Iran since the severing of diplomatic relations in 1980 and has facilitated several exchanges of discreet messages between the two countries. Its recognized neutrality, well-established diplomatic infrastructure, and tradition of confidentiality make it an ideal setting for negotiations on such sensitive issues.

The city of Geneva or Lausanne—the exact location has not been confirmed—also offers a logistical advantage: the simultaneous presence of American and Iranian delegations can be kept discreet, without personnel movements prematurely signaling the status of the negotiations to the media and hard-line factions who would be waiting for the slightest sign of weakness to trigger a crisis. The geography of the negotiations is not neutral—it shapes the psychological conditions under which diplomats operate.

The Limits of the Bilateral Framework

But the Swiss negotiations have a structural limitation: they are largely bilateral between the U.S. and Iran, with Pakistan and Qatar acting as mediators. The other major stakeholders—Israel, the European Union, the Gulf allies, Russia, and China, which were part of the P5+1 in the JCPOA—are either excluded from direct negotiations or involved only in a secondary role. This bilateral format has its advantages—it is faster and more confidential—but also its risks: an agreement reached without the full involvement of Israel and the Gulf allies risks being scuttled by those who feel excluded from it.

Russia finds itself in a particularly ambiguous position. On the one hand, it benefits from U.S.-Iranian tensions, which keep the United States tied up on multiple fronts. On the other hand, an Iran that is economically normalized and reintegrated into global oil markets could compete with Russian oil exports, reducing the revenues that finance the war in Ukraine. Moscow therefore has reasons to want the negotiations to fail. In any negotiation, it is just as important to identify who wants it to fail as it is to identify who wants it to succeed.

Russia’s role in this equation seems to me to be severely underanalyzed in media coverage. An Iran that normalizes its economic relations with the West is an Iran that has less need for Russia’s diplomatic protection—and that could even compete with Moscow in the oil markets. Putin is not neutral in this matter. If the negotiations appear to be making progress, we must watch for provocations or leaks that could derail them.

The 60-Day Diplomacy: Mechanisms and Timeline

What Needs to Be Resolved Before the Deadline

For the roadmap to meet its target date of around August 20, 2026, negotiators must resolve a series of technical and political issues within an extremely short timeframe. On the technical nuclear front: agreeing on the maximum permitted enrichment level, the stockpile of enriched uranium that may be retained, mechanisms for converting or diluting existing enriched uranium, and the terms of IAEA access—including additional protocols and access to suspected military sites.

Economically: establishing the precise sequence for lifting sanctions in exchange for nuclear measures—with verifiable milestones, an automatic “snapback” mechanism that can reinstate sanctions in the event of an Iranian violation, and a legal framework for foreign investment in Iran. On the regional front: address—even if only in confidential annexes—the concerns of Israel and Gulf allies regarding Iran’s proxy activities in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. All these issues together, within 60 days, will either spell the Waterloo of diplomacy or its absolute triumph.

The Week-by-Week Timeline

The first two weeks are crucial for determining whether the public disagreements over inspections can be resolved in technical sessions. If the two sides fail to agree on a verification framework within the first two weeks, the 60-day timeline risks dissolving into a gradual deadlock. Weeks 3 and 4 must address economic issues—frozen assets, the sequence for lifting sanctions, and escrow mechanisms. Weeks 5 through 8 are reserved for drafting the final text, consulting with stakeholders not at the table—the U.S. Congress and regional allies—and obtaining final approval from the executives of both countries.

This timeline is not impossible—it’s just extremely tight. A single major incident—an Israeli strike on Iran, a tanker seizure by the Revolutionary Guards, an ill-timed statement by Trump on social media—could tip the entire process into crisis. Peace is built slowly; it can collapse in a matter of hours.

This week-by-week timeline I’m outlining is, of course, an analytical extrapolation, not based on an internal source. I want to be transparent about that. What I’m doing is applying the logic of a standard diplomatic process to an exceptional situation. Diplomatic reality is always more chaotic than any model. But chaos without a conceptual framework is even harder to understand. I acknowledge this limitation.

Trump as a Peacemaker: The Paradox of the Unpredictable Negotiator

The Man Who Abandoned the JCPOA Is Seeking an “Even Better” Deal

There is something almost comical, from a historical perspective, about the fact that Donald Trump—the man who abandoned the JCPOA in 2018, calling it “disastrous” and “the worst deal ever made”— — is now attempting to strike a deal with Iran under potentially tougher terms, with Iran’s enrichment levels much higher than in 2015. Consistency has never been Trump’s hallmark when it comes to foreign policy.

According to his inner circle, the official line is that the 2026 roadmap produces an agreement “far superior” to the JCPOA—stricter on inspections, more permanent in its nuclear limitations, and including provisions on ballistic missiles and regional proxy activities that were missing from the 2015 agreement. If these claims reflect the reality of the final text, it would indeed be a significant step forward. But the initial contradictions regarding inspections cast serious doubt on the actual robustness of this supposedly superior agreement. The rhetoric about an agreement’s superiority over its predecessors must be tested against the actual text, not against the negotiators’ statements.

U.S. Domestic Politics as a Structural Constraint

The Trump administration is navigating politically treacherous waters on this issue. On the one hand, a significant segment of its electorate and its supporters in Congress—notably Republican senators close to Israel—oppose any agreement that does not completely dismantle Iran’s nuclear program. On the other hand, Trump likes to strike deals, showcase diplomatic “victories,” and demonstrate that his “deal-making” approach to negotiations outperforms traditional methods.

If a deal is reached within 60 days, Trump will want to present it as a resounding personal victory. This need for a victory narrative could create pressure to accept an imperfect deal rather than no deal at all. This is precisely what Iran anticipates—and could exploit in the final stages of negotiations, by maintaining hardline positions while leaving an exit strategy just acceptable enough for the Trump team to sell it politically. The psychology of the negotiator who “needs a deal” is exploited by all seasoned negotiators facing him.

I must admit a bias here: Trump both fascinates and worries me on this issue. On the one hand, his unpredictability can destabilize Tehran and force concessions that more conventional negotiators would not be able to secure. On the other hand, his personal need for victory could lead him to accept a mediocre deal that he’ll present as a triumph. These two dynamics coexist within him constantly. On the Iran issue, I don’t know which one will prevail—and that’s precisely why these 60 days are so nerve-wracking to watch.

Iran Under Sanctions: Why 2026 Marks a Peak in Pressure

Iran’s Economy on the Brink

To understand why Iran agreed to commit to a 60-day roadmap—a time constraint that is usually to its disadvantage—one must look at the actual state of its economy. U.S. and European sanctions have had significant cumulative effects: a devaluation of the rial by more than 90% compared to pre-sanction levels, chronic double-digit inflation, high unemployment—particularly among young people—and an inability to access international financial markets to finance infrastructure that is falling into disrepair.

More significantly, Iran faces growing demographic and social pressure. The generation that grew up under sanctions—born after the revolution, educated, and connected to the digital world—is the same generation that fueled the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests of 2022–2023. The regime needs to deliver tangible economic improvement to stabilize its social base. The prospect of 300 billion in reconstruction funding and partial integration into global markets directly addresses this internal pressure. Revolutions do not happen in public squares—they happen in economies that fail to feed their populations.

Iran’s Energy Sector Under Strain

Iran’s oil sector—the regime’s vital economic lifeline—is under particular pressure. Sanctions have limited Iran’s ability to sell its oil on international markets, forcing it to sell at discounted prices through informal channels, primarily to China. Drilling and refining equipment is aging due to a lack of spare parts, which are subject to export restrictions. Production capacity has declined relative to the theoretical potential of Iran’s reserves.

An agreement that would lift sanctions on the oil sector would represent a significant immediate economic gain for Iran. Increased Iranian oil exports would boost government revenues, fund social programs, and reduce the regime’s dependence on domestic resources and contributions from the Revolutionary Guards. This is a real economic incentive to reach an agreement—and that is why Iranian policymakers have approved this roadmap despite internal resistance. Economic pressure is sometimes the best catalyst for diplomacy.

The under-the-table sale of Iranian oil to China is one of the best-known secrets of global geopolitics. Everyone knows that millions of barrels of Iranian oil are feeding Chinese refineries despite the sanctions. It is this reality that sometimes puts the pressure of sanctions into perspective—Iran is bleeding, but it is not dying. An agreement that officially normalizes its oil exports would make Iran less dependent on Beijing and give it more room to maneuver. Paradoxically, a normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations could reduce Chinese influence over Tehran—which should be viewed as a positive development in Washington.

The Mediators' Guarantee: Can Pakistan and Qatar Keep Their Promise?

Pakistan: The Strengths and Weaknesses of a Border Mediator

Pakistan shares a long border with Iran and has maintained complex relations with its neighbor for decades. Islamabad has experience mediating regional conflicts—it has played a role in Afghan peace talks, and Pakistani emissaries have facilitated discreet contacts between rival powers in the Middle East. Its appointment as a mediator in U.S.-Iranian negotiations is a sign that Washington and Tehran have sought a less visible framework than the multilateral formats of the past.

But Pakistan also brings its own complications. Its relationship with the United States has historically been turbulent—the 2011 operation that killed bin Laden, disputes over Pakistan’s alleged support for the Taliban, and tensions over nuclear programs—all of which create a legacy of mistrust that has not been fully resolved. And its own internal security remains precarious, with terrorist attacks and border tensions that can distract its leadership from regional diplomatic commitments. Islamabad as the permanent guarantor of a complex multilateral nuclear agreement is a proposition that deserves to be questioned.

Qatar: The Pragmatic Mediator Par Excellence

Qatar brings to the mediation process its reputation as a neutral facilitator in politically charged conflicts. Its news network, Al Jazeera—which has covered the negotiations with care and, at times, bias—reflects Doha’s position as an actor that seeks to be at the center of events without getting completely burned. Qatar hosts the main U.S. air base in the Gulf (Al Udeid), maintains economic ties with Iran—notably regarding the shared North Dome/South Pars gas field—and has political ties with a variety of regional actors.

Qatar’s strength as a mediator lies precisely in this delicate balancing act—it is not perceived as exclusively aligned with the West, yet it maintains security guarantees with the United States. Its weakness is that its role as a mediator depends on the goodwill of both parties—and in the event of failure or crisis, it has neither the military capabilities nor the economic leverage to enforce compliance with commitments. A mediator can open doors—it cannot force people to walk through them.

What strikes me about the Pakistan-Qatar combination as mediators is their affiliation with the Islamic world—neither Western nor Persian, but clearly rooted in a cultural and religious tradition close to Iran’s. This positioning has symbolic value: it avoids the perception of an agreement “imposed by the West,” which would be politically unpalatable within Iran. It is a smart strategic choice. Its limitation is that neither of these countries has the economic or military power to serve as a credible guarantor of long-term implementation.

Failure Scenarios and Their Consequences

If the 60 days expire without an agreement

What happens if the 60 days expire on August 20, 2026, without a final agreement? There are several scenarios. The first—the most likely, according to analysts—is a negotiated extension: the parties agree to an additional deadline, citing “significant progress” that justifies continuing. This scenario keeps the negotiating table open but signals to hardliners on both sides that the deadline can be ignored without immediate consequences, thereby reducing the pressure to make difficult concessions.

The second scenario is a breakdown leading to a return to confrontational posturing. Iran resumes enrichment at higher levels, and the United States imposes new sanctions. This scenario returns the situation to a state worse than before the negotiations—with Iran having moved even closer to the nuclear threshold during the talks and now able to argue that its good faith has been betrayed. The third scenario—the most dangerous—is unilateral Israeli military action triggered by the conviction that negotiations will never lead to a genuine dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program. The failure of negotiations always comes at a cost—sometimes a cost in human lives.

The Global Geopolitical Consequences of a Collapse

A collapse of the U.S.-Iran roadmap would not merely be a bilateral diplomatic setback—its shockwaves would ripple through the entire international system. Oil prices would rise immediately, weighing on the economies of all oil-importing countries. The credibility of the United States as a diplomatic power capable of concluding lasting agreements would be undermined. Russia and China would seize the opportunity to assert that the West is incapable of constructive diplomacy with non-Western powers.

Above all, an Iran that resumes enrichment at full speed following the collapse of negotiations would find itself just months away from military nuclear capability. The proliferation clock, already well advanced, would be ticking closer to zero. The window for a diplomatic solution is narrowing with each passing month. It is not that an agreement is essential at any cost—it is that a bad agreement would be worse than a good one, but the absence of an agreement risks being worse than either.

I’ll conclude this section with an uncomfortable thought: perhaps the real goal of the 60 days is not to produce a comprehensive agreement but to generate enough creative tension to gauge the parties’ genuine good faith. If Iran negotiates in bad faith—seeking time and economic concessions without any intention of curbing its nuclear program—this will become apparent through contradictions, delays, and conflicting narratives. And if this bad faith is demonstrated, the international consensus for tougher measures will be stronger than it was before the negotiations. The roadmap can be useful even if it fails—provided that the right conclusions are drawn from it.

What Would Be Required for the Agreement to Succeed

The Minimum Conditions for a Credible Agreement

If the 60-day roadmap is to produce an agreement worth signing, certain conditions are non-negotiable. First, unrestricted and unannounced access by the IAEA to all Iranian nuclear facilities, including suspected military sites. Without this, any agreement is structurally unverifiable and therefore not credible. Second, a verifiable cap on uranium enrichment—ideally at 4–5% for civilian use, with no exceptions—along with a mechanism for dismantling or transferring stocks of uranium enriched to higher levels.

Third, an automatic “snapback” mechanism that reinstates sanctions without requiring a vote by the UN Security Council in the event of a violation—a lesson learned from the JCPOA’s difficulty in activating this mechanism in the face of a potential Russian veto. Fourth, a clause on long-range ballistic missiles—which were not part of the JCPOA—and on regional proxy activities. These last two points are politically essential for selling the agreement in Israel and in the Gulf capitals. An agreement that meets these conditions would be a truly historic step forward. An agreement that meets only a few of them is one that will last only as long as an election cycle.

The Issue of Permanence versus Sunset Clauses

The 2015 JCPOA included “sunset clauses”—expiration provisions stipulating that certain nuclear restrictions would end after 10 or 15 years. This was one of Trump’s most legitimate criticisms of the agreement: after these time limits, Iran could have regained its full nuclear capacity. A new agreement must resolve this issue by establishing permanent—or at least very long-term—limitations on enrichment capabilities. Iran will resist this demand in the name of its sovereign right to “civilian” enrichment. Finding a formula that respects this right in theory while sufficiently regulating it in practice is one of the most complex intellectual challenges of the negotiations.

It is not impossible—precedents exist in other nuclear agreements. But it requires legal and diplomatic creativity that the 60-day roadmap must produce, under intense pressure and in a climate of accumulated mutual mistrust. History will record the very fact that these negotiations are taking place as a remarkable achievement. What it will remember of their outcome depends on what is written in those 14 points in the coming weeks.

The JCPOA’s sunset clauses have always struck me as the agreement’s hidden flaw—unacceptable from a strategic standpoint, yet included to make the agreement acceptable to Tehran. This is the kind of compromise that solves an immediate problem by creating a more serious one down the road. If the new agreement repeats this mistake in a different form, it will be just as fragile. But if I were a U.S. negotiator, I would focus on this point above all others: permanence or nothing.

Pakistan and Qatar as Mediators: Credibility and Limitations

Pakistan as the Setting for the Negotiations: A Telling Choice

The choice of Islamabad as the venue for the memorandum is not a mere geographical coincidence—it is a politically significant decision. Pakistan maintains complex relations with both the United States and Iran, making it an acceptable negotiating venue for both parties. It is not a member of the Sunni Arab coalition allied with Washington, and its relationship with Iran—though marked by sectarian tensions between Pakistani Sunnis and Iranian Shiites—is pragmatic enough to allow for a facilitating role. It also sends a signal to China and Russia: the agreement is not being reached in an exclusively Western capital, which makes it easier to gain international acceptance.

But Pakistan is a mediator with limited resources. Its economy is on life support from the IMF, its military is preoccupied with internal tensions involving the Taliban, and its government faces chronic political instability. Pakistan’s credibility as a guarantor of an agreement is real but fragile—a change of government in Islamabad or an internal crisis could weaken its ability to play this role. Mediators are only as stable as they themselves are—and that stability is not guaranteed.

Qatar: A Discreet Mediator with Multiple Connections

At the same time, Qatar plays a discreet but crucial facilitating role. Doha has extensive experience in regional mediation—from Hamas to the Taliban to the Houthis—and maintains channels of communication with Tehran that few other countries in the region possess. Its geographic location at the heart of the Gulf, its relationship with the United States (which maintains the Al-Udeid military base there), and its ties to Iran make Qatar an indispensable intermediary during delicate phases of the negotiations.

The weakness of Qatar’s role lies in its inherent double-dealing: Doha maintains relations with actors that its neighbors and Western allies view as threats—Hamas, the Taliban, and at times Iran. This diplomatic versatility is precisely what makes it useful as a mediator, but it also raises suspicions about its motivations and long-term reliability. For the Washington–Tehran agreement, Qatar can facilitate contacts—but it cannot guarantee their longevity. Mediation is an art of the moment; the durability of an agreement is a matter of interests and institutions.

The choice of Islamabad and Qatar as frameworks for this diplomacy fascinates me because it reveals something important about the nature of contemporary international relations: major powers increasingly need intermediaries to communicate with one another, even when their interests align. This speaks to the level of mutual distrust that has built up. And it raises a real question about the sustainability of agreements reached through mediators rather than through direct bilateral relations. Bridges built by others can also be dismantled by others.

The Agreement and Iran's Ballistic Missile Program: The Big Absentee

What the Memorandum Doesn’t Say About Missiles

The Islamabad Memorandum addresses Iran’s nuclear program—but what about ballistic missiles? Iran has the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, with ranges exceeding 2,000 kilometers—enough to reach Israel, U.S. bases in the Gulf, and much of Southern Europe. These missiles serve both as a direct military tool and as a potential delivery vehicle for a nuclear warhead should Iran cross that threshold. Yet the memorandum does not appear to address this aspect head-on.

This is a major shortcoming. Iranian ballistic missiles were the primary U.S. objection to the 2015 JCPOA, which did not cover them. If the Islamabad memorandum replicates this omission, it would leave Iran free to continue developing and improving its delivery systems during the 60-day negotiation period and beyond. This asymmetry—restricting nuclear fuel without restricting the delivery system—is a structural vulnerability of the agreement. Controlling fissile material without controlling missiles is like removing the magazine from a gun without removing the barrel.

The Missile Dimension and Tehran’s Calculations

Tehran views its ballistic missile program as a non-negotiable red line—an existential guarantee of deterrence against its regional adversaries and U.S. intervention. Demanding its abandonment in a nuclear agreement that was already difficult to reach would likely have caused the negotiations to fail before they even began. This is probably why the subject does not appear explicitly in the memorandum.

But this omission carries a real security cost for Israel and the Gulf monarchies. It means that an Iran that scrupulously honors its nuclear commitments could continue to develop increasingly precise, longer-range missiles—thereby maintaining a strategic regional threat even without an immediate nuclear capability. For the Islamabad agreement to be truly transformative, the 60 days allotted for its finalization must find a way to address, at least partially, the missile dimension—even if only through a separate dialogue process. An incomplete peace is sometimes a step forward—but its incompleteness must be acknowledged.

The omission of Iran’s missile program from this memorandum deeply concerns me. I understand the diplomatic reasons—including missiles in the negotiations would have made the agreement even more difficult to conclude. But Iran, with less nuclear fuel but the same ballistic missiles, remains a major regional threat. For Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, the missile issue is just as urgent as the nuclear issue. To gloss over this problem in an agreement presented as historic is to promise a peace that leaves half the threat intact.

The Resilience of the Iranian Regime in the Face of International Pressure

Why the Revolutionary Guards Survive Sanctions and Agreements

A rarely discussed aspect of the negotiations with Iran is how the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has maintained its economic and political power despite decades of sanctions. The IRGC controls between 30% and 40% of the Iranian economy, according to various estimates—ranging from the oil and petrochemical sectors to construction and telecommunications. These economic empires have enabled the IRGC to sustain its programs, fund its proxies, and withstand the economic pressures that sanctions—intended to strangle Iran—had in fact partially diverted into these parallel channels.

This means that the lifting of sanctions will not benefit Iranian society uniformly—a substantial portion of the new economic flows will be captured by the IRGC’s networks and its commercial affiliates. The question of how to structure the lifting of sanctions to maximize benefits for the Iranian people and minimize the enrichment of the regime’s military-industrial structures is fundamental—and the details of the memorandum on this point will be decisive in assessing the agreement’s true value.

Democratic Iran versus Theocratic Iran: An Unresolved Underlying Tension

The Washington–Tehran agreement is being negotiated with the current government of the Islamic Republic—but Iranian society is deeply divided. The 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, which was suppressed but not extinguished, revealed the extent of Iranian youth’s aspiration for a fundamentally different Iran. Millions of Iranians view an economic agreement not as a solution, but as a lifeline for a regime that oppresses their fundamental rights. For them, lifting sanctions without demanding internal reforms amounts to prolonging the dominance of the theocratic structures that prevent them from living freely.

This social and political dimension of the agreement is systematically absent from the negotiations—by deliberate choice of the negotiators, who prioritize immediate feasibility over systemic transformation. This is a defensible position in the short term: an imperfect agreement that reduces the nuclear risk is better than no agreement at all. But in the long term, the stability of the agreement will also depend on the stability of the Iranian regime itself—and that is not guaranteed. An agreement reached with a weakened regime may become obsolete even before it is fully implemented.

The tension between negotiating with the Iranian regime and recognizing the aspirations of its people is real and painful. I do not claim to have an easy answer. Refusing to negotiate until Iran becomes a democracy would amount to rejecting diplomacy altogether—that is not viable. But signing an agreement that enriches the structures oppressing millions of Iranians without any human rights conditions is also a choice that carries a moral cost. The West should at least be honest about this compromise—not deny it in the name of diplomatic triumphalism.

The 60 Days: What Needs to Be Resolved for the Agreement to Become Historic

The list of unresolved issues in the memorandum

The 60 days of negotiations to finalize the Islamabad Memorandum will need to resolve several fundamental issues that the initial text deliberately left open. First, the precise definition of permitted uranium enrichment levels—the memorandum refers to “acceptable levels” without specifying them, which will allow each party to claim success while leaving the actual negotiations for later. Second, the exact sequencing of sanctions relief in relation to Iran’s obligations—a matter of mutual trust that has caused many previous negotiations to fail.

Third—and perhaps most difficult—is the issue of suspicious military sites that the IAEA wants to inspect and that Iran has consistently refused to open. This unresolved issue is the Achilles’ heel of any nuclear agreement with Iran. Without access to these sites, IAEA inspectors cannot verify whether Iran is conducting clandestine activities alongside its declared facilities. And without such verification, the agreement rests on a level of trust that the history of Iranian nuclear negotiations does not justify.

Scenarios for Success and Their Conditions

For the 60-day period to be a genuine success, it would require, at a minimum: an agreement on an enrichment cap of less than 5% (the civilian level); immediate IAEA access to all declared sites and several suspected military sites; a mechanism for the automatic “snap-back” of sanctions in the event of a confirmed violation; and a timeline for lifting sanctions precisely linked to the stages of Iran’s disengagement. These conditions are not impossible—but they require both sides to be honest about the necessary compromises, something their current public rhetoric does not clearly indicate.

The failure scenario, on the other hand, is easy to describe: negotiators dragging out the talks without resolving key issues, allowing each side to present its domestic position as a victory until the 60 days expire without a final agreement. In that case, the Islamabad memorandum would join the long list of missed opportunities in Iranian nuclear diplomacy—an instructive episode but one without lasting results. Sixty days is a timeframe that allows for either action or evasion—the difference depends entirely on the political will of both parties.

I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic about the 60 days—I am realistic. The obstacles are real: deep-rooted mutual mistrust, red lines on both sides, and regional actors who would prefer failure to an agreement that alters their balance of power. But the memorandum exists, and it represents a political will that neither Iran nor the United States can completely ignore. Sixty days to make history or repeat past mistakes—this is a rare opportunity that deserves every chance to succeed.

Conclusion: 60 days for the record books, or 60 more days in the cycle

What the Roadmap Says About Us

The U.S.-Iran roadmap of June 21, 2026, regardless of its outcome, is a sign that diplomacy can still find its way even in the most toxic contexts. Two countries that have subjected each other to decades of pressure, and that publicly clash over the facts within the first 48 hours of an agreement, nevertheless find themselves at the table with a deadline and a roadmap. That is the bare minimum required for any progress—and it’s already something.

But this minimum is not enough. Peace is not built on roadmaps whose contents the participants do not agree upon. It is built on precise texts, verifiable mechanisms, and a political will that survives the pressures of hard-line factions on both sides. These 60 days are the test of that will—for Washington, for Tehran, and for the world that is watching, hoping, and fearing all at once.

What the Rest of the World Must Demand

The international community—Europe, Japan, the Gulf allies, and the Asian economies dependent on Gulf energy—must not remain passive spectators during these 60 days. It must clearly articulate its own minimum requirements for a credible agreement, signal its willingness to support verification measures, and warn against the temptation of a half-hearted diplomatic deal. The world has a vital interest in a lasting agreement on Iran’s nuclear program and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz—and that vital interest gives it the right to influence the shape of that agreement, even from outside the negotiating table.

The next 60 days may be among the most important in Middle Eastern diplomacy in decades. Not because the agreement will be perfect—it won’t be. Not because it will solve all the problems—it won’t. But because an imperfect agreement that reduces the Iranian nuclear threat, even partially, is better than the alternative: an Iran just weeks away from nuclear capability, sanctions that impoverish a people without changing a regime, and a region just two incidents away from a war that no one can afford.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist