OPEN LETTER: Thomas Nilsson Is Right—The Russian Threat Will Outlast Putin, and Europe Must Listen

Russia Plans to Expand Its Military Presence on the Northeast Flank

Thomas Nilsson stated that Russia plans to expand its military presence along NATO’s northeastern flank, “from northern Finland all the way down.” These plans remain largely on paper while Moscow prioritizes its war against Ukraine—but MUST predicts that Russia will pursue them as soon as it regains sufficient military capabilities. Satellite imagery has captured the expansion of Russian military infrastructure near the Finnish border, confirming that these plans are not mere rhetoric.

Sweden and Finland have significantly strengthened the alliance’s presence in the Baltic region since joining NATO. The strategic depth the alliance has gained through these two accessions is considerable—the Baltic Sea is no longer a “Russian lake,” as Moscow used to call it before 2022. But Nilsson warns that this deterrent is not permanent—it must be maintained, strengthened, and adequately resourced over the long term.

The Hybrid Threat: Signal-Relay Drones, Relay Balloons, and SIM Cards

On June 30, 2026, Zelensky had given Belarusian dictator Aliaksandr Lukashenko an ultimatum a week earlier to remove signal repeaters that were helping Russian Shahed drones penetrate Ukrainian territory from Belarus. The repeaters stopped transmitting on June 22. But Russia has other methods: relay balloons and Shahed drones equipped with SIM cards that connect to neighboring countries’ networks to ensure their navigation. The hybrid threat does not end with a repeater being shut down.

This type of hybrid threat—difficult to formally attribute and difficult to counter without a bold political decision—illustrates exactly what Nilsson means by “deep, structural, and enduring.” Russia has been waging a hybrid war against all of Europe for years: disinformation, cyberattacks, election meddling, and recruitment of extremists. The war in Ukraine is the most visible and violent form of this confrontation. But it is not the only one.

Russian drones that use SIM cards from telecom operators in neighboring countries to navigate to their targets. If that doesn’t shock you, it’s because you haven’t fully understood what “hybrid warfare” means. Russia is using the civilian infrastructure of democracies to kill Ukrainians. And some of those telecom operators might be yours. Think about it.

Five Percent of GDP for Defense: A Goal That Is Not Exaggerated

The goal adopted at the Hague summit—to allocate 5% of GDP to defense by 2035—has been widely criticized as an excessive demand. Level-headed diplomats cite the economy, budget constraints, and social priorities. Nilsson and his colleagues in Nordic military intelligence have a simple answer: look at the map. Look at history. Look at what Russia has been doing in Ukraine since 2022. 5% is the price of freedom calculated with a calculator, not with emotions.

The E5 meeting in Berlin on June 24, 2026, confirmed that Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Poland accepted this target. It is a step in the right direction. But Spain—excluded from this meeting largely because of its reluctance regarding defense spending—illustrates that the European consensus remains fragile. Sweden, a small power paying the price for its foresight through a belated but committed NATO membership, is setting an example. The major countries should be ashamed of their hesitation.

Support Ukraine until victory—not until a convenient agreement

Nilsson’s analysis has direct implications for the policy of aid to Ukraine: there is no peace agreement with Russia that structurally resolves the European security problem. A ceasefire that would allow Moscow to retain occupied Ukrainian territories, rebuild its military forces, and resume the conflict in five years with greater resources would not be peace—it would be a dangerous respite. Ukraine knows this. The Baltic and Nordic countries know this. All of Europe must acknowledge it.

On June 30, 2026—the same day as Nilsson’s interview—Zelenskyy and Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson met to discuss the Gripen E deal and bilateral defense cooperation. Sweden is translating its analyses into action. Stockholm also announced $108 million in additional military aid on June 18, 2026, as part of the PURL initiative. That is what a coherent security policy looks like: analyzing the threat, naming it, and acting accordingly.

A peace agreement that gives Putin what he could not conquer militarily would be a strategic disaster for Europe. Not for abstract moral reasons—though those reasons exist and matter. But because Nilsson is right: Russia will return. And it will return stronger, more determined, emboldened by the belief that force always pays off. I refuse to accept that future for my children.

A military agreement signed on the day of Nilsson’s interview

There is something profoundly consistent about the fact that Ukraine signed an agreement with Sweden on that very same day, June 30, 2026, to acquire 16 Gripen E fighter jets. While Thomas Nilsson was telling Bloomberg that the Russian threat was structural and enduring, the Swedish government was translating its analysis into concrete military action. This is no editorial coincidence—it is the manifestation of a coherent policy that aligns words with actions.

Zelensky met with Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson to discuss the implementation of the agreement, broader bilateral defense cooperation, preparations for a drone initiative, and work on anti-ballistic capabilities. The agreement also includes related equipment, technical assistance, and support. In addition to the 16 Gripen E aircraft, Ukraine is expected to receive its first 16 Gripen C/D aircraft as early as the beginning of 2027. These are modern fighter jets, not promises.

$108 million and a spirit of Nordic solidarity

Sweden had already announced on June 18, 2026, an additional $108 million in military support as part of the PURL (Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List) initiative, alongside Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands. This is not an isolated decision—it is a coordinated strategy that aligns the most committed allies behind a common approach. The Nordic approach to supporting Ukraine—based on an honest assessment of the threat, not on calculating the minimum acceptable level of support—serves as a model for the rest of Europe.

Comparing Sweden’s approach to that of other European countries—which still hesitate to supply certain types of weapons and delay decisions under the pretext of avoiding “escalation”—reveals a gulf in political courage that the coming years will make even more apparent. Stockholm has chosen clarity. Europe must do the same before time runs out.

Sweden is signing the Gripen deal on the very day its head of military intelligence says that Russia will be a threat for a generation. These two actions are inseparable. That is what a mature security policy looks like: seeing reality, naming it, and acting accordingly without waiting for history to force you to do so through violence. All of Europe should follow this example.

What the 32 nations must confirm on July 7

The NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, will be a test of everything that Thomas Nilsson and his Nordic counterparts have been insistently asserting for years. The 32 allied nations will have to collectively decide on the level of support for Ukraine, defense commitments for the northeastern flank, and the response to Russia’s planned military expansionism. This is not a routine meeting. It is a meeting that will shape the European security architecture for the coming decade.

The allies are prepared to provide $70 billion to Ukraine over two years, according to reports cited by NewsUkraine and Censor.net. Donald Trump—the necessary evil, unpredictable but still present—will be in Ankara. Russia will be watching every word, every disagreement, every compromise. What the allies say in Ankara will be heard in Moscow. And Russia will adjust its strategy accordingly.

Sweden as a Model for Europe—Strategic Courage

Sweden offers Europe an example of what strategic courage means in practice. Joining NATO after two centuries of neutrality was not a popular decision across all strata of Swedish society. Delivering Gripen fighter jets to Ukraine while some countries still hesitate to send tanks requires a political clarity that few governments have found. Supporting Ukraine with honest analyses of the structural nature of the Russian threat—even when allies prefer soothing rhetoric—demands a rare intellectual rigor.

Europe needs more countries like Sweden in its ranks—countries that face reality head-on, draw logical conclusions, and act before history forces them into painful hindsight. Poland has done so. The Baltic states have done so since 2014. Sweden and Finland have done so. There are still too many countries waiting for others to make the difficult choices for them.

Sweden had been neutral since 1814. It renounced that neutrality in 2024 because its military intelligence experts told it the truth about Russia. That is true political courage: listening to your experts when what they say is uncomfortable. All of Europe should do the same. Nilsson’s analyses are not political opinions—they are professional assessments by people whose job is to survive misjudgments.

Comfortable Inertia and Its Consequences

I’m also writing to you—those of you reading these lines from a Parisian apartment, a Berlin home, or a Roman café. You who change the channel when news about Ukraine comes on, because it’s far away, because it’s complicated, because you have enough problems with inflation and the elections. I understand this weariness. I feel it myself sometimes. But I can’t afford to give in to this weariness, because Thomas Nilsson reminded me that the threat, for its part, never tires.

Russia is counting on our inaction. It’s counting on our weariness, on our tendency to believe that all of this will end with negotiations, with an agreement, with a return to normalcy. It’s right to believe that—if we give in to that illusion. But it is wrong on one fundamental point: democracy, when it becomes aware of an existential threat, is capable of a mobilization that authoritarian regimes cannot anticipate. That is why Putin has been wrong from the start. And that is why Ukraine is holding on.

What I Expect from Europe After Ankara

I expect Europe to emerge from the Ankara summit with concrete, measurable, and binding commitments to support Ukraine. I expect it to confirm the delivery of long-range weapons, air defense systems, and sufficient ammunition to enable Ukraine to continue its industrial war effort and defend its new front lines. I expect it to take Nilsson’s words—“deep, structural, and sustainable”—and make them the foundation of its long-term planning.

And above all, I expect it to understand that supporting Ukraine until victory is not a costly act of generosity toward a distant country. It is an investment in its own security, in the architecture of peace that allows our children to live without an existential threat at their doorstep. Thomas Nilsson is right. The threat will outlive Putin. And our response must also outlive our past hesitations.

I am not writing this open letter for Thomas Nilsson—he already knows all this. I am writing it for all those who prefer oblivion to vigilance, comfort to clarity, and soothing platitudes to uncomfortable truths. The Russian threat is structural. It will outlive Putin. And if Europe does not draw the right conclusions now, it will draw them in ten years under far more difficult circumstances.

Moscow Is Not Alone—An Anti-Western Coalition in Action

Thomas Nilsson spoke of the Russian threat, but the strategic reality is more complex. Russia is not fighting alone in Ukraine: North Korea is supplying artillery ammunition and soldiers, Iran is delivering Shahed drones, and China is buying up sanctioned Russian oil while also supplying electronic components. This coalition of the West’s adversaries is not a formal alliance—but it is functional and well-documented. Faced with it, the West cannot afford to be fragmented.

China poses the greatest long-term strategic threat to the West—even greater than Russia, whose economic resources are fundamentally limited. But for now, it is Russia that is killing Ukrainians with Iranian drones and North Korean shells. Nilsson’s analysis must therefore be read in this broader context: the West’s adversary is not just Moscow, but a coalition of actors who share the goal of weakening liberal democracies by any means available.

The European Union’s Response: 3.9 Billion for Drones

The EU sent a strong signal on June 30, 2026: 3.9 billion euros allocated specifically for the production of Ukrainian drones, as part of a total loan of 90 billion euros approved in April. Two-thirds of these funds are earmarked for defense needs: drones, ammunition, missiles, and air defense systems. Ursula von der Leyen stated that “Ukrainian ingenuity is at the heart of its resistance.” This concrete aid directly addresses the structural threat that Nilsson described.

Donald Trump—the necessary evil of the Atlantic alliance—remains unpredictable in his support. But on June 25, 2026, he stated that Zelenskyy was fighting “pretty well” against Russia. This minimal but genuine acknowledgment from the American side means that U.S. support, however capricious it may be, has not yet been withdrawn. Europe must take advantage of this window of opportunity to strengthen its own defense pillar, as Nilsson recommends and as confirmed by the E5 meeting in Berlin.

North Korea is supplying artillery shells. Iran is supplying drones. China is buying sanctioned Russian oil. And some Europeans are still debating whether supplying tanks to Ukraine is too provocative. This asymmetry in resolve between the West’s adversaries and some of its own members is precisely the vulnerability that Nilsson seeks to address. I hope he will be heard before it is too late.

“There’s no turning back”—and then what?

“Russia has chosen its path, and there is no turning back.” This statement by Thomas Nilsson is both the most lucid assessment and the most demanding challenge Europe must face. If Russia has no turning back, it is up to Europe to chart a future in which liberal democracy endures, grows stronger, and prevails. Not by hoping for change in Moscow, but by building resilience that renders Russian aggression ineffective in the long term.

This requires full support for Ukraine until victory is achieved. It requires substantial defense budgets. It requires an end to the naivety surrounding “bridges of dialogue” with a regime that uses such dialogues as a cover for its military preparations. It requires solidarity with the countries on our northeastern flank that face the threat more directly. And it requires the political will to call things by their proper names: Russia is our structural adversary. Not our eternal enemy—but our adversary, as long as it chooses this path.

Thank you, Mr. Nilsson—but the ball is in our court

Thomas Nilsson has done his job: analyzing, naming, and warning with rigor and without demagoguery. He has described a reality that too few European political leaders have had the courage to articulate with such clarity. His statement of June 30, 2026, deserves to be quoted in inaugural addresses, Security Council meetings, and contemporary history classes—not as an analytical curiosity, but as a strategic guide for the decisions to come.

The ball is now in our court. In the court of governments that must turn analysis into policy. In the court of citizens who must demand from their elected officials the clarity and courage that Nilsson demonstrated in this interview. In the court of every person reading these lines who must decide whether to stand on the side of vigilance or inertia. History does not remember those who were absent. It remembers those who chose to see.

I end this letter thinking of Ukraine. Of Zelensky, who will be fighting in Ankara for weapons. Of the pilots flying Mi-24Vs covered in victory marks. Of the civilians in Donetsk watching drones burn Russian depots. Nilsson said that Russia had chosen its path. Ukraine, for its part, chose its own path long ago: freedom, resistance, victory. Europe must choose the same.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist