REPORT: Forty Days of Fire: Zelensky’s Campaign to Put Pressure on Russia’s War Effort

Ufa, Bashkortostan: 1,300 kilometers behind enemy lines

While the strikes on Moscow were the first to make headlines, it was the strike on Ufa on June 25, 2026, that redefined the strategic parameters of the operation. More than 1,300 kilometers away, two of the three Bashneft refineries in the city’s northern industrial complex were hit: Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim and, likely, Bashneft-Novoil. The complex is owned by Rosneft, the state-owned oil giant controlled by the Putin regime.

This strike represents a qualitative shift in the 40-day operation. It is not within the traditional areas of operation for Ukrainian drones. It strikes a region that Russia considered a secure rear area, protected by its very distance. By striking Ufa, Ukraine is sending a message to every Russian industrial region—in the Urals, the Volga, and Western Siberia—that distance is no longer sufficient protection. This is a strategic paradigm shift.

Governor Khabirov denies it, but the smoke confirms it

The official reaction to the strike on Ufa followed the Russian regime’s usual script in response to successful Ukrainian strikes. The governor of Bashkortostan, Radiy Khabirov, immediately claimed that defenses had repelled the attack and that only debris had caused limited damage. Factories were reportedly operating normally. But satellite imagery, OSINT analyses from the Telegram channel Astra, and above all the black smoke visible from kilometers away contradicted this official version with eloquent force.

Moscow also imposed restrictions on mobile internet access in Bashkortostan during the drone alert—a sign that something serious had happened. After all, the Russian authorities would not have cut off mobile internet if the defenses had truly functioned as announced. This knee-jerk censorship has, paradoxically, become the best indicator that Ukrainian strikes are hitting their targets: when the internet is cut off, it means the strike was successful.

The mechanism of Russian censorship has become its own enemy. Every mobile internet outage in a region under attack is an unintended signal telling the world: “The strike was successful, and we’re trying to control the information.” Ukraine, its allies, and international observers have learned to interpret this censorship as confirmation. Moscow has turned its tool of control into a tool for verifying its own defeats. It’s absurd, and it’s revealing.

Sevastopol, the Kerch Bridge, and logistical facilities

The 40-day operation is not limited to deep strikes on the Russian mainland. It also includes continuous raids on facilities in Crimea, an occupied peninsula that Putin’s regime has turned into a symbol of its empire and a forward logistics base. The port of Sevastopol, naval facilities, fuel and ammunition depots, and air defense systems based on the peninsula—all these targets are in the crosshairs of the 40-Day Operation.

Crimea is doubly valuable to Ukraine in this strategy. It is both a political symbol—its recapture remains Kyiv’s stated objective—and a vital military logistics hub for Russian operations in the Black Sea and southern Ukraine. Every facility destroyed in Crimea reduces Russia’s ability to project its power in the region and to maintain its supply lines to the front.

The Black Sea as a Theater of Economic Warfare

The war in the Black Sea is one of the least-covered yet most significant fronts of the conflict. Ukraine has succeeded in neutralizing a significant portion of the Russian Black Sea Fleet—notably by sinking or damaging several major ships—using maritime surface drones. This naval pressure is an integral part of Operation 40 Days: it aims to deprive Russia of its ability to project naval power in the Black Sea and to protect its supply routes to Crimea.

As a result of this naval campaign, Russia has been forced to redeploy part of its Black Sea fleet to the Caspian Sea, out of range of Ukrainian drones but also rendered operationally useless in the conflict. This is a considerable tactical success for the Ukrainian Navy, which technically has not had any large surface ships since 2022.

The Ukrainian naval campaign in the Black Sea is one of the most remarkable stories of this war, and it deserves an entire article of its own. Surface maritime drones—initially homemade—have succeeded in neutralizing part of the Russian Black Sea fleet—a fleet that was supposed to be one of the most powerful in the region. It is a triumph of ingenuity over brute force, and it is deeply inspiring.

Russian Refining Output Down by a Third

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte cited a striking figure during his conversation with the Atlantic Council on June 25, 2026: Russian refining output has fallen by one-third since the start of Ukraine’s airstrikes on oil facilities. This is a figure of considerable gravity for an economy whose energy exports are the main driver. Reducing refining capacity by one-third means a corresponding reduction in revenue from exported petroleum products and in domestic fuel supplies.

In this already strained economic context—with a budget deficit exceeding $80 billion, defense spending accounting for more than 40% of the federal budget, and a sovereign wealth fund that is running dry—this reduction in refining output adds to considerable cumulative pressure. Russia is not on the brink of immediate economic collapse, but it is on a trajectory of gradual deterioration that accelerates with every refinery taken offline.

Russian bonds are plummeting: the markets are signaling concern

Russian financial markets are sending their own warning signals. Russian government bonds have plummeted in response to plans to increase war spending, with yields reaching around 15%—a level that indicates investor mistrust in Russia’s ability to service its long-term debt. High bond yields signal that bond buyers are demanding an increasing risk premium to hold Russian debt.

At the same time, Russia plans to increase its military spending by an additional 4 to 5 trillion rubles by 2026, according to data published by Bloomberg on June 23. This increase, against a backdrop of revenues eroded by strikes and sanctions, creates structural fiscal pressure. Zelensky’s sanctions advisor, quoted by RBC-Ukraine on June 26, 2026, summed up the situation in one sentence: “The Russian economy has reached a dead end.”

Bond yields of 15% on Russian sovereign debt: this is a figure that financial analysts interpret very differently from military analysts. For an economist, it’s a signal of sovereign distress—the markets are starting to pray for repayment. For a strategist, it’s confirmation that the combined economic pressure of sanctions and Ukrainian strikes is working. I am neither an economist nor a strategist, but I read both, and both are saying the same thing: Russia is in trouble.

Why 40 days? Duration as a strategic signal

The choice of the number 40 to designate this operation may not be coincidental in a country whose religious and cultural history is deeply marked by this number—the 40 days of Lent, the 40 years in the desert. For some in the Ukrainian and international audiences, the allusion is subtle but present. But beyond the symbolism, the 40-day duration is also an operational consideration: it is long enough to produce real cumulative economic effects, yet short enough to maintain an intense pace without exhausting drone production capacity.

A 40-day campaign of intensified strikes on Russian energy and logistics infrastructure forces Russia to continuously expend interceptor missiles and air defense resources. Every drone intercepted costs money and an interceptor missile. Every drone that is not intercepted results in a damaged facility. In both cases, Ukraine imposes a cost on Russia.

After 40 days: a pause or an escalation?

The question on every analyst’s mind is: what will happen at the end of the 40 days? Zelensky publicly announced this timeframe, which has created expectations. At the end of this period, will Ukraine pause to assess the results? Will it extend the operation? Will it move into a new, more intense phase? The answers depend on the results achieved, available drone stocks, and military priorities on the ground.

What is certain is that Ukraine’s deep-strike capabilities will not disappear at the end of the 40 days. The industrial infrastructure and operational doctrines built for this campaign will remain in place. Ukraine can decide at any time to resume deep strikes. This constant threat is in itself a strategic asset—it forces Russia to maintain a costly defense posture across its entire territory, even between active campaigns.

The persistent threat is perhaps the most underestimated aspect of Ukraine’s strategy. Even when Ukraine is not actively striking 1,300 km deep, Russia knows it is capable of doing so. Russia must therefore maintain defenses, patrols, and early-warning systems—all of which entail ongoing costs. This is known as the “cost of defense imposed by the adversary”—and it is a form of victory even when no drones are in the air.

The engineers behind the scenes: the ones who build the weapons that burn down refineries

Behind every drone strike are hundreds of engineers, technicians, and skilled workers who manufacture, test, program, and deploy these systems. In Ukraine, this industry has developed under extraordinary conditions: workshops relocated to avoid Russian strikes, decentralized production lines, and funding from both private and public sources. It is a wartime industrial revolution, carried out at the speed dictated by the urgency of the situation.

These people do not make the headlines. We do not know their names—for obvious security reasons. But their creations—the FP-1s, the Lyutyi, and the anonymous long-range drones that set Ufa’s refineries ablaze—are the most effective tools Ukraine possesses in its economic war against Russia. They deserve recognition that operational secrecy prevents them from receiving publicly.

Ukrainian Civilians Paying the Price of Resistance

The 40-day operation is taking place against a backdrop in which Ukrainian civilians continue to pay a terrible price. While Ukrainian drones strike Russian refineries, Russian missiles continue to rain down on Ukrainian cities. The Kh-22s, the Kh-101s, the Iranian Shahed drones—Russia is relentlessly striking Ukrainian power infrastructure, residential buildings, and hospitals. The war offers no humanitarian pause for Ukrainians, even as their drones strike far away.

It is important to keep this reality in mind so as not to fall into an overly abstract narrative of economic warfare. Behind the refining production figures and Russian government bond statistics, there are people dying in Ukraine every day. The 40-Day Operation is a brilliant military strategy, but it is unfolding amid an ongoing human tragedy for which Vladimir Putin bears primary responsibility.

I never want to lose sight of the human reality behind strategic analyses. It’s easy to become fascinated by the sophistication of drone strikes, by Russian economic figures, by geopolitical calculations—and to forget that, meanwhile, Ukrainians are dying under Russian bombs. The 40-day operation is necessary, but it does not erase the daily suffering. And that suffering must remain the focus of our attention.

The Public Statement as a Signal to Multiple Audiences

By publicly announcing the 40-day operation, Zelensky is playing on several fronts simultaneously. To Western allies: Ukraine is not passive; it has a strategy and is taking the initiative. This message is crucial ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, where discussions on support for Ukraine will be at the heart of the debates. To the Ukrainian people: their country is fighting back, their sacrifice is not in vain, and the government has a plan. To Putin: forty days of pressure are coming—get ready.

This ability to transform a military operation into a tool of political communication is one of Zelensky’s most underrated strengths. He understands better than most contemporary leaders that in a modern war, narrative is a weapon as important as missiles. Controlling the narrative, giving the resistance a narrative form—a plan, a timeline, an ambition—strengthens allied resolve and weakens the enemy’s will.

Ukraine at the Ankara Summit: What the Strikes Tell Allies

The NATO summit in Ankara, July 7–8, 2026, is taking place against a backdrop marked by the successes of Ukraine’s deep-penetration campaign. Zelenskyy will attend, and the strikes on Kapotnya and Ufa serve as concrete evidence in favor of increased support. They demonstrate that Ukraine is effectively utilizing its capabilities, taking strategic initiatives, and that additional support will yield tangible results.

Secretary General Rutte announced that the Ankara summit is expected to see the announcement of “tens of billions” in new defense contracts, and that Zelensky will participate directly. It is in Ukraine’s best interest for the 40-day operation to produce visible results before this summit—and the strikes on Moscow, Ufa, and Crimea are all concrete evidence presented to its allies.

The synchronization between Ukrainian military operations and major diplomatic events is something I’ve observed since the start of the war. Zelenskyy is perhaps the best political communicator of his generation—not because he’s a skilled liar, but because he aligns his actions with his words with rare consistency. When he says Ukraine is striking, the refineries go up in flames. This consistency is, in itself, a form of diplomatic credibility.

Moscow: Between Denial and Logistical Adaptation

The official Russian response to the strikes during Operation 40 Days follows two parallel tracks. In public communications: denial or systematic downplaying of the damage, claims that defenses “repelled” the attacks, and silence on the actual economic consequences. In terms of internal crisis management: emergency measures to offset production losses, plans to import fuel by sea, and a (relative) strengthening of defenses around key facilities.

This dual response reveals the fundamental tension within Putin’s regime: it must maintain an appearance of control and invulnerability for domestic consumption, while managing behind the scenes the actual consequences of strikes that have disrupted a significant portion of its industrial infrastructure. Propaganda and reality are pulling in opposite directions, and managing this growing gap is a governance challenge the Kremlin had not anticipated.

The Adaptation of Russian Air Defenses: Costly and Insufficient

In response to the Ukrainian campaign, Russia has attempted to improve its defenses against long-range drones. It has deployed more low-altitude air defense systems, developed electronic countermeasures, and established reinforced no-fly zones around strategic facilities. But effectively protecting thousands of industrial facilities spread across a territory of more than 17 million km² is a task that even the Russian military cannot accomplish with its available air defense resources.

The cost of this extensive defense is considerable. Every Pantsir or Tor system deployed to protect a refinery in the Urals is one fewer system available for the Ukrainian front. Every interceptor missile fired at a drone costs more than the drone itself. And every time Russia bolsters defenses in one area, Ukraine can simply strike elsewhere. This is the inexorable logic of the drone versus the defensive missile, and it structurally favors the attacker.

The cost-effectiveness of the offensive drone versus the defensive missile is one of the paradoxes of this war. A long-range Ukrainian drone costs a few tens of thousands of dollars. A Patriot interceptor missile costs between 2 and 4 million dollars. If Russia fires a Patriot missile to intercept a low-end drone, it loses out economically. If it doesn’t fire it, its installation is destroyed. Ukraine has found the fundamental asymmetry that allows it to exert pressure on an economy ten times its size.

The Operation and Negotiations: Putin Resists Any Agreement

The 40-day operation is unfolding against a unique diplomatic backdrop. Putin, when questioned in late June 2026, reiterated his willingness to negotiate on the basis of the “2022 Istanbul Agreements”—a position that the ISW (Institute for the Study of War) described, in its June 23, 2026, assessment, as a “reaffirmation of the 2022 war aims,” that is, Ukraine’s total capitulation. This is not a peace offer—it is a demand for surrender.

In the face of this maximalist Russian stance, the 40-day campaign sends an important signal: Ukraine has no intention of negotiating from a position of weakness. By striking Russian refineries, demonstrating its long-range capabilities, and imposing mounting economic costs, Kyiv is telling Moscow and potential mediators that any agreement must be negotiated on an equal footing—not on the ruins of an exhausted Ukraine forced to accept unacceptable terms.

Prisoner Exchanges: A Human Dimension Amid the War

Even during the 40-day operation, Ukraine maintained its prisoner-of-war exchange mechanisms. On June 26, 2026, the 76th prisoner exchange brought 160 Ukrainian soldiers home from Russian captivity—the third exchange under a complex agreement brokered by the United Arab Emirates. Since the beginning of 2026, 1,596 Ukrainians have returned home, and more than 9,500 have returned since the start of the war, according to Zelensky and data published by the Kyiv Independent on June 26.

These exchanges are taking place alongside airstrikes, combat, and economic pressure. They serve as a reminder that behind the strategies and statistics are men and women returning to their families after months or years of captivity. This is an inescapable human dimension of this war—one that Operation 40 Days neither erases nor should overshadow.

Prisoner exchanges move me deeply. Each return represents a life snatched from Russian captivity—with all that entails in terms of trauma, lasting effects, and difficult reunions. And the fact that these exchanges continue while drones strike Moscow highlights an important point: Ukraine does not confuse military warfare with humanitarian policy. It fights while negotiating the return of its children. This is not a contradiction—it is a sign of maturity.

Military analysts dissect Ukraine’s strategy

Zelensky’s 40-day operation was quickly analyzed by Western military think tanks. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), which tracks operations in Ukraine on a daily basis, noted in its assessments at the end of June 2026 that Ukraine’s deep strikes on Russian energy infrastructure constitute a coherent and deliberate strategy of economic attrition. The strikes are not intended to destroy Russian military capabilities in one fell swoop—they aim to degrade them gradually, in a cumulative manner, over time.

This analysis aligns with that of the Brookings Institution, which had noted prior to the Ankara summit that NATO’s rebalancing is based in part on lessons from Ukraine. Ukraine’s ability to wage an asymmetric economic war using drones is changing strategic calculations not only for this conflict but also for the defense doctrines of the entire Atlantic Alliance.

The Impact on NATO Doctrine: Ankara, July 7–8, as a Turning Point

The NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, provides an opportunity to formally incorporate the lessons from Ukraine into the Alliance’s doctrines and planning. Speaking before the Atlantic Council on June 25, Rutte emphasized the need for a “transatlantic defense industrial revolution,” explicitly citing the lessons from Ukraine. Anti-drone doctrines, counter-drone systems, and the production of long-range munitions—all of these are directly influenced by what Ukraine has been doing for the past four years.

Beyond military doctrines, the Ankara summit must also solidify financial commitments. The “tens of billions” in new defense contracts announced by Rutte, the 5% of GDP in defense spending by 2035, and the reinforcement of the eastern flank—all of this will be put on the table under pressure from Zelensky’s “40 days of fire.” Ukraine is striking Russian refineries, and NATO is meeting in Ankara. These two events are not unrelated.

The link between the Ukrainian strikes and the decisions made in Ankara is a perfect illustration of what I call “strategic fait accompli diplomacy.” By striking Ufa from 1,300 km away, Zelensky arrives in Ankara not as a president begging for handouts—but as a war leader presenting concrete evidence of effectiveness. This completely changes the dynamics of negotiations with allies who sometimes question the relevance of their support.

Possible Scenarios After the Operation Period

Several scenarios could unfold at the end of the 40 days. The first: the operation achieves its objectives of industrial disruption, and Ukraine decides to take a break to assess and replenish its drone stocks. This scenario maintains economic pressure through sanctions while preserving Ukraine’s capabilities for future operations. The second: the operation is extended, with intensified strikes on new targets, capitalizing on the element of surprise that the strike on Ufa created in the Ural regions.

The third scenario, the least likely but not impossible: a ceasefire offer emerges under international pressure, and Ukraine must decide between continuing its strikes and maintaining diplomatic dialogue. In this case, the 40-day campaign serves as a bargaining chip—Ukraine may agree to suspend its strikes in exchange for concrete guarantees. But given Putin’s current positions, this scenario seems far removed from the reality on the ground.

The central question: Can Ukraine sustain this pace?

The long-term viability of the deep-strike strategy depends on Ukraine’s ability to maintain drone production at a sufficient pace. Manufacturing thousands of drones per month, programming them, deploying them, and replacing them—all of this requires an industrial and logistical chain that remains vulnerable to Russian strikes. If Russia manages to systematically identify and strike Ukrainian drone production facilities, the 40-day strategy could be disrupted.

But Ukraine has made decentralization a founding principle of its drone industry. Production facilities are scattered, often in unlisted locations, and regularly change sites. This industrial resilience is one of the reasons why Russian strikes on the Ukrainian economy, despite their intensity, have failed to halt drone production. Ukraine produces, Ukraine strikes, and Ukraine will continue.

Ukraine’s industrial decentralization may be the real answer to the question, “How can Ukraine hold out?” Not a single large arms factory to take down, but hundreds of scattered workshops, thousands of engineers working in a network—an agile war industry that cannot be neutralized in one fell swoop. This is the strength of the weak against the strong: when you’re smaller, you fragment to survive.

Ukraine Proves That Well-Used Support Yields Tangible Results

Zelenskyy’s “40-Day Operation” comes at a crucial moment for Western support for Ukraine. Some allies are questioning the effectiveness of the aid provided, Ukraine’s ability to sustain its resistance, and the prospects for a negotiated settlement. The strikes on Kapotnya and Ufa answer these questions with a clarity that no speech could match: Ukraine is using its resources to strike Russia’s vital infrastructure with increasing precision, and the results are measurable.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, speaking before the Atlantic Council on June 25, 2026, did not hesitate to point out that Russian refining output had fallen by a third. This figure, cited at the highest diplomatic level, illustrates how Ukraine’s achievements have been integrated into the Alliance’s narrative. Ukraine is not merely asking for support—it is demonstrating, through its actions, that it deserves the trust of its partners.

The Ankara Summit: The Diplomatic Harvest of 40 Days

The NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, will be the first major diplomatic gathering where allies will debate in the shadow of Ukraine’s in-depth strikes. Zelenskyy will attend with a strengthened position: that of a war leader who can point to concrete results—enemy facilities taken out of commission—and a coherent strategy currently being implemented. This is no small matter in diplomatic negotiations where military credibility counts just as much as legal or moral arguments.

Ukraine’s objectives in Ankara—accelerating arms deliveries, securing a commitment to spend 5% of GDP on defense, and gaining support for a strengthened oil embargo—are driven by this momentum. Ukraine is not presenting itself as a supplicant. It is presenting itself as a partner that is doing its part, innovating, taking real risks, and demanding from its allies a level of consistency commensurate with its own sacrifices.

I view the Ankara summit with cautious optimism. Since the start of the war, Zelensky has consistently and skillfully managed to turn military challenges into diplomatic arguments. The 40 days of intense fighting are his trump card in Ankara. The question is whether his allies—all too often trapped by their own internal contradictions—will rise to the occasion. I hope so. But I have learned not to take for granted the consistency of democracies under pressure.

What Ukraine Can and Cannot Achieve with Its Drones

The 40-day campaign is impressive, but it would be irresponsible not to point out its limitations. Ukrainian drones can damage Russian refineries, but they cannot destroy them permanently. Russia has repair capabilities—albeit slowed by sanctions—and enough territory to disperse and protect its most critical facilities. Every refinery hit will be rebuilt, more slowly than usual, but rebuilt nonetheless. Ukraine knows this and has factored it into its strategy: the goal is not total destruction, but sustained disruption.

There is also a real risk of escalation, even if Moscow’s repeated warnings have lost their credibility. Each new stage of strikes—from Belgorod to Moscow, from Moscow to Ufa—tests the limits of Russian tolerance. So far, Russia has opted for rhetoric rather than symmetrical escalation. But this restraint has limits that neither Kyiv nor its allies can map out with certainty.

The question of sustainability: Can Ukraine maintain this pace?

Producing and deploying thousands of drones per month, while withstanding Russian strikes on its own production infrastructure, is a considerable industrial challenge. Ukraine has opted for maximum decentralization of its production chain—hundreds of scattered workshops rather than a single, vulnerable large factory. This strategy is effective against Russian strikes, but it also limits economies of scale and the standardization of the drones.

The sustainability of the 40-day operation—and of the deep-strike strategy beyond that—therefore depends as much on Ukraine’s industrial capacity as on the availability of raw materials, electronic circuits, and engines. This is where Western support becomes critically important: no longer just in heavy weapons, but in components, technologies, and industrial know-how. Ukraine can strike targets 1,300 km away. It needs its allies to continue doing so.

I conclude this report with a keen awareness of the limitations of my analysis from the outside. I am not inside the Ukrainian drone production facilities. I do not know how long this pace can be sustained. What I do know is that Ukraine has demonstrated a capacity for adaptation and innovation that few would have predicted in February 2022. This warrants cautious respect and unequivocal support.

How This Operation Is Shifting the Balance of Power

Zelensky’s 40-day operation will not single-handedly determine the outcome of the war. No one is claiming that. But it does change something important in the balance of power between Ukraine and Russia: it demonstrates that Ukraine can impose real, measurable, and sustained economic costs on its adversary, even while being militarily weaker. It proves that Russia’s geographical depth is no longer an absolute safeguard. And it sends a signal to all parties involved in the conflict—allies, neutrals, and adversaries—that Ukraine has not yet had its final say.

The refineries in Kapotnya and Ufa will not reopen for months, perhaps longer. Russian refining output will remain constrained. Russia will import gasoline by sea. And Ukrainian engineers will continue to build the drones that make all of this possible. This is the reality of this war in June 2026—a reality that forty days of fighting have made even more evident.

Ukraine as a Model of Creative Resistance

This report is also, implicitly, the story of a country that refuses to be defined by its losses and chooses instead to define itself through its innovations. In the fourth year of the war, with the economy under pressure and terrible human losses—and yet, drones reaching the Urals, a defense industry moving upmarket, and a president announcing and leading offensive operations. Ukraine is a model of creative resistance that history will remember, regardless of the final outcome of this conflict.

Zelenskyy’s “40 Days of Fire” are not the end of something. They mark the beginning of a new phase—one in which Ukraine is no longer content merely to hold its ground, but is actively imposing its terms on a Russia forced to defend its entire vast territory. This is a partial strategic reversal, insufficient to win the war on its own, but enough to shift its dynamics. And in this conflict that has been playing out for years, changing the dynamics is already a form of victory.

Forty days of intense fighting, and Ukraine has not laid down its arms. It has struck farther, more precisely, and harder. Kapotnya in flames, Ufa under drone attack, a Russia forced to import its own fuel—that is the preliminary toll of this campaign. Preliminary, because Ukraine has no intention of stopping there. The strategic transformation is underway, and it is irreversible.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist