FACT-CHECK: China in the South China Sea — What’s True, What’s Exaggerated, What’s Dangerous

What Beijing Says

The Chinese military spokesperson stated that the U.S.-Philippine exercise on June 27–28 “undermined regional peace and stability.” Beijing systematically portrays its adversaries’ military exercises as provocations to which it is forced to respond. It’s the usual script: China deploys forces, but it’s always the other side’s fault.

The context of this exercise: U.S. Coast Guard ships (USCGC Charles Moulthrope and USCGC Emlen Tunnell) and Philippine naval units (BRP Antonio Luna, BRP Melchora Aquino, BRP Capones) conducted an exercise 50 nautical miles (93 kilometers) from Scarborough Shoal. Four Chinese ships—a Type 054B destroyer and three coast guard vessels—followed them.

The Facts: A MISLEADING VERDICT

Military exercises in international waters are perfectly legal under international law and UNCLOS. The 50-nautical-mile distance between the exercise and the reef places it outside any Chinese territorial claim, even by the most generous standards. China, on the other hand, has conducted military patrols around a reef over which it has no recognized legal sovereignty. Presenting this as a proportionate response to a provocation is a reversal of causality. VERDICT: MISLEADING.

The fact that China deployed a Type 054B destroyer to monitor a U.S. and Philippine Coast Guard exercise 93 kilometers from a disputed reef is not a defensive response. It is a deliberate act of intimidation. Calling this a routine patrol is like calling an armed threat a leisurely stroll.

What Beijing Says

The Global Times, the official propaganda organ of the Chinese Communist Party, claimed that the United States is “arming the Philippines” to “start a war with China.” Chinese experts quoted in the article warned that the deployment of U.S. naval drones to the Philippines “risks increasing the likelihood of a miscalculation” and that the data collected would likely be “remotely managed by the United States.” This transfer would therefore constitute a disguised act of aggression.

On June 22, 2026, the United States officially transferred four Ocean Aero Triton autonomous naval drones to the Philippine Navy during a ceremony at the Subic Bay Naval Operational Base. The value of the transfer: $13 million. These drones are powered by solar and wind energy and are capable of operating autonomously for up to 30 days on the surface and underwater.

The reality of the equipment: VERDICT PARTIALLY FALSE

The Ocean Aero Tritons are maritime surveillance drones—not offensive weapons. They cannot fire missiles or launch torpedoes. Their mission is maritime domain awareness: detecting and tracking activities in the Philippine EEZ, monitoring undersea cables and gas pipelines, and documenting Chinese incursions. Portraying them as weapons intended to “start a war” is a blatant distortion. That said, it is true that the United States plans to transfer lethal capabilities to the Philippines by 2027 as part of the Asymmetric Assistance Program—a reality that Manila has the right to address sovereignly in the face of Chinese pressure. VERDICT: PARTIALLY FALSE regarding the claims about their offensive nature.

Solar-powered surveillance drones for a 300,000-square-kilometer EEZ—that is the bare minimum for a sovereign navy that wants to see what is happening in its own waters. To call this a provocation is to claim that installing cameras in one’s own home constitutes a threat to a neighbor. Beijing’s logic on this point does not hold up to even a second of serious scrutiny.

What Beijing Says

Since 2016, China has maintained that the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s award is “illegal and null and void.” It asserts that the court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute, that the Philippines raised issues beyond the scope of UNCLOS, and that the award is therefore invalid. The Chinese Embassy in Manila reiterated this position on June 29, 2026, on the 10th anniversary of the ruling.

It is noteworthy that China is a signatory to UNCLOS and initially accepted its dispute settlement framework. Its decision to reject the tribunal’s jurisdiction—after the tribunal had been constituted—and to reject the award is unilateral and unprecedented in the international practice of UNCLOS signatory states.

The Reality of International Law: FALSE VERDICT

The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in July 2016, after four years of proceedings, that its decisions were binding under Annex VII of UNCLOS. China cannot unilaterally invalidate an award rendered by a tribunal it accepted by signing UNCLOS. Countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam have, to varying degrees, incorporated the findings of the award into their maritime policies. ASEAN, despite its collective silence, has not endorsed China’s rejection. What China says is not without political significance, but it has no legal value. VERDICT: FALSE.

What is truly troubling is not that China rejects the ruling—it is that this rejection is effective. Ten years later, China still controls Scarborough Shoal, has built artificial islands in the Spratlys, and continues to intimidate its neighbors. The ruling established the law. But without an enforcement mechanism, the law remains a dead letter. This is the tragic limitation of a rules-based international order when faced with a power that chooses to operate outside that order.

What the Exercises Really Mean

Joint U.S.-Philippine military exercises in the South China Sea take place within an established legal and bilateral framework. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines is one of the oldest and most clearly defined security treaties in the Indo-Pacific region. Exercises in international waters are legal under UNCLOS and international practice.

The exercise on June 27–28, 2026, involved two U.S. Coast Guard vessels and three Philippine naval units—a light formation, not a major show of force. The fact that China sent a destroyer and three coast guard vessels to monitor an exercise of this size speaks volumes about its level of strategic paranoia—or, more precisely, its strategy of deliberate intimidation.

The Triton Drone: Manila’s Sovereign Eye

The transfer of the four Ocean Aero Triton drones on June 22, 2026, is part of a broader U.S. assistance program, the Philippines-U.S. Security Sector Assistance Roadmap. These solar-powered drones can operate autonomously for up to 30 days, cover vast maritime areas, monitor undersea cables and illegal fishing activities, and operate both on the surface and underwater. For a national navy protecting an EEZ of 300,000 square kilometers, they represent a fundamental tool of sovereignty—not a weapon of aggression.

I am not naive about U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Washington is not transferring drones to Manila out of pure altruism—it is also to protect its own strategic interests in the South China Sea. But in this specific case, U.S. interests and Philippine law coincide perfectly. And China cannot discredit this coincidence by calling it a provocation.

ASEAN and the Taboo of the Arbitral Award

In July 2026, the world marks the 10th anniversary of the 2016 arbitration ruling—issued under the ASEAN chairmanship of the Philippines. Yet ASEAN has never officially recognized this ruling. In 2016, Cambodia—under Chinese economic influence—openly opposed any collective statement mentioning it. Laos maintained a facade of neutrality. Thailand issued a statement that carefully avoided the words “ruling,” “award,” or “tribunal.”

This collective silence from ASEAN sends a devastating message: even a binding international legal decision can be ignored without significant political cost, as long as a major power chooses to reject it. According to analysts at The Diplomat, this silence risks “eroding the authority of the ruling and the broader credibility of the rules-based international order.” This is precisely the calculation China has been making for the past ten years.

The Philippines under Marcos Jr.: A Clear New Course

Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Philippines has radically changed its approach compared to the Duterte years. The 2016 ruling has once again become a central pillar of Philippine maritime strategy. Manila has documented and made public every incident involving the Chinese coast guard and navy—a strategy of international transparency that stands in stark contrast to the silence of its predecessor. As chair of ASEAN in 2026, the Philippines is pushing for stronger language in collective statements.

We must pay tribute to the Philippines’ political courage. Marcos Jr., despite all his flaws, has chosen to face reality head-on: China is an expansionist power that uses coercion to impose its illegal claims. Refusing to acknowledge this reality, as some ASEAN members do, is not neutrality—it is complicity through silence.

An Escalation That Has Been Going On for Years

The statement issued by the PLA Southern Theater Command on June 30, 2026, is not an isolated event. It is part of a gradual and well-documented escalation. In May 2026, China installed a floating platform at the entrance to Scarborough Shoal—and then removed it under international pressure. The Chinese Coast Guard stepped up its patrols throughout June 2026. Incidents involving Philippine vessels around the reef multiplied—with the use of water cannons, blinding lasers, and boardings documented on video.

This escalation is part of a broader pattern: since 2012, when China physically took control of Scarborough Shoal during an incident that was initially limited in scope, it has never left. It has gradually transformed this de facto control into permanent administration, then into a declaration of sovereignty, and finally into the creation of a national nature reserve. Each step was presented as legal, defensive, and legitimate. None of them were.

The Construction of Artificial Islands in the Spratlys

In parallel with its presence at Scarborough Shoal, China has built seven artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, equipping them with runways, hangars for fighter jets, radar systems, and weapons systems. These construction projects, which began around 2013–2014, were explicitly condemned by the 2016 ruling as violations of the Philippine EEZ and the Philippines’ traditional fishing rights. China has continued. These permanent military installations in the South China Sea represent the most concrete and well-documented threat to freedom of navigation in the region.

Seven militarized artificial islands. Radar stations. Runways for fighter jets. All of this built on the seabed of a foreign exclusive economic zone, in violation of an international ruling. If another country had done this—if Russia had built military islands in the North Sea—the international reaction would have been immediate and massive. The fact that Beijing has done so with almost no consequences is one of the most significant failures of the international order since the end of the Cold War.

What Beijing Claims

Beijing regularly asserts that it supports freedom of navigation and that its activities in the South China Sea do not threaten it. Its spokesperson reiterates that its patrols are aimed at “protecting peace and stability” in the region. Chinese state media portray incidents involving Philippine and U.S. ships as unilateral provocations.

In essence, China uses the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea for its own unimpeded exports. Its merchant marine sails freely. What it disputes is the right of other navies to operate in what it considers its “territorial waters”—an illegal claim.

The observable reality: VERDICT FALSE

In June 2026, Chinese coast guard vessels harassed commercial ships in waters east of Taiwan—a fact documented and condemned in a joint statement by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. China has physically controlled Scarborough Shoal since 2012, depriving Filipino fishermen of access to traditional fishing grounds recognized by the 2016 ruling. The Chinese coast guard has used water cannons and laser equipment against Philippine civilian vessels resupplying their own military outpost at Second Thomas Shoal. VERDICT: FALSE — the documented facts demonstrate an active restriction on freedom of navigation and the economic rights of coastal states.

Freedom of navigation cannot be defended only when it benefits those who claim it. It must be defended universally, or it is worthless. When China hinders Philippine fishermen’s access to their traditional fishing grounds recognized under international law, it is not protecting peace—it is imposing by force a claim that the law denies it.

The Joint Western Statement

In June 2026, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany issued joint statements describing China’s actions in the waters east of Taiwan as “deeply destabilizing.” This is remarkable—the participation of European powers such as France and Germany in a statement explicitly condemning China in the South China Sea marks a shift in the European position.

But statements are just statements. China has ignored statements for ten years. What it understands is a physical presence—ships, drones, joint exercises. The transfer of Triton drones to the Philippines, regular exercises, and U.S. freedom-of-navigation operations—these are what have real deterrent value.

The Limits of Current Deterrence

Despite these signals, China continues to advance. The fundamental question remains open: What is the red line beyond which the United States would launch a direct military response in defense of the Philippines? Article V of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty should, in theory, answer this question. But U.S. strategic ambiguity in the region creates uncertainty that Beijing methodically exploits, pushing the limits without ever completely crossing the explicit red line.

Strategic ambiguity has long been presented as a tool for stability—not clearly telling Beijing what would trigger a military response so as not to encourage it to test that limit. But after ten years of mounting Chinese pressure, I wonder if this ambiguity isn’t costing more than it’s worth. Clarity, in geopolitics as in diplomacy, can sometimes be as powerful as a weapon.

The Philippines Is Not Backing Down

Under President Marcos Jr., the Philippines has adopted a well-documented and transparent strategy of resistance: filming incidents, making them public, and bringing them before international bodies. This strategy is having an impact: it has mobilized partners such as the United States, Japan, Australia, France, and Germany to issue statements of support. It has transformed the issue of Scarborough Shoal from an obscure bilateral dispute into a high-profile international policy issue.

Manila has denounced the declaration of Scarborough Shoal as a national nature reserve as a “clear pretext for occupation.” It has refused to yield under pressure from water cannons. It continues to supply its outpost at Second Thomas Shoal despite Chinese obstruction. This tenacity deserves to be recognized—and supported.

Beijing’s Long-Term Calculation

China is playing a game of attrition. It pushes the limits, backs off slightly when international pressure becomes too strong, and returns a few months later. It’s the artichoke strategy: removing the leaves one by one, without ever triggering the response that would bring everything to a halt. The floating platform installed and then removed at the entrance to Scarborough Shoal in May 2026 is a perfect example of this. What mattered was not that it was removed—it was that it could be installed, even briefly, without consequences.

This “step forward, step back, step forward” strategy works because it never crosses the line that would trigger a decisive response. But every step forward leaves a mark. Every instance of international tolerance sets a precedent. In ten years, we may look back on this period as the time when the South China Sea definitively fell under Chinese control—and we’ll wonder why no one acted sooner.

A Dangerous Precedent for Ukraine, Taiwan, and Elsewhere

The South China Sea issue is not an isolated one. It is directly linked to the war in Ukraine by a fundamental principle: Can territories be acquired by force, and can claims be imposed by rejecting international legal decisions? Russia has been saying yes since 2014. China has been saying yes since 2012. As long as these actions come at no real cost, the message sent to Iran, North Korea, and future revisionist powers is disastrous.

The rules-based international order is not a philosophical abstraction. It is the difference between a world where disputes are settled by law and a world where they are settled by force. Every unpunished violation undermines this order. Scarborough Shoal in 2026 is a test that the world cannot fail to address.

China as a Systemic Threat—Not Just a Regional One

China is not just a threat to the Philippines or Taiwan. It is a systemic threat to the international order. Its strategy in the South China Sea is a model it will export—to the Arctic, to Africa, and to global maritime routes. By supporting Moscow diplomatically and economically during the war in Ukraine, it is contributing to the erosion of international norms. These two issues—the South China Sea and Ukraine—are two sides of the same existential challenge for the West.

That is why I cover both issues with equal intensity. Ukraine and the South China Sea are not two separate wars. They are two fronts in the same fundamental conflict: Do the rules of the international game still hold, or have revisionist powers succeeded in stripping them of their substance? The answer to this question is being played out right now, simultaneously, in Kyiv and at Scarborough.

What Is False, What Is Misleading, What Is True

FALSE: China exercises legitimate sovereign rights over Scarborough Shoal. The 2016 ruling bindingly determined otherwise. FALSE: The 2016 arbitral award is “illegal and null and void.” It is valid under international law. FALSE: China does not pose a threat to freedom of navigation—documented facts demonstrate the opposite. MISLEADING: Chinese patrols are a response to U.S.-Philippine provocation—the reversal of causality is evident. PARTIALLY FALSE: The U.S. drones transferred to the Philippines are offensive weapons—they are tools of sovereign surveillance, not weapons of aggression.

TRUE: China conducted military patrols around Scarborough Shoal on June 30, 2026. TRUE: The United States transferred four Triton drones worth $13 million to the Philippines on June 22, 2026. TRUE: PLA ships monitored the U.S.-Philippines exercise 93 kilometers from Scarborough Shoal on June 27–28. TRUE: The 10th anniversary of the arbitration ruling passes without formal recognition from ASEAN.

What This Fact-Check Reveals About China’s Information Strategy

China’s information strategy regarding the South China Sea is based on a simple principle: repeat often enough that its claims are legitimate until their illegitimacy seems debatable. This does not change the law. But it creates confusion in the public debate that benefits Beijing. This fact-check aims to help dispel that confusion by calling the facts what they are: facts, not narratives.

I do not claim to have all the answers regarding the course of this conflict. I do not know whether China will eventually attempt direct military action against the Philippines or Taiwan. But I do know that meticulous documentation of the facts—which is what this fact-check aims to be—is the first line of defense against the information strategy that allows revisionist powers to advance with impunity. The truth is not neutral in this context. It is a tool.

ASEAN’s Choice During the Philippine Chairmanship

In 2026, the Philippines will chair ASEAN. This is an opportunity—perhaps the last one for a long time—for the association to clearly affirm its commitment to the 2016 ruling and the principles of UNCLOS. If ASEAN lets this 10th anniversary pass in silence, it will send a message that China will be sure to exploit: even the neighbors most directly threatened cannot unite to defend international law in the face of Beijing.

What the World Will Remember About Scarborough in 2026

In June–July 2026, China is conducting military patrols around a reef that does not legally belong to it. The Philippines are resisting with their four Triton drones and their American allies. ASEAN is hesitating. The West issues statements but struggles to take action. And China advances, one reef, one island, one patrol at a time. This is not a conflict that will one day erupt into war. It is a conflict that has been ongoing for years, whose consequences are measured in lost freedoms, confiscated fishing rights, and eroded sovereignty. Calling this a threat is not alarmist. It is factual.

Ten years after the ruling, Scarborough Shoal remains under Chinese control. Patrols are intensifying. Incidents are on the rise. And the world is still searching for a way to respond to a power that has decided the rules do not apply to it. I don’t have a magic solution. But I know that starting by telling the truth—as this fact-check attempts to do—is the absolute minimum.

What This Fact-Check Confirms

Following this review, five of China’s main claims were analyzed. Two are clearly false. One is misleading. One is partially false. Only one is partially true. Beijing’s information strategy regarding the South China Sea relies heavily on inaccurate assertions presented with confidence and repeated tirelessly. This pattern is not a communication error—it is a deliberate strategy to cast doubt on what is clear.

Facts do not always change people’s minds, nor do they do so immediately. But they serve as a bulwark. And in a world where authoritarian regimes invest heavily in producing false narratives, maintaining this bulwark of facts is a responsibility I take seriously in every article I write. Scarborough Shoal deserves the truth. So does Ukraine. They are two sides of the same struggle for world order.

The Role of Information in This Conflict

China is the world’s second-largest economic power after the United States. It has a formidable state-run communications apparatus. The best weapon against this is factual accuracy. This fact-check does not claim to resolve the conflict in the South China Sea. It aims to help ensure that the debates that matter are based on verified facts—not on narratives carefully crafted by Beijing to obscure its aggression.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist