ANALYSIS: Poland Purchases V-BAT Drones — The Baltic Region Becomes a Hub for Advanced Surveillance

Sabotaged Submarine Cables: Hybrid Warfare in the Depths

Since 2022, the Baltic Sea has become one of Europe’s most strategically tense maritime areas. Several incidents have involved undersea communication cables and gas pipelines, the damage to which could not be clearly attributed to natural causes. The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline in 2022—the circumstances of which remain partially unresolved—was the most spectacular. But other incidents—involving the Estlink cables, cables between Finland and Germany, and cables connecting the Baltic states to Sweden—have fueled growing concerns about the vulnerability of critical undersea infrastructure.

Monitoring this infrastructure has therefore become a priority for the navies of countries bordering the Baltic Sea, including Poland. A drone like the V-BAT can be programmed to fly over cable routes at regular intervals, compare visual and thermal signatures between two passes, and automatically alert authorities if an anomaly is detected. This is a direct application of drone ISR technology to infrastructure security.

Kaliningrad: The Constant Threat

The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, wedged between Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic coast, is one of the region’s most densely concentrated military areas. It is home to Iskander missile systems, submarines of the Russian Baltic Fleet, and—according to NATO sources—dual-capable missile systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Monitoring maritime traffic to and from Kaliningrad is an ongoing priority for the Polish, Lithuanian, and Swedish navies.

The V-BAT deployed on a Polish ship enables maritime surveillance of Kaliningrad and its approaches without exposing a ship or manned aircraft to direct risk. The drone’s operational range—which can cover extensive areas from its host ship—gives the Polish Navy a persistent surveillance capability that conventional aircraft patrols cannot maintain with the same efficiency.

Kaliningrad is just a few dozen kilometers from the Polish coast. Russian Iskander missiles and submarines in this enclave, combined with insufficient maritime surveillance, is a recipe for strategic surprise. The V-BAT does not eliminate this risk, but it significantly reduces it. And in today’s Baltic Sea, every reduction in uncertainty counts.

A First on the Eastern Flank: Strategic Significance

The fact that Poland is the first country on NATO’s eastern flank to acquire the V-BAT is significant. It reflects Poland’s growing strategic position as a dominant military power in the region. With a defense budget exceeding 4% of GDP—the highest in NATO—and ambitious procurement programs including F-35s, HIMARS, South Korean K2 tanks, and now V-BATs, Poland is building a comprehensive defense architecture.

This effort is not merely a response to the Russian threat—it is also a strategy for positioning itself within the Atlantic Alliance. A country that can demonstrate cutting-edge military capabilities across multiple domains (land, air, sea, cyber, and drones) becomes an indispensable partner in any collective defense decision. Poland is investing in capabilities that make it credible and irreplaceable—not only in its own defense, but in the collective defense of Eastern Europe.

The Link to Ukrainian-Polish Industrial Cooperation

Poland’s purchase of the V-BAT comes amid the growing strength of the Polish defense industry and its partnerships with Ukraine. The agreement signed between TAF Industries (Ukraine) and PGZ (Poland) for the joint production of drones illustrates how the two countries are developing industrial synergies in the field of unmanned aerial systems. Poland is acquiring U.S. maritime capabilities while developing land-based capabilities with Ukraine—a technological diversification that strengthens the overall regional defense posture.

For Ukraine, the rise of the Polish navy and defense industry is good news for several reasons. It means a more secure western flank, deeper industrial cooperation, and a strategic partner capable of contributing to regional security beyond mere arms transfers. A militarily strong Poland is good news for the Alliance’s entire eastern flank.

Poland purchasing V-BATs for the Baltic region, co-producing drones with Ukraine, and spending 4% of its GDP on defense—this paints the picture of a regional power that takes its security seriously. I haven’t always agreed with all of Warsaw’s decisions, but on this point, they are right.

Estlink and the Lessons from Recent Acts of Sabotage

The Estlink 2 power cable connecting Finland to Estonia was damaged in December 2024, an incident attributed to a Russian tanker sailing under a flag of convenience. This incident—and other similar ones affecting data cables between the Baltic countries and Sweden—have alerted NATO navies to the vulnerability of the region’s undersea infrastructure. Russia’s hybrid war is not being waged solely on the Ukrainian battlefield—it is unfolding in the depths of the Baltic Sea.

NATO’s response has included stepping up maritime patrols and establishing specialized surveillance mechanisms. But the available resources remain insufficient given the scale of the infrastructure that needs to be monitored. Thousands of kilometers of undersea cables, several gas pipelines, and strategic shipping lanes to Baltic ports—monitoring all of this with conventional ships and aircraft is impossible. This is where autonomous maritime drones like the V-BAT offer a disruptive solution.

Persistent Surveillance as a Defense Doctrine

The doctrine of persistent surveillance involves maintaining a continuous sensor presence over an area of strategic interest, without the logistical and human constraints of traditional naval patrols. A V-BAT deployed from a Polish ship can maintain surveillance over several dozen square kilometers for hours, providing command centers with real-time data on ship movements, suspicious divers, and thermal anomalies in the water.

This persistent surveillance capability is transformative for a modest-sized navy like the Polish Navy, which must cover a vast maritime area with limited naval resources. A drone that extends a ship’s surveillance range is a force multiplier—exactly the kind of technological investment that enables a medium-sized navy to play a role disproportionate to the size of its fleet.

Persistent surveillance—being everywhere all the time with sensors. This is the smart response to hybrid warfare that targets undersea cables. You can’t station a ship every kilometer along a cable. But you can deploy a drone to patrol it. This is strategic thinking tailored to the threats of the 21st century.

The Maritime Drone Market: A Race Underway

The market for military maritime drones has been booming since 2022. The war in Ukraine—and in particular the spectacular use of Ukrainian naval drones against Russian warships in the Black Sea—has accelerated investment in this sector across all NATO navies. Companies such as Shield AI, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and European players like Thales and MBDA are developing naval solutions ranging from surveillance drones to armed drones.

Poland’s decision to acquire Shield AI’s V-BAT rather than a European system is significant in this competitive context. It reflects both the greater technological maturity of certain U.S. companies in this field and the priority Poland places on interoperability with U.S. and NATO systems. The integration of the V-BAT with the U.S. command and communication systems already in use by the Polish Navy facilitates its operational deployment.

Shield AI’s Business Model and the Sustainability of the Partnership

Shield AI is a fast-growing company that has raised several hundred million dollars in venture capital since its founding and has positioned itself among the most innovative defense suppliers in the United States. Its model is based on integrating embedded AI into its systems—which sets its products apart from conventional drones and justifies a premium price.

For Poland, purchasing a Shield AI system entails a long-term relationship with the company: software updates, advancements in AI capabilities, and operator training. It is as much a technological partnership as it is a purchase of equipment. In an environment where AI capabilities are evolving rapidly, this ongoing relationship is just as valuable as the system itself—it ensures that the Polish V-BAT will remain at the cutting edge of technology well beyond its initial delivery.

Purchasing a Shield AI drone means investing in an ongoing technological partnership. AI updates, new detection capabilities, and improvements in endurance—all of this comes with the partnership. In a field that evolves so rapidly, this is often more valuable than the initial hardware.

A Signal to Allies and Adversaries

Poland’s decision to acquire the V-BAT sends a dual message. To NATO allies: Poland is making a serious investment in maritime capabilities that contribute to collective surveillance of the Baltic Sea, strengthening the Alliance’s posture without relying solely on major navies such as the Royal Navy or the U.S. Navy. To Russia: the activities of the Baltic Fleet and infrastructure sabotage operations will be subject to increased and more persistent surveillance.

This dual message is precisely what the deterrence strategy aims to achieve: to convince the adversary that the cost and risk of hostile action outweigh the expected benefits. If Moscow concludes that its cable sabotage operations or the activities of its Baltic Fleet are now subject to more intensive and persistent surveillance, the likelihood of incidents increases for its operators—which may alter the risk-benefit calculation.

Toward a Distributed Surveillance Network in the Baltic Sea

Poland’s purchase of the V-BAT is part of a broader trend: the gradual construction of a distributed maritime surveillance network in the Baltic Sea. Finland and Sweden, as new NATO members, are contributing their underwater surveillance capabilities. The Baltic states are developing their own systems. Poland is adding maritime drones. Germany is modernizing its Baltic Navy.

Together, these national investments are creating a surveillance network that is gradually covering the entire Baltic Sea with increasing density and persistence. This is not the result of centralized planning—it is the emergence of a distributed architecture arising from converging national decisions. And this distributed architecture is ultimately more robust than a centralized system that would have single points of failure.

Finland, Sweden, Poland, the Baltic states—each is adding its own layer of surveillance to the Baltic Sea. Not because they were told to do so, but because they are experiencing the threat firsthand. This is the best collective security architecture there is: distributed, resilient, and based on the conviction of each member. NATO at its best.

The Drone as a Naval Force Multiplier

Poland’s decision illustrates a fundamental shift in the design of modern naval forces: the autonomous maritime drone as a force multiplier for medium-sized navies. A frigate equipped with a V-BAT is no longer limited to monitoring its 30-kilometer radar horizon—it can extend its situational awareness to hundreds of kilometers using persistent sensors.

For navies that cannot afford fleets of maritime patrol aircraft or a sufficient number of submarines, maritime drones offer a cost-effective and flexible solution. The cost of a V-BAT is a fraction of that of a P-8 Poseidon maritime aircraft. Its maintenance is infinitely simpler. And its ability to operate from an existing surface ship without major modifications to naval infrastructure is a decisive operational and economic advantage.

Limitations: What the V-BAT Cannot Do

An honest strategic fact-check must also note the V-BAT’s limitations. It is a surveillance system—not a combat system. It can detect a saboteur diver or a suspicious vessel, but it cannot stop them. It improves situational awareness, but the physical response to an identified threat still requires conventional naval assets. Its resilience to Russian countermeasures—jamming, decoys, and enemy drones—has not yet been fully documented in a high-intensity environment.

These limitations do not call into question the system’s usefulness—they define its optimal area of operation. In the Baltic context, where the primary threat is covert hybrid warfare (sabotage, espionage, “gray zone” naval activities) rather than open naval combat, the V-BAT is ideally suited. However, a comprehensive defense posture requires that this drone be integrated into an architecture that also includes active response capabilities—which Poland is developing through its land- and air-based acquisition programs.

The V-BAT conducts surveillance. It does not engage in combat. This is important to note. Poland is building its maritime defense in layers: surveillance with the V-BAT, response with its frigates and submarines, and deterrence with its coastal missiles. A good defense architecture is always multi-layered. Warsaw seems to have understood this.

A purchase that speaks volumes about Poland’s strategic vision

Poland’s acquisition of the V-BAT is more than just a defense contract. It reflects a coherent strategic vision: investing in capabilities that make Poland indispensable to collective security in the Baltic region, diversifying technological partnerships, and providing a concrete response to hybrid threats that have until now targeted critical infrastructure without facing sufficient oversight.

The Baltic Sea: A New Front in European Security

The Baltic Sea has become one of Europe’s most complex strategic areas. Flanked almost entirely by NATO countries since the accession of Finland and Sweden, yet still exposed to Russian hybrid activities and the capabilities of Kaliningrad, it requires constant surveillance and rapid response capabilities. Poland’s V-BAT is a modest but useful piece in this security architecture. And in today’s Baltic region, every piece counts.

The Baltic Sea, almost entirely surrounded by NATO—this is a strategic gift that Finland and Sweden have given to the Alliance. But a sea that is surrounded is not automatically a secure sea. It must be monitored, patrolled, and defended. The Polish V-BAT shows that Warsaw has understood what “defending the Baltic” means in practical terms. That’s the right direction.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist