EDITORIAL: NATO Summit in Ankara — The Moment of Truth for an Alliance That Is Reinventing Itself

Maxime Marquette

2026-07-02 14:54:37

The Legacy of 70 Years of the Transatlantic Alliance

Mark Rutte uses the term “NATO 3.0” to signify a genuine break with the alliance’s previous incarnation. NATO 1.0 was the Cold War—an alliance of containment against the USSR, dominated by American power, in which Europe was essentially protected rather than a protector. NATO 2.0, after 1991, was the “peace dividend” alliance—eastward expansion, declining spending, and increased dependence on the United States for collective defense. NATO 3.0 is the response to two simultaneous realities: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the United States’ gradual disengagement from Europe.

Rutte’s statement is unambiguous: “NATO 3.0 is different from NATO 2.0, in which we were too dependent on the United States. ” He did not say that the United States is leaving. He said that Europe must be capable of defending itself with or without them. This is a cultural revolution within an institution built on the idea that America was the ultimate guarantor.

Europe Stepping Up—Reality or Posturing?

European and Canadian allies have spent an additional $250 billion on defense over the past two years. The goal of 5% of GDP by 2035 has been adopted. This figure—up from 2% prior to 2022—represents a structural shift in national budgets. But allies such as Spain, Hungary, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom have made little real progress. The promise is there. The execution is uneven. And it is precisely for this reason that Rutte wants to make the Ankara summit a summit of implementation rather than a summit of new promises.

Five percent of GDP for defense. For France, that’s 175 billion euros a year. For Germany, 230 billion. For Canada—which has been dragging its feet for decades—it’s a commitment that can no longer be put off. NATO 3.0 is all well and good. But 3.0 without funding is just a version number. Summits tend to produce declarations. What happens after July 8 will show whether this time is different.

70 billion for Ukraine — without the United States

An unprecedented package—and one without Washington

NATO allies—without U.S. participation—are set to announce in Ankara €70 billion in military aid to Ukraine for 2026, or approximately $76.9 billion. The commitment extends beyond a single year: the allies are expected to pledge at least an equivalent amount for 2027. This decision was initially proposed by Germany in May 2026. It reflects a new reality: Europe is now capable—and willing—to finance support for Ukraine without waiting for the U.S. check.

The absence of the United States from this package is not a sign of American abandonment—it is a sign of a new transatlantic division of labor. Washington provides weapons through its own mechanisms (USAI, stockpile transfers, arms sales). Europe is providing massive funding. This functional complementarity, when combined, far exceeds what either side could achieve on its own.

Billions in defense industry contracts

Beyond aid to Ukraine, the Ankara summit is expected to result in industrial defense contracts worth tens of billions of dollars. These contracts cover investments in deep-strike capabilities, air defense systems, and drones. For European defense industries, this moment represents a historic opportunity: after decades of underinvestment, governments are finally purchasing systems in large quantities. NATO hopes that these contracts will serve not only as a political statement but also as a strong economic signal to companies: produce more, produce faster, and the alliance will buy from you.

Seventy billion euros for Ukraine, tens of billions in industrial contracts, 32 heads of state. The figures are impressive. But I recall that Ukraine’s defense budget for 2026 is approximately $65 billion—for an army fighting along a 1,200-kilometer front. Those 70 billion are necessary. They are not enough. War costs what it costs. And Ukraine continues to pay the highest price.

Turkey in the Game — An Imperfect Ally, a Strategic Host

Erdogan Walks a Tightrope on Transatlantic Relations

Turkey has been a NATO ally since 1952—nearly 75 years. It has the alliance’s second-largest military, with approximately 3,000 defense companies in its industrial ecosystem. Its flagship company, ASELSAN, is one of the region’s most active defense electronics firms. And yet, throughout the war, Turkey has maintained trade relations with Russia, resisted pressure to join sanctions, and sold its Bayraktar drones to Ukraine while continuing to engage in dialogue with Moscow.

Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Güler made it clear ahead of the summit: the United States is not seeking to leave NATO; it plays “a central role in the alliance’s security and deterrence,” and the transatlantic bond must be preserved. This statement, made to Reuters, comes from an ally who wants NATO to hold together—not out of idealism, but because Turkey needs a strong alliance for its own regional interests. It’s NATO as a strategic tool—and that’s perfectly valid.

Turkey’s Exclusion from European Defense Initiatives

A major source of tension behind the scenes at the summit: Turkey is not a member of the European Union and is therefore excluded from European defense initiatives such as the EDIP (European Defense Industry Program). Güler described this exclusion as “strategically misguided,” asserting that Europe must adopt a “visionary approach” that includes Ankara in its industrial plans. This friction between NATO and the EU—two organizations whose memberships overlap but do not coincide—is one of the structural challenges facing the emerging European defense framework. Resolving this tension will require more than a single summit.

Turkey sells drones to Ukraine and natural gas to Russia. It blocks NATO accessions to secure concessions. It demands to be included in European defense while remaining outside the EU. It’s an opportunistic—and brilliantly calculated—foreign policy. Erdogan is frustrating. But he holds the summit’s key. And without Turkey, NATO loses its border with the Black Sea, with Syria, and with Iran. Imperfect allies are sometimes the most valuable.

Trump in Ankara: A Visit That Changes Everything

Rutte and the Economic Argument

Mark Rutte has long understood how to convince Trump: don’t talk about collective security—talk about money. Rutte’s central argument to Ankara is that the defense industry contracts the summit is expected to yield are economically beneficial to the United States. If European allies purchase American weapons systems—Patriot missiles, F-35 aircraft, precision munitions—Trump can return to Washington with announcements of contracts worth billions of dollars. That’s the art of selling multilateralism to a transactional president: show him the dollars.

U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced a six-month review of the U.S. military presence in Europe—a way to keep pressure on European allies to spend more. This review will conclude around the time of the Ankara summit. If the Europeans demonstrate credible commitments, Trump will be able to announce that his pressure strategy is working. Everyone wins symbolically—and Ukraine gets its 70 billion.

Zelensky at the NATO Table

For the first time at a summit since the war began, Volodymyr Zelensky will be present in Ankara. His presence is both a symbol and a demand. The symbol: Ukraine is not a topic to be discussed in its absence—it is a key player. The demand: additional air defense systems, long-term security guarantees, and a clear roadmap for post-war Euro-Atlantic integration. Zelensky will not leave Ankara with a formal invitation to join NATO—that’s not on the agenda. But he can secure commitments that will be highly valuable on the ground.

Zelensky in Ankara. Trump in Ankara. Rutte in between. It’s a scene that would have seemed impossible five years ago. A Ukrainian president sitting down with NATO allies, discussing 70 billion euros and Patriot systems. The war has changed the rules of the diplomatic game. And Zelensky—who entered this war as a lone man facing a superpower—is now at the center of transatlantic politics. That is a victory in itself.

The Challenges That Remain — and the Divisions That Persist

Allies That Fall Short

Behind the impressive figures lie harsher realities. In 2025, only 23 of the 32 NATO members met the 2% of GDP target—the minimum threshold established in 2014. In 2026, the target was raised to 5%. Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom have made little progress on their commitments since the previous summit. Spain has only just reached the 2% threshold and has refused to commit to 5%. These laggards are creating a burden imbalance that nations meeting their commitments—such as Poland, the Baltic states, and now France—find increasingly difficult to accept.

The issue of long-range weapons also remains a point of contention. European allies want to develop deep-strike capabilities to deter Russia. Washington is hesitant: the Pentagon has refused to transfer Tomahawk missiles to Germany, fearing that Moscow might interpret this as an escalation. This tension between European ambition and American caution remains unresolved in Ankara.

Iran in the Background—The Tension That Complicates Everything

The Ankara summit is taking place against the backdrop of the United States having just signed a preliminary agreement to end the conflict with Iran. The allies included in the final declaration a call for Iran to guarantee freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz—a symbolic concession to Trump, described by diplomats as an “olive branch” intended to help him present the summit as a victory. This use of the Iran issue to manage relations with Trump illustrates the complexity of dealing with an ally as unpredictable as the current administration.

Iran in the NATO declaration. An olive branch for Trump. Allies adjusting their diplomatic language to avoid irritating a president who criticizes NATO while remaining a member. This is realpolitik in its purest form—and it is both understandable and depressing. The moral clarity of the Ukrainian cause deserves a better policy than this. But this is the world we live in.

What the summit can change—and what it cannot

The 70 billion: an immediate or delayed effect?

The 70 billion euros announced in Ankara will not be transferred to Ukraine overnight. Financing mechanisms, parliamentary approvals in each member country, and the time required to manufacture and deliver the weapons—all of this takes time. Part of the 70 billion will be disbursed in 2026, part in 2027, and part may be contingent on developments on the ground. For Ukraine, the immediate value of the summit lies less in the figures than in the political signal: NATO is not giving up. The support is structural, multi-year, and spans both sides of the Atlantic.

Industrial defense contracts, on the other hand, can have more immediate effects. An order placed by Germany or France with a manufacturer of drones or artillery shells sets in motion a production chain, with deliveries capable of beginning within a few months. It is this industrial impact of the summit—less visible than the figures, but more immediately operational—that interests Ukrainian military planners the most.

Postwar integration: the real debate in Ankara

Behind the numbers and contracts lies a question that few allies dare to state clearly: what will happen after the war? Will Ukraine be invited to join NATO? Will it receive formal security guarantees? Opinions differ. The Baltic states and Poland are among the most supportive of a clear path to membership. Some Western European allies remain more cautious. The United States has not taken a clear stance. This debate will not be settled in Ankara—but it will be raised. And its outcome will shape the post-war landscape of Europe for decades to come.

A NATO without Ukraine in its ranks after the war would be a missed opportunity—both strategically and morally. Strategically, because Ukraine has the second-largest army in Europe, unparalleled combat experience, and military intelligence on Russia that no one else possesses. Morally, because you cannot ask a people to die for Western values and then tell them: “Sorry, but you’re not one of us.” Ankara should take this to heart.

The defense industry—Ankara's real race

Produce Faster Than Russia Can Spend

Behind the political rhetoric, Ankara’s real challenge is industrial. Russia is still producing artillery ammunition at a rate that exceeds that of all Western allies combined. Rutte’s meeting with European defense industry leaders just before the summit sends a clear message: contracts must be signed, production lines ramped up, and lead times shortened. 155-mm shells, interceptor missiles, anti-drone systems—all of these take time to produce. And every month of delay results in shortages on the Ukrainian front. The Ankara summit must turn political promises into firm industrial orders.

France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Poland have all increased their defense production capacities since 2022. But this ramp-up remains insufficient given the needs. NATO’s creation of a defense innovation accelerator—DIANA—and the research and development contracts it awards are a first step. The tens of billions in industrial contracts announced in Ankara must fit within this framework: not just orders for existing capabilities, but investments in future capabilities.

Drones—the top defense priority in the post-Ukraine era

Drones are explicitly mentioned in Ankara’s statements as one of three investment priorities, alongside deep-strike capabilities and air defense. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that a well-organized drone force can destroy sophisticated air defense systems, strike deep-seated logistics depots, and disrupt enemy supply chains. European defense industries have been slow to develop these capabilities—Turkey, with its Bayraktars, has been one step ahead. Now is the time for Europe to seriously embark on its own drone revolution.

It took the European defense industry years to realize that drones would change everything. Ukraine knew this before anyone else—not because it had better theorists, but because it was fighting. This firsthand combat experience, bought at the cost of thousands of lives, is the most valuable military knowledge available. If NATO in Ankara fails to turn it into doctrine and industrial contracts, it will squander a historic opportunity. And history does not forgive missed opportunities.

Conclusion: A Historic Summit in the Shadow of War

What’s Really at Stake in Ankara

Ultimately, the Ankara summit answers a simple question: Does the West have the political will to support Ukraine until an acceptable peace is achieved? The 70 billion euros, the industrial contracts, the presence of Trump and Zelensky together at the same table—all of this points to a positive answer. But the outcomes of summits are only as valuable as what follows them. Votes on defense in European parliaments. Actual arms deliveries. Production lines maintained and ramped up. What happens on July 8 is just the beginning.

NATO 3.0—if it delivers on its promises

Rutte’s NATO 3.0 is an ambitious political project. An alliance in which Europe takes on more responsibility for its own defense while remaining anchored to America. An alliance in which support for Ukraine is structural, not circumstantial. An alliance whose members honor their spending commitments. This project is necessary. It is urgent. And it will be judged not by what leaders say in Ankara, but by what their militaries and industries do over the next twelve months. History will judge this summit not by its declarations, but by its results. And so will Ukraine.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist