OPEN LETTER: To Those Who Still Doubt That Libya Will Ever Be Able to Hold an Election

Maxime Marquette

2026-07-07 14:22:59

A technical agreement, but not yet a political one

On June 24, 2026, UNSMIL announced that participants in the fourth round of consultations of the 4+4 Committee—four representatives from eastern Libya and four from the west—had reached a consensus on the presidential election law. This committee was established by the United Nations as an alternative mechanism to overcome the persistent political deadlock, following the failure of the House of Representatives and the High State Council to agree on amending the electoral laws and appointing a new board for the High National Electoral Commission (HNEC).

According to UNAMUL, this fourth session—held in an atmosphere described as “positive and constructive”—resolved most of the issues related to the electoral process in the first two phases of the UN-facilitated roadmap. A fifth round is scheduled for the first half of July to continue discussions and consolidate the progress made.

A Necessary Clarification: The 4+4 Committee Is Not the Structured Dialogue

It is important to be precise here, because confusion often prevails in media coverage of this issue: the 4+4 committee is not a replacement for the Structured Dialogue, which issued its own final report on June 7, 2026, containing more than 525 recommendations. The United Nations emphasizes that the 4+4 is a complementary mechanism, focused on specific obstacles to organizing the election.

This technical distinction matters: it shows that UN diplomacy in Libya is advancing on several parallel fronts, with specific mandates, rather than in a vague fog of unstructured negotiations.

This clarification of the respective mandates may seem dry, but I find it reassuring: a process that clearly distinguishes its various bodies is more likely to stand the test of time than a diplomatic catch-all.

The June 18 Roadmap: A Timeline Finally Set

Three Leaders, a Historic Agreement

A few days before the 4+4 Committee reached an agreement, an equally significant event took place in Tripoli: on June 18, 2026, the leaders of Libya’s three main political institutions—Aguila Saleh, Speaker of the House of Representatives; Mohammed Takala, President of the High State Council; and Mohamed al-Menfi, President of the Presidential Council—jointly announced a roadmap setting February 17, 2027, as the date for simultaneous presidential and legislative elections.

This marks a rare convergence among institutions that, historically, have been characterized primarily by mutual deadlock. The agreement also provides for the creation of a high-level oversight body, including the governor of the Central Bank of Libya, the chair of the HNEC, and representatives of the Joint Military Commission (5+5).

A Timeline Based on the 13th Constitutional Amendment

The roadmap calls for amendments to electoral legislation in accordance with the 13th constitutional amendment and requires the future elected president to launch a broad national dialogue to finalize a permanent constitution. This is a significant detail: it shows that this round of elections is not intended as an end in itself, but as the starting point of a broader constitutional process designed to bring lasting stability to the country’s institutions.

Respect for the Constitutional Declaration, the Libyan Political Agreement, and the conclusions of the previous Cairo talks was also reaffirmed by the three leaders—a welcome signal of legal continuity in a country where, in the past, every actor has sought to rewrite the rules to their own advantage.

Seeing three men who have long neutralized one another sign the same document makes me cautious rather than enthusiastic: in Libya, the signing of an agreement has often been merely a prelude to its violation.

The Impact of Structured Dialogue: 525 Recommendations for Rebuilding the State

Six months of consultations, 120 Libyan voices

On June 7, 2026, during its final plenary session in Tripoli, the Structured Dialogue presented its final recommendations to enable the holding of national elections, unify and strengthen state institutions, and address the deep-rooted and persistent causes of the conflict. This process brought together approximately 120 Libyans from diverse backgrounds over a six-month period, resulting in more than 525 recommendations spanning governance, the economy, security, and national reconciliation.

While some disagreements emerged—particularly regarding governance—the report was generally well-received by stakeholders, according to the United Nations, which is now calling for its translation into a structured, phased implementation led by the Libyans themselves.

What This Report Reveals About Public Fatigue

This volume of recommendations, impressive as it may be on paper, reflects one thing above all: the scale of the institutional reconstruction work still needed in a country that has been fragmented since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. It will not be enough simply to organize an election: the elected institutions will also need to have real authority over the entire territory, including the eastern region controlled by the forces of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

It is this structural dimension—often overlooked in media coverage focused on election dates—that will determine whether the February 2027 election, if it takes place at all, will lead to lasting stability or to a new crisis of legitimacy.

Five hundred twenty-five recommendations—a figure that inspires in me as much respect for the work accomplished as it does concern about the Libyans’ actual ability to implement them all in time.

The National Electoral Commission: The Decisive Technical Link

A Reconstituted Commission, an Approved Budget

One technical development that is often underestimated concerns the reconstituting of the board of directors of the High National Electoral Commission (HNEC), a process that began in late 2025 and continued through the 4+4 mechanism. On December 30, the House of Representatives had already approved a proposed budget of 210 million Libyan dinars to cover the estimated costs of organizing national elections in 2026.

The HNEC itself has repeatedly reaffirmed its operational readiness, subject to three cumulative conditions: adequate funding, sufficient security guarantees, and a final agreement on electoral laws. It is this last condition that the 4+4 committee has just brought closer to a resolution.

The Discreet but Essential Role of the Judiciary

One technical detail is worth highlighting: the recommendation that the future chair of the reconstituted HNEC should be selected from among judges recognized for their impartiality and competence—a decision entrusted to Attorney General Siddiq al-Sour. This choice to entrust a key role to the judiciary, rather than to rival political blocs, is specifically intended to limit suspicions of manipulation of the electoral process.

It is an institutional detail that, on paper, seems minor, but which in reality determines the very credibility of the election in the eyes of the Libyan people, who have been disillusioned by years of broken promises.

I find it reassuring that the issue of the electoral commission’s impartiality is finally being taken seriously, because an election organized by officials suspected of bias would be worse than no election at all.

Remaining Security Challenges

A country still divided into two armed factions

No roadmap, however well-drafted, can change the security reality in Libya in 2026: the country remains divided between the Government of National Unity based in Tripoli and the General Command of the Libyan National Army, loyal to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, based in the east. UNSMIL continues to facilitate what it calls the “Smaller Convening,” a discussion format bringing together representatives from both sides.

According to the most recent briefings to the Security Council, these discussions have produced an agreement in principle on the reconstitution of the HNEC, but further progress is still needed on the electoral laws themselves and on the security guarantees surrounding the election.

The sensitive issue of holders of administrative numbers

A specific point of contention concerns the status of individuals holding “administrative numbers,” an issue related to populations whose civil identity has been affected by years of conflict and displacement. The advisory committee recommended that voter registration and candidacy be reserved for holders of a national identity number, while recognizing the urgency of resolving this issue free from any electoral or political pressure.

This is the kind of technical, almost bureaucratic detail that can nevertheless derail an entire electoral process if future authorities do not handle it with the necessary rigor.

I am always concerned about these bureaucratic details that are overlooked in grand announcements, because it is precisely there—in contested voter rolls—that the most violent post-election crises often arise.

What Washington Is Watching From Afar

Discreet but Active U.S. Diplomacy

According to information reported by specialized diplomatic intelligence services, the Trump administration’s advisor on Africa is reportedly considering an alternative option that would allow the two rival Libyan factions to remain in power, recognized as legitimate, as part of a power-sharing arrangement within a reunified government whose mandate would not require a vote. If confirmed, this approach would contrast with the electoral approach favored by the United Nations.

I report this with due caution: this is an option under consideration, as reported by a specialized source, not a final decision. But it illustrates the ongoing tension between the democratic goal championed by UNSMIL and the short-term stability calculations that certain external powers may prioritize.

Should the West push harder for genuine elections?

I’ll say this plainly: prioritizing a simple power-sharing arrangement without going through the ballot box would be a strategic mistake for the West, even if it seems simpler in the short term. Stability bought at the cost of democratic legitimacy always comes at a higher price later on, in countries like Libya where every superficial agreement has ultimately exploded into a new armed crisis.

Firmly supporting the electoral process led by UNSMIL, rather than backroom deals between armed factions, should remain the priority of any serious Western diplomatic effort on this issue.

I strongly oppose any temptation to sacrifice the Libyan electoral process on the altar of superficial stability, because the country’s recent history is replete with examples where that choice has come at a high cost—both in human lives and in international credibility.

China's Position and Russia's Relative Silence

Beijing Welcomes the Agreement but Remains on the Sidelines

It is telling that China’s official news agency provided extensive coverage of the 4+4 Committee agreement, and that China also commended the joint committee’s work on electoral laws at the Security Council. This superficial diplomatic support, however, masks concrete economic interests: Beijing seeks to secure its presence in Libya’s reconstruction and infrastructure projects, regardless of which side ultimately comes to power.

Russia, for its part, maintains a discreet but real presence through mercenaries and logistical support for certain factions in eastern Libya, in a power struggle that extends far beyond the electoral issue alone and should be of greater concern to Western foreign ministries.

Why This Rivalry for Influence Matters to Us

Libya is not merely an isolated regional issue: it is also a battleground for influence between the West, China, and Russia, in a country rich in oil and strategically located across from southern Europe. Every election postponement, every new institutional crisis, provides additional room for these rival powers to consolidate their influence at the expense of stability aligned with Western interests.

This is, in my view, yet another reason for Europe and the United States to engage more actively—and not just rhetorically—in ensuring the success of this fragile electoral process.

I believe the West is dangerously underestimating the stakes in Libya in the face of China’s and Russia’s growing influence, as it remains focused on other theaters deemed more urgent.

What Ordinary Libyans Really Want

A sense of weariness that transcends political divides

Beyond diplomatic negotiations, it is important to remember what ordinary Libyans actually want: an end to chronic power outages, a stable currency, functioning public services, and the ability to travel from one region to another without fear of checkpoints manned by rival militias. According to consultations conducted by UNSMIL itself, a majority of Libyans agree on the need to unify the government even before elections are held, given how much the current divisions affect their daily lives.

This popular demand, documented by the UN mission’s own polls and consultations, should carry more weight in diplomatic calculations than considerations of the electoral calendar alone.

The Risk of Further Disillusionment

The country has already experienced the cancellation of the election scheduled for December 2021, a disappointment that has permanently eroded public confidence in any new announced timeline. If the February 17, 2027, date were also to be postponed, there would be a real risk of widespread public disengagement from any future democratic process, with potentially explosive consequences for the country’s stability.

It is this time pressure—as much as the backroom dealings among political elites—that should drive the international community’s sense of urgency on this issue.

I sincerely believe that the patience of the Libyan people—already severely tested since 2011—is reaching its limit, and that the world would do well to be more concerned about this than it currently is.

Why This Letter Is Also Addressed to Western Diplomats

A Call for Consistency Rather Than Cyclical Indifference

To the decision-makers in Washington, Brussels, and European capitals who are following this issue intermittently, I address this part of my letter directly to you: Libya does not deserve sporadic attention, revived only during peaks of the migration crisis or outbreaks of violence in Tripoli. It deserves consistent support for the process led by UNSMIL, even when negotiations seem technical and unspectacular.

The 4+4 Committee and the Structured Dialogue are making progress precisely because international attention—even if discreet—maintains constructive pressure on Libyan actors. Reducing this attention just as real progress is taking shape would be a major strategic mistake.

What I’m Asking for in Concrete Terms

I am not asking for a diplomatic miracle, only consistency: clear financial and logistical support for the reconstituted HNEC; sustained diplomatic pressure to ensure that the fifth round of the 4+4 Committee, scheduled for July, yields concrete results; and a categorical rejection of any easy solution that would bypass the popular vote in favor of a mere power-sharing arrangement among armed factions.

This, in my view, is the only path that honors both the memory of the Libyans who have fallen since 2011 and the legitimate hope of those who want to finally vote freely for their future.

I am addressing Western diplomats directly here: your inconsistency has already taken a heavy toll on this issue, and history will judge you harshly if you let this window of opportunity slip away.

Lessons from a Decade of Failures That Must Not Be Repeated

2021: The Precedent That Still Haunts People’s Minds

It is impossible to discuss the 2027 election schedule without revisiting the failure of the December 2021 election, which was canceled at the last minute due to a lack of agreement on candidate eligibility criteria—notably the contested candidacy of the son of former leader Muammar Gaddafi. That failure left deep scars on public trust and fueled years of further institutional fragmentation.

The difference this time may lie in the approach: unlike in 2021, when election laws were cobbled together in a rush, the current process is based on a more methodical effort, spread out over several months, with dedicated mechanisms such as the 4+4 Committee and the Structured Dialogue.

Caution remains warranted despite the progress

I refuse, however, to succumb to blind optimism: Libya has demonstrated, on multiple occasions since 2011, its ability to derail processes that seemed well underway. The coming weeks, with the fifth round of the 4+4 Committee scheduled for early July, will be a decisive test of whether this positive momentum holds or collapses, like so many others before it.

It is this constant tension between cautious hope and informed skepticism that must, I believe, guide our collective assessment of this issue in the months ahead.

I refuse to give in to naive optimism about Libya, but I equally refuse to succumb to the comfortable cynicism that claims nothing will ever change in that country.

The Libyan Economy: A Silent Hostage to the Political Crisis

A Country Rich in Oil but Paralyzed by Division

Libya possesses Africa’s largest oil reserves, but this wealth remains largely trapped by the institutional divide between the eastern and western parts of the country. The Central Bank of Libya, whose governor will now serve on the electoral oversight body established under the June 18 roadmap, plays a pivotal role in distributing oil revenues among the country’s various factions.

This direct involvement of the Central Bank in the electoral process is significant: it reflects the need to ensure that public funds—particularly revenues from oil exports—are not misappropriated to finance unfair election campaigns or armed militias hostile to the democratic process.

Currency: A Barometer of Public Confidence

The Libyan dinar remains highly volatile, reflecting persistent political uncertainty. Each new announcement of diplomatic progress, such as that from the 4+4 Committee in late June, sends positive but fragile signals to the informal foreign exchange markets that dominate the day-to-day economy of Libyans. Lasting political stabilization would be the best possible lever for restoring long-eroded confidence in the currency.

It is this concrete economic reality—rather than abstract diplomatic negotiations—that will determine whether the population continues to support the electoral process or gradually turns away from institutions incapable of improving their daily lives.

I believe that people still underestimate the power of a stable dinar to convince a skeptical population of the real value of a political agreement signed hundreds of kilometers from their homes.

The Role of Mediterranean Europe in This Matter

Italy and France, Neighbors Directly Affected

Among Western powers, Italy and France remain particularly attentive to the Libyan situation, due to their geographic proximity and the migration challenges directly linked to the country’s instability. A stabilized Libya with legitimate institutions would be a far more reliable partner for managing migration flows across the Mediterranean than a country fractured by rival militias.

In the past, these two European countries have at times taken divergent positions on Libya, supporting opposing sides to varying degrees. This historic European division has itself contributed to undermining the credibility of Western mediation in the country—a point that few Western analysts are willing to acknowledge publicly.

An Opportunity to Patch Up European Policy

The current moment, with tangible progress driven by UNSMIL, offers a rare opportunity for the European Union to finally speak with one voice on the Libyan issue, rather than letting each capital pursue its own interests in a fragmented manner. A unified European position would considerably strengthen the West’s diplomatic clout in the face of competing ambitions by China and Russia in the region.

This is a test of diplomatic maturity for a Europe that has, all too often, allowed its internal divisions to serve the interests of external powers hostile to its own strategic priorities.

I remain convinced that Europe’s inability to speak with one voice on Libya will go down in the annals of diplomatic history as one of the most costly and preventable failures of the past decade.

The Tunisian Precedent: Why Tunis Matters So Much in This Story

A proven choice of neutral venue

The choice of Tunis as the venue for the 4+4 Committee negotiations is no coincidence. For several years now, the Tunisian capital has hosted the main inter-Libyan talks, offering a neutral, secure, and logistically accessible venue for delegations from both eastern and western Libya. This recurring diplomatic choice reflects the relative trust that both sides place in Tunisia as a discreet facilitator.

Tunisia’s own relative stability—despite its internal political tensions—makes it a valuable partner for UN diplomacy in the region, a role that Tunis appears to have assumed with calculated discretion since the start of the UNSMIL process.

A Model for Other Regional Mediation Efforts

The Tunisian model of facilitation—combining geographic proximity with a commitment to political neutrality—could inspire other mediation processes in similar regional conflicts, where the choice of negotiation venue often has an underestimated influence on the parties’ willingness to engage seriously in dialogue.

For Libya, this geographical continuity of negotiations in Tunis also offers a welcome form of institutional predictability in a process otherwise marked by numerous twists and turns and schedule changes.

I find it remarkable that Tunisia, itself in a state of political recovery for years, has managed to provide a stable framework for its Libyan neighbor—a lesson in diplomatic humility that few major powers would be able to offer.

Conclusion: A letter that ends on a cautious note of hope

What I Take Away from This Pivotal Moment

As I conclude this letter, I note that, as of late June 2026, Libya is experiencing a rare turning point: a technical consensus on the presidential election law, a timeline endorsed by the country’s three main institutions, and substantive work led by the Structured Dialogue to rebuild solid institutional foundations. These are not guarantees, but they are verifiable steps forward, documented by the United Nations itself.

The date of February 17, 2027, remains fragile, hinging on the goodwill of actors who, historically, have often prioritized their short-term interests over Libya’s national interest. But for the first time in years, this date is grounded in an institutional framework that is more robust than mere declarations of intent.

A final word to those who have lost hope

To you, Libyan citizens weary from a decade of broken promises, I cannot offer any certainties. But I can tell you that this process, this time, is being built with greater method, more verification mechanisms, and more documented international attention than before. It will be up to you—and your institutions—to turn this window of opportunity into a concrete electoral reality.

I close this letter with a sense of cautious optimism: I hope my doubts prove unfounded, and above all, I hope that the next time I write about Libya, it will be to describe open polling stations rather than yet another postponement.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist