EDITORIAL: The 21st Package: Europe Must Stop Haggling

Three small countries that see further than the big ones

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania don’t need anyone to explain what imperial Russia is. They’ve experienced it firsthand, right under their feet. These three nations have long been pushing for a total oil embargo, long before the major European capitals deigned to give it serious thought. Their position is clear and unambiguous: one cannot claim to sanction Moscow while continuing to buy its energy in disguised forms.

The June 27, 2026, edition of the Kyiv Post documents their pressure on Brussels: the Baltic states want an accelerated embargo, without the usual delays that allow Russia to adapt. Their argument is unassailable: every delay is a strategic gift to Putin. The EU must listen to those who understand the enemy, not those who still hope to do business with him tomorrow.

Geography as a Moral Compass

There is something deeply revealing in the fact that the countries closest to Russia are the most determined to sanction it. Poland, the Baltic states, Finland—all understand that the EU’s current weakness is not only morally reprehensible but strategically suicidal. When the countries most exposed to the Russian threat are calling for a tougher stance, and the most protected countries are dragging their feet, there is a problem with how reality is perceived.

France, Germany, and Hungary—for very different reasons—have all too often played the role of moderators. France out of diplomatic ambition, Germany out of historical dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, and Hungary out of open complicity with Orbán. The result: twenty watered-down packages instead of sustained maximum pressure.

Geography doesn’t lie. The Baltic states, which lie just a few kilometers from Russian military bases, have understood what some Brussels bureaucrats seem to ignore: Putin is not a difficult partner; he is an active enemy. Treating one’s economic partners as enemies is a courageous decision. Refusing to accept the consequences is a sign of weakness.

The June 27 Proposal: A Step Forward or More of the Same?

According to Daily Finland on June 27, 2026, the EU officially proposed its 21st package of sanctions against Russia. The specific details are still being negotiated, as is always the case. But the outlines are taking shape: new import restrictions, expanded blacklists of individuals and entities, and measures to prevent the circumvention of sanctions via third countries. On paper, it looks serious. In practice, everything will depend on the ambition of the measures ultimately adopted.

The history of previous packages speaks for itself: with each announcement, the rhetoric is strong. Then come the negotiations, the exemptions, and the transition periods. The final package is always less stringent than the initial draft. It’s a well-oiled machine that Moscow has learned to anticipate. Russian strategists know the European rhythm better than some European parliamentarians do.

The two countries opposing the entry ban on Russians

Pravda Ukraine, in its June 25, 2026, edition, reveals that two EU member states still oppose the entry ban on Russian nationals. The fact that these countries refuse to comply with this symbolic measure illustrates just how divergent interests are within the Union. This does not require significant economic sacrifices—just a firm stance on the free movement of citizens from a state waging a war of aggression.

This kind of internal resistance undermines European unity—precisely what Moscow seeks to erode. Every exception, every delay, every exemption is a victory for Russian propaganda, which claims that the West is divided and weak. And, let’s be honest, this propaganda isn’t entirely wrong when we look at certain European behaviors.

Two EU countries opposing a ban on Russian entry in 2026—four years after the full-scale invasion—is beyond comprehension. This isn’t a matter of diplomatic nuance. It’s a matter of where one stands morally in this conflict. And some are still struggling to choose a side.

Russian Oil Still Flowing

Despite sanctions, Russian oil continues to flow. The “ghost fleet”—those ships that transport Russian crude while circumventing controls—has become an industry in its own right. Hundreds of old tankers, operating under flags of convenience, are shipping Putin’s oil to Asian refineries, which, in turn, resell the refined products in Europe and the West. The route is well known. The tools to block it exist. What’s lacking, however, is the political will.

According to initial reports, the 21st package is expected to include additional measures against this “ghost fleet.” But “including measures” is a phrase that can mean many things. Symbolic sanctions against a few ships, or a genuine crackdown on the entire network? The difference is significant, and Moscow is monitoring every detail with a level of attention that the EU should demand of itself.

Russian Military Spending: A Signal That Must Not Be Ignored

When Putin announces an increase in military spending from four to five trillion rubles, he is sending a clear message: he is not looking for a way out. He is stepping up the pace. This decision, against the backdrop of a budget deficit already exceeding $80 billion, is not that of a leader who senses defeat. It is that of a man betting that the West will tire before he does.

This bet is not irrational. Europe has shown in the past a remarkable capacity to grow weary, to seek compromises, and to want to “de-escalate.” Putin is counting on that. The response must be to show him that this calculation is wrong—and that requires a 21st sanctions package that really packs a punch, not just a list of good intentions.

Putin is increasing his military spending despite a colossal deficit. This is the most important signal that Europeans seem unwilling to recognize. This man is not looking for a way out. He is preparing for the next round. And Europe, for its part, is preparing for its next working meeting.

The Oil Embargo: The Decisive Measure

Economists, strategists, and geopolitical analysts largely agree: a total oil embargo on Russian oil is the most effective measure available. Oil revenues still account for a substantial portion of the Russian federal budget. Cutting them off—or drastically reducing them—directly undermines Putin’s ability to finance his war. The Baltic states have understood this. It is time for the rest of Europe to follow suit.

The argument that a total embargo would be too painful for European economies has lost its merit. Europe has diversified its energy sources since 2022. Liquefied natural gas from the U.S. and Qatar has partially replaced Russian supplies. The transition, though costly, has been completed. There is no longer any valid economic excuse for not seeing it through to the end.

Secondary sanctions: targeting those who aid Russia

A 21st sanctions package worthy of the name must also include robust secondary sanctions against entities that enable Russia to circumvent existing sanctions. Companies in Turkey, China, the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere serve as conduits for Russia’s war economy. Secondary sanctions make it possible to target them directly—at the risk of creating diplomatic tensions, to be sure, but that is the price of consistency.

The European Union has for too long been reluctant to impose such sanctions for fear of upsetting trading partners. But the issue is no longer about preserving trade relations with countries that are helping Putin finance his war against Ukraine. The question is whether Europe is serious about its commitment to defending its values.

Secondary sanctions are the real red line. Targeting Chinese, Turkish, or Emirati companies that help Russia circumvent sanctions means accepting a real diplomatic cost for a real strategic gain. This is exactly the kind of courage Europe has been lacking for far too long. And this is exactly what the 21st sanctions package should embody.

The Slow Pace of Bureaucracy Versus the Fast Pace of War

The pace of European negotiations is fundamentally incompatible with the pace of war. Ukraine is losing men every day. The front lines shift every week. Russian military capabilities—funded by revenues that Europe still indirectly helps to fuel—are continuously striking civilian infrastructure. Meanwhile, Brussels organizes expert meetings, sends diplomatic notes, and waits for consensus.

This time lag amounts to a form of passive complicity. Not out of malicious intent—I do not attribute sinister ulterior motives to our European diplomats. But rather, it stems from an institutional inability to keep pace with the urgency of the situation. The European treaties were designed to manage trade disputes, not to respond to wars of aggression. And this structural inadequacy is taking a heavy toll on Ukraine.

Aid fatigue: a trap we must reject

A narrative is beginning to gain traction in some European capitals: “aid fatigue toward Ukraine.” Too much money, too many weapons, for too long. This narrative is dangerous, and we must call it what it is: a rationalization for abandonment. Ukraine is not asking for a favor. It is fighting for values that Europe claims to defend—sovereignty, international law, and democracy.

Abandoning Ukraine halfway through would not only be a moral betrayal. It would be a strategic blunder of the first order. A victorious Russia would not stop at Ukraine. The Baltic states, Poland, and the Scandinavian countries—all understand that the current front line of the conflict is their own line of defense. The 21st aid package is not just an economic tool: it is a declaration of intent regarding what Europe is prepared to defend.

Fatigue over aid to Ukraine is a moral luxury that Europe cannot afford. When I hear politicians talk about “finding a way out” or “not humiliating Russia,” I wonder if they’ve seen what this war has done to Mariupol, Bucha, and Kharkiv. Fatigue, in this context, would be a capitulation disguised as pragmatism.

Moscow has learned to anticipate sanctions even before they are adopted

Since 2022, Russia has developed formidable expertise in anticipating and circumventing sanctions. Its economic teams monitor European negotiations, identify likely exemptions, and prepare alternative channels even before the measures take effect. By the time a sanctions package is adopted, the workarounds are already in place. This is why the speed of adoption is just as important as the content of the measures.

The 21st package must be designed with this reality in mind. Drafters of sanctions legislation must work within legal frameworks broad enough to cover foreseeable workarounds. Designation lists must be updated quickly and regularly. And enforcement mechanisms must be adequately resourced—something the EU has often neglected, resulting in sanctions that are well-drafted but poorly enforced.

Closing Loopholes Before They Are Exploited

One lesson from previous sanction packages is that loopholes identified at the time of adoption—negotiated exemptions, transition periods, sector-specific exemptions—are systematically exploited to the fullest by Russia and its partners. A six-month transition period becomes a six-month window for circumvention. A limited sector-specific exemption becomes a gateway for much larger flows.

The European Commission and the Member States must therefore adopt a radically different approach for the 21st package: minimize exemptions from the outset, provide for enhanced monitoring mechanisms for any remaining loopholes, and include automatic adjustment clauses if data show that circumventions are occurring. This is a more ambitious goal than that of previous packages. It is precisely what the situation demands.

Russia’s ability to anticipate European sanctions even before they are adopted is the result of four years of learning. Europe has been predictable, methodical, and at times naive regarding the ingenuity of those seeking to circumvent the rules. The 21st package should be designed not as a political message, but as a precise economic weapon—with the engineers of circumvention sitting across from them in the newsroom.

Twenty rounds of sanctions weren’t enough: the twenty-first must be different

Since 2022, the European Union has demonstrated that it can act with a unity and speed previously unseen. The first twenty rounds of sanctions, imperfect as they may be, represent an unprecedented effort in the history of multilateral economic sanctions. But the enemy has adapted. Workarounds have been organized. The Russian economy has absorbed the shocks—at the cost of massive distortions, to be sure—but it has held up.

The 21st package must be of a different nature. Not a catalog of symbolic measures intended to show that Europe is “active.” A coordinated economic offensive, with real teeth—secondary sanctions, a robust oil embargo, and the political will to enforce it even in the face of internal resistance and protests from third-party partners. Europe has the tools. It must find the will.

Zelensky deserves better than repeated promises

Volodymyr Zelensky has turned Ukraine into a symbol of resistance. His country is enduring daily strikes on its infrastructure, its cities, and its civilians. He is holding firm with a dignity and determination that few leaders would have shown. What Europe owes him in return is not yet another 21st aid package accompanied by a press conference. It is a real, quantified, binding commitment to economically strangle the war machine that is terrorizing his people.

To stop haggling over sanctions is also to stop haggling over our own values. Europe cannot define itself as a community of values and continue to leave the taps open that fuel a war of aggression. The time has come. The 21st package must be the turning point, not the twenty-first episode in an endless series.

Twenty-one sanctions packages mean Europe has had twenty-one opportunities to do better. This is not the twenty-first chance to replay the same timid scenario. It may be the last chance to act before the strategic window closes. I say this with all the solemnity the situation deserves: the time is now.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist