ANALYSIS: Google may pay for half of it, but can it stop controlling the choice?

The button that almost no one sees

A decision made before the first search

The default search engine may seem like just another interface detail. Yet it is a gateway to nearly the entire web. Before a user types a word, someone has negotiated where that query will be sent—and then set the compensation tied to that placement.

The search market thus begins before the user even makes a choice: in a contract the user never reads.

Convenience has its own economy

You can switch search engines. That freedom exists. But companies pay precisely because the majority of users stick with the default settings. The default doesn’t eliminate choice; it shapes the path of least resistance, and that path generates search queries, data, and revenue.

The “Pay for Half” proposal tackles this mechanism without banning all payments. Google could pay a manufacturer or distributor for a privileged position on only half of the devices in a given line. The other half would finally become negotiable.

The strongest monopoly is sometimes a setting that no one thinks to check.

What the Court Has Already Established

Liability, Not an Impression

In August 2024, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that Google had illegally maintained a monopoly in general search and search-related text advertising, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. This conclusion remains at the heart of the appeals.

It is therefore not a matter of punishing a company simply because it is massive, but of addressing conduct deemed anti-competitive.

Distribution as a Barrier

The court found that the distribution agreements foreclosed a substantial portion of the market, deprived rivals of the scale necessary to improve their search engines, and reduced their incentives to invest. In particular, Google paid Apple, Samsung, Mozilla, and other partners for default status.

Google responds that its market power also stems from high quality, constant innovation, investment, and a recognized brand. The ruling itself deemed these advantages lawful when it rejected certain structural remedies. Competition requires distinguishing between merit and market barriers.

An excellent product can win; it should not be able to buy its way out of competition.

The remedy that keeps the system alive

Substantive Prohibitions

The final ruling prohibits Google from entering into certain exclusive contracts related to the distribution of Search, Chrome, Google Assistant, and Gemini. It also mandates the sharing of certain search data, syndication services for qualified competitors, and a technical committee responsible for oversight.

The court opened significant windows of opportunity, but it allowed Google to continue paying to stay in the game.

One year, renewable

Default payments remain permitted if the agreements are non-exclusive and last one year or less. The judge feared that a total ban would deprive manufacturers, carriers, and browsers of revenue, weaken certain players, and could even drive up device prices.

This compromise makes sense. It also has a weakness: the monopolist retains the ability to outbid others thanks to the profits generated by its scale. Legal exclusivity may disappear, while economic exclusivity survives contract after contract.

Changing the duration of the lock isn’t enough if the same hand holds the key.

Pay for Half: Half as a Loophole

Fifty percent of devices

The authors of the proposal want to limit the share of a given device line for which Google can pay for privileged status to 50%. A manufacturer could keep Google as the default on other devices, but without receiving compensation from Google for searches conducted on those open devices.

Half does not guarantee a rival; it merely gives the rival a territory that Google can no longer buy.

A competitor has yet to emerge

On the open portion, Apple, Samsung, or another partner could choose a competing search engine, negotiate with an AI-based newcomer, or keep Google without payment. The user would remain free to change their search engine, including switching back to Google.

This nuance is essential. “Pay for Half” does not automatically redistribute market share. It redistributes an opportunity for distribution. The rival must still convince the manufacturer, offer compensation, deliver a credible search experience, and survive users manually switching back to Google.

A breach is not a victory; it is the place where a victory finally becomes possible.

The second barrier: forty percent

Preventing Payments from Doubling

A cap on devices isn’t enough. Google could pay twice as much for the authorized half and tacitly secure the other half. The authors therefore propose capping total payments at 40% of the search revenue generated by each device.

Without this second safeguard, Google could comply with the letter of the 50% rule while effectively buying out the rest.

The Apple Precedent

The Yale paper uses a simple example: replacing a 36% revenue share across all iOS devices with a 72% share on half of them would leave Apple with comparable total revenue. An officially limited agreement could thus continue to discourage any genuine openness.

The 40% cap is presented as a starting point, not a given. If it does not push distributors to sign with competitors, the technical committee could recommend lowering it. The remedy therefore assumes that it will need to learn from the market.

A useful cap does not measure what it prohibits, but what it makes possible.

Chance versus the cream of the market

Not reserving the best users

Even with two caps, Google and its partners could concentrate privileged status on the devices or users generating the highest advertising revenue. Competitors would then receive a less profitable half, doomed to appear equal on paper but inferior in value.

A handpicked half is not an open half; it’s statistical rejects disguised as competition.

Random allocation

“Pay for Half” therefore requires a random distribution of devices favored by Google, by product line and at the point of sale or during setup. The goal is to prevent sorting based on income, age, geography, or advertising potential.

This idea is elegant on paper but challenging in practice. It requires verifiable systems in stores, at carriers, online, and during updates. The technical committee will need to obtain the data without turning the solution into a tool for monitoring users.

To open up the market, it is sometimes necessary to strip the giants of the privilege of choosing whom they abandon.

Scale feeds scale

More queries, better search engine

General search benefits from network effects. Queries, clicks, and time spent on results help improve relevance. The already dominant search engine receives more signals, improves its product, attracts more users, and can pay more to remain dominant.

The cycle becomes a fortress when the profits from scale are used to buy the next level of scale.

Data sharing may not be enough

The existing remedy requires Google to share certain data from its index and interactions with qualified competitors. It also provides for limited syndication of results and ads. These tools can help a new entrant get started without immediately having to build the entire infrastructure.

But a search engine can receive data without attracting users. Yet improvement requires actual, repeated use. Pay for Half therefore adds distribution to the toolkit: not just the search engine’s raw material, but an opportunity to be tried out.

You don’t build a competing road by sharing the map and keeping all the traffic for yourself.

Apple, Mozilla, and the Price of Dependency

Revenue That Also Funds Products

The court refused to issue a total ban, in part because the partners depend on payments from Google. For an independent browser, this revenue can fund development. For a manufacturer, it can support profit margins or investment. Cutting it off completely could shift the harm rather than remedy it.

The problem is a harsh one: money from the monopoly can support players whose very existence makes the digital landscape less uniform.

A Transition Rather Than an Amputation

“Pay for Half” retains a portion of this revenue and then encourages partners to seek a second commercial relationship. This is its strongest policy argument. The remedy does not claim that dependence will disappear on the day of the ruling; it facilitates a gradual weaning.

But this gentleness can become a weakness. If no rival can pay enough, or if partners prefer to keep Google on open devices for free, the flow of revenue shifts without any real expansion of choice. The transition must produce a new player, not just a new spreadsheet.

You don’t liberate a market by perpetually protecting the revenue that closed it off in the first place.

The consumer is not an abstract click

Theoretical freedom

Defenders of the status quo point out that a user can switch search engines in just a few clicks. That’s true. But technical feasibility doesn’t account for the pressure of the default option, a lack of awareness of alternatives, the integration of services, or the time required to compare invisible products.

Saying “you could switch” does not answer the question of why a company pays billions to keep you from switching.

Quality Must Be Proven

The best solution shouldn’t punish the user by forcing them to use a subpar service. Pay for Half preserves the user’s right to return to Google. This freedom is one of the model’s strengths, but also its toughest test: if everyone goes back, contractual openness won’t create sustainable competition.

The right answer isn’t to keep users captive with the rival. It’s to give the rival enough exposure to demonstrate its value. Competition doesn’t guarantee that Google will lose. It guarantees that Google will have to earn its place again.

Choice is only real when the alternative has had the chance to be known.

Artificial intelligence won’t save the judge

A Potential Disruption, Not a Cure

The court expressed hope that generative artificial intelligence would revolutionize search. This hope is not unfounded. New services respond differently, synthesize information, and shift certain search queries. But an emerging technology does not automatically remedy an already established illegal practice.

Waiting for a future invention to correct a present monopoly is like entrusting competition law to the weather.

New entrants will need the same entry points

An AI-based assistant must also reach devices, earn trust, and sustain high costs. If Google retains the main access points through its payments, innovation may arise elsewhere and remain inaccessible to the general public.

“Pay for Half” also includes AI products capable of meeting general information needs. The solution, therefore, focuses on function rather than label. This is essential in a market where products can change faster than legal proceedings.

New technology does not eliminate the old battle for distribution.

Surveillance or Theater

A committee with data

The technical committee should review contracts, payments, device distribution, actual usage, and change trajectories. The authors propose a review every six months. In the absence of input, the payment cap could decrease by five points each period.

A remedy without measurement becomes a press conference; an adjustable remedy can become a living policy.

Workarounds are already waiting

Google could promote its search engine in Chrome, Gmail, Maps, YouTube, or the Play Store. Payments could be routed through independent browsers. Product lines could be redefined. Commercial incentives could shift the default without formally violating the cap.

The judge will therefore need to monitor the effect, not just the contract. How many new entrants gain distribution? How many users retain them? Are payments changing form? An antitrust rule that fails to track behavior quickly becomes a manual for circumventing it.
Monopolies read injunctions like maps: they first look for the missing route.

The 50% Threshold May Be Too Generous

Half for a single rival

The authors acknowledge that a 50% cap theoretically leaves room for a competitor of comparable size in a product line. It does not necessarily create a pluralistic market. For three or four significant players, a lower cap might be required.

Cutting the lock in half can produce a comfortable duopoly rather than healthy competition.

Contractual market share is not the same as actual market share

A rival pre-installed on half of all devices will not necessarily retain half of all searches. Users will return to Google. Its brand, quality, and integration remain powerful. The competitor might therefore need greater contractual exposure to achieve a meaningful scale.

This uncertainty does not doom “Pay for Half”; it simply means we should not treat its name as sacrosanct. The 50% figure is a starting point. If the data shows that it protects Google more than it opens up the market, the court must have the courage to reduce it.

Half is not sacred; only openness matters.

The Risk of a Man-Made Market

Unintentionally Picking a Winner

Any intervention of this magnitude can favor certain players. Manufacturers will negotiate, competitors will pay, and the committee will determine who qualifies. A wealthy new entrant could take the place of a monopoly while smaller players remain on the sidelines. The process must avoid creating an official champion.

The law must level the playing field, not predetermine who will come out on top.

Privacy in the Blind Spot

Measuring usage, advertising value, and search engine shifts may require sensitive data. Random attribution must be verifiable without profiling individuals. Sharing search data should help competition without undermining the confidentiality that protects the most private queries.

This conflict is not trivial. Competition built on the uncontrolled flow of data betrays part of its promise. The technical committee must prioritize aggregated metrics, data minimization, and strict audits over a renewed centralization of user data.

You cannot give the public a choice by taking away the privacy of their search queries.

Google also deserves clear rules

Punish the behavior, preserve the merit

Google must be able to attract users through the quality of its search engine, its speed, relevance, and innovation. It should even be able to be selected by default—without payment—on open devices if the partner honestly decides to do so. The goal is not to engineer its defeat.

Restored competition does not guarantee that Google will lose; it merely removes its right to buy the absence of competitors.

A Proportionate Obligation

The court refused to force the sale of Chrome, deeming this solution risky, complex, and insufficiently linked to the violation. “Pay for Half” aims to be more narrowly focused. It targets the payments that were used to lock out competitors while preserving a portion of the partners’ revenue.

This proportionality may make the remedy more robust on appeal. It may also make it too timid. The judge must remember that legal prudence is not economic stagnation. A proportionate remedy must still be strong enough to produce an observable change.

The moderation of a remedy has value only if the remedy works.

The Trial of Time

Six years can go by very quickly

The judgment must last six years. In technology, that’s an era; in an appeal process, it’s sometimes the blink of an eye. While briefs are exchanged, interfaces change, AI assistants take hold, and habits become entrenched.

Every year without meaningful access gives the dominant player more data, revenue, and resources to define the next frontier.

Urgency without haste

The federal government and several states have appealed the ruling, while Google disputes liability. The appeals court must address weighty issues without confusing slowness with wisdom. A market may close while the courts refine their reasoning.

The monitoring already initiated by the technical committee offers a partial antidote. Enforcement data must be made public as much as possible, and thresholds must be flexible. Otherwise, the six-year ruling risks meticulously documenting the very permanence it was meant to break.

In a digital market, waiting is sometimes a decision in favor of the one who already reigns.

Making the Choice Visible

What “Pay for Half” Can Achieve

The proposal has a rare virtue: it targets the exact mechanism without claiming to know the winner in advance. It limits the share that can be purchased, caps the price of that share, and prevents Google from securing the most profitable devices. It then preserves the user’s freedom.

This isn’t an attack on Google; it’s an attempt to dismantle the monopoly profit tied to the invisibility of choice.

The proof will come from open devices

The verdict will not lie in the elegance of the model. It will lie in the devices themselves: have rivals signed on, been tested, improved their service, and gained users? Have partners replaced a single dependency with multiple genuine relationships? Has Google resumed paying to win over users rather than to exclude them?

If the open half remains empty, we’ll have to drop below 50%, lower the financial cap, or impose further restrictions. If it fosters sustainable competition, the law will have found a middle ground between drastic curtailment and laissez-faire. For the first time in a long while, choice might begin after the purchase rather than before it.

Success will also have to be measured by more than just signed contracts. A manufacturer can add a second engine without the user noticing, without the interface making it accessible, or without actual volumes changing. Oversight must therefore track distribution, usage, the quality of alternatives, and the ability of new entrants to turn their access into lasting improvement. Otherwise, the market will appear open on the court’s docket while remaining closed in the palm of our hands.

That is why “Pay for Half” deserves more than just laboratory-style enthusiasm. Its strength lies in targeting the pipeline that feeds the monopoly, not just its visible outcome. Its weakness is assuming that a liberated half will spontaneously find competitors capable of filling it. The judge cannot manufacture their excellence. He can, however, prevent their first contact with the public from being bought in advance by the very entity they are trying to challenge.

The real question is not which engine we prefer, but who had the right to ask us.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist

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I am not a journalist, but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analyzing the geopolitical, economic, and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work consists of dissecting political strategies, understanding global economic trends, contextualizing the decisions of international actors, and offering analytical perspectives on the transformations that are redefining our societies.

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ANALYSIS: Google may pay for half of it, but can it stop controlling the choice?