ANALYSIS: 1,796 warheads deployed — Russia has never been this well-armed since 2017

SIPRI’s figure

Four Consecutive Years of Increase

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has published its estimates of global nuclear forces. As of January 1, 2026, Russia had 1,796 nuclear warheads deployed on missiles and delivery systems—the highest number since 2017.

The increase has been steady and well-documented year after year: 1,588 deployed warheads in 2022, 1,674 in 2023, 1,710 in 2024, 1,718 in 2025, and 1,796 in 2026. Four consecutive years of growth, representing an increase of about 14% compared to 2020 levels.

While the world watches the trenches of the Donbas, the arsenal that really matters is growing in the silos.

The Complete Inventory

Russia’s total stands at approximately 5,420 warheads: 1,796 deployed, 2,604 in central storage, and some 1,020 decommissioned and awaiting dismantlement. This is the largest nuclear arsenal in the world. Russia also holds the world’s largest stockpile of non-strategic warheads, generally estimated at well over a thousand.

By comparison, the United States maintains approximately 1,770 deployed warheads, France 280, and the United Kingdom 120. Of the estimated global total of 12,187 warheads as of January 2026, approximately 9,745 are in usable military stockpiles, of which 4,012 are actually deployed. Between 2,100 and 2,200 of these are maintained on high operational alert on ballistic missiles.

Two countries alone account for approximately 83% of the warheads available for military use. This figure has not changed since the Cold War.

The Context Nobody Mentions

New START expired in February

Here’s the key point, and it went almost unnoticed in our media. The New START treaty—the last bilateral agreement limiting U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces—expired in February 2026. It capped each party at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads on 700 deployed delivery vehicles.

After its expiration, Moscow stated that it would continue to abide by these limits as long as Washington did the same. This is a unilateral declaration, not a legal obligation. There is no longer a binding agreement, no mutual inspection regime, and no independent verification.

For the first time in decades, the world’s two largest arsenals are operating on the basis of a verbal promise.

A Growing Reliance on Nuclear Weapons

SIPRI notes a broader and more troubling trend than the mere count: nuclear-armed states are increasingly relying on nuclear weapons as an instrument of security and foreign policy. They are no longer a last-resort insurance policy tucked away in the basement; they have once again become an everyday negotiating tool.

France provides a telling example: it has announced its intention to increase the number of its warheads and has stopped publicly disclosing the size of its arsenal. Transparency is declining everywhere as the numbers rise.

When countries start hiding their figures again, it’s rarely because those figures are decreasing.

What Russia Is Building

Programs That Work, and Those That Don’t

Honesty requires reporting both sides of Russia’s technical record, because it is not uniform. A new test of the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile failed in 2025; Western sanctions and competing demands related to the war in Ukraine appear to have affected the program. In contrast, the Burevestnik, a nuclear-powered cruise missile long mocked for its failures, reportedly successfully completed a flight test of over 14,000 kilometers in 2025.

Russia has also begun construction of a forward base in Belarus for its dual-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Orechnik—that is, one capable of carrying either a conventional or nuclear warhead. The Orechnik has been used against Ukraine with conventional warheads, most recently in May 2026.

A missile capable of carrying both types of warheads, stationed in Belarus: ambiguity is the message.

What Washington Says

In March 2026, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General Richard A. Correll, testified before Congress that Russia’s stockpile numbered approximately 4,600 warheads, 2,600 of which were assigned to strategic forces. SIPRI considers this figure slightly high and estimates the military stockpile to be closer to 4,400.

The discrepancy between the two estimates is telling: without inspections, we are reduced to comparing assessments by intelligence agencies and independent institutes that differ by a few hundred warheads.

A few hundred warheads of uncertainty is more than France’s entire arsenal.

The Rest of the Picture

China and India Are Also on the Move

Russia isn’t the only one increasing its stockpile. China has gone from about 600 to 620 warheads in one year, and, more importantly, its number of deployed warheads has risen from 24 to 34. It is the fastest-growing arsenal in the world. As for India, SIPRI has, for the first time, attributed deployed warheads—twelve—to the country out of an estimated arsenal of about 190.

These figures are small in absolute terms. They signal a shift in doctrine: countries that traditionally kept their warheads separate from their delivery systems are beginning to mount them on the systems.

A warhead in storage is an insurance policy. A warhead on a missile is an intention.

Why This Should Concern Us

We must ultimately connect this issue to the one we’ve been tracking for weeks. The Russian increase isn’t happening in a vacuum: it accompanies a four-year conventional war, a documented drone campaign against thirteen NATO countries, weekly strikes on European border posts, and a risk window identified by analysts for the end of the decade.

Nuclear weapons have not been used a single time since 1945, and this is likely the most significant achievement in modern diplomatic history. But this achievement was built on an architecture: treaties, inspections, hotlines, and verified stockpile counts. This architecture has just been dismantled, piece by piece, while attention was elsewhere.

It is not the number of warheads that should cause concern. It is the fact that there is no one left to count them.

Signed: Maxime Marquette, columnist September 12, 2026

Columnist’s Transparency Box

Editorial Position

I am not a journalist, but a columnist and analyst. My job is to dissect geopolitical and strategic dynamics and offer a critical interpretation of events. I do not claim the cold objectivity of news reporting; I claim analytical clarity.

Methodology and Sources

The figures in this article are drawn from the SIPRI Yearbook 2026, published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, an independent institution and established authority on global nuclear forces. These are estimates, not official counts. No nuclear-armed state publishes a verifiable inventory of its arsenal, and SIPRI works by cross-referencing open sources, imagery, and official statements.

The U.S. estimate cited comes from testimony by the commander of Strategic Command before Congress in March 2026. The discrepancy between this estimate and SIPRI’s is reported as is rather than arbitrarily resolved.

Data from the Congressional Research Service and the Federation of American Scientists align with SIPRI’s figures regarding the order of magnitude of Russian and U.S. deployed warheads.

Nature of the Analysis

The link drawn between the increase in deployed warheads, the expiration of New START, and the general deterioration of the arms control architecture is the author’s interpretation. An alternative interpretation exists and is worth noting: the increase in deployed warheads may result from maintenance and modernization cycles rather than a strategic decision to escalate, and the New START limits remain de facto respected by both parties, according to their statements.

This article describes a situation documented as of September 12, 2026. No government, political party, or organization has commissioned, paid for, reviewed, or approved this text.

ANALYSIS: 1,796 warheads deployed — Russia has never been this well-armed since 2017