ANALYSIS: U.S.-Iran Crossfire Around the Strait of Hormuz — The Ceasefire on the Brink of Collapse

Missiles and Drones Targeted U.S. Bases

On June 27, 2026, Iran took things a step further. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched a combined missile-and-drone operation against U.S. military facilities in Kuwait and Bahrain. In Kuwait, the military intercepted two ballistic missiles—causing no damage or casualties. In Bahrain, where the U.S. 5th Fleet is based, sirens blared. Authorities reported that an Iranian drone had damaged a residential building in the province of Muharraq. No American injuries were officially reported—but the symbolism of the attack on a U.S. naval base in an allied Gulf nation was unmistakable.

The IRGC justified the attack by claiming that the U.S. strikes on June 26 had violated the ceasefire and that their response was intended to “completely halt all diplomatic processes.” The IRGC Navy threatened that U.S. bases in the region “would experience hell in the coming days.” This was no longer a maritime incident. It was a deliberate escalation on the territory of two sovereign states—and a direct test of the resilience of U.S. alliances in the Gulf.

Trump Threatens the Very Existence of the Islamic Republic

Trump’s response was swift. In a message that would keep world capitals on edge all night, he wrote: “There may come a point when we are no longer able to be reasonable, and will be forced to militarily complete the job that we very successfully started. ” Then, in terms that no U.S. president had used so directly in decades: “If that happens, the Islamic Republic of Iran will no longer exist!” This was not a diplomatic warning. It was a public, existential threat—uncoordinated with allies—that potentially closed off diplomatic avenues for Tehran.

Publicly calling into question the very existence of a regime while claiming to want a peace agreement creates a fundamental contradiction. Iran cannot negotiate its survival under such a threat without losing face domestically—which makes any agreement more difficult, not easier. Trump’s rhetoric, however sincerely deterrent it may be in its intent, objectively complicates the task of diplomats trying to keep the June 18 framework alive.

Threatening to annihilate a regime while seeking to sign a peace agreement with it is psychologically coherent for a domestic American audience—and strategically counterproductive in negotiations where the other side must be able to go home with something. Trump is a necessary evil in the Western balance of power. But on this specific issue, his rhetoric of survival masks his exit strategy.

Why Iran Won’t Give Up the Strait Without Something in Return

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) documented in its special report dated June 27, 2026, that Iran uses the Strait of Hormuz as a “trump card” in all of its dealings with Washington. Iran’s reasoning is that of a rational actor who has identified its greatest leverage: the Strait is an irreplaceable maritime route for approximately 20 to 21% of the world’s oil. Closing the Strait or making transit through it uncertain immediately drives up oil prices, affects the global economy, and puts maximum political pressure on Washington to negotiate.

The traffic diversion plan that Iran is attempting to impose is the concrete manifestation of this logic: if ships take the Iranian route, they implicitly recognize Iranian sovereignty over the strait. This is a geopolitical validation that cannot be bought with lifted sanctions or nuclear guarantees. On June 23, the IMO and Oman announced a joint effort to reroute hundreds of stranded ships via a secure route along the Omani coast. Iran launched an attack on June 25 specifically to disrupt this effort—the message was crystal clear.

The Blockade of the Northern Route Versus the Southern Route

The core of the operational dispute is not theoretical. There are two routes through the strait. The northern route passes through Iranian waters and under its control, with attempts to impose tolls that Trump explicitly condemned on social media on June 24. The southern route runs along the Omani coast—promoted by Washington as a safe alternative to Iranian dominance. On June 27, the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) had widened the southern route to allow simultaneous traffic in both directions. But as soon as ships used it, such as the Ever Lovely, Iran attacked them.

For the West and its Asian partners, who depend on Gulf oil, this is a matter of survival. CMA CGM—one of the world’s largest shipping companies—had withdrawn its container ship Galapagos from the strait, describing the move as “an important step in a regional context that remains complex.” Hundreds of other ships remained on hold. Every day of blockage or uncertainty resulted in disruptions to global supply chains and cumulative economic pressure that neither Europe nor Asia could absorb indefinitely.

The Strait of Hormuz is not a regional problem. It is a problem for our commercial civilization. When Iran attacks a cargo ship to challenge a maritime route, it is not attacking the security of a single vessel—it is attacking the very logic of free global trade. The West cannot accept that vital trade routes be subject to the unilateral veto of an armed theocratic regime.

Persona non grata: The Gulf’s Formal Response

In response to Iranian attacks on their territory, both Kuwait and Bahrain have taken formal diplomatic measures. Kuwait summoned the Iranian chargé d’affaires and declared two Iranian diplomats persona non grata for what it described as “ongoing aggression.” The Kuwaiti government reported that its armed forces had been forced to engage 13 ballistic missiles and 17 drones originating from Iran, with debris falling on several residential areas. Bahrain, for its part, had asked the UN Security Council to hold an emergency session to hold Iran accountable.

These expulsions are not empty symbolic gestures. They represent a formal break in bilateral diplomatic relations between two Gulf states and Tehran—states that had until now attempted to maintain open lines of communication, often in the face of U.S. pressure. The decision to declare Iranian diplomats persona non grata sends a clear signal to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and to Washington: the Gulf states are no longer willing to absorb Iranian attacks without a formal political response. This hardening of their stance limits Tehran’s diplomatic options in the region.

The GCC on High Alert

GCC Secretary-General Jasem Mohamed Albudaiwi condemned the Iranian attacks as a “dangerous and unprecedented escalation,” asserting that they “reflect the Iranian regime’s insistence on pursuing hostile and rejected policies targeting the security, stability, and sovereignty” of member states. This collective statement by the GCC is significant: it marks an explicit alignment of the Arab Gulf states with the U.S. position toward Iran, at the very moment when Tehran was attempting to fracture that alignment by selectively attacking member states.

On June 25, the GCC and the United States had explicitly rejected any Iranian attempt to exercise control over the strait, including the collection of tolls. It was this joint statement that Iran cited as justification for the attack on the Ever Lovely that same day. The sequence is telling: a firm multilateral statement, followed by an Iranian attack on a civilian vessel that very same day. Iran was not testing U.S. resolve. It was testing the collective resolve of the Western order in the Gulf.

The diplomatic expulsions by Kuwait and Bahrain represent a pivotal moment that is often underestimated in media coverage of this crisis. These are countries that had always preferred discretion over confrontation with Tehran. Seeing them take such severe formal measures speaks volumes about the extent of the breakdown in trust in the region. Iran has exhausted the patience of its immediate neighbors.

A verbal agreement that doesn’t stand up to the facts

On the evening of June 28, 2026, diplomatic sources spoke of a verbal ceasefire—a halt to active hostilities without a signed agreement or verification mechanism. This fragile arrangement followed the June 18 agreement, which had itself been violated within seven days. Talks in Qatar had been mentioned by U.S. officials as a possible next step—but Iran had denied that they were being organized, placing the U.S. announcement in an uncomfortable zone of diplomatic ambiguity. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to determine from the outside who is telling the truth.

U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf had led talks in Switzerland a week before hostilities resumed. Those negotiations had resulted in the 14-point framework of June 18. But a 14-point agreement between two governments is only valid if the military actors on the ground—notably the IRGC, which operates with considerable autonomy—feel bound by the civilian government’s commitments. Iran’s decision-making structure, with its multiple centers of power, makes the coherence of its foreign policy structurally uncertain.

The ISW and Iran’s Command Structure

The ISW documented in its June 27 report that the Strait of Hormuz is a “golden card” precisely because its strategic value to Iran is not contingent on any specific agreement: it is permanent. As long as Iran controls or can threaten the strait, it has leverage over global economies that allows it to negotiate from a position of relative strength even in the face of U.S. military power. This asymmetry of leverage explains why successive ceasefires do not produce lasting peace: the incentive structure that drives Iran to use its leverage does not disappear with a verbal agreement.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi had stated that the responsibility for restoring maritime traffic in the Strait to pre-war levels lay “solely with Tehran” and had urged others not to interfere in “Iran’s administration of the Strait.” This statement constitutes a de facto claim of sovereignty over an international waterway—a position that is legally unacceptable under international maritime law and politically unacceptable to the United States, the European Union, and the Asian maritime powers.

A verbal ceasefire between parties that do not trust one another, without a verification mechanism, in a strait where the next provocation could occur within hours, is less a peace agreement than a tactical pause. Iran has used every lull in this conflict to reposition its capabilities. No one in Washington should be unaware of this.

Hundreds of ships stranded, prices fluctuating

The economic impact of the Strait of Hormuz crisis during the period of June 26–28, 2026, was immediate and measurable. Hundreds of ships stranded in or around the strait had begun to move during the two weeks preceding the attack on the Ever Lovely, taking advantage of the June 18 agreement. After the attack and the U.S. strikes, the renewed flow of traffic came to a halt. Oil prices, which had “converged toward pre-war levels” according to sources cited by Reuters, rebounded amid renewed uncertainty. Marine insurers immediately raised their premiums for any transit through the strait.

For the global economy—and particularly for Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and India, which rely heavily on oil imports from the Gulf—every day of uncertainty in the Strait represents a direct economic cost. The European Union, already under economic strain after years of war in Ukraine, cannot indefinitely absorb an energy premium caused by Iranian instability. This global economic pressure is a factor that should, in theory, push toward a resolution. In practice, it also serves as leverage for Iran to force concessions.

The Global Fleet Caught in the Crossfire

The shipping company CMA CGM described the departure of its container ship Galapagos from the Strait as an “important milestone,” while emphasizing a context “that remains complex and requires constant vigilance.” This diplomatically cautious statement from a shipping giant says everything there is to know: global commercial enterprises are navigating institutionalized uncertainty, unable to plan long-term routes in a region where an agreement can be violated in seven days. The risk premium they factor into their prices is passed on to every global consumer of manufactured goods transported by sea.

The IMO had suspended its safe corridor initiative as early as June 26, following the attack on the Ever Lovely. Suspending a UN maritime security program less than a week after its launch is a clear indicator of the depth of the crisis. The intergovernmental organization responsible for global maritime security is unable to guarantee safe routes in an area where a member state is deliberately attacking civilian vessels. This is a failure of the international governance architecture that the U.S.-Iran conflict is brutally exposing.

With the IMO suspending its safety corridor after six days and CMA CGM describing a successful crossing as a “major milestone,” we can gauge just how much international shipping standards have been eroded by this conflict. What was the norm a year ago—passing freely through an international strait—has become a remarkable achievement. This is a step backward for civilization that the West should not accept.

February 28 to June 28: Four Months That Changed the Middle East

The war between the United States, Israel, and Iran began on February 28, 2026, with a joint U.S.-Israeli bombing campaign in Iran. In four months, the fighting claimed thousands of lives, killed 13 U.S. service members, and disrupted the global economy. Iran had largely closed the Strait of Hormuz for most of the conflict—a decision with immediate global economic consequences. Indirect, then direct, talks had led to the June 18 framework agreement—which was signed, then violated within a week.

The events of June 26–28 are not an isolated incident. They are part of a documented pattern: agreement, violation by Iran, U.S. response, Iranian threats, partial escalation, verbal ceasefire, repeat. This cycle is not the result of a miscalculation. It is the result of an incentive structure in which Iran judges that testing the limits of the agreement is less costly than complying with an agreement that would require it to relinquish its control over the strait. Understanding this calculation is a prerequisite for any attempt to change it.

Israel, Lebanon, and the Regional Crisis Arc

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz is unfolding alongside a broader regional crisis arc. In Lebanon, successive ceasefires between Israel and Hezbollah had limited effect: Israel insisted on not withdrawing from the seized Lebanese territory, while Hezbollah refused to lay down its arms as long as Israeli troops remained in place. On June 26, the ISW reported that Iranian Foreign Minister Araqchi explicitly linked Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon to the terms of the agreement with Washington—a way of linking the two fronts and increasing Iran’s leverage in negotiations.

This link between the Iranian front, the Lebanese front, and the Strait of Hormuz reveals the full complexity of Tehran’s strategy: to keep multiple fronts open simultaneously to maximize its bargaining power, force Washington to make compromises on several issues at once, and prevent any sector-specific agreements that would resolve problems one by one. It is a strategy of attrition that relies on the fact that American democracy, with its political cycles and internal economic pressures, cannot indefinitely maintain a high-pressure stance on all fronts at once.

Iran is playing multiple cards simultaneously—the Strait of Hormuz, Lebanon, and the militias in Iraq and Syria—with a strategic coherence that the West struggles to match in its response. This is not military genius. It is strategic perseverance. And the West, divided between its priorities in Ukraine, China, and the Middle East, is struggling to maintain consistent pressure on all these fronts. This is the weakness that Iran is exploiting.

Strike and Negotiate Simultaneously

Washington’s position in this conflict illustrates a fundamental tension: striking Iran militarily to maintain deterrent credibility, while negotiating with it to reach a lasting peace agreement. These two objectives are not contradictory in theory—striking precisely to make the cost of violations high enough, while offering an honorable diplomatic way out. But in practice, every U.S. strike is used by the IRGC to justify new attacks, creating a cycle that fuels escalation rather than curbing it.

Trump’s rhetoric—threats to annihilate the Islamic Republic on social media—further complicates this equation. A regime that feels existentially threatened has less incentive to negotiate in good faith: any agreement it signs could be interpreted as a capitulation that undermines its domestic legitimacy. The Revolutionary Guards, whose grip on Iranian power is structural, have an interest in maintaining a state of crisis that justifies their role and resources. Iran’s internal dynamics are a factor that Washington cannot ignore in its strategy.

JD Vance, the Swiss Talks, and the 14-Point Framework

The talks led by Vice President JD Vance in Switzerland, one week before hostilities resumed, had produced the June 18 14-point framework. This framework covered three main areas: an end to the fighting, the reopening of the strait, and the launch of negotiations on the nuclear program and sanctions within 60 days. Washington’s lifting of certain sanctions accompanied this agreement—a gesture of good faith that Iran immediately exploited as proof that the pressure was working, though it did not translate into sustained compliance with the ceasefire.

The central issue raised by the partial failure of this agreement is that of verifiability and enforcement. A ceasefire agreement without a third-party verification mechanism, without peacekeeping forces, and without automatic, pre-established consequences in the event of a violation is structurally fragile. The international community—and the European Union in particular—bears direct responsibility for establishing a credible monitoring mechanism. The absence of such a mechanism is not an inadvertent oversight. It is a shortcoming that reflects a collective inability to impose the conditions for lasting peace on an actor that has not renounced its ambitions for regional control.

Negotiating without a verification mechanism is like building on sand. JD Vance did some real diplomatic work in Switzerland—and the June 18 agreement was a real step forward. But without third-party verification capabilities and without predefined automatic consequences, the first actor that deems it in its interest to violate the agreement can do so with impunity. Iran made that calculation in seven days.

A Spectator Exposed to All Kinds of Risks

Europe watched the tit-for-tat strikes of June 26–27 with palpable economic anxiety. Its energy prices, already under pressure since the war in Ukraine, were hit by yet another shock. Its trade routes to Asia via the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz were once again compromised. Yet Europe was structurally absent from the diplomatic or military levers in this conflict: no military forces deployed, no formal participation in the JD Vance talks, and no rapid-response mechanism. Presidents Macron and Meloni had mentioned a possible naval mission in the Gulf of Oman “if the conditions were right”—without specifying what those conditions might be.

Europe’s relative powerlessness in a conflict that directly affects its economic and energy interests is a lesson in strategic autonomy that the Old Continent still refuses to fully integrate into its actual capabilities. It is not enough to declare that Europe must be a geopolitical power in order to actually be one. This requires military projection capabilities, rapid decision-making mechanisms, and the political will to take risks—all of which the current European consensus does not yet allow. The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz is a stark reminder of this.

Macron, Meloni, and the Aborted Naval Mission

The signals sent by Presidents Macron and Meloni regarding a possible naval mission in the Gulf of Oman deserve special attention. This is the first time since the start of the conflict that European leaders have explicitly mentioned a direct military contribution to securing Iranian maritime routes. This development—even if conditional and unconfirmed—reflects a growing awareness that European economic interests in freedom of navigation cannot be delegated indefinitely to the United States.

But “willingness to participate if conditions were met” is a phrasing that says as much by what it does not say as by what it affirms. What conditions? Who defines them? What mandate? How would it integrate with the U.S. chain of command in the Gulf? These questions, which have no public answers, are a sign that European strategic autonomy remains at the stage of political aspiration, not operational capability. For Europe to be a credible actor in a future Gulf crisis, concrete decisions will be needed—not conditional readiness.

France and Italy have sent a signal. That’s already something—and it’s clearly more courageous than silence. But between signaling conditional readiness and projecting a credible naval force into disputed waters lies a chasm of capability and political will that Europe will one day have to bridge. The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz is a stark warning. I hope it will be heeded.

An International Strait Claimed as National Waters

Iran’s claim to control the Strait of Hormuz—including the right to impose tolls and designate shipping lanes—is in direct contradiction to international maritime law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which guarantees the right of innocent passage through international straits. This contradiction is not new: Iran has never ratified UNCLOS and has for decades contested the Western interpretation of its coastal rights in the strait.

What the 2026 conflict reveals with brutal clarity is that international law without a credible enforcement mechanism is an aspiration, not a guarantee. Iran can attack civilian ships in an international strait, expel UN missions from it, and demand tolls on a waterway whose status as an international strait is established—and the immediate practical sanction remains limited to U.S. military strikes and the expulsion of diplomats from the Gulf. The international community lacks a functioning collective enforcement mechanism to counter an actor determined to defy norms.

The ISW’s Statement on the Israel-Lebanon-U.S. Trilateral Framework

On June 26, 2026, the U.S. State Department published the full text of the Israel-Lebanon-United States Trilateral Framework—a 14-clause document that sought the disarmament of non-state groups in Lebanon, notably Hezbollah. Clause 4 required the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to completely disarm all non-state groups. Clause 7 affirmed the right of Israel and Lebanon to self-defense. Clause 11 stipulated that the United States and Lebanon would restrict the flow of funds to entities affiliated with Lebanese non-state armed groups.

This ambitious framework immediately came up against the reality on the ground. The Iranian IRGC had declared as early as June 27 that the continuation of Israeli military action in Lebanon constituted a violation of the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding—explicitly linking the two conflicts. Hezbollah leader Fadlallah had stated on June 26 that Iran would not sign any agreement with the United States until Israel had completely withdrawn its troops from Lebanese territory. These interlinked positions create a negotiating framework in which any progress on one front can be blocked by a demand on another.

A trilateral framework with 14 clauses, a U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding, a 14-point ceasefire agreement, talks in Switzerland, and discussions announced in Qatar—I count at least four simultaneous diplomatic frameworks, none of which has authority over the others. This isn’t variable-geometry diplomacy. It’s parallel diplomacy without a center of gravity. Structures of this complexity collapse under their own weight.

A Strategic Dividend for Russia

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz and the tit-for-tat U.S.-Iran strikes have one observer who is far from neutral: Moscow. Every day Washington spends in the Middle East—negotiating with Tehran, planning strikes on Iranian sites—is a day of reduced strategic attention to the conflict in Ukraine. Russia has a direct interest in seeing the Iranian crisis persist and escalate: it divides American attention, drains military resources, and creates a tactical window of opportunity on the Ukrainian front while the United States manages an additional front.

The Iran-Russia axis is not merely a circumstantial convergence of interests. Iran has supplied Russia with Shahed drones that have terrorized Ukrainian cities. Russia has provided Iran with diplomatic cover at the Security Council and missile technology. In the context of the cross-strikes in late June 2026, it is reasonable to assess—though we cannot directly document it—that Moscow was observing the escalation with satisfaction and was actively working to prevent Washington from finding a way out of the crisis too quickly, which would allow it to refocus its attention on Ukraine.

North Korea as the Third Variable

The Iran-Russia-North Korea triangle is a geopolitical reality that the strikes in the Strait of Hormuz forcefully underscore. North Korea has supplied Russia with artillery ammunition and troops. It is observing Iran’s ability to stand up to the United States militarily with calculated interest. Pyongyang draws lessons from every conflict involving actors that militarily challenge Washington—particularly regarding the use of asymmetric attack drones, short-range ballistic missiles, and the doctrine of gradual escalation. The U.S.-Iran conflict is a school of war that North Korea is studying closely.

For Ukraine and its Western partners, this interconnection between theaters—the Strait of Hormuz, Ukraine, and the Korean Peninsula—is a strategic reality that Western collective defense doctrine must incorporate. NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners are facing an informal but functional alliance of revisionist powers that are coordinating their pressure on different fronts simultaneously. Responding front by front is insufficient. A coalition strategy is needed that addresses the coordinated threat in its entirety.

While Washington negotiates with Tehran in Qatar, Moscow is bombing Kyiv. While CENTCOM strikes Iranian sites, Pyongyang is supplying Russian artillery depots. These three crises are not independent of one another. They are branches of the same strategy to challenge the Western order by revisionist powers that have learned to coordinate without forming a formal alliance. The West does not yet have an equivalent coordinated response.

The 60-day countdown

The June 18, 2026, agreement gave negotiators 60 days to make progress on Iran’s nuclear program and U.S. sanctions. Factoring in the disruptions from June 26–28, this countdown was now contingent on a ceasefire—one that had already been violated once. If talks do indeed take place in Qatar—which neither side had consistently confirmed at the time of these events—the agenda will be packed: the permanent reopening of the strait, verification of Iranian military positions, a maritime surveillance framework, and the nuclear agreement.

The conditions for a lasting agreement remain difficult to meet. Iran is demanding security guarantees that only full diplomatic normalization could provide—something the current U.S. political context makes impossible in the short term. The United States is demanding sufficient dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program to reassure Israel—something the Iranian regime cannot accept without compromising its strategic deterrent. This equation has not changed with the strikes in the Strait. It has simply been brought home to everyone with renewed urgency.

The Least Likely Way Out

The scenario for a lasting resolution—a comprehensive agreement covering nuclear issues, sanctions, the Strait, and the militias—would require a convergence of political will that the events of June 26–28 have made less likely, not more so. Iran emerges from these days in a position of perceived tactical strength: it attacked civilian ships, struck U.S. bases, and secured a verbal ceasefire without any documented major concessions. If its internal assessment is that violence pays off, there is no immediate reason for it to change its strategy.

For the West, the operational lesson is clear: deterrence must be credible, visible, and systematic—not reactive and proportionate after each incident. The U.S. strikes on June 26 degraded Iranian capabilities, but they did not change Tehran’s strategic calculus. Changing that will require either economic and military pressure intense enough that the cost of conflict outweighs the tactical benefits for Iran, or a diplomatic offer substantial enough that peace becomes a preferable option to the Strait strategy. Neither of these two paths is in sight in the short term.

I have no good news to offer here. The U.S.-Iran conflict over the Strait of Hormuz has no clear end in sight. It follows cycles—escalation, ceasefire, violation, escalation—each iteration of which erodes a little more the confidence that formal agreements can hold. What I fear is that becoming accustomed to these cycles will eventually dull the West’s vigilance at the very moment Iran takes one step too far.

60 Days to Defuse a Diplomatic Bomb

The June 18, 2026, agreement gave negotiators 60 days to address Iran’s nuclear program and U.S. sanctions. This issue is the real heart of the conflict—far more so than the maritime incidents, which are merely symptoms. Iran has continued to enrich uranium to levels close to the weapons threshold for years, under the cover of geopolitical tensions. In 2026, according to public assessments by the IAEA, Iran would be just weeks away from the capability to manufacture a nuclear weapon if the political decision were made. It is this proximity that gives the regime its sense of strategic security—and that makes any negotiation extraordinarily complex, as Iran will not negotiate the dismantling of its “life insurance” without equivalent guarantees of survival.

For Israel—a central player in the origins of this conflict—the June 18 agreement, lacking a credible nuclear dismantlement mechanism, amounts to funding the problem rather than solving it. The Israeli government supported the initial strikes on February 28 precisely because it believed diplomacy had reached its limits. The resumption of hostilities in late June retrospectively lent credence to this pessimistic assessment. Europe, the moderate United States, and the Gulf allies face a structural dilemma: a nuclear agreement without Israel is politically unpalatable in Washington, but an agreement with Israel imposes conditions that Iran cannot accept without threatening its regime.

Iran’s nuclear program has been the elephant in every negotiating room for the past twenty years. One can establish as many ceasefire frameworks as one likes around the Strait of Hormuz—as long as the nuclear issue remains unresolved, Tehran will always have a ultimate deterrent that makes its policy of confrontation rational from its point of view. And as long as that leverage exists, a lasting agreement will remain out of reach.

Washington and the lifted sanctions—a signal that backfired

Washington’s decision to lift certain sanctions against Iran as part of the June 18 agreement was a gesture of good faith—and a diplomatic gamble. This gamble was based on the assumption that access to additional economic resources would give the Iranian government an incentive to maintain peace. In practice, the attack on the Ever Lovely seven days later allowed its critics—and there are many in Washington—to argue that lifting the sanctions had enriched the regime without changing its behavior. This debate has been ongoing for thirty years in U.S. policy toward Iran. It has not been resolved by the events in the strait. It has simply been reframed.

Vice President JD Vance, the architect of the Swiss talks, must defend the results against a U.S. political establishment that has witnessed an agreement violated within a week. This domestic political pressure in the United States—which favors the durability and robustness of agreements over their speed—is a structural factor that Iranian negotiators understand and exploit. The more the negotiating window is perceived as politically precarious in Washington, the less incentive Iran has to make costly concessions now. It can wait until the next elections and recalibrate.

Lifting sanctions as a sign of good faith is a legitimate diplomatic tool. But it must be conditional on verifiable results, not verbal promises. Offering economic resources to a regime without a mechanism to verify its commitments is tantamount to financing its next round of pressure. Diplomatic generosity without a verification framework is not diplomacy. It is optimism.

A Structural Crisis, Not a Single Incident

The cross-fire exchanges on June 26 and 27, 2026, between the United States and Iran around the Strait of Hormuz are not a mere hiccup in a peace process that is on track. They are the manifestation of an unresolved structural contradiction: Iran wants control of the strait as a condition of its strategic security. The United States, its Gulf allies, and the international maritime community reject this claim as incompatible with international law and freedom of navigation. This contradiction will not disappear with a verbal ceasefire or even a formal 14-point agreement. It requires either the capitulation of one of the two sides or an international governance framework for the strait—one that no one has yet seriously proposed.

For Ukraine and its allies observing this crisis from Kyiv, there is a direct lesson: authoritarian powers—Iran, Russia, China, North Korea—are coordinating their pressure on the international order in a way that exhausts the West’s capacity to respond on multiple fronts simultaneously. The West must develop a response that addresses this coordination. The fragmentation of Western responses—the Strait of Hormuz here, Ukraine there, Taiwan elsewhere—is the weakness that these regimes exploit with a strategic persistence that democracies struggle to match over the long term.

What History Will Remember About June 25, 2026

On June 25, 2026, Iran attacked the M/V Ever Lovely—seven days after the signing of a peace agreement. This act will reveal, for the record, the value Tehran places on formal commitments when they constrain its ambitions for regional control. It will also say something about the architecture of peace agreements in a world where armed non-state actors—the IRGC—operate with sufficient autonomy to violate what the civilian government has signed. And finally, it will say something about the vigilance required of the West in the face of regimes that sign and violate agreements in the same breath—not out of diplomatic incompetence, but through deliberate strategic calculation.

The Strait of Hormuz will remain at the heart of global geopolitics as long as Iran maintains its regional hegemonic ambitions and as long as Gulf oil fuels the world’s economies. Finding a sustainable framework for governing this vital waterway is one of the most urgent geopolitical challenges of our time. The cross-strikes of late June 2026 remind us that urgency does not wait for us to be ready.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist