COMMENT: 16 Gripen E jets for Ukraine — Sweden is arming for a future that begins in 2029

A country that broke with two hundred years of history to support Ukraine

Sweden joined NATO in March 2024, ending more than 200 years of military neutrality. This decision, accelerated by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, has transformed Stockholm into one of Kyiv’s most active military supporters. Since the war began, Sweden has supplied Ukraine with tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, and reconnaissance aircraft.

The sale of the Gripen E fighters is the most significant step in this support. It is by no means a politically straightforward move: delivering modern fighter jets to a country actively at war with a nuclear power is a decision that commits Sweden to a long-term security relationship with Ukraine. Zelensky thanked “the Swedish people and government for their meaningful partnership and constant support since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.”

The Bilateral Partnership Beyond the Gripen

The June 30, 2026, meeting also addressed broader bilateral cooperation: preparations for a drone initiative and work on anti-ballistic capabilities. These two areas are top priorities for Ukraine in 2026: drones as an offensive tool and anti-ballistic defense as protection against Iskander missiles and other Russian ballistic systems that have caused considerable destruction.

Sweden possesses particular expertise in both of these areas—notably in missile defense systems and surveillance drone technologies. This technical partnership is part of a broader strategy: Sweden is not merely helping Ukraine by selling it aircraft; it is helping Ukraine build a comprehensive and sustainable defense architecture.

Sweden has sacrificed two centuries of neutrality on the altar of a reality that can no longer be ignored: a Europe where Putin calls the shots is not a Europe where neutrality remains possible. Stockholm understood this before many others did. And now it is arming Ukraine with its best aircraft. It is a consistency that I admire—and one that should inspire other capitals that are still hesitant.

Su-35, Su-57, and Guided Bombs: The Threat the Gripen Must Counter

The Russian Air Force operates Su-35S, Su-30SM, and Su-34 bombers, as well as—in small numbers—Su-57 stealth fighters. These aircraft drop KAB guided bombs, which devastated Ukrainian neighborhoods in 2025 and 2026. They operate from Russian territory, out of range of Ukraine’s short-range air defense systems. Ukraine currently lacks the capability to intercept these aircraft before they drop their payloads.

The Gripen E, armed with the Meteor missile—which has a range exceeding 100 km—could theoretically engage these Russian aircraft before they reach their drop zones, radically transforming the dynamics of air combat. This is not a certainty: integrating a new type of aircraft into an active war is complex, and Russian forces would adapt to this new threat. But the potential capability is real and significant.

The 246 guided bombs dropped on June 30 as an argument for faster delivery

On June 30, 2026—the very day the Gripen E contract was signed—Russian forces dropped 246 guided bombs on Ukrainian territory. This figure, taken from the Ukrainian General Staff’s daily report, is an irrefutable military argument for accelerating deliveries. Every Russian aircraft carrying these bombs and operating with impunity poses a direct risk to Ukrainian civilians.

The Gripen E contract, with delivery scheduled for 2029, does not address this immediate emergency. The Gripen C/D models expected in 2027 will be quicker to integrate. And the F-16s already delivered represent the capacity available right now. The combination of the three platforms—F-16, Gripen C/D, and Gripen E—outlines a gradual build-up in capability that should transform the Ukrainian Air Force by the end of the decade.

246 guided bombs on the day the Gripen E contract was signed. The contrast is striking. On one side, Russian aircraft bombing with impunity. On the other, a contract for fighter jets that won’t be delivered for another three years. Urgency and long-term planning are in constant tension. This is the cruel reality of a war that demands both surviving today and preparing for tomorrow.

A Gradual Transition to NATO Standards

Since 2024, Ukraine has been receiving F-16s from Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. These aircraft represent the first generation of Western fighter jets to join the Ukrainian Air Force, marking a historic break from the Soviet legacy of the MiG-29s and Su-27s that the country had operated since its independence.

The Gripen C/D models, expected in early 2027, will join this emerging fleet. The Gripen C/D is a less advanced version than the E model but is fully capable of performing air defense and ground-attack missions. Like the E model, it offers the advantage of operational dispersion—the ability to operate from unconventional locations, which is so valuable in the Ukrainian context.

Training as a Critical Factor

The training of pilots and technicians remains a limiting factor in the integration of these new platforms. Training a qualified pilot on a new type of aircraft takes between 12 and 18 months under normal circumstances—even longer in wartime when available pilots are already engaged in operational missions. The fact that Ukrainian pilots are already training on the Gripen in Sweden even before the C/D models are delivered is a wise strategic choice: to be ready when the first deliveries arrive.

This training requirement also explains why the 2029 deadline for the Gripen E isn’t as far off as it seems: by then, the pilots will have gained experience on the C/D models, which will facilitate their transition to the more advanced version. The two contracts form a logical continuum of skill development.

Training a fighter pilot requires years of investment. Training Ukrainian pilots on the Gripen in the midst of a war—with personnel who could be called upon for other missions tomorrow—is a considerable logistical and human challenge. And yet they’re doing it. Because they know this war won’t end in six months. And that air power will be decisive when it does end.

From Neutrality to Alliance: Ukraine’s Impact on Swedish Defense Policy

Sweden’s accession to NATO in March 2024 transformed Stockholm’s position on all defense and security issues. Before 2022, selling advanced fighter jets to a country at war would have been politically impossible for a nation that claimed neutrality. Following the Russian invasion and Sweden’s accession to NATO, this decision is a logical step in line with Sweden’s new defense posture.

Sweden has invested heavily in its own defense since 2022. Its defense budget has doubled in four years, reaching 2% of GDP—the NATO target. It has reinstated mandatory military service. It has strengthened its presence in the Baltic Sea. The sale of Gripen E fighters to Ukraine is part of this general rearmament effort affecting NATO’s entire northern flank.

Saab and the Swedish defense industry: a strategic industrial partnership

Saab, the manufacturer of the Gripen, is one of the flagships of the Swedish defense industry. The sale of 16 Gripen E aircraft to Ukraine represents not only a significant commercial contract but also a real-world demonstration of the system’s capabilities in a high-intensity combat environment. This operational exposure is invaluable for the Gripen’s international marketing.

The agreement signed on June 30, 2026, includes a “package of related equipment, technical assistance, and support”—suggesting a long-term industrial and maintenance relationship between Saab and Ukraine. This is not merely a transaction: it is a defense partnership that commits both countries for at least a decade.

Saab, the company that manufactures the Gripen, also knows that Ukraine is the world’s most demanding testing ground for its systems. If the Gripen E proves its worth in Ukrainian skies, the credibility of the entire platform will be strengthened. There is a commercial dimension to this solidarity that no one mentions—and that in no way detracts from its moral value.

Putin and the Gripen: Rhetorical Escalation or Tactical Adaptation?

Russia traditionally responds to announcements of arms deliveries to Ukraine with rhetorical threats and calculated escalations. When deliveries of Leopard 2 tanks in 2023 and F-16s in 2024 were announced, Russian statements alternated between threats of escalation and assertions that these weapons would make no difference. The Leopard tanks did make a difference. The F-16s made a difference. The Gripens will make a difference as well.

Russia’s tactical adaptation to Ukraine’s new capabilities generally follows a predictable pattern: increased aircraft camouflage, dispersal of bases, and greater use of electronic jamming systems. These adaptations do not neutralize Ukraine’s new capabilities—they complicate their implementation. But the underlying dynamic remains that of a Russian military forced to adapt to a Ukraine that is gradually receiving increasingly sophisticated tools.

What 16 Aircraft Can—and Cannot—Change

Sixteen Gripen E aircraft make up a squadron. This is not a strike force capable of achieving air superiority on its own. But as part of the Ukrainian Air Force’s gradual buildup, it is an essential component. Combined with the F-16s already in service, the Gripen C/D models expected in 2027, and potential additional deliveries from other partners, these 16 aircraft are part of a qualitative rather than quantitative equation.

The goal is not to outnumber the Russian Air Force—which has several hundred operational aircraft. The goal is to impose a sufficiently high operational cost so that Russian aircraft can no longer operate with impunity over Ukrainian territory or in its immediate vicinity. This is the doctrine of denied access applied to the air domain.

Sixteen aircraft for a war being fought along a 1,000-kilometer front. Mathematically speaking, that’s not much. But 16 Gripen E aircraft equipped with the Meteor represent a capability that Ukraine does not currently possess. And every new capability, however modest, forces Russia to reassess its strategy. War is not just a quantitative equation. It is also a matter of the marginal cost imposed on the adversary.

From Abstention to the Vanguard of Military Support

In 2022, Sweden was delivering humanitarian aid. In 2023, it was sending armored vehicles and artillery pieces. In 2024, it joined NATO and supplied reconnaissance aircraft. In 2026, it is selling fighter jets. This trajectory serves as a model for how support for Ukraine can gradually evolve into substantial military engagement without crossing the line into uncontrollable escalation.

Sweden did not do this out of abstract idealism: it did so because it judged that a Russian victory in Ukraine would pose a direct threat to its own security. This pragmatism rooted in national security is the best foundation for lasting support—far better than compassion, which pales in the face of domestic budgetary or political constraints.

The message to other allies: consistency as a strategic virtue

Sweden is sending a message to its European partners: it is possible to support Ukraine with increasingly sophisticated weapons without triggering the nuclear apocalypse that some feared in 2022. Every time a country has crossed a threshold—tanks, jet aircraft, fighter jets—Russia has threatened, adapted, and carried on. It has not escalated to a direct war with NATO.

This reality should encourage still-hesitant allies to speed up their deliveries. The 16 Swedish Gripen E fighters are not the limit of what is possible—they are proof that the limit is much higher than previously thought. And that countries which set their own limits out of excessive caution are doing Ukraine a disservice—and ultimately their own security as well.

Sweden has gone from centuries-old neutrality to the Gripen E in four years. Other European countries that are still hesitating should take note. History will judge those who supported Ukraine as being up to the challenge—and those who balanced their caution against their domestic political comfort. Sweden has clearly chosen its side. And it’s the right side.

A contract whose price has not been disclosed

The price of the contract for the 16 Gripen E aircraft has not been officially disclosed. According to public estimates, a Gripen E costs approximately $60 million to $80 million per unit, plus the costs of training, maintenance, and associated equipment. Sixteen aircraft therefore potentially represent several billion dollars—a considerable sum for a country at war whose economy remains under pressure despite international support.

The issue of funding is no small matter. The 90 billion euros in European loans—60 billion of which is earmarked for defense aid—are intended, in part, to cover acquisitions of this type. The first installment of 3.9 billion euros for drones, to be disbursed on June 30, 2026, is only a fraction of the total aid planned. The question is whether these funds will be available and disbursed in time for Ukraine to meet its contractual obligations without jeopardizing other budget priorities.

Swedish Aid: A Grant or a Loan on Favorable Terms?

The exact terms of the contract—pure purchase, Swedish credit, government aid—were not specified in the public announcements of June 30, 2026. However, given Sweden’s history of generous support for Ukraine since 2022, it is plausible that favorable financial terms were negotiated. Sweden has provided several billion euros in grant-based military aid to Ukraine—the possibility of partially concessional financing for the Gripen aircraft cannot be ruled out.

These financial details matter because they determine Ukraine’s ability to sustain this procurement effort over the long term. The war has destroyed a significant portion of Ukraine’s economic fabric, and the country relies heavily on international aid to finance both its defense and its day-to-day operations. Every arms contract signed without ad hoc financial support represents a burden that must be offset elsewhere.

The price has not been disclosed. This is perhaps the most delicate part of this agreement—not the political symbolism, but the actual financing. Ukraine is committing to 2029—that’s a bold move. But between the signing and delivery lie four years of war, budget constraints, and fluctuating international aid. I do not underestimate this reality. I prefer to state it clearly rather than ignore it in the excitement of the announcement.

A Transformation in Both Doctrine and Equipment

The arrival of the Gripen—and later the Gripen E—in the Ukrainian Air Force is not just a matter of technology. It is a transformation of doctrine. The Soviet and, later, Ukrainian air forces of the post-Soviet era were designed for different missions, with a different command structure and a different operational philosophy. Transitioning to NATO standards—F-16s, Gripens—requires a profound reorganization of command structures, procedures, and logistics.

This transformation has been underway since 2022, accelerated by necessity. Ukraine does not have the luxury of proceeding in stages as outlined in a classic military transformation manual. It is transforming its air force while still in combat—with modernized Soviet aircraft on one side, Western F-16s currently being integrated on the other, and future Gripen aircraft in the plans. This is a considerable challenge, being tackled with a sense of urgency that outside observers sometimes find difficult to grasp.

The Gripen E as a Long-Term Deterrent

Beyond the current war, the Gripen E represents an investment in long-term deterrence. A Ukraine equipped with a fleet of modern, NATO-compatible fighter jets—kept airworthy through a sustainable industrial partnership with Saab and other Western manufacturers—will be a much harder target to attack in ten or twenty years. The goal is not merely to win the current war—it is to build a defense capability that makes any future Russian aggression too costly to contemplate.

This is the lesson from the Baltic states, which invested heavily in their defense after 2014. It is the logic behind the Nordic countries that joined NATO after 2022. And this is now the logic of Ukraine, which is signing contracts for 2027 and 2029: it is building the postwar defense architecture while fighting the war of the present.

Gripen E fighters for 2029. This is long-term strategic planning in a country at war. It proves that Zelensky isn’t just thinking about survival—he’s thinking about building a strong, defensible Ukraine for decades to come. This long-term vision is perhaps the most impressive aspect of this entire announcement.

A security relationship that has deepened despite everything

In 2022, the question of supplying tanks to Ukraine was a political taboo in several European capitals. In 2023, the tanks were delivered. In 2024, the fighter jets. In 2026, contracts for next-generation fighter jets. This progress—slow, hesitant, and at times frustrating for Ukraine—nevertheless represents a genuine deepening of the security relationship between Ukraine and the West.

The Gripen E contract is a sign of this evolution: it would not be possible if the relationship of trust between Kyiv and Stockholm—and more broadly between Ukraine and NATO—had not deepened significantly since 2022. Long-term defense partnerships are built on trust, consistency, and results. Ukraine has demonstrated that it can make good use of the weapons it has received. And the West is gradually drawing the appropriate conclusions.

Persisting Limitations: What the Contract Does Not Address

Despite the undeniable progress represented by the Gripen E contract, several critical gaps remain in Western support for Ukraine. Artillery ammunition remains insufficient. Air defense systems are too few to cover the entire Ukrainian territory. Restrictions on the use of certain long-range missiles supplied by allies against targets in Russia are still in place in some cases.

These gaps have a direct human cost: civilians are dying under bombs that additional systems might have intercepted. The Gripen E contract, however symbolically important it may be, does not change this immediate reality. It promises a transformation by 2029. Ukraine needs solutions for today, for tomorrow, and for the 256 combat engagements on the eastern front that occur every day.

2029 for the Gripen E. That’s a long way off. But right now, bombs are falling on Ukraine every day. I want to acknowledge this tension without simplifying it: the contract is good news, and the current shortcomings are a cruel reality. These two truths coexist. And an honest columnist must hold them both in mind without pitting one against the other.

The Gripen as a Benchmark Platform for Post-Soviet Armies

Ukraine is not the only post-Soviet country considering the acquisition of the Gripen. Poland, the Baltic states, and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe are seeking to modernize their air forces by turning to NATO-compatible fighter jets. The Gripen E is competing with the F-35, the Typhoon, and the Rafale in this market—a market that has been growing rapidly since 2022.

The fact that Ukraine is choosing the Gripen E for its new orders—following the planned deployment of the Gripen C/D starting in 2027—is a positive sign for Saab in this competitive environment. If the Gripen proves its worth in real combat conditions in Ukraine, its position in regional markets will be strengthened.

European defense cooperation: toward a common vision

The Sweden-Ukraine agreement for the Gripen E is part of a broader movement to strengthen European defense cooperation. The European Defense Fund, joint arms procurement projects, and increased defense budgets across the EU—all of this points to a European defense framework that is gradually taking shape under the pressure of the war in Ukraine.

This “Europe of defense” is still incomplete and heterogeneous—each country maintains its own national priorities and defense industries to protect. But the trajectory is clear. And the Gripen E contract, signed on June 30, 2026, is one of the symbols of this transformation: European democracies cooperating to defend their common security, with Ukraine serving as both a beneficiary and a driving force behind this evolution.

A European defense framework taking shape under Russian bombs. This is not the Europe we wanted to build—but it may ultimately be the strongest one. Crises forge the institutions that prosperity cannot build. The war in Ukraine could well be the defining moment for a Europe capable of defending itself. If we are willing to pay the price.

From the Soviet legacy to NATO standards: a profound transformation

The gradual integration of the Gripen E into the Ukrainian Air Force represents much more than a change in equipment: it is a profound doctrinal transformation. Combat procedures, communication protocols, friend-or-foe identification systems, and operational doctrines—all of these will need to be aligned with the NATO standards that the Gripen entails. This doctrinal transformation, if successfully completed, will structurally bring the Ukrainian Air Force closer to full interoperability with its allies.

This interoperability is not only useful during wartime: it will be crucial in the post-conflict period. A Ukraine whose air force is fully integrated with NATO standards is a Ukraine that could potentially join the Alliance—the question of Ukraine’s NATO membership remains open and politically complex, but operational interoperability creates the technical conditions for future integration.

The Role of the Gripen in Electronic Warfare and Intelligence

The Gripen E features advanced electronic warfare and intelligence-gathering capabilities. In a conflict where situational awareness—knowing where Russian systems are located, which radars are active, and which flight corridors are safe—is a matter of life and death for pilots, these capabilities have direct operational value. The Gripen E is not just a fighter jet—it is a sophisticated intelligence-gathering platform.

These airborne intelligence capabilities will integrate with and strengthen Ukraine’s existing intelligence architecture—which includes surveillance drones, commercial satellites, and intelligence sharing with NATO allies. Gradually building a more comprehensive and reliable picture of the battlefield is one of the keys to Ukrainian superiority despite numerical disadvantages.

A multirole fighter that also performs electronic warfare and intelligence missions. For a military like Ukraine’s, which must compensate for numerical inferiority with intelligence, this is exactly the right platform. A well-used Gripen E is not only worth its price in aerial combat—it is also worth what it learns about the enemy on every sortie.

Hardware Interoperability as a Reason for Membership

The issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership remains one of the most diplomatically sensitive aspects of the conflict. The United States and several major European countries have been reluctant to commit to a specific timeline, fearing a disproportionate Russian response. But the technical case has gradually strengthened: the more the Ukrainian military operates with NATO systems, the more natural formal integration into the Alliance becomes—and the less costly it is operationally.

The Gripen E aircraft ordered by Zelensky on June 30, 2026, directly support this argument. A Ukrainian Air Force that operates F-16s, Gripen C/Ds, and Gripen Es is an air force that can fly alongside NATO forces without major adjustments. This is no guarantee of membership. But it is one less obstacle on an already complicated path.

The Paradox of Membership and Security

The central paradox of Ukraine’s NATO membership is well known: the Alliance does not admit a country currently at war, to avoid invoking Article 5 against Russia. But the war in Ukraine has causes for which NATO is partially responsible—having left Ukraine in a security gray zone long enough for Putin to deem an invasion a risky move.

The way out of this paradox likely lies in a series of cumulative bilateral security guarantees—including defense agreements that follow arms delivery agreements, such as the Gripen E contract dated June 30, 2026—which effectively create a security architecture akin to membership without the formal invocation of Article 5. It’s not ideal. But that’s what Ukraine is building, brick by brick, contract by contract.

Formal NATO membership remains blocked by a legal and political paradox. But the Gripen Es, the F-16s, and the billions in European funding are effectively creating a security architecture that increasingly resembles a collective guarantee. Ukraine is building its de facto membership while awaiting de jure membership. It’s slow. It’s frustrating. And it may be the only viable path.

A contract that says, “We’re betting that Ukraine will win”

Signing a contract for the delivery of 16 Gripen E aircraft in 2029 is like placing a bet on the future. It implies that Ukraine will still exist in 2029. It will need to defend its airspace. It will have pilots trained to fly these aircraft. It will have the infrastructure to maintain them. This bet isn’t irrational—it’s based on four years of Ukrainian resilience that have defied all pessimistic predictions. But it’s still a bet. And Sweden is making it with its best aircraft.

This gamble is also a bet on the West’s consistency: that support for Ukraine will continue through 2029 and beyond, that the promised funding will be provided, and that political changes in government will not reverse the commitments made. These uncertainties are real. But the alternative—failing to invest in Ukraine’s long-term security—is strategically even riskier.

What Zelensky Said—and What He Didn’t Say

“Together with Sweden, we continue to strengthen Ukraine’s combat aviation”: that is the public statement. What it does not say is the depth of the determination that preceded it—the years of fighting, the pilots lost, the planes shot down, the runways bombed. What it doesn’t say is the relief felt by a head of state who had to convince one reluctant ally after another that his country was worth saving.

Zelensky is signing contracts for 2029 because he fought to ensure that Ukraine would still be here in 2029. Because tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers paid with their lives to make this signing possible. This Gripen E contract is not just a diplomatic gesture: it is the culmination of four years of resistance, transformed into flying metal. And that deserves more than a press release. It deserves our attention.

Zelensky is signing for 2029. And I’m thinking of all those who won’t be here to see these planes fly. The soldiers who fell at Pokrovsk, the civilians killed in Dnipro, the pilots shot down in aging MiG-29s. This contract is for them, too. It is the promise that their sacrifice will not have been in vain—that Ukraine will fly higher, farther, and freer.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist