OP-ED: Kaliningrad Conducts More Strikes: The Russian Threat at Our Doorstep

Riga Alerts Its Allies: Drones and Missiles Are on the Way

While Su-24M jets were conducting training flights from Kaliningrad, Latvia shared a troubling intelligence assessment with its allies. As reported by Fox News on June 22, 2026, this alert indicated that Russia is preparing to launch hybrid attacks involving drones and missiles against NATO’s eastern flank. The alert does not specify a timeline—such is the nature of intelligence assessments in a gray zone—but its very existence, and the decision to make it public, is significant.

Latvia is not sounding the alarm out of hysteria. It is a serious nation with a competent intelligence service, shaped in part by its long experience under Soviet and then Russian surveillance. When Riga says something is brewing, allies should listen with the same attention they give to Washington or London. Geography is sometimes the best intelligence sensor of all.

Drones, Missiles, Hybrid Warfare: The Baltic Mix

Drones pose a threat particularly well-suited to Russia’s intentions in the Baltic region. They are relatively inexpensive, difficult to intercept en masse, and their use can be attributed to non-state actors, complicating a conventional military response. Russia has developed and deployed a considerable drone strike capability in Ukraine, including Iranian Shahed drones and domestically produced models. The same arsenal could be turned toward the Baltic states, with devastating effects on critical infrastructure.

The missiles based in Kaliningrad, meanwhile, offer precision and strike power on an entirely different scale. The Iskander-M, with a range of 500 km, can reach Warsaw, Berlin, Stockholm, and all the Baltic capitals. A single demonstration strike—on a military site or piece of infrastructure—would be enough to trigger a major political crisis within the Alliance. This is the scenario that NATO military planners fear the most.

Russia has been using Iranian Shahed drones to terrorize Ukrainian cities for over two years. That same arsenal—or its equivalent—could be directed toward Riga, Tallinn, or Vilnius tomorrow. The question is not whether this is possible—it clearly is. The question is what NATO intends to do to ensure it remains unappealing.

Enhanced Forward Presence: Necessary but Insufficient

In response to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NATO has strengthened its military presence on its eastern flank by activating and expanding its Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups. British, German, Canadian, French, and American soldiers are now deployed in each of the Baltic states and in Poland. Joint exercises are more frequent. Additional air defense capabilities have been deployed.

But while these measures improve the situation, they still fall short of what strategists consider necessary for a robust defense. NATO’s battle groups in the Baltics number a few thousand soldiers. Faced with a Russian army capable of projecting tens of thousands of troops from Kaliningrad or Belarus within a few hours, this is symbolically significant but militarily limited. The Gdańsk Declaration of June 25, 2026, specifically demands that this balance shift in Ankara.

Missile Defense Systems: The Response to Kaliningrad

The most direct response to the threat from Kaliningrad missiles is the deployment of missile defense systems capable of intercepting Iskander missiles before they reach their targets. U.S. Patriot systems are already deployed in Poland. Franco-Italian SAMP/T batteries are beginning to become available. SHORAD systems for defense against drones are proliferating.

But the systematic deployment of these capabilities across all the Baltic states—combined with real-time shared intelligence databases and clear rules of engagement for intercepting Russian threats—remains an unfulfilled objective. The Ankara summit is an opportunity to prioritize this, with specific financial commitments and binding deadlines. Otherwise, Kaliningrad will continue to simulate strikes—and one day, perhaps, carry out actual ones.

Every Patriot missile deployed in the Baltics is a direct response to Kaliningrad’s Su-24Ms. Missile defense is not an aggressive posture: it is telling Putin that his missiles will not buy him political cooperation. That is the language he understands. Not diplomatic communiqués.

Multilayered Defense Against a Multilayered Threat

Faced with Kaliningrad’s arsenal—Iskander-M ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and guided bombs launched by Su-24M aircraft—the defense of the Baltic states requires a multilayer architecture. At the top layer, systems such as the U.S. THAAD or the future Arrow-3 are designed to intercept ballistic missiles at high altitudes. At the intermediate level, Patriot PAC-3 batteries target cruise missiles and hostile aircraft. At the lower level, SHORAD systems counter drones and rockets. Each layer fills in the blind spots of the others.

This architecture already exists in part in the Baltic states. U.S. Patriot systems have been deployed in Poland, and shorter-range systems partially cover the Baltic territories. But coverage remains incomplete. Entire areas of these territories remain vulnerable to strikes that current defenses could not fully intercept. The Ankara summit must decide on a systematic deployment plan to fill these gaps.

The Baltic Fleet: A Naval Threat Not to Be Overlooked

The Kaliningrad arsenal is not limited to land and air forces. The Russian Baltic Fleet, based in Kaliningrad and Baltiysk, includes submarines, missile corvettes, and a naval mine-laying capability that could disrupt maritime links with the Baltic states in the event of a crisis. Since Finland and Sweden joined NATO, the Baltic Sea has effectively become an “inland sea” of the Alliance—but operational control of this sea still needs to be consolidated.

Joint naval exercises, an increased NATO presence in the Baltic waters, and the deployment of anti-submarine warfare capabilities in the region are essential elements of a comprehensive defense strategy for the Eastern Flank. These capabilities do not make the headlines in political press releases—they are less photogenic than tanks or missiles—but they are just as important militarily as land-based weapon systems.

The Baltic Sea is the other blind spot in the defense of the eastern flank. There is much talk of tanks and missiles. There is less talk of Russian submarines and naval mines that could cut off maritime links with the Baltic states in a matter of hours. It is this dimension that military planners in Ankara must take into account.

Preparing Populations for Resistance

Since 2022, Ukraine has demonstrated a fundamental truth: a population’s civilian resilience can become a decisive strategic factor. Ukrainian civilians have learned to cope with power outages, keep communication networks running under pressure, and support the war effort while maintaining a minimum level of economic activity. This resilience was not innate: it was built, in part, in the years leading up to the full-scale invasion, when the Ukrainian armed forces and civil society incorporated the lessons of 2014.

The Baltic states have drawn similar lessons. Estonia has developed the concept of “total defense,” which involves the whole of society in defense preparedness. Lithuania distributes civil survival manuals and organizes mobilization drills. Latvia is investing in redundancy for its critical infrastructure to reduce its vulnerability to cyberattacks and strikes. These measures do not make headlines, but they form the foundation without which no military defense is viable.

What the West Can Learn from Kyiv

Ukraine has maintained a partial power grid despite hundreds of Russian strikes on its power plants and transmission lines. It has maintained communication networks despite constant cyberattacks. It has maintained a free press, elections, and functioning democratic institutions during wartime—which represents an immense institutional challenge. These successes offer lessons for Alliance democracies that might find themselves in similar situations.

Preparation for civilian resilience has long been the poor relation of defensive planning in Western Europe. Countries that have not experienced war on their territory since 1945 find it difficult to concretely imagine what it means to function under bombardment. The Baltic states, aware of their vulnerability, have been doing so for years. The Ankara summit should include this often-overlooked dimension of collective defense on its agenda.

Ukrainians have been living under bombardment for more than four years and have managed to keep their institutions functioning. This is an example of civilian resilience unparalleled in the modern history of democracies. It would be a shame if their allies were to draw only military lessons from this painful experience and ignore the lessons in institutional resilience that Kyiv is teaching them firsthand.

The Demilitarization of Kaliningrad: A Utopia or a Goal?

In the medium term, the only lasting solution to the strategic problem posed by Kaliningrad is the demilitarization of this enclave. As long as it houses nuclear-capable Iskander missiles and armored brigades within striking range of the Baltic capitals, it will pose a permanent threat that no missile defense system can completely neutralize. The demilitarization of Kaliningrad would be part of a comprehensive peace agreement between Russia and the West—an agreement that, as of June 2026, seems extremely distant.

This long-term goal must not serve as a pretext for inaction in the short term. We cannot decide not to defend the Baltic states today on the grounds that we are hoping for an agreement that would demilitarize Kaliningrad in ten years. But including the demilitarization of the enclave in the list of objectives for a comprehensive political settlement is a legitimate position that the countries on the eastern flank have the right to demand.

The Alliance for Future Generations

The decisions made in Ankara in July 2026 do not concern only the next three or five years. They define the European security architecture for decades to come. An Alliance that truly strengthens its eastern flank, that deploys the necessary capabilities, that gives the Baltic states and Poland the certainty that their sovereignty will be defended—such an Alliance can claim to be a stabilizing force in the international order for the next thirty years.

An Alliance that issues statements without backing them up with sufficient military and financial resources will create disillusionment that will erode its credibility from within. The new generations of decision-makers in the member states—and in the candidate countries—will be watching to see what the Alliance’s promise of solidarity is worth. Kaliningrad is stepping up its strikes. This is a call to finally take collective defense seriously.

Ankara’s decisions will be judged twenty years from now, when historians write about this period. Either they will write that the Alliance assessed the threat and built a defense to match it, or they will write that it left the Baltic states with empty promises. The choice will be made now, in the conference rooms of Beştepe on July 7 and 8, 2026.

Memory as a Political Duty

The Baltic states have a memory that Western Europe does not. The mass deportations of the 1940s, the Soviet occupation that lasted half a century, the armed resistance of the “Forest Brothers” that held out until the 1950s—none of this is ancient history for Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. It is the living memory of their grandparents, and sometimes their parents. And this memory tells them that Russian aggressions are not historical accidents: they are part of a recurring pattern that only force can contain.

Defending the Baltic states today also means honoring that memory. It means telling the peoples who resisted Soviet occupation that their choice of the West, of democracy, of the European Union, and of NATO will not be betrayed. This is a moral debt that the Alliance assumes by welcoming these countries—a debt that Ankara must honor in practice, not just in words.

Passing on Strategic Clarity

The generation that lived through the Cold War knew, instinctively, that the Soviet threat was real and that a robust defense was the prerequisite for freedom. This conviction did not carry over into the 1990s and 2000s as strongly as it should have: the “peace dividend” numbed the sense of risk among many European decision-makers. It is to be hoped that the war in Ukraine—as terrible as it is—will at least serve to reawaken this strategic clarity and pass it on to the next generation of decision-makers.

The Baltic states, Poland, and Finland never lost this clarity. They kept it alive through thick and thin, even when their Western allies looked upon them with benevolent condescension. Today, they are the ones who have been right all along. Heeding their message is not only the right strategic decision; it is also a form of belated but necessary historical justice.

I am a columnist, not a prophet. But here is what I know: countries that have experienced occupation know things about freedom that countries that have never lost it do not know. The Baltic states offer this knowledge to the Alliance. The only question is whether we will have the wisdom to accept it.

The Price of Indifference

In 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, many said it was “far away” and “complicated.” In 2022, when it invaded Ukraine, many said that “Putin wouldn’t go so far as to attack NATO.” Today, Russian bombers are training to strike our allies from an enclave in the heart of Europe, Latvian intelligence agencies are warning of hybrid attacks in the works, and Western officials admit to fearing an imminent provocation in the Baltics.

At what point does the West decide that repeated warning signs warrant a proportionate response? At what point does complicity through indifference become a shared moral responsibility for whatever might follow? The threat is at our doorstep. Kaliningrad is driving this home live, publicly, and without hiding anything. The ball is in our court.

What We Owe Our Baltic Allies

We owe the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians who have joined our Alliance one simple thing: the certainty that Article 5 means something. That an attack against one is an attack against all, and that this phrase is not a rhetorical device but a real military commitment, backed by the necessary means for its defense. They joined NATO with their histories of suffering under Soviet occupation. They deserve better than a symbolic tripwire and conditional promises.

The Ankara summit must send this message with the clarity and force that the situation demands. Kaliningrad has spoken. Now the Alliance must respond in a manner commensurate with the threat.

Kaliningrad has been speaking to us for years. Its missiles aimed at our allies, its bombers training over the Baltic, its growing arsenals—all of this is a message that the West hears but fails to fully act upon. It is time to truly listen. Before the message is delivered in a different way.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist