ANALYSIS: Ukrainian Drones in the Netherlands — When the Defense Industry Crosses Borders

Maxime Marquette

2026-07-02 14:55:55

A Diverse Arsenal of Long-Range Strike Drones

The types of drones covered by the production program in the Netherlands include long-range and medium-range drones. The models associated with the Build with Ukraine program include the Lyuty, the UJ-22 Airborne, the Bober, and a jet-powered drone used for deep strikes into Russia. These aircraft represent different segments of the operational spectrum: surveillance, precision strikes, and long-range strikes on infrastructure.

The Lyuty drone—the term means “wild” or “ferocious” in Ukrainian—is a strike drone developed for deep-strike missions. The UJ-22 Airborne is a versatile aerial drone system capable of both reconnaissance and strike missions. The Bober (the beaver) is a heavy strike drone capable of carrying significant military payloads. These systems, developed and refined on the Ukrainian battlefield, have proven their worth under real combat conditions—a competitive advantage that no laboratory can simulate.

Diversification from production in Great Britain

This initiative in the Netherlands complements a similar program already launched in the United Kingdom. This geographic diversification is deliberate: manufacturing in multiple European countries reduces the risk of supply chain bottlenecks, increases total production volume, and creates a distributed industrial network that is more difficult for an adversary to disrupt. It also signals that the “Build with Ukraine” model is replicable—other countries could join this network in the coming months.

Fedorov stated: “Ukrainian technology and battlefield experience help our partners adapt more quickly to the challenges of modern warfare. At the same time, support from our allies allows us to scale up solutions that have already proven their effectiveness on the battlefield.” This phrasing is important: this is not a beneficiary-donor relationship. It is an exchange of mutual value.

The Bober, the Lyuty, the UJ-22. These names—drawn from Ukrainian animals and adjectives—convey a sense of craftsmanship and determination. These drones did not emerge from Lockheed Martin laboratories with billion-dollar budgets. They emerged from a desperate need, designed by engineers whose cities were being bombed while they worked. This context of their creation gives them a legitimacy that no military specification can replace.

The Ukraine-Netherlands Bilateral Defense Agreement: Beyond Drones

A Framework Agreement on Defense and Innovation Cooperation

In parallel with its drone production program, Ukraine has signed a defense cooperation agreement with the Netherlands, focused on “advancing defense innovation and strengthening collaboration between Ukrainian and Dutch arms manufacturers.” This agreement also provides for the joint development of missiles and electronic warfare capabilities to enhance the readiness of both nations.

This expansion into missiles and electronic warfare signals the partnership’s strategic ambition: not to limit itself to drones, but to build an integrated bilateral defense architecture. Electronic warfare has become a critically important domain in the conflict in Ukraine—Russian electronic countermeasures seek to jam the communications and navigation systems of Ukrainian drones, and Ukraine has developed remarkable counter-countermeasure capabilities that its partners now wish to co-develop.

The Netherlands as a Leading Strategic Partner

Fedorov described the Netherlands as a country that provides not only “one of the largest volumes of military aid” but also “some of the highest-quality support among all of Ukraine’s international partners.” This recognition is well-deserved—the Netherlands has notably contributed to the Patriot and F-16 coalitions, supplied artillery and air defense systems, and is now engaging in a deep industrial partnership. The 500-million-euro support package mentioned by Fedorov includes 250 million for the supply of drones to the Ukrainian defense forces and 250 million for the procurement of U.S. weapons under the PURL mechanism.

This two-pronged approach—investing in Ukrainian production AND purchasing U.S. weapons for Ukraine—illustrates the sophistication of the Dutch strategy. Amsterdam is not choosing between suppliers; it is diversifying its channels of aid to maximize the impact on the ground in Ukraine. This is allied defense policy at its most effective.

The Netherlands and Ukraine are jointly developing missiles and electronic warfare systems. Ten years ago, this sentence would have sounded like science fiction. Today, it is a signed agreement. What the war in Ukraine has unexpectedly produced is an acceleration of European defense industrial integration that twenty years of common policies had failed to achieve.

The "Build with Ukraine" Initiative: The Danish Model on a Larger Scale

From the Danish Model to European Architecture

The Build with Ukraine program is part of what Euromaidan Press calls the “Danish model”: rather than supplying Danish equipment to Ukraine, Denmark pioneered the practice of directly funding Ukrainian defense production. By November 2025, Denmark had committed 188 million euros through this model. Canada had increased its contribution through this model to approximately 190 million Canadian dollars by February 2026. Sweden and Norway followed suit.

But it was the EU that truly took things to a new level. On June 30, 2026, the European Union disbursed 3.9 billion euros to Ukraine—the first defense tranche of its 90-billion-euro support loan. This sum is “restricted to the production of Ukrainian drones, defense industrial capabilities, and urgent supplies for the front lines.” Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated: “Ukraine’s ingenuity is at the heart of its success in resisting Russia’s full-scale invasion. An ingenuity that we want to support.”

Ukrainian Domestic Production: From 70% to 90%

These investments are yielding measurable results. The Ukrainian defense industry now produces 90% of its newly authorized weapons, up from 70% a year ago. More than 400 Ukrainian combat units have ordered over 500,000 drones and pieces of equipment via the Brave1 Market platform. The EU had also disbursed 3.2 billion euros in general macro-financial support the previous week. These massive, direct funding flows toward defense production represent a paradigm shift in how the West supports Ukraine.

The total disbursed under the EU support loan reached more than 7 billion euros following these payments, out of a 2026 budget of 45 billion euros, of which 28.3 billion is earmarked for Ukraine’s defense industrial capabilities. These figures are of an unprecedented scale in the history of European defense.

28.3 billion euros for Ukraine’s defense industrial capabilities by 2026. If you had said that to an official at the European Council in 2020, they would have looked at you in utter disbelief. What was once unthinkable has become the Union’s official policy. Russia has achieved something that Brussels had failed to accomplish in twenty years of common defense policy: making collective European defense both urgent and real.

Ukraine's Industrial Relocation Strategy

Manufacturing Outside Ukraine to Increase Production

The decision to manufacture in the Netherlands—and in Great Britain—is clearly a defensive move. Drone manufacturing plants on Ukrainian territory are constant targets of Russian strikes. The average of 3,000 strikes per day documented by the Ukrainian General Staff for July 1, 2026, includes attacks on industrial infrastructure. Relocating part of production safeguards the continuity of the supply chain against Russian attempts to dismantle it.

This is the same logic that led allied democracies to relocate parts of their industrial production during World War II—out of reach of enemy bombers. Ukraine, compelled by the realities of war, is discovering and applying these principles in real time, with remarkable agility for a country at war.

The Long-Term Goal: A Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Integrated into Europe

The vision behind “Build with Ukraine” extends beyond the current war. It aims to integrate the Ukrainian defense industry into the European industrial ecosystem in a sustainable manner. Whether the conflict ends in six months or two years, factories in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom will continue to produce. Co-development agreements for missiles and electronic warfare will continue to move forward. The industrial partnerships established during the war will become the foundation for deeper integration into the EU defense market.

This prospect is crucial for Ukraine’s future. A country whose defense industry is integrated into Europe has an additional security guarantee that goes beyond formal treaties. Industrial interdependence creates mutual incentives for collective defense that treaty provisions alone cannot guarantee.

Industrial integration as a guarantee of security—this is a lesson that Europe itself learned after 1945. The European project began with the ECSC, the European Coal and Steel Community: creating economic interdependencies to make war unthinkable. Integrating Ukraine industrially into Europe means applying this lesson to the current situation. It is historical wisdom cloaked in industrial policy.

The Drone War on the Front Lines: Why It's Urgent to Increase Production

Frontline figures that explain the urgency

To understand the urgency of the production program in the Netherlands, one must look at the figures from the front lines. On June 29, 2026, Russia deployed 9,618 kamikaze drones in a single day. The next day, 9,801. This deluge of drones—more than 400 per hour on average—is why Ukraine needs a production capacity that can keep pace with this rate of use. Drones have become the main instrument of Russia’s war of terror, but also the primary tool of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Ukrainian drones are not only used to defend against Russian Shahed drones. They strike Russian logistics depots, command posts, and air defense systems. Since the beginning of 2026, Ukraine has destroyed nearly 200 Russian air defense systems—including 31 in June alone—primarily through drone strikes. On June 30, Ukrainian counterattacks included the destruction of six Russian drone control stations. This pace of targeted destruction requires a massive number of operational drones.

The Production Race: Interceptors, Strike Drones, Long-Range Drones

Ukraine doubled its fleet of interceptor drones in 2026 compared to 2025. At least 29 Ukrainian companies are now licensed for the mass production of interceptors. Orders for systems such as the Octopus have reached 8,000 units. General Cherry carried out 11,473 strikes in March 2026 alone, destroying 43% of Russian Molniya drones. These figures illustrate the scale of the operational demand for drones.

To maintain and increase this pace, production in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom is essential. It allows for an increase in the overall available volume without relying solely on production capacity on Ukrainian soil. This diversifies the supply chain with an immediate, direct benefit on the ground.

Nine thousand eight hundred Russian drones in a single day. To counter this, Ukraine must produce thousands of drones every week. This industrial equation haunts me. It should haunt every Western leader. Drone production in the Netherlands is not a nice diplomatic gesture—it is an industrial response to an industrial attack. The front lines are also being fought in the factories.

The Impact on Russia's War Economy: Strikes on Refineries and Systemic Pressure

Ukrainian Long-Range Drones Targeting Russian Infrastructure

Ukrainian long-range drones—some of which will soon be manufactured in the Netherlands—are playing a crucial role in the campaign to strike Russian economic infrastructure. Strikes on Russian refineries have taken 50% of Russia’s refining capacity offline, according to analyses compiled by Euromaidan Press. These strikes are causing domestic fuel shortages in Russia, reducing Moscow’s oil revenues, and complicating fuel supplies to the Russian armed forces.

On June 3, 2026, a Neptune missile took two primary distillation units at the Novoshakhtinsk refinery in the Rostov Oblast out of service. Ukrainian long-range drones have struck other refineries, oil terminals, and fuel depots. This systematic campaign against Russian energy infrastructure is one of the most effective fronts in the war—one that strikes directly at Russia’s civilian economy and affects Moscow’s ability to finance and fuel its war machine.

The Russian Economy Under Increasing Pressure

The Russian refining industry is just one of the sectors affected. Ukrainian strikes have targeted arms factories, logistics centers, and rail infrastructure. On the night of June 30–July 1, 2026, a Ukrainian drone struck the Penza Scientific Research Institute, a manufacturer of sensors for Iskander, Kalibr, and Kh-101 missiles, as well as components for Russian military aircraft. By depriving the Russian military of its capacity to produce precision sensors, Ukraine is attacking the supply chain for the weapons that are striking its own cities.

Russia has responded to these Ukrainian successes with statistical manipulation—according to Swedish intelligence chief Thomas Nilsson, Russian officials have “manipulated statistics to conceal the impact of four years of war on economic growth and inflation.” Behind these doctored figures, the economic pressure is real and growing.

Ukraine is striking Russian refineries with drones manufactured in Kharkiv, Dnipro, or Kyiv. Soon, some of these drones will be produced in Rotterdam or Birmingham. There is something in this geography that goes beyond mere military logistics—it is the industrial solidarity of free Europe against the organized barbarism of the East. This solidarity is having a real impact on the lines at Russian gas stations.

Program Challenges: Intellectual Property, Technology Transfer, Training

Unresolved Issues in Co-Production

The Build with Ukraine program raises complex practical issues that official statements do not fully address. The question of intellectual property rights for Ukrainian drone technologies—developed with Ukrainian public funds but enhanced through Western funding and partnerships—has not yet been fully resolved within the European legal framework. The terms of technology transfer, the export rules applicable to drones produced in the Netherlands and sold to third parties, and the mechanisms for revising the terms of an agreement originally designed for wartime needs—all of this will need to be formalized.

Staff training is another practical challenge. Dutch technicians will need to be trained on Ukrainian systems—a reversal of the usual direction of technology transfer in defense partnerships. This training requires time, a Ukrainian presence in the Netherlands, and potentially translations of technical documentation currently available only in Ukrainian. These logistical challenges are surmountable but require rigorous planning.

Quality Assurance and Standardization

Another challenge concerns standardization and quality control. Ukrainian drones were developed in a wartime emergency industrial environment—sometimes with standards less formalized than those required by European defense procurement processes. Adapting these production processes to the requirements of Dutch industry without losing the flexibility and speed that make Ukrainian production so successful will be a delicate balance to maintain.

These challenges do not call into question the validity or importance of the program. They simply indicate that the announcement on June 30, 2026, marks the beginning of a process, not its conclusion. The success of the “Build with Ukraine” program in the Netherlands will be measured by the actual deliveries of drones to Ukrainian forces in the coming months—and by any orders from third countries that demonstrate the commercial and strategic value of this model.

We must acknowledge the challenges without letting them stifle the legitimate enthusiasm for this program. Intellectual property, training, standardization—these are real issues. But they are issues faced by people working together, not adversaries. The good faith on both sides is evident. And in defense partnerships, good faith matters just as much as contractual provisions.

Drone Diplomacy: Estonia, Japan, Taiwan, Australia

Ukraine as an Exporter of Military Expertise

Production in the Netherlands is one facet of a broader diplomatic strategy that Ukraine has been pursuing since mid-2026: transforming its drone expertise into a diplomatic asset. The Estonian foreign minister stated in June 2026 that “Ukrainian drones deployed within NATO are worth the cost of Russia’s defeat”—a statement that explicitly acknowledges the strategic value of Ukrainian drone technology transfers. Japan has launched a collaboration with Ukrainian startups to develop interceptor drones such as the Terra A1, which has been tested in Ukraine since April 2026.

On June 29, 2026, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha began a tour of East Asia—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—to transform Ukraine from an aid recipient into a strategic partner. Drone technology and wartime experience are at the heart of this new diplomacy. Ukraine is building a network of technological alliances that extends beyond the current conflict.

The Dutch Program as an Exportable Model

The “Build with Ukraine” program in the Netherlands could become a model for other allied countries. Australia, which is developing its own drone capabilities; Germany, which is seeking to rebuild its defense industry; and Poland, which is investing heavily in its defense—all of these countries could benefit from similar agreements with Ukraine. Ukraine’s expertise in combat drones—the most advanced in the world under real-world conditions—is a resource that the entire West has an interest in integrating into its own doctrines and industrial capabilities.

The Gdańsk Declaration of June 25, 2026 explicitly called for “strengthening government and industrial defense cooperation with Ukraine, particularly in drone and anti-drone technologies.” The Dutch program is the most advanced implementation of this to date—and likely the precursor to a distributed production network that will span several European countries over the next two years.

Ukraine is doing something that few countries have succeeded in doing throughout history: turning a defensive war into a global diplomatic lever. Ukrainian drone technology has become a bargaining chip with Tokyo, Amsterdam, London, and Ottawa. This is the geopolitics of war—conducted with a sophistication that would have done credit to countries with decades of diplomatic tradition.

The Drone Value Chain: Components, Software, and Artificial Intelligence

Beyond Assembly: The Complete Chain of Subcomponents

Drone production in the Netherlands will not be limited to assembly. The bilateral cooperation agreement includes close integration of Ukrainian and Dutch technologies and industrial bases. This raises a crucial question: what proportion of the components will be produced locally in the Netherlands, and what proportion will come from Ukraine or other sources? The Ukrainian drone industry’s dependence on Chinese electronic components—a reality acknowledged in analyses of drone diplomacy in Asia—is a cause for concern.

The agreement also includes an electronic warfare component, whose software elements are central to the effectiveness of modern drones. The Ukrainians have developed particularly sophisticated drone detection and jamming systems. Integrating these software capabilities into a European production framework raises issues of data security and the protection of trade secrets that will need to be rigorously managed.

Artificial Intelligence in Drone Systems

The next generation of drones—some of which will likely be developed as part of the Ukrainian-Dutch partnership—will incorporate artificial intelligence capabilities for autonomous navigation, target detection, and electronic countermeasures. Ukraine is at the forefront of developing these systems, which are tested under real combat conditions that no laboratory can simulate. The partnership with the Netherlands—a country with a strong tradition of excellence in precision engineering—could significantly accelerate these developments.

This AI aspect is particularly sensitive because it touches on issues of human responsibility in firing decisions—a subject that will be subject to increasing international regulation. The bilateral agreement will need to incorporate ethical and legal safeguards that meet European standards while preserving the operational effectiveness of the systems on the battlefield.

Artificial intelligence in combat drones—this is a subject on which I must admit I have real uncertainty. I do not know precisely where the ethical boundaries lie that this partnership will need to respect. What I do know is that Ukraine is the only real-world testing ground for these technologies. And this testing ground must be supported while ensuring that the rules of international humanitarian law are applied. This is not a contradiction—it is an obligation.

The message sent to Moscow: Ukrainian production is out of reach

The Strategic Significance of Manufacturing Outside Ukraine

The decision to manufacture Ukrainian drones in the Netherlands sends a clear strategic signal to Moscow: Ukraine’s production capabilities can no longer be completely neutralized by strikes on Ukrainian territory. Factories in Rotterdam and other Dutch cities are out of range of Russian missiles and kamikaze drones. This guarantee of uninterrupted production changes Russia’s calculations regarding the effectiveness of strikes against Ukraine’s defense industry.

This follows the same logic as North Korea’s involvement in the conflict—Moscow has sought sources of artillery shells beyond the reach of Ukrainian counterattacks. Ukraine is responding with the same logic, but in reverse: its allies are becoming distributed production hubs that the adversary cannot strike. This is 21st-century industrial warfare.

Pressure on Russia’s Decision to Continue

This decentralized production program adds to other factors complicating Russia’s assessment of the war’s duration. The rate of Russian advances has plummeted by 77% in less than a year. The 200 Russian air defense systems destroyed since January are weakening the protection of Russian forces. Burning refineries are reducing the Russian government’s revenue. And now, the industrial base producing Ukrainian weapons is expanding geographically beyond Russia’s reach. The combination of these factors must be weighing heavily in discussions within the Russian military command regarding the long-term sustainability of this war.

But I must be honest: this pressure is not yet sufficient to force a change in Russia’s course in the short term. Putin has demonstrated an ability to absorb costs that defy conventional forecasts. The duration of this war remains unknown. What the “Build with Ukraine” program guarantees is that the more time passes, the more Ukrainian capabilities increase—and the more Russia’s calculations deteriorate.

Time is working against Putin—if the West holds firm. It’s that “if” that worries me. Dutch drone production is good news. Whether Western support persists for eighteen months, twenty-four months, or thirty-six months—that is where the outcome will be decided. Democracies have short memories, and election cycles are unforgiving. This program must survive political shifts in allied capitals.

The Missiles and Electronic Warfare Component: The Logical Next Step

Joint Missile Development: A Major Milestone

The bilateral agreement between Ukraine and the Netherlands also provides for the joint development of missiles—an aspect that goes far beyond drones and positions this partnership as one of the most ambitious in recent European defense history. If this aspect comes to fruition, the Netherlands would become a co-developer of offensive weapons with Ukraine—a remarkable precedent for a country that, prior to 2022, had no tradition of co-developing weapons with non-NATO partners.

This missile component of the partnership is part of the same trend as the memorandum between MBDA and Bureau Luch for the Neptune 2, or the deliveries of Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine. The European defense industry recognizes that Ukrainian technologies—developed and tested under the harshest conditions imaginable—have a value that it would be absurd not to capitalize on. Joint development creates industrial synergies that will benefit both Ukraine in wartime and Europe in peacetime.

Electronic Warfare: A Field Undergoing a Revolution

The electronic warfare component of the Dutch partnership deserves special attention. The conflict in Ukraine has sparked a revolution in this field—Russian electronic countermeasures (GPS jamming, communication disruption, and neutralization of drone data links) have forced the Ukrainians to develop counter-countermeasures of remarkable sophistication. These Ukrainian advances in electronic warfare are well-documented and recognized as among the most advanced in the world under real combat conditions.

Integrating these Ukrainian electronic warfare capabilities into a Dutch co-development framework would enable Europe to strengthen its own defenses against Russian hybrid strategies—jamming of civilian systems, disruption of communications, and cyberattacks. What is being tested on the Ukrainian battlefield today will become the electronic defense doctrine for the entire NATO alliance tomorrow.

Electronic warfare is the domain least discussed in the mainstream media yet considered by the military to be one of the most critical. Ukraine has learned to fight in an environment of intense jamming, electronic decoys, and constant cyberattacks. This expertise—which the Netherlands wants to help develop—is worth billions. And it should be of interest to every NATO member preparing for the same threat.

Conclusion: The “Build with Ukraine” Model as a Vision for the Future

What This Program Says About Western Strategic Solidarity

The “Build with Ukraine” program in the Netherlands represents the maturity of an alliance that has evolved since the first deliveries of helmets and body armor in 2021. Over the past four years, Western support for Ukraine has evolved from humanitarian to military, and then from military to industrial. This progression signals a growing understanding that support for Ukraine is not charity—it is an investment in the West’s collective security.

Fedorov put it plainly: “This is an investment in Europe’s defense industrial capacity and in our common security.” This phrasing is accurate and significant. The drones produced in the Netherlands under Ukrainian license are not merely weapons for the current war. They are the prototypes of an integrated European defense industry that will be better, more agile, and more capable than it was before this war.

Ukraine as a Partner, Not as a Recipient of Aid

The fundamental paradigm shift represented by “Build with Ukraine” is the transition from being a recipient of aid to being a partner. Ukraine is no longer just a country that receives weapons—it is a country that contributes technologies, patents, and expertise that its allies want to co-develop. This transformation has profound implications for the future of Ukraine-EU relations: a country whose military technologies are integrated into European industry is a far more credible candidate for membership than a mere recipient of aid.

On June 30, 2026, Ukraine was simultaneously under Russian bombardment, receiving 3.9 billion euros from the EU for its drones, and launching production of its own systems in the Netherlands. This threefold reality—war, funding, and outsourced production—says everything about what Ukraine has become: a country that is fighting, innovating, and building its future all at once. It is a kind of courage that few nations could have sustained.

Under bombardment and simultaneously launching industrial production in Europe. I don’t have the words to fully do justice to what Ukraine is accomplishing. I only know that every time someone says, “Ukraine can’t hold out,” this kind of announcement—precise, industrial, strategic—answers them more effectively than any speech.

The EU's 3.9 billion: The Unprecedented Scale of Financial Support for Ukraine's Defense

The Largest Single Payment Ever Made for the Defense of a Third Country

The payment of 3.9 billion euros on June 30, 2026—the first defense tranche of the 90-billion-euro Support Loan to Ukraine—represents the largest single payment ever made by the EU for the defense of a third country. This sum, strictly earmarked for “the production of Ukrainian drones, defense industrial capabilities, and urgent supplies for the front lines,” is managed by Ukraine under Brussels’ supervision. It is part of a 2026 budget of 45 billion, of which 28.3 billion is dedicated to defense industrial capabilities.

Funding on this scale makes the “Build with Ukraine” program in the Netherlands not only possible but sustainable. Ukraine does not rely solely on variable bilateral aid from member states—it has a stable flow of institutional funding, derived from a mechanism approved by the European Parliament and the Council. This financial architecture is one of the most significant institutional innovations in the European response to the war in Ukraine.

Use of Funds: What This Tranche Will Finance

The 3.9 billion euros will be used to finance drone orders via the Brave1 Market platform, investments in Ukrainian industrial capacity, and urgent supplies for the front lines. A portion of these funds will likely finance the establishment of the production line in the Netherlands, the associated technology transfer, and the initial production contracts. The traceability of these funds—ensured by Brussels’ verification mechanisms—is essential to maintaining the confidence of the countries that agreed to participate in the joint borrowing to finance this loan (with the exception of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, which chose not to participate in the joint borrowing).

Minister Fedorov was clear about how the funds will be used: “These resources will be invested directly in expanding Ukrainian defense production—by increasing the number of drones and other capabilities critical to our Defense Forces.” The program in the Netherlands is a concrete expression of this vision: increasing the number of drones by diversifying production sites.

28.3 billion for Ukraine’s defense industrial capabilities. That is nearly three times Belgium’s annual defense budget. If Europe invests these funds effectively—in the right technologies and with the right procedures—this war will mark the beginning of a European defense industry finally worthy of the name. Otherwise, it will be money well spent to save Ukraine—but poorly spent for the future of European defense. The devil is in the details of implementation.

Conclusion: An Industrial Transformation That Goes Beyond the War

The Legacy of the “Build with Ukraine” Program for the Postwar Era

When this war comes to an end—in whatever form—the Build with Ukraine program will have left a lasting mark on the European defense industry. Drone factories in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Ukrainian patents and know-how integrated into European industrial processes. Co-development agreements for missiles and electronic warfare. Networks connecting Ukrainian, Dutch, and British engineers. These legacies will outlive the conflict and form the foundation of a transformed European defense industry.

This legacy is valuable regardless of the war’s final outcome—even though I remain convinced that Ukraine will prevail, that is, preserve its existence as a sovereign nation within internationally recognized borders. Industrial collaborations forged during wars have often produced the most enduring innovations in the history of technology. The “Build with Ukraine” program is writing one of those chapters.

The final message: innovating under bombardment is the ultimate dignity

Ukraine’s ability to innovate, build industrial partnerships, and steer its own defense production strategy—all while withstanding thousands of strikes a day—is the most eloquent proof that this country deserves the West’s full and unwavering support. This is not a country begging for aid. It is a country offering a partnership that provides mutual added value. The Netherlands has understood this. May the rest of Europe do the same.

Ukraine is innovating under bombardment. Its engineers are designing drones while their cities are being struck. Its negotiators are signing industrial agreements while their country burns. There is something in this ability to build even as destruction rages that embodies human dignity in its highest form. I have no other word for it. And that is why I continue to write about this war.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist