A List of Shortcomings That Raises Concerns
The two leaders have publicly listed the gaps that remain despite the efforts already underway: shortages of fighter jets, air defense systems, missile defense systems, drones, naval assets, and military stockpiles. This unusual transparency, coming from both the presidency of the European Commission and the NATO Secretary General’s office, illustrates the perceived gravity of the situation.
According to their op-ed, current production capacity remains insufficient to meet demand—a finding that directly echoes the difficulties documented by Ukraine regarding the shortage of Patriot interceptor missiles. Continued military support for Ukraine, combined with instability in the Middle East, is placing additional strain on already stretched stockpiles.
Factories Are Opening, but Not Fast Enough
Von der Leyen and Rutte acknowledge that European NATO allies and European Union member states are increasing their defense spending, opening new factories, and expanding their production lines. Traditional manufacturers as well as newer technology companies are ramping up production, particularly in drones, unmanned ground vehicles, and electronic warfare systems.
I note this industrial acceleration with a mixture of relief and concern: it is real, but it comes after years in which we allowed these very capabilities to erode in the name of a peace that history has just brutally disproved.
The Named Threats: Russia, China, Iran, North Korea
An area of cooperation that worries the Alliance
Von der Leyen and Rutte explicitly point to the expansion of defense cooperation between Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. They assert that Moscow has reoriented its entire economy toward sustained war production, while China’s defense industry and nuclear arsenal continue to grow unabated.
This convergence among four regimes hostile to the Western-led international order constitutes, according to the two leaders, yet another urgent reason to accelerate transatlantic cooperation on defense production and innovation, rather than delaying it due to bureaucratic or budgetary considerations.
Europe and North America Have the Means, but Not Yet the Speed
The two signatories assert that Europe and North America possess the economic strength, technological expertise, and industrial capacity necessary to respond to this joint threat. What they still lack, according to their own assessment, is the speed of execution in the face of adversaries who have already completely reorganized their production apparatus around the logic of war.
I believe this statement deserves to be repeated in every Western capital: we have the means; all we lack is the will to use them as quickly as our adversaries are reorganizing theirs.
What the Actual Size of U.S. Industry Reveals
A Quantified and Documented Imbalance
According to the SIPRI ranking cited by Anadolu Agency, the world’s 100 largest arms and military services companies generated $679 billion in revenue in 2024. U.S. companies—including Lockheed Martin, RTX, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and General Dynamics—alone accounted for $334 billion, or nearly half of the global total.
Lockheed Martin alone generated $64.65 billion in military revenue in 2024, representing approximately 9.5 percent of the total arms sales in the entire SIPRI ranking. European companies, excluding those in Russia, totaled only $151 billion over the same period—a gap that concretely illustrates the industrial imbalance denounced by von der Leyen and Rutte.
NATO’s Budgetary Burden: A Persistent Dependency
NATO’s total defense spending exceeded $1.4 trillion in 2025, with approximately 60 percent coming from the United States, compared to about 40 percent from European members and Turkey combined. This budget ratio, documented by Anadolu Agency based on official Alliance figures, alone explains why Europe is now seeking to rebalance its industrial contribution—and not just its financial one.
I believe this 60-to-40 percent figure should haunt every European defense minister: talking about European strategic autonomy while depending so heavily on the American taxpayer is, for now, more of a slogan than a budgetary reality.
European Industrial Leaders: An Uneven Mosaic
The United Kingdom, France, and Germany Lead the Way
The United Kingdom has seven companies in the SIPRI ranking, including BAE Systems, which together generated $52.2 billion in defense revenue in 2024. France, with Dassault Aviation, Thales, Safran, and Naval Group, generated $26.1 billion, of which nearly $11.8 billion came from Thales alone. Germany, driven by Rheinmetall and Diehl, saw its military sales surge by 47 percent and 53 percent, respectively, over the course of a year.
Turkey deserves special mention: five Turkish companies, including ASELSAN, Baykar, and Turkish Aerospace Industries, generated $10.1 billion in 2024—an 11 percent increase and a historic record for the country, according to the SIPRI ranking cited by Anadolu Agency.
National spending still far from the common target
As a percentage of GDP, the United Kingdom will spend 2.40 percent on defense in 2025, France 2.07 percent, Germany 2.03 percent, and Italy 2.01 percent. These figures remain below the 5 percent of GDP target discussed during the preparatory talks for the Ankara summit, according to Biz Chosun, illustrating the scale of the budgetary effort still required.
I note that even the top-performing European countries remain at less than half of the 5 percent target: the potential for growth, if seriously pursued, could transform the transatlantic industrial balance within a decade.
Germany is pushing for joint production
A New Proposal on Tomahawk and Patriot Missiles
According to Biz Chosun, the German government has proposed to the United States a plan for the joint production of Tomahawk cruise missiles and Patriot PAC-3 interceptors on German soil. The stated goal is twofold: to reduce the burden on U.S. defense contractors while accelerating the procurement of weapons within Europe itself, against a backdrop of growing security uncertainty.
This initiative is directly in line with the European rearmament drive that began after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It also addresses a concrete concern: instability in the Middle East could delay deliveries of U.S. weapons to Europe, a risk that Berlin is seeking to mitigate by physically bringing production closer to the theater where the weapons will be deployed.
Hundreds of Billions in Contracts Announced in Ankara
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated, according to Biz Chosun: “Hundreds of billions of dollars in new contracts for the defense industry will be announced at next week’s summit.” ” Europe and Canada have already placed approximately $300 billion in orders with U.S. defense companies—orders that support about 195,000 jobs in the United States.
I see a rare strategic maturity in the German proposal: rather than simply buying American, Berlin is seeking to co-produce, which strengthens both its industrial sovereignty and the resilience of the Alliance as a whole.
The Transatlantic Tensions the Op-Ed Doesn't Mention
Washington Fears Being Excluded from the European Fund
According to Biz Chosun, U.S. and European interests do not fully align on this industrial issue. The United States fears that a defense industry fund pushed by the European Union could be managed in a way that excludes U.S. companies and non-EU countries—a concern that could hinder the transatlantic cooperation that von der Leyen and Rutte are calling for.
A U.S. administration official, Matthew Whitaker, summed up this logic bluntly: “Those who do more will get more good things,” indicating that Washington intends to reward allies differently based on their actual level of defense investment.
European Autonomy Still Largely Theoretical
Europe is pushing for autonomy in its defense industry while remaining heavily dependent on the United States for the most advanced weapons systems and technologies. This contradiction, documented by Biz Chosun, explains why von der Leyen and Rutte’s op-ed places such strong emphasis on cooperation rather than a complete break with the U.S. partner.
I believe that this unresolved tension between professed autonomy and actual dependence will remain the weak point of the entire European discourse on defense until it is clearly resolved through massive and coordinated industrial investments.
What This Means in Practical Terms for Ukraine
A Stronger Industry, a Better-Supplied Front
This debate over the European defense industry is not a budgetary abstraction disconnected from reality on the ground: every factory opened, every production line ramped up in Germany, France, or Turkey potentially translates into more ammunition, drones, and interceptors available to Ukraine, whose missile defense system has remained under critical strain since the attacks of July 2026.
Germany’s proposal to co-produce Patriot PAC-3 interceptors on European soil directly illustrates this link: bringing production closer to the theater of war reduces delivery times and limits dependence on a transatlantic supply chain already under pressure—an issue highlighted by the shortages Ukraine experienced on July 6.
A Test of Coherence for the Entire Western Alliance
If von der Leyen and Rutte’s call actually translates into contracts and accelerated deliveries, Ukraine could benefit directly in the months following the Ankara summit. If, on the other hand, this call remains a rhetorical exercise without concrete follow-through, the contradiction between statements of support for Kyiv and industrial reality will continue to cost Ukrainian civilian lives every week.
I refuse to separate this European industrial debate from the daily plight of Ukrainian civilians: a factory running at full speed at Rheinmetall or Diehl could mean one more Patriot interceptor over Kyiv the following week.
Conclusion: The Industrial Race Against Time
An Ankara Summit Under Intense Pressure
The NATO summit in Ankara on July 7 and 8 will need to translate this shared platform into concrete, quantifiable commitments. Increased defense spending, the joint purchase and production of U.S. weapons, and the expansion of defense industry supply chains are among the key items expected to be on the agenda, according to Biz Chosun.
What History Will Remember About This Call
Von der Leyen and Rutte are right to identify the threat and demand an industrial acceleration, but their statement will remain a mere public relations exercise if it does not translate, in the months following the Ankara summit, into factories operating at full capacity and contracts that result in actual deliveries on the ground in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe.
I’ll conclude with a simple demand: that the next op-ed signed by von der Leyen and Rutte no longer cite intentions, but rather factories that have actually opened, contracts that have actually been signed, and interceptors that have actually been delivered to those who need them tonight.
Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist
Sources
Primary Sources
NATO — Overview: 2026 NATO Summit in Ankara, accessed July 2026
Secondary sources
Chosun Biz — Germany leads US-Europe arms co-production as NATO summit approaches, July 3, 2026
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