ANALYSIS: In Syria, lifting sanctions is not enough to dispel fear

A Door Opens After 47 Years

The Move on August 24

The United States has removed Syria from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. A label dating back to 1979 has just been lifted.

On August 24, the State Department ended this designation and the accompanying restrictions. On the same day, it revoked the global terrorist designation of the al-Nusra Front, also known as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.

The Treasury Department simultaneously removed HTS from its list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. General License 25, which OFAC deemed no longer necessary, was revoked.

A country is no longer its former regime

This legal shift carries a powerful political message: post-Assad Syria must not remain trapped by sanctions designed against Assad’s Syria. Punishing a transition indefinitely for the crimes of the regime it overthrew would be inertia disguised as principle.

But this opening is not an absolution. It is a bet on Ahmed al-Sharaa, on his commitments, on the institutions he has yet to consolidate, and on a society that has already paid too dearly for the calculations of others.

Washington has just opened the door; no one yet knows which state will walk through it.

What Has Actually Been Lifted

The End of Comprehensive Sanctions

OFAC no longer maintains comprehensive sanctions against Syria or a general freeze against its government. The change is structural.

Executive Order 14312, signed on June 30, 2025, and effective the following day, had already revoked six executive orders that formed the backbone of the Syria program. The former rules under Title 31, Part 542, were subsequently removed from the Code of Federal Regulations.

Individuals designated solely under these former authorities were removed from the SDN list, and assets frozen for that reason alone were unfrozen. Syrian financial institutions, including the central bank, were also removed from the list.

The Last Major Obstacle

The designation as a state sponsor of terrorism remained an obstacle for banks, investors, certain dual-use goods, aid, and financial transactions. Its revocation therefore removes more than just a diplomatic symbol.

The joint document from the Departments of Commerce, State, and the Treasury now states that U.S. sanctions no longer constitute an obstacle to most commercial activities in Syria. The key word is “most,” not “all.”

One less barrier does not yet mean a thriving economy, but it is finally a lock that is turning.

What Remains Targeted

Assad Is Not Cleared

The general lifting of sanctions does not remove Bashar al-Assad, his associates, or human rights abusers from U.S. sanctions lists.

The new PAARSS regime maintains targeted sanctions against the former president, his networks, Captagon traffickers, actors linked to Syrian proliferation, affiliates of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, as well as Iran and its proxies.

This distinction is essential. A blanket sanction impacts an entire economy, including those it purports to protect. A targeted sanction seeks to isolate those responsible and hold the perpetrators accountable.

Justice After the Cover-Up

This framework must be judged by its actual ability to track money, shell companies, illicit trafficking, and chains of command. Changing the name of a program is not enough if those responsible can move their assets faster than governments can designate them.

But the principle is a step in the right direction: loosening the noose around Syrians while tightening it around figures from the former regime and those who profit from violence. Accountability becomes more precise—and therefore potentially more just.

A sanction worthy of the name does not confuse a people with their oppressor.

The Caesar Act is now a thing of the past

A Repealed Law

On December 18, 2025, Donald Trump signed the defense appropriations bill that repealed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act.

This law subjected foreign actors to mandatory sanctions when they supported the Syrian government or engaged in certain transactions in sectors such as infrastructure and energy. Its scope thus extended far beyond U.S. companies.

Prior to the repeal, a 180-day waiver and General License 25 had provided a temporary transition period. The repeal of the law replaced this fragile reprieve with a more lasting change in the legal landscape.

Secondary Fear

Secondary sanctions take effect even when they are not enforced. A bank backs out. An insurer refuses. A supplier withdraws. No direct order is necessary when doubt alone is enough to derail a contract.

The repeal can therefore unblock projects that temporary licenses failed to reassure. But it does not mandate credit, trust, or administrative competence. It removes a threat; it does not, on its own, create investment.

The law can stop prohibiting. It cannot force the world to believe.

The Gamble: Ahmed al-Sharaa

From Jihadism to the Presidency

Ahmed al-Sharaa now leads Syria’s transition after having led HTS, a group that emerged from the former Syrian branch of al-Qaeda.

This background is no footnote. HTS was designated as a foreign terrorist organization until July 2025, and its designation as a global terrorist entity was not removed until August 24, 2026.

Sharaa himself had been designated a global terrorist by the United States in 2013. His name was removed from that list in November 2025. U.S. policy does not deny this past; it decides that it should no longer be the sole determinant of the present.

Behavior as the New Test

Marco Rubio justified the decision by citing Sharaa’s positive actions and commitments to steer Syria away from international terrorism. This is a political statement, not yet a historical assessment.

The test will be observable: the actual dismantling of transnational networks, the state’s monopoly on the use of force, the protection of minorities, civil institutions, justice for abuses, and the role granted to regions resistant to central authority.

An old name may disappear from a list; old reflexes must disappear from the seats of power.

A transition concentrated at the top

Dissolved institutions

Assad’s fall destroyed an order. The transition has not yet proven that it can build pluralism rather than another center of power.

The new authorities have announced the dissolution of military factions, several political organizations, the former Parliament, the Ba’ath Party, and the regime’s military and security apparatus. They have promised to integrate them into the state.

A five-year transitional constitutional declaration recognizes freedoms and affirms diversity, but it grants most powers to the interim presidency. Islamic law becomes the primary source of legislation.

An Incomplete Assembly

Indirect elections filled 119 of the 210 seats in the Transitional People’s Assembly in October 2025. Seventy members are to be appointed by Sharaa, and 21 seats remained unfilled in areas outside government control.

According to a report by the Congressional Research Service, the Supreme Constitutional Court had not yet been fully constituted, and the committee tasked with drafting a permanent constitution had yet to be established. The government promises a transition; the checks and balances, however, have yet to take full shape.

Lifting sanctions on a state without strengthening its boundaries may enrich the center before protecting the periphery.

Minorities as a Measure of Truth

The promise of unity

Success will not be evident in Washington’s press releases, but in the sense of security experienced by the Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and Christians.

Sharaa has presented himself as a unifying leader. The transitional declaration proclaims freedom of belief, territorial integrity, diversity, and social peace. These words are necessary. They are not yet autonomous safeguards.

According to the CRS, the Kurdish regions in the northeast did not participate in the national dialogue or in the drafting of the constitutional declaration. They are calling for a revision of the text and a more decentralized solution.

The Danger of a Blank Check

If U.S. sanctions relief becomes a reward without political conditions, the message will be terrible: breaking ties with Iran, containing transnational jihadists, and stabilizing the borders would be enough—even if minorities remain vulnerable.

The United States must not, out of convenience, reinstate the old deal in the Middle East: stability in exchange for silence on rights. Syria has already lived for half a century under this crippled definition of order.

A transition that protects only the majority is nothing more than domination under a new flag.

The economy won’t rebound by decree

The Hesitant Bank

U.S. legislation lifts bans; it does not repair power grids, bank balance sheets, or business confidence.

A foreign company will still have to assess residual sanctions, export controls, security risks, property disputes, and the capabilities of local partners. The legal change reduces uncertainty without eliminating it.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated that the easing of restrictions was intended to encourage new investment and support political and economic stability. The verb “encourage” matters: it describes a possibility, not a result.

Capital also looks at politics

Investors don’t just look at the SDN list. They examine the courts, the currency, corruption, insurance, European sanctions, worker safety, and the ability to repatriate profits.

Syria may therefore face a difficult period in which legal obstacles disappear faster than projects materialize. We must resist the temptation to declare failure too soon, but also the temptation to confuse an announcement with actual jobs.

Export controls add another layer of complexity. The joint U.S. statement describes easing of restrictions, but also licenses and residual restrictions depending on the goods. A turbine, software, or dual-use equipment does not cross a border simply because a single classification has changed. Companies will still need to understand the rules, document the recipient, and convince their own compliance departments.

An economy is not reborn the moment the ban ends, but the moment someone finally dares to sign.

Reconstruction as a Human Emergency

More Than Just Concrete

The lifting of sanctions can help Syrians regain access to services, trade, and jobs. That is its strongest justification.

United Nations experts have welcomed the international easing of sanctions, emphasizing the need to rebuild the country and guarantee economic and social rights. The banking, energy, and transportation sectors had been particularly constrained.

Reconstruction isn’t limited to major contracts. It involves the availability of parts, funding for a clinic, bringing a power plant back online, making cross-border payments to a supplier, and a family’s ability to receive money.

Don’t Make Survivors Pay

Broad sanctions have sometimes complicated lawful transactions even when humanitarian exemptions existed. The risk of non-compliance often leads private actors to avoid an entire country rather than interpret a complex exemption.

Replacing this framework with targeted sanctions can reduce this phenomenon of overcompliance. This is a moral as well as an economic step forward: the poverty of a population should never be a convenient tool for indefinite pressure.

Dignity sometimes begins with a transaction that no one is afraid to authorize anymore.

Donald Trump took the right risk

Recognizing the Shift

On this issue, Donald Trump chose to give the transition a chance rather than maintaining collective punishment out of inertia.

He had announced the lifting of sanctions in May 2025, then signed Executive Order 14312 in June. His administration continued this process with the repeal of the Caesar Act, the removal of certain leaders from sanctions lists, and the decision on August 24.

This is not merely a public relations move. The sequence of events has dismantled, piece by piece, a legal framework built up over decades. It deserves to be recognized as a coherent strategic decision.

Credit Does Not Erase Obligation

Precisely because this is a genuine gesture, its consequences must be monitored without complacency. If Sharaa concentrates power, tolerates reprisals, or fails to protect minorities, Washington will need to use the targeted sanctions it has retained.

Being open to change does not mean being naive about who benefits from it. Good policy is not one that takes no risks. It is one that knows what risks it is taking, on whose behalf, and how it will respond if things go wrong.

Giving someone a chance is not the same as granting impunity.

Distancing Damascus from Moscow and Tehran

Geopolitics Behind the Aid

The U.S. outreach also seeks to prevent post-Assad Syria from falling back into the orbit of Russia or Iran.

This calculation is legitimate. Iranian networks helped prop up the former regime, while Russia provided it with military power and a safe haven. A Syria capable of engaging with the West has more options.

Removing barriers can also weaken the illicit trade and parallel channels that thrive when the official economy is stifled. The more legitimate transactions become possible, the less the black market can present itself as the only option.

Syria Is Not a Piece of the Chessboard to Be Reclaimed

But Syrians must not become mere pawns in a shift of spheres of influence. Replacing Russian or Iranian dependence with Western tutelage would not constitute sovereignty.

The goal should be a Syria stable enough to choose its own partners, pluralistic enough to debate them, and strong enough to refuse to allow an external power to use its territory. The West stands to gain more by supporting this autonomy than by seeking a client state.

Breaking free from an orbit only makes sense if the country regains its own center of gravity.

The memory of crimes is not negotiable

Sanctions and justice are not synonymous

Lifting an economic sanction does not undo torture, disappearances, or accountability. It merely changes the instrument.

Targeted measures against Assad and his associates remain in place. They must accompany investigations, the preservation of evidence, the search for the disappeared, and potential legal proceedings—without claiming to replace these efforts.

A financial sanctions list can freeze assets. It cannot, on its own, establish the full truth about a prison system, hear a victim’s testimony, or render a criminal verdict. Confusing these functions weakens both sanctions and justice.

Do Not Buy Stability at the Cost of Forgetting

The transition will be tempted to integrate structures, grant amnesty to perpetrators, or postpone accountability in the name of urgency. Certain measures may be necessary to prevent another war; they must not erase the most serious crimes.

Washington and its allies must support a credible Syrian justice system and existing international mechanisms. A reconstruction built on the silence of victims would have political foundations as fragile as the buildings it is rebuilding.

Peace sometimes requires delay; it never requires forgetting.

Accuracy vs. Euphoria

What the Decision Does Not Prove

Removal from a list does not prove that capital will flow in, that prices will fall, or that minorities will be protected.

Nor does it prove that HTS has completely disappeared from the new institutions. A United Nations panel of experts reported as recently as February 2026 that several states viewed its integration as an ongoing transition.

The U.S. decision is therefore a favorable condition, not an economic, social, or security outcome. It opens up paths; it does not guarantee that Syrian institutions will be able to take them.

What it does change, however

Downplaying the move would be just as wrong. The designation of the state as a terrorist entity and HTS’s status had concrete legal consequences. Their removal clarifies the scope of action for banks, businesses, and governments.

The right approach lies between triumphalism and cynicism: acknowledging that a major obstacle has been removed, and then observing whether the space that has been freed up becomes a service, an investment, an institution, and a form of protection.

Serious hope does not promise a result; it finally names the possibility.

The Conditions for True Success

Human indicators

Policy must now be evaluated by concrete outcomes: access to banking, electricity, jobs, repatriation, local security, and protected rights.

We must distinguish between announced contracts and funded projects, and then between funded projects and services actually delivered. An investment ceremony is not a functioning power plant. A line of credit is not yet a paycheck.

We must also measure who benefits from the opening up of the economy. If networks close to those in power secure the contracts while marginalized regions remain deprived, the lifting of sanctions will have consolidated a new elite without repairing the country.

Clear Political Conditions

Washington should clearly specify the behaviors that would trigger new targeted sanctions: massacres, arbitrary detentions, trafficking, support for terrorism, attacks against minorities, or serious obstruction of the constitutional transition.

This predictability protects everyone. It prevents arbitrary action, serves as a warning to the Syrian government, and reassures investors that a future crisis will not automatically lead to a return to broad-based sanctions.

The credibility of an opening depends as much on its safeguards as on its boldness.

The people must no longer be the target

Changing the Doctrine

The best lesson from this decision can be summed up in a few words: a just policy targets those responsible without condemning the innocent to suffocation.

For decades, sanctions piled up in step with crimes, wars, terrorism, and repression. They made sense at the time. Then the regime fell, and maintaining the same framework would have served the past more than the future.

The shift to targeted measures acknowledges that the context has changed. It retains tools against Assad, traffickers, Iranian networks, the Islamic State, and Al-Qaeda, while freeing everyday activity from a blanket ban.

Opportunity and Duty

Ahmed al-Sharaa has been given a rare opportunity: to govern without being able to blame every failure on the American stranglehold. The United States has been given an equally rare duty: to help without turning a blind eye, to invest without buying silence, and to impose sanctions without resuming the punishment of an entire country.

Two days after the decision, no one can gauge its actual impact. We can only see its logic, its risks, and the direction it makes possible.

Syria is no longer officially a pariah state in Washington’s eyes. It must now become a state where no Syrian is treated as an intruder in their own future.

After 13 years of war and more than half a century of family rule, the country does not need a narrative of instant redemption. It needs time, money, rules, and guarantees that the victors themselves agree to respect. The U.S. decision does not provide these four things. It simply stops blocking several of them at once, and that alone is a difference that Syrians have the right to experience in their lives rather than just in our speeches.

The sanctions have been lifted. Fear, however, still awaits proof.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist’s Transparency Box

Editorial Stance

I am not a journalist, but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analyzing the geopolitical, economic, and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work consists of dissecting political strategies, understanding global economic trends, contextualizing the decisions of international actors, and offering analytical perspectives on the transformations that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim to possess the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which is limited to factual reporting. I strive for analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation, and a deep understanding of the complex issues that affect us all. My role is to make sense of the facts, place them within their historical and strategic context, and offer a critical interpretation of events.

Methodology and Sources

This text respects the fundamental distinction between verified facts and interpretive analyses. The methodological rule is consistent: factual information is published only if it is supported by a verifiable source, and the sources actually used in this article are listed under “Sources,” never here.

Categories of primary sources used by the publication, when applicable: official press releases from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organizations, and dispatches from recognized international news agencies.

Types of secondary sources: specialized publications, internationally recognized news media, analyses from established research institutions, and reports from sector-specific organizations.

When an article cites statistical, economic, or geopolitical data, it comes from data-producing institutions (intergovernmental organizations, central banks, national statistical institutes), and the specific institution is listed under “Sources.”

Nature of the Analysis

The analyses, interpretations, and perspectives presented in the analytical sections of this article constitute a critical and contextual synthesis based on available information, observed trends, and expert commentary cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, contextualize them within the framework of contemporary geopolitical and economic dynamics, and give them coherent meaning within the broader narrative of the transformations shaping our era. These analyses reflect expertise developed through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a state of affairs documented as of its publication date, not a prediction: subsequent developments may alter these perspectives. No updates are promised in advance; when an article is corrected or supplemented, the change is dated within the text.

ANALYSIS: In Syria, lifting sanctions is not enough to dispel fear